

लुड्विक स्टर्नबाख़

अभिनन्दन-ग्रन्थ

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LUDWIK STERNBACH
FELICITATION VOLUME

PART ONE



Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad
Lucknow (INDIA)

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Publishers' Note

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Prof. Sternbach is an erudite scholar of Sanskrit. He has produced a number of works covering the vast field of Sanskrit learning, particularly literature and Dharmaśāstra. His contribution to the study of Sanskrit anthologies is remarkable, for which he has rightly been christened as Subhāṣitavidvān by Dr. R. N. Dandekar of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. The Parishad feels honoured in felicitating Prof. Sternbach, who is also one of its Distinguished Members. The Parishad is grateful to him for providing it with this opportunity.

With our keenness to present this Volume to the great scholar, we have been confronted with a number of limitations, but it was with the cooperation and active help of our well-wishers that we could overcome all of them.

This Volume ought to have been out long back but due to various unforseen reasons it has been unduly delayed.

The Parishad is grateful to the eminent scholars who have helped in the collection and edition of the articles contained in the Volume. It is extremely grateful to its Editor, Dr. J. P. Sinha, who had to work hard for

bringing it out in this form. It was only with the inspiration and encouragement the Parishad received from its former President the late Prof. K. A. Subramania Iyer; its President, Sri B. D. Sanwal; Director of Research, Dr. S. V. Singh; its Distinguished Members, Sri Radha Krishna and Dr. J. D. Shukla and Dr. (Mrs.) Kapila Vatsyayan of the Ministry of Education and Culture, Govt. of India that the publication of the Volume could have been possible. The Parishad is grateful to all of them.

The Parishad puts on record its sense of gratitude to the Ministry of Education and Culture, Govt. of India and the Deptts. of Education and Cultural Affairs, Government of Uttar Pradesh for financial assistance rendered in this connection.

I shall be failing in my duty if I conclude without thanking Mr. Vishwa Mohan, Proprietor and Shri Durga Prasad Mishra, Foreman of the Pnar Mudrak but for whose cooperation the printing of the Volume could not have been possible.

Gopal Chandra Sinha
Secretary

Editor's Note

Vidvān sarvatra pūjyate is an age old saying. True to this saying, Prof. Ludwik Sternbach commands universal respect among scholars. He is admired for his deep scholarship and loved for his gentlemanliness. By his numerous writings covering a vast field by Indology Prof. Sternbach has created a distinguished place for himself in the long tradition of Sanskritists of the West. The profundity of his scholarship has won for him the Honoris Causa degree of Vidyāvācaspati from the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi and K. S. Sanskrit University, Darbhanga (Bihar) recently, although much after the Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Lucknow had conferred on him its Hony. Fellowship and had decided to felicitate this great savant of Sanskrit and Indology on the occasion of his 70th birthday in Dec., 1979. This decision was taken at the instance of the late Prof. K. A. S. Iyer, the then President of the Parishad.

The project was started in the beginning of 1979. It was gratifying to note the encouraging response from the scholars all over the world who were almost unanimous that the proposed Volume was well-deserved by the scholar whom it ventured to felicitate. The articles started pouring in from the middle of 1979 but due to circumstances beyond our control the printing was considerably delayed and for this I beg to offer my sincere apologies to the contributors to the Volume. I also owe an apology to Prof. W. Morgenroth of Berlin (D. D. R.) and Prof. E. R. Sree Krishna Sharma of S. V. University, Tirupati, whose articles could not be included as they were lost in transit. I am sure that these two articles from the pen of such eminent scholars of international repute would have further enriched the Volume.

The present Volume is divided into nine Sections. The articles are arranged in the alphabetical order of the surnames of their authors in each Section

but those received behind the schedule have been included in the Addenda under the respective Sections. A Supplement to the Bibliography of the works of Prof. Sternbach is also included therein. A brief biodata of the contributors is appended to the Volume which is being brought out in two parts to make it more handy. Part One consists of five Sections and Part Two contains the remaining five Sections, Addenda, Our Contributors, Indices and Corrigenda.

I am extremely indebted to the learned members of the Advisory Editorial Board, but for whose ungrudging help, able guidance and mature advice it would not have been possible for me to undertake and fulfil the onerous task of editing this large Volume felicitating the great scholar. I would crave the indulgence of the readers and contributors for all the failings and shortcomings, which I own personally and with all the modesty at my command. I thank Shri Gopal Chandra Sinha, Secretary of the Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Lucknow for the help he unhesitatingly rendered to me in the preparation of this Volume. My sincere thanks are also due to Shri Narendra Pratap Srivastava for preparing its Indices and Corrigenda.

The project was initiated by Prof. K. A. Subramania Iyer, encouraged by Prof. V. Raghavan and appreciated by Prof. C. Hooykaas. None of them is in this world to see the Volume in its present form. I bow to them all in reverence.

J. P. Sinha

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श्रुतशीलनयोपेतः स्टर्नबाख़स्तु लुड्विकः ।
सुभाषितमहाप्राज्ञः जीवेत् स शरदां शतम् ।।

अभिनन्दनम्

रामनारायणत्रिपाठी

पोलैण्डे लब्धवान् यो जनिमथ कृतवाञ् शारदापादसेवां
वैदुष्यं भारतीये श्रुतप्रतननये प्राप्तवांश्चापि धर्मे ।
ख्यातः प्राज्ञः कृतज्ञः क्षितिविततयशा लुड्विकः स्टर्नबाखो
विद्वद्वर्याय तस्मै परिषदियमिदं स्वागतं व्यातनोति ॥१॥

आचार्यत्वं दधानो निजपरविषये विश्वविद्यालयेषु
प्रौढां व्याख्यानमालां गुरुतरविषये यो विधत्ते मनोज्ञाम् ।
शिक्षासंस्थासु दाक्ष्यादलभत बहुशो मानितं पारिषद्यं
विद्वद्वर्याय तस्मै परिषदियमिदं स्वागतं व्यातनोति ॥२॥

जन्या वैदेशिको यः कृतिमयवपुषा भारतीयो महीयान्
प्रेम्णाध्युष्यार्यभूमौ कतिपयशरदां नीतवान् रम्यकालम् ।
यात्रा नैकाः स्वयोगं व्यधित च निपुणं शोधसंस्थानपुञ्जे
विद्वद्वर्याय तस्मै परिषदियमिदं स्वागतं व्यातनोति ॥३॥

संयुक्ते राष्ट्रसङ्घे पदमलमकृत प्रोच्चसञ्चालकत्वं
साभापत्यं निकाये दनुजरिपुगिरां प्राच्यविद्यासमित्याम् ।
नानागोष्ठीषु योऽयं पदमपि महितं लुड्विकः स्टर्नबाखो
विद्वद्वर्याय तस्मै परिषदियमिदं स्वागतं व्यातनोति ॥४॥

वाण्या यः श्रोतृवर्गं बुधजनहृदयं विद्यया सत्स्वभावैर्
यूनः शैल्या विनेयान् व्यवहृतिततिभिर्धीरचेतांस्यनल्पम् ।
कार्यैर्मित्राणि लोकान्निजकृतिकलया नन्दयन् स्टर्नबाखो
विद्वद्वर्याय तस्मै परिषदियमिदं स्वागतं व्यातनोति ॥५॥

SECTION I

Reminiscences and Bibliography

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One of the aims and objects of the Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Lucknow (India) is to honour and felicitate eminent scholars of Sanskrit and Indology. It is just to provide inspiration to the new generation, which may remain devoted to the high ideals of Indian culture. The Parishad has already brought out felicitation Volumes in honour of the late M. M. Dr. Gopi Nath Kaviraja and the late Prof. K. A. Subramania Iyer in 1967 and 1976 respectively. Now the Parishad feels proud of presenting a Felicitation Volume to honour Prof. Ludwik Sternbach on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

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THREE ENCOUNTERS

Nicholas Altuchow

I have been asked by the editor of this Volume to contribute some reminiscences about Prof. Dr. Ludwik Sternbach whom I have known for forty years. I gladly accepted this invitation, having a very deep respect not only for the well known Scholar but also for the Person. We met and worked for a short time at the Institute directed by my Guru, the late Professor Stefan Stasiak about whom Sisirkumar Mitra wrote in his "*The Vision of India*": "When Prof. Stasiak of the Crakow University (here the author makes a mistake, Prof. Stasiak taught always in Lwów) visited Santiniketan in 1935, he surprised the writer by the fluency with which he spoke Sanskrit" (page 212, ed. Jaico Book, 1949).

October 1939. The first chapter of World War II was closed. Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union. I reached Lwów after a rather long journey, mostly "per pedes apostolorum", not knowing what I would find. The University of Jan Casimir, now Iwan Franko, showed no signs of war. But there were changes. Instead of the Polish Language there was mostly Ucrainian and a crowd of unknown, sometimes rather strange, new faces. The same at my Institute of Indian Philology and Culture where I had been assistant. I met all my colleagues and students and my Professor full of energy and projects—and again a crowd of unknown people. I remember only one, a quiet and serious man, a couple of years older than myself. It was the former assistant from the Indological Department of the Cracow University. A lawyer, interested in Ancient Indian Law, already known by his work in this field—Dr. Ludwik Sternbach who took refuge in Lwów. And right he was, because nearly all the teaching staff of the Cracow University was sent by the German authorities to a Concentration Camp. And not too many survived. We met fairly often for some months and one thing I will never forget : at that time Sundays were abolished in the Soviet Union and evey fifth day was

free. It happened that X'mas Eve was a working day and I asked Sternbach to replace me this day at the Institute. He accepted immediately.

As I mentioned already, the Head of the Institute was Prof. Stefan Stasiak, my Professor for some years. We met rather by accident : I thought to study Mongolistic, but the Professor of that subject was mostly ill. Somebody suggested : why not try Indology ? Why not ? In the classroom half a dozen students waiting for the beginning. Then came Prof. Stasiak, middle-aged, of medium height, a very serious face. May be not good looking, but with eyes I had seldom seen in all my life. It seemed as if he could see the inside of others. The meeting was rather unpromising. When I asked permission to stay, he asked if it was worth while, as the other students had already acquired some knowledge of Hindi. Well, he accepted my "let's try" and then begun the "*shuru kahanika yah hai*". As so many others, I fell under his spell. He tried always to find some field of Indology which interested the student : grammar for one, Vedic Hymns for others, Hindi for the third, history or medicine for the fourth. His students were of all creeds and nationalities and various political opinions, but only work counted.

Soon I left Lwów and lost contact with both, my Guru and Sternbach. And some years after the war I met in a Displaced Persons Hostel in England one of my former colleagues who gave me good news that my Professor and his former assistant lived in London ; not so good, that the majority of our friends and fellows from Lwów were either dead or their destiny unknown. At the first opportunity I visited Prof. Stasiak. We both were glad to meet after eight years. I found him cheerful but in very bad material conditions. He had survived not only the war but the Warsaw Upraising as well. In spite of this cheerfulness there was a tragedy : he lost all the notes of the research he had carried out over many years. A loss he never could recuperate and which made the rest of his life so difficult. He did not try to get a chair in the new Poland in spite of the fact that he had most rights to get one ; Prof. Schayer from Warsaw was dead and the Professor from Cracow was in Paris. My Professor went first to his beloved Paris and then settled down in London, living as a pauper, teaching and spending every penny on books and most of his time in the Library of the British Museum. From him I learnt that Sternbach had survived and after a stay in India he now had a responsible post at the U. N. and was making his name among the well known Indologists. We contacted by mail but it was only in 1963 on my way back from India that we met in New York for a couple of hours, talking about the past and the future. In the meantime my Professor was no longer with us. He perished in a street accident, returning from the British Museum. Although physically in rather a bad state, his handwriting is difficult

to decipher—in his last letter, some days before his end, he announced his visit to the hospital for a new operation, mentally he was bright as always, helping his pupils. He was a strange personality, an outstanding one. He had enemies, but I think, more friends. Various of his pupils later occupied chairs in Poland and abroad, and even during his last stay in London he helped at least one to get a Lectureship in Indian Logic.

Then I met Sternbach a couple of years ago in Paris in his flat (rather a library). He had not changed much, only, very unfortunately, had problems with his sight. Retired from the U. N. and from the chair at the Collège de France (the second Polishman there, the first being Adam Mickiewicz, the greatest Polish poet a century ago) Sternbach was very busy organizing the IV World Sanskrit Conference in Germany.

Well, Friend Sternbach. I am afraid there won't be a fourth encounter for me, but I sincerely hope that somebody will publish my remniscences about you on the occasion of your 80th birthday. Lord Ganesh grant you long and happy life !

MY REMINISCENCES OF PROFESSOR STERNBACH

P. L. Bhargava

Professor Ludwik Sternbach is one of those few persons who, while shining with the lustre of their profound learning and wisdom, are at the same time richly endowed with the humane qualities of sincerity, cordiality, warmth and humility. No person better exemplifies the Sanskrit maxim "*Vidyā vinayena śobhate*" than this great Polish scholar of Sanskrit. While his prolific writings reveal his profound learning in Indology in general and ancient Indian law and *nīti* literature in particular, a meeting with him at once reveals his great humane qualities.

I have been in close contact with this great savant for over fifteen years and have the privilege of counting him among my most esteemed friends. During this period I have had several occasions of discovering his great love of Indian learning and the warmth and generosity of his heart. In October 1964 I, as Editor of the Rajasthan University Studies in Sanskrit, requested him to contribute an article for its first number. Since he was engrossed in writing the second volume of his *Cāṇakya Nīti text Tradition* he wrote a letter to me expressing his inability to write an article for our journal. But having done that the scholar and gentleman in him revolted and only three days later on November 5, 1964 he wrote the following letter to me. "I sent you a letter on 2 November, 1964 and after having sent it I felt badly about it, since I do not like to refuse to write a paper to a journal dealing with Indian culture. Therefore, I decided to interrupt the writing of my second volume of the *Cāṇakya Nīti text Tradition* and to write an article". Devotion to learning and love of Indian culture are over-flowing in these words. This was, however, no stray incident. For each of the six numbers of the Studies which I edited he was good enough to send an article.

His generosity and warm-heartedness are as over-flowing as his devotion to learning and love of Indian culture. In August 1967 I was deputed by my University to attend the 27th session of the International Congress of Orientalists held at Ann Arbor, Michigan, U. S. A. Since Dr. Sternbach was at that time in New York as Senior Social Affairs

Officer in the Department of Trusteeship and Non-self Governing Territories in the United Nations I wrote to him a letter informing him of my intention to attend the Congress. Prompt came his reply telling me that he would like to have me for lunch in the United Nations. After the session of the Congress I did have the lunch with him when he was kind enough to show me and the other invitees round the United Nations.

After he took over as Professor of History of Law and Civilization of Ancient India at the University of Sarbonne in Paris early in 1971, I had many more occasions to meet him. In December 1975 when I was returning to India from Canada where I had gone on a teaching assignment I stayed in Paris overnight. In the morning I called Dr. Sternbach on the telephone and he insisted on my meeting him over a cup of tea at his residence. Unfortunately I had to deny myself the pleasure as the time of the departure of my flight did not leave me enough time to move from the hotel where I was lodged. Later I learnt from his letter that the same evening he had to be hospitalized for an eye operation. This, I then realized, did not prevent him from his offer of hospitality to me.

Dr. Sternbach has published a large number of works including *Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law, Cāṇakya Niti-text Tradition, Kāvya Portions in the Kathā Literature and Indian Riddles.* His latest and the most monumental work is the *Mahāsubhāṣita-saṅgraha.* The work is expected to cover 20 volumes of which four have already been published. May God spare him for many more years to enrich Indological literature.

LUDWIK STERNBACH

Juan Miguel De Mora

A great head of white hair, thick lenses, a walking stick. The patient and erudite work of an expert in Sanskrit, a constant contribution to humanity. Such is Ludwik Sternbach.

A gentle nature, an amiable smile, a tender gaze, an admirable human being and a tranquil one. So, also, is Ludwik Sternbach.

I met him in Paris, at a reunion of Sanskrit scholars, and we have kept up correspondence, almost always relative to matters concerning I. A. S. S. But I only really understood who Ludwik Sternbach is and what he represents near Weimar, during the IVth World Sanskrit Conference.

On that occasion, we—the delegates to that Congress—were to place a wreath at the Buchenwald memorial—a place where barbarism sank its talons into humanity, finding its solace in pain and blood. And I saw Ludwik Sternbach, serene, leaning on his walking stick, his tender eyes opaque behind the thick lenses of his spectacles, advancing slowly towards the monument. Advancing slowly.

I observed him with painful anguish, because of the memory of the black hour of horror. And seeing that calm gentleman walking on, leaning on his cane and without losing the gentleness in his eyes as he advances towards such a place of fright and murder, going to bear witness to the fact that humanity lives on, I understood what the humanities signify as I never before would have understood, and at that very instant I saw them fully represented (from the *Ṛgveda* to the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, from Philo to Erasmus, from Kāṇāda to Rāmānuja, from Saadia to Spinoza) in that kind and gentle scholar called Ludwik Sternbach.

MY REMINISCENCES ABOUT THE GREAT SCHOLAR Dr. L. STERNBACH

Olivier Lacombe

Ten years ago, as his UNO term of office in NewYork came to an end, Dr. Ludwik Sternbach applied for a professorship in Paris. I happened to be at that time the Director of the *Institute of Indian Civilization* in the Sorbonne. So, the applica-cation came to me. I felt very much gratified when reading that such a distinguished scholar might become our immediate colleague and benefit our students with his immense learning in Indology.

After the usual course of procedure, Dr. Sternbach was appointed Associate Professor. For two years he taught in the Sorbonne the various disciplines concerned with the *trivarga,* and during four more years he lectured in the Collège de France on Indian poetry in general and more particularly on gnomic poetry.

He has now retired from active service, but still lives in France, although he has retained his Polish nationality. He, nevertheless, has generously accepted the burden of Secretary Generalship to the lately established Indian Association for Sanskrit Studies.

Dr. Sternbach was born in Cracow in 1909. His father was an eminent lawyer and his uncle a renowned scholar in classical philology. He retained from them his two-fold interest for legal and philological matters. The University of Cracow granted him the degrees of Doctor in Law, in 1934, and of Ph. M. (Philosophy and Sanskritology) in 1936.

Professor Mrs. de Willman-Grabowska had guided his first steps in Indology. He then became an Assistant Professor in Cracow University. The break of World War II compelled him, first, to join the University of Lwów where Professor Stasiak welcomed him, and then, to leave Poland and take refuge in Bombay (1940), where he was to live until 1946, and where he served as Professor of *Dharmaśāstra* and *Arthaśāstra* in the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. He was, during these years, in close relation with such remarkable personalities as Sri K. M. Munshi and Sri P. V. Kane, and with major institutions such as the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona.

This lengthy and fruitful stay in Bombay enabled Dr. Sternbach to travel widely through India, lecturing in various Universities and coming into intimate contact with the Hindu way of life.

India has acknowledged in her generous manner, the learning of Dr. Sternbach and his devotion to her glorious legacy. He has been awarded the Chandragupta Gold Medal, admitted as a Member of the Asiatic Society of Calcutta, and is now presented with this Felicitation Volume.

For a long period, Dr. Sternbach's scholarly interest was focussed on traditional Indian law and political science. As already mentioned, he later on undertook a critical investigation into the vast and little known field of Sanskrit, gnomic literature (*subhāṣita*). The crop of his indefatigable research work in this line, is in course of publication under the general title : *Mahāsubhāṣita-saṅgraha*. Four volumes have already been issued. Six more are ready for print. Many others are expected to see the light in the future, thanks to the enduring activity of the author.

I personally feel proud to rank with the many Indian or western admirers of Dr. Sternbach's most valuable contribution to Indology. And let him too allow me to greet his amiable and self-renounced character.

MY REMINISCENCES ABOUT DR. LUDWIK STERNBACH

T. Pobozniak

I have known Dr. Ludwik Sternbach early in the thirties when he studied law at the Jagellonian University in Cracow. He was, however, also interested in Indian culture. Several times he read papers from this domain in the meetings of the Student Circle of Orientalists. At that time Mme. Helena Willman-Grabowska was Professor of Indian Philology in Cracow. She had no assistant at first. L. Sternbach had taken over these duties as volunteer in 1933 and fulfilled them till 1938. Especially the keeping of the Indian Department required much time from him. Also the Indological library, constantly increasing, absorbed him very much.

We often discussed scientific problems, especially Indian law and customs and collaborated together. In the course of time the Indological studies of Dr. Sternbach deepened more and more and their first result was the work "*Law of Inheritance in Ancient India*". He read a paper on it in a session of the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1938. It was a pioneer work, highly appreciated both by jurists and by Indologists in Poland. The work based on twelve Indian sources, chiefly law codes, i. e. *Āpastambīya-Dharma Sūtra, Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra, Bṛhaspati Dharmaśāstra, Gautama Dharmasūtra, Kauṭilīya-Arthaśāstra, XIIIth Book of Mahābhārata, Mitākṣarā, Mānava Dharmaśāstra, Nārada Smṛti, Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* and *Yājñavlakya-Dharmaśāstra.* The work was very comprehensive but only a digest of nine pages was published from it in the Proceedings of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow. However, even in this digest there appears already the attitude of the author to the Indian law. He interpreted it in connection with the religious beliefs and customs. This attitude became the basis for the development of his further Indological studies.

In the year 1936-37 when Professor Willman-Grabowska left for India, Dr. Sternbach delivered lectures on Indian law for the students of Indian Philology and of law.

The most important features of his character were kindliness, friendliness and the sense of humour. His decisions, however, dictated by these features proved more efficacious than if they were a result of the most cunning calculation.

In 1939 he moved to Lwów and there at the University he was in charge of Sanskrit courses under the direction of Professor Ludwik Stasiak. In the difficult war time he managed to provide with victuals the students of the Indological department.

The imminent invasion of Hitler on Soviet Union forced him again to migrate further to the East, this time to India. In Bombay he stayed several years, later on he moved to USA and afterwards to Paris. After the war he often visited his homeland and kept regular contacts with the Polish Science. In 1949 he was appointed Member of the Oriental Commission of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Up to this date he has retained his Polish citizenship.

पोलैण्ड के एक वयोवृद्ध भारतीय विद्या-विशेषज्ञ

प्रो० लुड्विक स्टर्नबाख़

सत्यव्रत शास्त्री


जून १९७७ का महीना। पेरिस में विश्व संस्कृत सम्मेलन हो रहा था। उसमें भाग लेने के लिए मैं वहां पहुंचा। अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय संस्कृत परिषद् उसका आयोजन कर रही थी। उसके महासचिव थे कॉलेज द फ़ांस के अवकाशप्राप्त एमेरिटस प्रोफ़ेसर लुड्विक स्टर्नबाख़। मेरा उनसे पूर्व परिचय था। दो तीन बार पहिले भी उनसे मिल चुका था। पर इस बार की भेंट कुछ और ही प्रकार की थी। सम्मेलन में अत्यधिक व्यस्त होते हुए भी उन्होंने लगभग एक घण्टा मेरे साथ बिताया। अनेक विषयों पर चर्चा हुई। यदा कदा प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ को बीते दिनों की याद भी आई। कुछ अन्तरङ्ग संस्मरण भी उन्होंने सुनाये।

प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ को लोग प्रायः फ़ांसीसी समझते हैं। बहुत कम लोगों को मालूम होगा कि वे मूलतः पोलैण्ड के हैं। वहां के पश्चिम भाग में सुप्रसिद्ध क्राकोव में उनका जन्म हुआ था। वहीं उन्होंने शिक्षा-दीक्षा पायी। प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ मूर्धन्य भारतीय विद्या विशेषज्ञ के साथ-साथ एक उच्च कोटि के विधिवेत्ता भी हैं। क़ानून तथा भारतीय विद्या का अध्ययन उनका साथ-साथ चला। सन् १९२७ से १९३० तक उन्होंने क़ानून का अध्ययन किया। १९३१ में एक न्यायाधीश की कचहरी में उन्होंने काम किया। १९३२ से १९३६ तक वे एक वकील के सहायक के रूप में काम करते रहे। १९३७ में उन्होंने स्वतन्त्र रूप से क़ानून की प्रैक्टिस प्रारम्भ कर दी और शीघ्र ही वकालत में अच्छा नाम कमा लिया। वकालत के साथ साथ ही उनका भारतीय विद्या का अध्ययन भी चलता रहा। उसे उन्होंने १९३२ में समाप्त किया। १९३३ में क्राकोव विश्वविद्यालय में भारतीय सभ्यता विभाग में रीडर के पद पर उनकी नियुक्ति हुई। वकालत और अध्यापन कार्य उन्होंने साथ-साथ चलाया।

१९३९ में विश्व-युद्ध प्रारम्भ हुआ। पोलैण्ड के पश्चिमी भाग पर, जिसमें क्राकोव भी शामिल था, नाज़ियों का अधिकार हो गया। उन्होंने अपने अधिकृत क्षेत्र में मनमाने अत्याचार करने प्रारम्भ किये। प्रो० लुड्विक स्टर्नबाख़ के चाचा प्रो० लिओ स्टर्नबाख़, जोकि क्राकोव विश्वविद्यालय में भाषा शास्त्र के प्राध्यापक थे, को उन्होंने मौत के घाट उतार दिया। अपने लिए भी ख़तरा जान प्रो० लुड्विक स्टर्नबाख़ ने वहां से चले जाने में ही कल्याण समझा। वे भाग कर ल्वूफ़ में पहुंच गये जोकि पोलैण्ड के पूर्वी भाग में था और जिस पर युद्धपूर्व के जर्मनी–रूस समझौते के अनुसार रूस का अधिकार था। ल्वूफ़ में शरणार्थी के रूप में जब ये पहुंचे तो एक कौड़ी भी उनके पास नहीं थी। अत्यन्त कठिन परिस्थितियों में जिस किसी तरह उन्होंने अपना काम चलाया। अपने जन्मस्थान की याद उन्हें वहां बहुत आती थी। उससे उन्हें मोह था जोकि स्वाभाविक था। वहां जाने की अनुमति उन्होंने रूसी अधिकारियों से मांगी जो उन्हें मिल गई। पर भाग्य में कुछ और ही लिखा था। वे फिर वहां जा नहीं पाये। कुछ का कुछ हो गया। तभी जर्मनी ने रूस पर आक्रमण कर दिया। ल्वूफ़ से सीधे क्राकोव जाना असम्भव हो गया। इस्तम्बूल, तुर्की, भारत आदि देशों से होकर ही वहां पहुंचा जा सकता था। ५०० मील पहुंचने के लिये परिवर्तित परिस्थितियों में १५००० मील का फ़ासला तय करना पड़ता था। प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ ल्वूफ़ से चले। कुछ समय तुर्की, ईराक़ आदि देशों में रुके। फिर भारत आ गये। भारत से वे न्यूयार्क गये। वहां से फ़्रांस में आ गये। अन्य देशों में ही इनका जीवन बीता। युद्ध काल में अपनी जन्मभूमि में जाना सम्भव नहीं था। एक बार जब वे स्वदेश से अलग हुए तो अलग ही रह गये। जहां जहां भी वे गये सभी जगह स्थानीय सहायता उन्हें मिलती गई। बम्बई पहुंचने पर भारतीय विद्या भवन में उन्हें काम मिल गया। १९४६ तक वे वहां काम करते रहे। १९४२ में बम्बई विश्वविद्यालय ने उन्हें धर्मशास्त्र तथा प्राचीन भारतीय सभ्यता का आदरी आचार्य पद प्रदान किया। १९४७ से १९७० तक उन्होंने न्यूयार्क में संयुक्त राष्ट्र संघ में अस्वायत्त राष्ट्रों से सम्बद्ध शोध–विभाग में उपनिदेशक के पद पर कार्य किया। उन्हीं के निर्देशन में पश्चिमी सामोवा में जन-मत सङ्ग्रह हुआ। १९७० में वे फ़्रांस आ गये—पहले सारबोन विश्वविद्यालय में, तदनन्तर कॉलेज द फ़्रांस में प्राध्यापक के रूप में। अकेले प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ ने भारतीय विद्या-अध्ययन के क्षेत्र में वह काम किया है जो शायद बड़ी बड़ी संस्थाएं भी नहीं कर सकी होंगी। इनके **ज्यूरिडिकल स्टडीज़ इन एंशियण्ट इण्डियन ला** (२ भाग), **चाणक्य-नीति-सम्प्रदाय** (५ भाग), **काव्य-पोर्शन्स इन कथा लिट्रेचर** (५ भाग), **गणिका-वृत्त-सङ्ग्रह, इण्डियन रिडिल्स, ए फॉरगॉटन चैप्टर इन दि हिस्ट्री आफ संस्कृत लिट्रेचर** आदि ग्रन्थ विद्वत्समाज में सुप्रसिद्ध हैं। पर इन सब से भी बढ़कर है इनका २० खण्डों का बृहद् ग्रन्थ **महासुभाषित-सङ्ग्रह** जिसके चार खण्ड प्रकाशित हो चुके हैं तथा छः और प्रकाशन के लिये तैयार हैं।

प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ अविवाहित हैं। विवाह की कभी इच्छा ही न हुई हो यह बात नहीं। अविवाहित रहने की भी इनकी एक करुण कथा है। क्राकोव में इनका एक लड़की से प्रेम सम्बन्ध था। जब वे माता-पिता के साथ ल्वूफ़ की ओर भाग निकले थे तो वह भी अपने परिवार के साथ वहीं को भाग निकली थी। वहां ये दोनों मिलते रहे। प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ को क्राकोव आने की अनुमति मिल गई पर वह लड़की वहीं रह गई। कुछ दिनों के पश्चात् रूसी शासन ने आदेश निकाल दिया कि पोलैण्ड के पश्चिमी भाग से जो

शरणार्थी ल्वूफ़ में आये हैं उन्हें साइबेरिया के कन्सेण्ट्रेशन कैम्प में भेज दिया जाय। वह लड़की साइबेरिया में चली गई। बस यहीं तक की सूचना प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ को है। उन्हें आशा लगी रही कि युद्ध समाप्त होगा और फिर उससे मिलन हो सकेगा। पर उसका कुछ पता नहीं चला। सम्भवतः वह कन्सेण्ट्रेशन कैम्प में मारी गई। प्रो० स्टर्नबाख़ ने निश्चय किया कि उसी की यादों के सहारे जीवन काट देंगे। उन्होंने विवाह का विचार ही मन से त्याग दिया और साधना का जीवन अपना लिया। एक अत्यन्त मितभाषी, सारस्वत उपासना में निरन्तर रत, बाहर से सर्वथा निर्लिप्त दीखने वाला यह महामनीषी अपने मन की गहराइयों में कितना विषाद छिपाये हुए है यह सहसा किसी को आभास नहीं हो सकता है।



Prof. Sternbach with the Secretary of the Parishad (on his right)
and the Editor (on his left)

PROF. STERNBACH–AS I KNOW HIM

J. P. Sinha

July 3, 1978. Our train from Luzern (Switzerland)steamed in the Paris East station at 7.45 A.M. Our aim in visiting Paris was more to meet Prof. Ludwik Sternbach than to see the city, which is the seventh biggest of the world. Our host in Groningen (Netherlands), Prof. Jacob Ensink had already informed him about the schedule of our arrival in Paris and it was arranged that Prof. Sternbach would come to the station to receive us. The problem with us was that, although we had known each other since long, we had never met before and could not recognize each other. As soon as the train came to a halt, we got down and looked for a trolley for transporting our luggage. At the same time we were trying to spot out Prof. Sternbach. I saw a grand old man standing at a distance with a stick hanging on his left arm and holding a trolley with his hands. The old man advanced towards me. From the gestures of the old man and from my Indian dress we recognized each other, introduced ourselves and exchanged greetings.

No sooner Prof. Sternbach introduced himself to me than I realised that I was a dwarf before him—both intellectually and physically. A well built and tall body reminded me of '*vyūḍhoraskaḥ vṛṣaskandhaḥ*' of Kālidāsa and simultaneously struck to my mind another line of the *Raghuvaṁśa*—'*ākārasadṛśaprajñaḥ*'. His curly thick and grey hair were speaking of the wisdom and experience of the man. His broad forehead was really looking like the digit of the moon on the eighth of the bright fortnight (*aṣṭamīcandra-śakalākāraḥ*). Two small black moles on his right cheek near the chin were adding to the personality of the scholar. He was wearing thick glasses fitted in a beautiful frame which itself was tied with a black thread round his neck. On the whole, the personality of Prof. Sternbach was impressive, handsome and attractive. I had been knowing him since long as a man of promptness and perseverance and it occurred to me that Kālidāsa's description of Dilīpa in the *Raghuvaṁśa* was equally true of Prof. Sternbach. This is what Kālidāsa says about Dilīpa and which applies to Prof. Sternbach in entirety—

ākārasadṛśaprajñaḥ prajñayā sadṛśāgamaḥ|
āgamaiḥ sadṛśārambha ārambhasadṛśodayaḥ||

Raghuvaṁśa. I.15

It was, indeed, a red letter day of my life, not because I happened to be in Paris, but because I was face to face with a scholar who is a true devotee of Sanskrit and Indian culture and has dedicated himself to their cause. From the station Prof. Sternbach took us to his residence—of course, a rare honour, particularly in the West, where it is not customary to see visitors at home. I was in a pleasant and patronising company of Shri Gopal Chandra Sinha, Secretary of the Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Lucknow, which, in fact, was the means of our acquaintance with Prof. Sternbach, which developed into friendship. Prof. Sternbach entertained both of us with sumptuous breakfast. He had already arranged for us a short tour of the city of Paris, known as 'Paris Vision'. We had a good time in going round Paris and seeing some of its most important places and sights. After our return from that tour in the afternoon we were entertained by Prof. Sternbach to equally heavy and sumptuons tea. He was very particular about entertaining us to Indian food. He actually took us to a restaurant specialising in Indian dishes, but was disappointed as there was no room for us. Although we took tasty and wholesome vegetarian dinner in another restaurant, it was quite clear from the gestures of the Professer that he was not satisfied with the hospitality being extended to us. For us, however, it did not matter, because there would have been nothing new for us in the Indian dishes. Prof. Sternbach took leave of us only after seeing us off at the Paris (North) station, where we boarded the train for London. It was a pleasure for me to have spent about a whole day with a scholar, who is a foreigner by birth, but who, by his temperament, culture, training and dedication to Sanskrit, is more of an Indian. At the same time an idea was repeatedly pinching me that I snatched the whole day of the Professor, who would have utilised it better by writing some more pages to add to the vast literature he has altready produced.

Prof. Sternbach is living in an apartment of a grand building. The apartment consists of five rooms, three of which are serving as Prof. Sternbach's personal library. Prof. Sternbach took us round the whole apartment, as if we were his own kith and kin. All the three rooms were packed with books, which were arranged subjectwise in the shelves fixed from the bottom to the top of the room. The room adjacent to one of these rooms was his bed room. It was simple, but tidy. In a separate row there was a room for his House Keeper, Madame O. Le Grand who also impressed me with her affectionate and pleasing manners. Had the Professor not introduced her as such I would have certainly mistaken her, as she is living in the Professor's house more like a mistress of the house

than its keeper. It will not be out of place to mention here the affection and regard of the Professor for his House Keeper. Prof. Sternbach had visited India a few weeks back and, while in Varanasi, he had purchased some Banarsi Sarees for her. But the difficulty was that neither the 'Madame' knew to wear a saree nor Prof. Sternbach himself could help her in it. While introducing the 'Madame'—this is how Professor Sternbach calls her—he unhesitatingly told me about this difficulty and asked if I could demonstrate to her how to wear a saree. I certainly did so. What impressed me most was the humane aspect of his personality. He is not a mere drab and dry bookworm, but a real human being imbibed with all the feelings of affection and love for others.

Prof. Ludwik Sternbach was born on December 12, 1909 in Cracow, Poland. He was educated in the University of Cracow and was awarded the degrees of Doctor in Law in the year 1933 and Ph.M. (Philosophy and Sanskritology) in the year 1936 from the same University. His special subjects of study were Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra. He studied Sanskrit in Poland with Professor H. Willman-Grabowska and S. Stasiak. He was Reader at the University of Cracow from 1937 to 1939. From 1939 to 1940 he was in Lwów (Poland), where he delivered special lectures on Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*. He was also a member of the Bar in Cracow. He left Poland during World War II and came through Turkey and Iraq to India where he was Hony. Professor of Dharmaśāstra and Ancient Indian Culture in the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay from Dec. 1940. Then he accepted a new assignment in the United Nations, which he served as Dy. Director of Research in the Department of Trusteeship and Non-self Governing Territories from 1947 to 1970. During this period he used to visit India and spend his vacations here every second year. He also delivered lectures at Indian Universities and Scientific Institutions. In 1964 he was Chairman of the Classical Sanskrit Section of the XXVI International Congress of Orientalists held at Delhi. He has travelled far and wide in India and whole of South-East Asia. In 1970 he left the United Nations to take up a new assignment at the University of Sorbonne Nouvelle which he served till 1972, when he joined the Collège de France—the highest teaching institution in France—in the same capacity. He retired from the Collège de France in the year 1976. He is associated with a number of literary Societies. He was appointed Hony. Fellow of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta in 1955. Besides, he is Hony. Member of the Ganga Nath Jha Kendriya Vidyapeeth, Allahabad (India) ; Hony. Member of the Sanskrit Vishva Parishad ; Distinguished member of the Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Lucknow (India) ; Member of the Oriental Commission of the Polish Academy of Sciences and Secretary General of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies. He was awarded the Naresh Chandra Gold Medal for his contribution to the study of Indian Society and Ancient Indian Law by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta in the Year 1977.

It is relevant to note that Professor Sternbach has made a will by which all his movable property will be handed over to an Indian Research Institute, to create a Foundation in his name for continuing the publication of the compilations of Sanskrit aphorisms ((*Subhāṣita*-s)—a subject which is so dear to him. Professor Sternbach is a versatile genius and an erudite scholar of Sanskrit and Indology. He has produced a vast literature which will be read with interest by posterity for a long time to come.

May Professor Ludwik Sternbach live full span of life of physical fitness, mental alertness and prosperity to serve the *Devavāṇī*.

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J. P. Sinha

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SECTION II

Vedic Studies

THE COMPARATIVE ANTIQUITY OF INDRA AND VARUṆA

P. L. Bhargava

It is an undoubted fact that tremendous light has been thrown on every aspect of the oldest literary monument of India, the *Ṛgveda*, as a result of its critical and comparative study in modern times by such celebrated western scholars as Roth, Max Müller, Oldenberg, Hillebrandt, Bergaigne, Grassmann, Ludwig, Geldner, Whitney and Macdonell. Yet it cannot be claimed for any person, however learned or enlightened, that his is the last word on any subject. Even good Homer nods is a proverb too true to be dismissed lightly. It is, therefore, no reflection on the great work of these scholars if some of the theories advanced by them appear untenable and deserve re-examination.

One of these theories is that Varuṇa was greater in the Indo-Iranian period and was superseded by Indra in *Ṛgveda*. It was maintained by Roth and Whitney and upheld by Macdonell and practically all the Vedic scholars coming after him. This theory, however, can hardly bear close scrutiny in the opinion of the present author. It is, therefore, proposed to examine it in this article.

Indra and Varuṇa are two well known Ṛgvedic deities. In the *Avesta* the name of Indra occurs as that of a demon, while his epithet Vṛtrahan is mentioned there in the form of Verethraghna as the genius of Victory. Varuṇa is not mentioned in the *Avesta* by name at all but his Ṛgvedic epithets Asura and Medhira occur there in the form of Ahura Mazda as the name of the Wise Spirit who agrees with Varuṇa in character, though not in name. As to the relative importance of the two deities in the two works, so far as the *Ṛgveda* is concerned, it was admitted by Macdonell himself that there seems to be no direct and decisive proof for the supersession of Varuṇa by Indra during the composition of the *Ṛgveda*. In other words Indra is the more popular of the two gods throughout the *Ṛgveda*. Of course, so far as the Ādityas are concerned, there can be no doubt that Varuṇa, Mitra and Aryaman were the oldest gods to bear this epithet and Indra, Sūrya, Savitṛ, Dakṣa and Aṁśa were only later added to the list. This, however, in no way disproves the greater

popularity of Indra in the *Ṛgveda*. In the *Avesta*, on the other hand, the supremacy of Ahura Mazda is undoubted.

The question as to which of the two gods was greater in the Indo-Iranian period must be examined from all points of view before hazarding an opinion. We must start with chronology. Here it will not be wrong to assume that a work which is closer to a certain period in date is likely to reflect the ideas of that period more faithfully than a work which is less close. Now it is universally admitted that the language of the *Ṛgveda* shows an older phase of Indo-Iranian language than the language of the *Avesta*. The religion of the *Ṛgveda* also reflects an older stage in the development of Aryan religion than the religion of the *Avesta*. As it is not a matter of controversy, one example will suffice to demonstrate the greater antiquity of the Ṛgvedic religion in comparison to that of the *Avesta*. The word '*deva*' is used in the sense of demon in the *Avesta*. Since it is an Indo-European word meaning god in all the other languages of this family, it is certain that it must have borne the same meaning in the earlier stage of the language of the *Avesta* also. On the other hand the word Ahura, the Iranian form of the Sanskrit Asura, means god in the *Avesta* but bears the opposite meaning in most of the literatures of India. Here also the evidence of the *Avesta* shows that at an early stage of Indo-Aryan language the word 'asura' must have borne the same meaning in which it is used in the *Avesta*. The earlier stage in the history of the words 'deva' and 'asura' is reflected in the *Ṛgveda* in the greater part of which both these words are used synonymously. It is thus proved beyond doubt that the religion of the *Ṛgveda* is much closer to the religion of the Indo-Iranian period than the religion of the *Avesta*. That being so, on the ground of chronology the greatest god of the *Ṛgveda* rather than of the *Avesta* is likely to have been the greatest god of the Indo-Iranian period.

Let us now examine this question from another point of view. People at an earlier stage of civilization, when they were struggling against heavy odds, required a rough and ready god like Indra. It was only when they had settled down and had abundant time to reflect on the true nature of divinity that they showed preference for a god like Varuṇa who used to sit in his mansions looking on all deeds or Viṣṇu whose highest step was seen by the wise like an eye fixed in heaven. This is fully supported by the history of Indra in the two religions to which we now turn.

We have unfortunately no document earlier than *Avesta* to throw light on the earlier stage of Iranian religion. The mention of Indra as a demon in the *Avesta*, however, clearly proves that it was his great popularity at an earlier period which compelled Zoroaster to take the drastic step of converting a god into a demon, for, thus alone people could be prevailed upon to forsake him. The analogous history of Indra fully establishes this conclusion. The Vaiṣṇava teachers of India had to face the same

situation, which Zoroaster faced in Iran. Here Indra was decidedly the most popular god for a long time. The Vaiṣṇavas, therefore, did everything short of turning him into a demon to bring him into disrepute. The rise of Viṣṇu and the fall of Indra is already foreshadowed in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* which calls Viṣṇu the most eminent among the gods and maligns Indra by the myth of Ahalyā. The epics and the Purāṇas completed the process of the fall of Indra and the ascendancy of Viṣṇu. Thus the evidence of both the Zoroastrian and Hindu scriptures leads us to the conclusion that Indra, rather than any other member of the Aryan pantheon, was the greatest god in the Indo-Iranian period.

Before concluding, it is necessary to examine one more point. When and where did the ancestors of the Indians and the Iranians live together before their final separation? The *Ṛgveda* does not throw any light on this question. The *Avesta,* however, does provide an answer which has somehow escaped the attention of the scholars. The first chapter of the *Vendidad* enumerates sixteen holy lands created by Ahura Mazda which were later rendered unfit for the residence of men i.e. the ancestors of the Iranians on account of different things created therein by Angra Mainyu, the evil spirit of the *Avesta.* This clearly means that the ancestors of the Iranians had lived turn by turn in all these lands before they finally settled in Iran and that is why they regarded them as holy. The first of these lands was of course Airyana Vaijo which was abandoned by the ancestors of the Iranians because of severe winter and snow. Of the other lands one was Hapta-hindu, the land of seven rivers. Excessive heat created in this region by Angra Mainyu was, according to the testimony of the *Vendidad,* the reason why the ancestors of the Iranians left this country. Now it is known to every student of the *Ṛgveda* that the land in which the hymns of this work were composed was known as Sapta-sindhu, the land of seven rivers. The Hapta-hindu of *Avesta* can only be identified with the Sapta-sindhu of the *Ṛgveda.* This leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the period of the composition of the earlier hymns of the *Ṛgveda* was itself the Indo-Iranian period when the ancestors of the Indians and the Iranians lived together before their final separation. Those who do not agree with this must point out another country with seven rivers and excessive heat with which the Hapta-hindu of the *Vendidad* can be identified.

MARRIAGE OF SŪRYĀ

(*Ṛgveda* X. 85)

G. K. Bhat

The hymns of the *Ṛgveda* (*RV*) are in the main praises and prayers addressed to various deities. They contain a description of a personified deity, its characteristics, qualities and functions and prayers for material happiness and other gifts. We are aware that the *RV mantrā*-s are used in the context of ritual and religious performances. Yet, there are a few hymns in the *RV* whose theme is secular. And though these too are treated with a religious faith and a suggestion of secret, magical power, it is possible yet to discover in them shades of secular life. In the same way, the mythological and religious hymns which prominently describe the nature and powers of divinities reveal, through occasional allusions and poetic imageries and similes, glimpses of social life lived by the Aryans. Such references and imageries are very valuable for drawing a picture of the social conditions in the Ṛgvedic period.

RV. X.85 is known as *Sūryā-Sāvitrī-sūkta*. The authoress of this hymn is supposed to be Sūryā, the daughter of Savitṛ, who describes here, along with the praise of some connected deities, her own marriage to Soma, the Moon. The deities that figure in this hymn are described with the usual mythical colour and poetic imagery. But the description of the marriage and of the social customs related to it appears to be closely connected with actual life of the people. Marriage in Indian Culture is a sacrament, a religious event. The mythical account of Sūryā's marriage, therefore, can naturally be looked upon as providing a foundation of philosophical thought and a religious sanction for the marriages of human couples. The objective here is to analyse the *Sūryā-sūkta* and to deduce a few ideas regarding the marriage ceremony and customs in the Ṛgvedic times.

AGE OF THE BRIDE

It is stated in the hymn that Soma became the lover of Sūryā and wooed her[1].

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1. *Somaḥ vadhūyuḥ abhavat, RV*. 10.85.9.

Sūryā on her part was eager and willing for a husband (*patye śaṁsanti*). This is indicative of the fact that the bride was not a 'child' but of a marriageable age. The hymn clearly refers to the union of the couple and symbolically mentions the 'pillow' on the marriage-bed[1]. Sexual intercourse is also mentioned[2]; as also the 'soiled garment' of the bride[3]. Besides, the blessings given to the bride show that she is expected to be the mistress of the new home and authority over all her in-laws, both young and aged[4]. If an Indian girl were supposed to attain maturity and puberty at the age af 12-13, she cannot be expected to be younger than 15-16 at the time of her marriage.

This supposition is strengthened by other references in the *Ṛgveda*. Thus, for example, there is a mention of the accord and harmony, mutual trust and co-operation between the married couple[5], which is possible only when both are mature. In fact, the words in the Vedic language expressive of an unmarried girl or a daughter point to the same inference: '*Duhitrā*' means a girl who is entrusted with the household work of milking the cows, and is assumed to be grown up enough to handle this responsibility; Yāska in his *Nirukta* derives the word '*kanyā*' to mean 'a lovely girl', whom a young man may easily pick up and carry away to his house to be his bride; '*yuvatī*' expresses the sense of youth, a girl who has come in youth; and Sāyaṇa says in one place that '*yoṣā*' indicates a mature, marriageable girl.

CHOICE OF BRIDE AND GROOM

The marriage of Sūryā appears to have been settled by mutual consent. Her father Savitṛ is said to have given away his daughter in mind[6]. This may imply the necessity of parental consent to the marriage; or the later practice of 'engagement' or the beginning of '*kanyādāna*'.

The grown-up attitude implied in this marriage settlement is, in fact, corroborated by a social custom revealed in the *Ṛgveda*. The word *samana* occurs a few times in the *Ṛgveda*. Uncertain in meaning though, it seems to mean generally, 'union, meeting, gathering or going together'. Roth assigns to the word the meaning of 'battle or festivity'. Pischel thinks that *samana* denotes a popular, social festival, to which women went to enjoy themselves, which poets attended to win fame by presenting their literary

1. *Ibid.* 10.85.7.
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.37.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.29, 30.
4. *Ibid.* 10.85.36, 46.
5. *Ibid.* V.3.2.
6. *manasā Savitā dadāt, Ibid.*, 10.85.9.

creations, and bowmen to gain prizes by showing their skill in archery at the organised competitions. The festival lasted till the next morning. Some significant references in the *Ṛgveda* clearly indicate that *samana* festival provided a natural opportunity for young men and women to come out together socially, and, if possible, to choose one's partner for life. The statement, 'Agni, Sūryā, Waters, Cows or Streams of ghee' flow freely, like a young girl rushing to the *samana*'[1]; a description in an *Āpri-sūkta*, 'They decorate the Cellestial-Doors like cows licking their calf in affection, like a young girl getting ready for the *samana*'[2]; the description of Vāyu, 'They hurry along the traces of Wind, they come to Him as young girls to a *samana*'[3]: these show the eagerness of young maidens to attend the social festivity, and the care they took about their appearance on this social occasion. A descriptive touch in an Uṣas hymn shows that mothers lent a personal hand in the toilette and decoration of their daugthers[4]. In another context Sūryā is described as coming after the radiant Uṣas, 'like a young man following a maiden' (*maryo na yoṣām abhyeti paścāt*)[5]. Thus, one can be reasonably sure of a public festival like *samana* in the Ṛgvedic times which was attended by young men and women, for which mothers dressed their daughters with personal care, and which provided a social occasion for a get-together; mutual attraction and tender feelings could rise on such a festive occasion, and blossom into marital ties.

Many a marriage could, thus, have been love marriages or of *svayaṁvara* type. There is of course the other side, where parents chose worthy suitors for their daughters. There is a story of one Śyāvāśva who attended, with his father Arcanānas, the sacrifice of king Rathavīti Darbha. He saw the king's daughter and wanted to marry her. The king had no objection; but the queen said that Śyāvāśva was no 'seer' of independent *mantra*-s; if a seer were chosen the daughter would be 'a mother of Veda'. Rathavīti, therefore, rejected him. Śyāvāśva could not forget the girl and his love grew. Once, as he was contemplating in a forest, the gods Maruts appeared before him. He recognised them after a little thinking by the gold ornament on their chest and praised them[6]. He become a 'seer' now; and on this background when he proposed again the king accepted him and bestowed his daughter on him with gifts[7]. The story of Kakṣīvat is equally revealing. King Svanaya, son of Bhāvayavya, was once roaming for pleasure through a

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1. *Ibid.* IV.58.8.
2. *Ibid.* VII.2.5.
3. *Ibid.* X.168.2.
4. *mātṛ-mṛṣṭ-eva yoṣā, Ibid.* I.123.11.
5. *Ibid.* I.115.2.
6. *Ibid.* I.61.
7. *Bṛhaddevatā.* V. 50-81a.

forest with his wife and retinue, when he saw Kakṣīvat asleep under a tree. The king was impressed by the 'comely appearance' of the boy who looked like a 'god's son'. He wished to bestow his daughter on him. He only wanted to be sure about the caste and family of the boy; and when he learnt that the boy was the son of a seer, Dīrghatamas Ucathya, the marriage was settled[1]. These two accounts reveal the following significant details in settlement of marriages: Young girls had the freedom and opportunity to choose their life's partner; the parental consent, however, was necessary afterwards. In choosing a son-in-law, the opinion of the daughter's mother naturally carried weight. The parents expected certain qualifications in the boy, like wisdom and learning ('seer') good family and parentage. The reference to ***varṇa*** and ***gotra*** should be taken to mean only high and noble family; because, in the Vedic times, change of caste like a Kṣatriya becoming a Brāhmaṇa or Seer was possible, and ***anuloma*** or ***pratiloma*** marriages were not forbidden.

In settling a marriage a girl's personal qualities are bound to be an asset at all times and everywhere. 'If a girl were virtuous and of comely appearance she would find a friend of her own accord among the people', says a poet[2]. On the other hand, a physical defect, like blindness, may prove to be a serious handicap. It is said[3] that 'If a father had a daughter who was eye-less, who, knowing it, would be wroth with her for blindness? Which of the two will loose on him his anger—he who leads her to (her husband's) house or he who chooses her (for his friend or master)?' The allusion is rather vague. But physical defect and the difficulties it will entail are obviously foreshadowed here. It is also suggestive of a sympathetic attitude: If a defective girl were chosen and married knowingly, it is uncharitable to vent anger on her or her father afterwards.

There is another factor, however, which seems to have some importance in the contemporary society. It was not easy to find a husband for a girl who had no brother. The father looked upon the sons of his married daughter as his own. The daughter's son (*dauhitra*) had the religious right to perform the funeral rites for his mother's father; the later *Dharmasūtra*-s gave him the legal right to claim a share in the maternal grandfather's property too. But if a son were thus claimed in blood-relation and by religious law, the son's own father and his family are deprived of a legal successor. Such consideration may have governed the attitude of Vedic people towards the choice of a brother-less girl.

Apart from parents who would naturally be active in settling the marriage of their

1. *RV.* I.126; *Bṛhaddevatā*, III.142-150.
2. *Ibid.* X.27.12.
3. *Ibid.* X.27.11.

daughters, there were middlemen who negotiated marriages; they were known as 'friend among the people'[1].

MARRIAGE GIFTS

After the marriage Sūryā's bridal procession (*vahatuḥ*) started towards the house of her husband in pomp[2]. She was dressed for the occasion and was being taken in a fine chariot to which bulls were yoked[3]. It is said that 'Heaven and earth were her treasure' (*kośa*)[4]. Later the bride is instructed to distribute wealth to Brahmins[5]. The groom says, 'Agni has bestowed on me riches and sons and this my spouse'[6]. There is a reference to marriage feast[7]. In view of all this it may be presumed that the father of the girl willingly spent liberal amount of money over the celebration of his daughter's marriage and the bestowal of a girl was accompanied by gifts to the bridegroom.

This is confirmed by other references. Kakṣīvat says that the king, his father-in-law, gave him 10 maidens decked with ornaments, 10 chariots, strong bay horses in teams of four, money and utensils of inferior metal, goat and sheep, hundred necklets and hundred bulls[8]. Śyāvāśva received a hundred white steeds[9]. Obviously, rich fathers were generous in bestowing gifts on their sons-in-law. It is asked at one place, 'How many a maid is pleasing to the suitor who fain would marry her for her splendid riches[10]?'.

A young man who did not qualify would find it difficult to get a bride. In such cases, the bride appears to have been purchased for a price. Praising Indra-Agni a poet says, 'I have heard that you are more liberal than an unqualified son-in-law (*vi jāmātuḥ*) or the brother of a girl (*śyālāt*)[11]. The brother would give money out of affection for his sister; but an unqualified suitor would be required to win the consent of his would-be father-in-law only by liberal gifts. The authors of ***Dharmasūtra***-s condemned this practice of bride-price (***kanyāśulka***), because this is an 'Āsura' type of marriage, and not commend-

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1. *jane mitra*, *Ibid.* X.68.2.
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.13.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.20.
4. *Ibid.* 10.85.7.
5. *Brahmabhyo vi bhajā vasu*, *Ibid.* 10.85.29.
6. *Ibid.* 10.85.41.
7. *Ibid.* 10.85.13.
8. *Ibid.* I.126.2-3; *Bṛhaddevatā*, *op. cit.*
9. *Bṛhaddevatā*, *op. cit.*
10. *RV.* X.27.12ab.
11. *Ibid.* I.109.2.

able. But the celebrated writer of marriage customs of the world, Westermarck, tells us that purchasing a wife for money is a Universal practice.

RITUAL, RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL CUSTOMS

It is said in the hymn that, 'When (the moon) is in the constellation Maghā bulls are killed (for the marriage feast); when (the moon) is in the constellation Arjunī they wed the bride[1]. The idea of choosing an auspicious day (*muhūrta*) for celebrating marriage may be discerned in this statement.

Another religious belief rootcd in the minds of the people seems to be suggested in the hymn. Sūryā was married to Soma. But there is a mention of the celestial husbands of the bride. Aśvinā are mentioned here and elsewhere[2]. In the same way, Pūṣan[3], Agni[4] and Gandharva Viśvāvasu[5] are mentioned as Sūryā's divine husbands. They help Sūryā to mount the chariot, lead her to her husband's house, giving up their claim on her hand her over to her human husband[6]. One verse plainly states that Soma is the first husband of the bride, Viśvāvasu Gandharva is the second, Agni is the third and the fourth is the one born of woman[7]. It is probably a religious blief that a marriageable girl belongs first to the gods and the human husband is her lord in material life. The belief is suggestive of the religious and auspicious aspects of marriage and of the divine blessing and protection that would accompany the wedded couple in their life. The blessings pronounced on the couple at the end of the ceremony bear this out.

The *Sūryā-sūkta* is composite in nature. It is loosely constructed and contains some extraneous elements. The actual description of marriage occurs mainly in verses 6 to 16; other verses refer to religious and social practices, prayers to deities and blessings to the wedded pair. It is not easy, therefore, to determine the ritual precisely, the order of the performances and their place. However, some kind of a logical account may be given, taking help, if necessary, from the later codified procedure.

(1) The hymn describes from the beginning the bridal procession. The important ritual of '*hastagrābha*'[8] when the bridegroom takes the bride's hand in his must be determined in the light of the *śāstra* procedure and must be assumed to be taking place at the

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1. *Ibid.* 10.85.13.
2. *Ibid.* X.85.14-15; I.116.17.
3. *Ibid.* VI.55.4.
4. *Ibid.* X.3.3; X.85.38-39.
5. *Ibid.* X.85.21-22.
6. *Ibid.* 10.85.21, 22,26, 36, 38, 39 etc.
7. *Ibid.* 10.85.40.
8. *Ibid.* 10.85.36.

house of the bride's father, before the start of the wedding procession. The groom takes the bride's hand in his and recites the following mantra :

> 'I take your hand in mine for happy fortune (*saubhāgya*) that you may reach old age with me, your husband.
>
> Gods Aryaman, Bhaga, Savitṛ, Purandhī have given you (to me) to be the mistress of my household'[1].

According to the later ritual the holding of the hand is done in the presence of the sacred fire. The presence of Agni must be assumed here also, because Agni is evoked in a following verse :

> 'For you, O Agni, they first escorted Sūryā to her home with the bridal train.
>
> Give to the husband in return the wife with progeny'[2].

A similar invocation is made to Gandharva Viśvāvasu. He is offered a worship and a prayer that the bride has now a husband (*pativatī hi eṣā*), the Gandharva should seek another willing maid and leave the bride with her husband[3].

Earlier, the people in the bridegroom's party recite the following prayer on their way to the bride's house :

> 'Straight in direction be the paths and thornless, on which our fellows travel to the wooing.
>
> Let Aryaman and Bhaga lead us ; O gods, perfect the union of the wife and husband'[4]

In the house the bride's father, giving away his daughter, recites the following mantra :

> 'I free you now from the noose of Varuṇa, wherewith the Most Blessed Savitṛ has bound you.
>
> In the seat of the Law (*Ṛta*, the fire-altar) I give you up, uninjured with your consort, into the world of virtuous action' (*sukṛtasya loke*)[5].

Savitṛ here stands for the bride's father, and Sūryā is the symbol of bride. *Varuṇa-pāśa* denotes, in the later ritual, the girdle the bride fastens round her waist, after she has bathed, combed her hair and dressed for the marriage ceremony. Here it refers

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1. *Ibid.*
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.38.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.22, 23.
4. *Ibid.* 10.85.23.
5. *Ibid.* 10.85.24.

symbolically to the tie of affection which held the girl bound to her father. Reciting this *mantra,* the father gives up his right over the daughter as she is to become another man's wife. In the next *mantra* the father says:

> 'From here (the father's house), and not from there (the husband's house), I send you free. I make you softly fettered there,
>
> so that, O Bounteous Indra, she may live blessed in her good fortune and her sons'[1].

It is evident that the bride's father has to recite these *mantra*-s before the bridal procession starts from his house. Thus, the arrival of the groom's party to the house of the bride, the father's earlier mental consent, followed now by his giving away the bride on fire-altar to the recitation of appropriate *mantra*-s, *hastagrābha* or the groom taking the bride's hand in his before the sacred Fire, the prayers, and preparations for the bridal procession; these appear to be the details in this performance.

(2) The description of the bridal procession is given elaborately in the hymn. Some details appear to be symbolic; yet the general picture is quite vivid.

The chariot in which Sūryā proceeded to her husband's house was made from the wood of Kiṁśuka and Śalmalī trees. It was painted in gold colour. Its wheels were fine and rolled smoothly[2]. Two white bulls were yoked to the chariot[3]. Symbolically it is said that 'Hymns were the cross-bars of the pole; Kurīra metre decked the car or was the handle of the reins (*opaśa*)'[4]. In truth, it was a mind-fashioned car (*manasmaya*). Its covering was heaven; the bright steers that drew it were steady and were kept in place by holy verse (*ṛc*) and Sāma hymn; ears were the two clean chariot wheels; the path was tremulous in the sky; wind was the axle fastened to the wheels. In other words, Sūryā had mounted a spirit-fashioned car[5]. The procession moved with the incantation of *mantra*-s and recitation or singing of hymns. The figurative description may suggest that the bride's father, who could not afford to take out the procession in 'pomp' as Sūryā's father, Savitṛ did[6], would follow the ritual and recitation of *mantra*-s but would omit the material paraphernalia, and that was accommodated.

Savitṛ started the bridal procession from his house[7]. The twin Aśvinā joined the

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1. *Ibid.* 10.85.25.
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.20.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.10.
4. *Ibid.* 10.85.8.
5. *Ibid.* 10.85.10-12.
6. *Ibid.* 10.85.13.
7. *Ibid.*

procession as wooers or honoured members of both the houses[1]. Agni was leader of the train[2]. It appears that the people who had gathered at the bride's house were also invited to join the procession[3].

The bride is asked to mount the chariot when it is ready to move[4]. Sūryā has put on a fine dress (*Sūryā bhadram iv vāso*)[5]; unguent or collyrium is mentioned[6]. Two bride's maids accompanied Sūryā: Raibhī was her dear bridal friend (*anudeyi*), and *Nārāśaṁsī* led her home (*nyocani*)[7]. 'Raibhī' is really the ritual *mantra*; and '*Nārāśaṁsī* is a formula or song of praise. Figurative as the reference is, it foreshadows the common practice of sending a girl or two with the bride when she goes to her husband's house for the first time. The same verse states that 'the bride came to that (house) which *Gāthā* had adorned'. Since *Gāthā* means a verse or song handed down in tradition, it is possible to surmise that the groom's house is 'adorned' (*pariṣkṛta*) or decorated for the occasion and there is music also to receive the bride.

When the bride mounts the car the following *mantra* is recited:

'Mount this all-shaped, gold-hued (car) ...

Bound for the world of immortal life, Sūryā, make for your lord a happy bridal journey'[8].

It is at this time that Gandharva, Agni and Aśvinā, the celestial husbands of a bride, are offered salutations and prayers to release the bride for her human husband. Some religious beliefs are linked up with these salutations and prayers. Agni is not only assumed to be a divine husband of every bride, Agni is also the central deity round whom the daily life of Vedic Aryans turned. It is believed that Agni will animate the bride for procreation and bless her husband with sons and riches[9]. Soma is supposed to infuse the bride with *rasa*, the natural fluids of sexual secretion. Gandharva will give her accomplishments. Bhaga and Purundhī are the deities of good fortune and wealth; Pūṣan represents prosperity of agriculture and cattle; Aśvinā were supposed to have wooed Sūryā. This is the reason why these gods figure in the ritual and ceremony of marriage. Varuṇa is the Lord of Ṛta, the cosmic order. Varuṇa's noose kept the girl tied to her

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1. *Ibid.* 10.85.14.
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.8.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.33.
4. *Ibid.* 10.85.20
5. *Ibid.* 10.85.6.
6. *Ibid.* 10.85.7.
7. *Ibid.* 10.85.6.
8. *Ibid.* 10.85.20.
9. *Ibid.* 10.85.41.

father, and now it will keep her bound to her husband. *Varuṇa-pāśa* will be the symbol of the couple's mutual trust, affection and protection. Indra is the military God of the Aryans. Victory and success against the odds are necessary for the couple in their life together; and so Indra is offered an invocation and a prayer.

Along with the recitation of prayers there is an expression of good-will too. As the bridal procession marches, it is said:

'Let not the highway thieves who lie in ambush find the wedded pair.

By pleasant ways let them escape the danger, and let enemies depart'[1].

The bride is wished 'signs of good fortune' and happiness (*saubhāgya*) on her way to her husband's house[2].

(3) With the arrival of the bridal procession at the bridegroom's house some kind of a ritual and oblations are expected. Some verses in the hymn suggest this, because *mantra*-s are usually recited in the presence of a deity, unless the entire performance is executed in mind. According to the later ritual the bride and the groom offered a *homa*, appropriate *mantra*-s were recited, and the couple was blessed by all. It may be presumed that this religious ceremony took place in the evening and the following morning after the bride reached her new home.

The bridal procession of Sūryā had started for Agni. Now, Agni and other celestial husbands of the bride are requested to return the wife to the husband with progeny[3]. Then the prayer:

'Agni has given the bride again with splendour and with long life.
Long-lived be he who is her lord; let him live a hundred autumns'[4].

The Brahmins now bless the couple:

'Be you not parted; dwell you here; reach the full span of human life.
With sons and grandsons sport and play, rejoicing in your own abode'[5].

The objective of the marriage is sons, happiness of home and prosperity. This is suggested from the start of the bridal procession. The bride is addressed:

'Let Pūṣan take your hand and conduct you from here; may the Aśvinā transport you on their car.

Go to the house to be the household's mistress and speak as lady to your gathered people.......'

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1. *Ibid.* 10.85.32.
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.33.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.38.
4. *Ibid.* 10.85.39.
5. *Ibid.* 10.85.42.

'Be you happy and prosper with your children here; be vigilant to rule your household in this home'[1].

Similar wishes are now expressed, and probably the bridegroom joined in the recitation with the Brahmins:

'May Prajāpati vouchsafe children to us; may Aryaman adorn us till old age come near.

Full of auspiciousness enter you your husband's house. Bring blessing to our bipeds and our quadrupeds[1].

'Of kindly eye, not injuring your husband, sweet-minded and finely lustrous, be you blissful to our cattle.

Bearing heroic sons, loving the Gods, and delightful, bring bliss to our men and animals'[2].

It is now time for the friends and relatives to bless the married couple. They are formally addressed:

'This bride is brimful of auspiciousness. Come all of you and have a look at her.
Bless her with good fortune, and then return to your homes again'[3]
The gathering then blesses the bride:
'O Bounteous Indra, make this bride blessed in her sons and full of fortune.
Vouchsafe to her ten son , and make her husband the eleventh.
Rule over your father-in-law (dear girl !) like an Empress,

Empress over your mother-in-law, Empress over your husband's sister, Empress over the husband's brothers'[4].

The bridegroom then prays for himself and his bride:
'May the Universal Gods, may the Heavenly Waters join our hearts together.
May Mātariśvan, Dhātṛ and Deṣtrī (Goddess of advice and fruitfulness) bind us close together'[5].

The reference to the slaying of oxen[6] suggests that the ceremony concluded with a marriage feast.

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1. *Ibid.* 10.85.27.
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.43-44.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.33.
4. *Ibid.* 10.85.45-46.
5. *Ibid.* 10.85.47.
6. *Ibid.* 10.85.13.

(4) Presumably after the bride's arrival in the husband's house and after the conclusion of the necessary ritual, physical union of the couple took place. It is indicated through suggestive references and in plain terms.

Symbolic hint comes at the start of the bridal procession when it is said that, 'Thought was the pillow of her couch'[1]. During the procession the bride is blessed to 'prosper with your children' and also advised to 'Closely unite your body with this man, your husband'[2]. Sexual intercourse si mentioned in plain words in another verse[3].

Probably in this connection the bride's soiled 'garment' is mentioned[4]. It is said that the husband's body appears unlovely when it glistens with the fiend (*kṛtyā*), when he wraps the wife's garment about his limbs; the garment is blue and red due to *Kṛtyā*[5]. The bride is to give away this woolen robe to a Brahmin who is conversant with the *Sūryā-sūkta*. The fringe of the garment, the portion that decks the head, and the three places where the garment is parted are tinged; the Brahmin knows purification procedure; he deserves to receive the garment[6]. This again is a clear hint of sexual intercourse.

The reference to *Kṛtyā*, the fiend, in this context may have its origin in a semi-religious belief. *Kṛtyā* is supposed to walk down and cling to a man like a wife. Her presence is suggested by the blue-red spots on the garment. She is harmful to the relatives and kinsmen, and by her the husband is bound fast in bonds[7]. The garment with *Kṛtyā*-s blue red marks is pungent, bitter, filled as it were with arrow-barbs, empoisoned and unfit for use[8]. And so, it is essential to exorcise the fiend with proper procedure to secure the happiness of all concerned. This is done when the bride presents the worthy Brahmin with gift of wealth.

Connected with the union of the married couple there is a practical detail. Along with the removal of *Kṛtyā*, there is the following prayer: 'Consumptions (*yakṣmā*) from her people which follow the bride's resplendent train (*vadhvaḥ candram vahatum*), these let the holy Gods carry back again to the place from which they came'[9]. This is a hint about hereditary diseases like consumption etc. that a bride may unknowingly bring with her. For reasons of healthy life and happiness, the precaution and prayer are timely and

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1. *Ibid.* 10.85.7.
2. *Ibid.* 10.85.27.
3. *Ibid.* 10.85.37.
4. *vadhvo vāsas, Ibid.* 10.85.30; *śāmulya*—woolen robe, *Ibid.* 10.85.29.
5. *Ibid.* 10.85.28, 30.
6. *Ibid.* 10.85.34, 35.
7. *Ibid.* 10.85.28.
8. *Ibid.* 10.85.34.
9. *Ibid.* 10.85.31.

essential. Connecting this consideration for health with the removal of *Kṛtyā* what is sought to be ensured is healthy and happy union of the husband and wife, their future happiness and that of the children born to them.

FEATURES OF ṚGVEDIC MARRIAGE

The study of the *Sūryā-sūkta* reveals the following features of marriage in the Ṛgvedic times:

1. Young girls and boys settled their marriage by meeting together on occasions of public festivals like the *samana*; or the parents selected husbands for their daughters; in terms of the later *śāstra*, this is *Svayaṁvara* or Brāhma type of marriage; when the bride had to be purchased by a young man, it would be *Āsura* marriage.

2. Parental consent was necessary to the marriage; the mental giving away of the bride by the father is either approval or engagement; there is *Kanyādāna* also[1].

3. The marriage ritual consisted mainly of *hastagrābha*, and the bridal procession (*vahatu*).

4. In the bridegroom's house the performance comprised *homa*, recitations of *mantra*-s, blessings to the couple.

5. Marriage feast.

6. Union of the married couple took place on the wedding night, with attendant religious and social ceremonies.

7. The bride was accepted in the new home as a complete mistress of the household with authority to rule over all men, young and old.

8. The bride was hailed as an image of auspiciousness; her presence was an augury of weal, happiness and prosperity.

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1. *Ibid.*, 10.85.24.

THE RAISING OF THE CENTRAL PILLAR (MADE OF UDUMBARA WOOD) OF THE SADAS HUT BY THE UDGĀTṚ ACCORDING TO JAIMINĪYA BRĀHMAṆA I. 70–72.

H. W. Bodewitz

Preparing a contribution to the Diamond Jubilee Volume of *ABORI* (1977-78 : "*Atharvaveda Saṁhitā* 3. 12 : The Building of a House") I was struck by the religious importance of the central pillar of the house. Mentioning parallels of the *sthūṇā* of the house like the *yūpa* in connection with the symbolism of the cosmic pillar I did not refer to the *Udumbara* pillar of the *Sadas*. In fact this *Udumbara* pillar is completely identical with the *sthūṇā*. Since the erection of the pillar belongs to the special function of the *Udgātṛ* and (as announced in former publications) I have resumed the translation of the Sāmavedic *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* I thought it might be interesting to present here a translation with commentary of *JB*. I. 70-72, which deals with this ritual. This paper may also serve as a specimen of the complete translation of *JB*. I. 66-364, which will be published in the future (if time permits). For the present passage see Caland-Henry, *Agniṣṭoma* § 93-94; *Jaiminīya Śrauta Sūtra* 1. 6; *Pañcaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa* 6. 4 and *Lāṭyāyana Śrauta Sūtra* 1. 7 (with Parpola's translation, Vol. I : 2, Helsinki 1969).

JB. I. 70. Prajāpati distributed his strength for the creatures[1]. Then the *Udumbara* tree came into existence. The *Udgātṛ* is Prajāpati[2], the *Udumbara* tree is related to Prajāpati. One elects the other priests, but not the *Udgātṛ*. When the *Udgātṛ* through his first act takes hold[3]

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1. This is done for the gods according to *PB*. 6. 4. 1. See also Caland's note on that text.
2. Instead of *prajāpatir* one may perhaps read *prajāpater*. See Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, "*Studies in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (Book I)*", *Studia Indologica (Fel· Vol. Kirfel)*, Bonn 1955, p. 258. See on the other hand *ŚB*. 4. 3. 2. 3 *prajāpatir vā udgātā*.
3. Mostly *anvārabh* does not merely denote the taking hold of something, but implies some sort of participation (e.g. by the sacrificer who takes hold of the priest and thereby participates in the sacrifice). Here the connotation of *anu* may be that it is not only the *Udgātṛ* who takes hold of the pillar: he does so in cooperation with the *Adhvaryu*.

of the *Udumbara* pillar, he thereby elects himself for the function of priest by means of his own deity. He takes hold of it (with the formula) : "I place you in the seat of life,[1] in the shelter of the helping one[2], in the heart of the ocean[3]. Salutation to the ocean, salutation to the eye of the ocean[4]. May Yonorvan (?) not leave me[5]". When he says "I place you in the seat of life (*Āyu*)"—*Āyu* is the sacrifice—its place is made here. When he says "In the shelter of the helping one"—the sacrifice helps[6]—a shelter is made here in the form of the *Sadas* hut. That he says "In the heart of the ocean"—the heart is the middle of the trunk (of a living being)—therefore, the *Udumbara* pillar is erected[7] in the middle of the Sadas hut. When he says "Salutation to the ocean, salutation to the eye of the ocean"—the ocean is speech, the eye of the ocean is mind—he thereby utters a salutation to these two vital powers[8], when he is on the verge of performing his priestly

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1. All the translations do not render *āyu* in this formula and appear to take it as a personal name. However, it seems preferable to interpret *āyu* as life and to make this refer to the navel. The central pillar of a house or of a sacrificial *Sadas* is identical with the axis mundi which is placed in the navel of the earth. See author, *ABORI* 1977-78, p. 59-68 (espec. p. 65).
2. It is uncertain who is meant by "the helping one". The explanation of the Brāhmaṇa itself and of Sāyaṇa does not give any reliable information. The god who is most helpful and who is also connected with the axis mundi pillar is Indra. One might also think of Varuṇa in whose domain the root of the cosmic pillar is placed.
3. The ocean refers to the water poured out into the pit in which the pillar is placed, See Caland-Henry, p. 95. This water symbolically represents the water of the nether world in which the cosmic tree is rooted. See Kuiper, "The heavenly bucket", *India major* (*Fel. Vol. Gonda*), Leiden 1972, p. 144 ff. See also author, *ABORI* 1977-78, p. 66.
4. The eye of the (subterranean) ocean is the sun, which is hidden in those waters during the chaos before cosmogony and the darkness before daybreak. The pillar which is erected is identical with the rising sun. See author, *ABORI* 1977-78, p. 65-66.
5. This is the usual translation of the parallels of this obscure formula. The Jaiminīya version has *yonorvāṃ hāsīḥ* instead of *yūnarvān hāsīd*. The text does not make sense and the explanation of the Brāhmaṇa itself (see also *PB*. 6. 4. 8) is not helpful. The original form and meaning of the verse were undoubtedly different. One may suppose that the verse expresses the wish that *āyu(s)* "life" does not leave the speaker or the sacrificer (*mā māyur . hāsīd*) and that in the Jaiminīya version a vocative *āyo* has to be assumed (*mā māyo ..... hasīḥ*). For this kind of formula cf. *TS*. 5. 3. 1. 2 *mā māṃ tejo* (resp. *ojo*, *suvar*) *hāsīd*. The explanations of the Brāhmaṇa (*Āyu*=sacrifice, *Yūnarvān*=*Sāman*) do not form a starting point for the analysis and the separation of the words. Perhaps a masculine form *āyu*—(cf. the first formula *āyoṣ ṭvā sadane* .) is preferable. Before *hāsīd* the nominative *arvāñ* ("downwards", i.e. "to the subterranean residence of the deceased") may be assumed.
6. Read *avati* instead of *avatiḥ* in accordance with *PB*. 6. 4. 5.
7. Read *audumbarī mīyate* for *audumarīm īyate* (cf. *PB*. 6. 4. 6).
8. For *devatā* meaning "vital power" cf. *JB*. 1. 68 *mano* (crit. ed. *jano*) *ha vai prajāpatir devatā*. Here we have again one of those unfruitful *adhyātma* interpretations which have been popular from the

function[1]. When he says 'May Yonorvan not leave me'—Yonorvan is the *Sāman*—he thereby utters a salutation to the *Sāman*, when he is on the verge of performing his priestly function[2]. The *Sāman* does not carry him away. He does not come to distress which is connected with the *Sāman*. He who knowing thus utters a salutation to the *Sāman* does not fall short of (the duty of correctly singing) the *Sāman*. He who criticizes him, comes to distress.

71. The *Sadas* hut is Prajāpati's belly[3]. The *Udumbara* wood is strength (life-sap). When the *Udumbara* pillar is erected[4] in the middle of the *Sadas* hut, one thereby places food, life-sap, in the middle of (i. e. among)[5] the creatures[6]. Therefore, food, when eaten in its middle part, nourishes. Therefore, people become hungry, when this (pillar) is made (of wood which is) mouldered.[7] They become, however,

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oldest times till now. Mind and speech are addressed, because they are essential for a good performance by the *Udgātṛ*.

1. The punctuation of the crit. ed. is hopeless and creates an anacoluthon for which Oertel's *Syntax of Cases* and Delbrück's *Altindische Syntax* give no parallels. Evidently the quotations of the formulas form a dependent clause introduced by *yad āha* (which has to be repeated before every quotation). Then follows an explanatory parenthesis with the particle *vai* in second position and finally comes the conclusion or the interpretation of the function of the formula. So *ārtvijaṃ kariṣyan* belongs to this conclusion, as also appears from *PB*. 6. 4. 8.
2. *Ibid.*
3. This equation is not only found in *PB*. 6. 4. 11, but also in other passages which deal with this ritual: *KS*. 25. 10; *KapS*. 40. 3; *MS*. 3. 8. 9; *TS*. 6. 2. 10. 6; *ŚB*. 3. 6. 1. 1-2. In some of the parallels the *Sadas* is the belly of the universe of the sacrifice, which are both identical with Prajāpati.
4. See f.n. 7 on p. 78.
5. I take *madhyataḥ* with *prajānām*. *PB*. has *prajābhyas* for *prajānām*. Cf. also *KS*. 25. 10 (*madhyato.. yajamāne ca prajāsu ca*); *MS*. 3. 8. 9 (*madhyata ātmano..prajānāṃ ca*): *TS*. 6. 2. 10. 6 (*madhyata eva prajānām*). It seems that two different ideas are found in the several versions of this passage: (a) One places food in the midst of the creatures, i.e. in the middle or belly of the cosmic person; (b) one places the Udumbara pillar as an umbilical cord through which food is conveyed for the embryos in the middle of Prajāpati's belly, i.e. in his navel, in the cosmic navel. In some versions *madhyataḥ* does not mean "amidst, among", but "in the middle, in the belly". In the latter interpretation a micro-macrocosmic identification of man and Prajāpati (the cosmic man) is made. However, in that case two things are confused: (a) *Sadas*=belly, and (b) placing in the middle of the *Sadas*=placing in the middle (=belly) of someone.
6. I doubt the correctness of Caland's translation "he brings to his children (and young ones) food in the middle" (*PB*. 6. 4. 11), since the *prajās* seem to be Prajāpati's *prajās* (=creatures); see also the beginning of 1. 72, where Prajāpati (=the *Udgātṛ*) gives food to the creatures. On the other hand *KS*. and *MS*. make a distinction between the sacrificer or the self and the *prajās* ("offspring"; or "subjects"?).
7. Caland translates: "Therefore, where this (pillar) becomes worn out, then the progeny becomes hungry" (*PB*. 6. 4. 12). He seems to make *yātayāman* refer to the situation after the raising of

prospering[1].

They consider : "Should there be touched or not[2] (i. e. should the *Udgātṛ* touch the pillar or not)?" Everything here is animated (i. e. has a soul). If indeed now someone shows as it were (by taking hold of it) that his desire is directed towards[3] food, this (food) hates him very much. If he should touch (the pillar which means food), he would blow away[4] the food. If he should not touch, he would deprive himself of the food. Indeed touching (the pillar) there should be sung[5] (by the *Udgātṛ*) in a very free way (hardly 'touching' the verse on which the *Sāman* is based)[6]. One does not blow the food away; one does not deprive oneself of the food.

The *Sāman* is the food of the gods, the *Udumbara* is life-sap. When the *Udgātṛ* leans[7] on the *Udumbara* pillar, he thereby places the food for the gods, the life-sap, in the

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the pillar, as also appears from his quotation from Sāyaṇa. However, the pillar of a Sadas will hardly get the chance to become worn out, since the Sadas is not preserved after the sacrifice has become finished. The pillar representing food should be made of fresh wood.

1. Obviously something like "if the pillar is made of fresh *Udumbara* wood" has fallen out.
2. Read *upaspṛśyā3ṃ nopaspṛśyā3ṁ* in accordance with *TS*. 7. 5. 7. 1 *utsṛjyā3ṁ notsṛjyā3ṁ iti mīmāṅsante*. For this *Pluti* see Delbrück, *Altind. Syntax*, p. 552.
3. By grasping the pillar (=food) one shows too much greed. In *abhīva kāmayate* the aggressive and dynamic aspect (the usurpation) is expressed by *abhi*.
4. Read *pradhamet* for *prathamet*. See also "*Studies in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*" of the editors and A. Frenz, *Verben im Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, thesis Marburg 1965, p. 20 (where useful parallels are quoted).
5. I read *udgeyam* and place a stop after this word.
6. The problem is how to touch and at the same time not to touch too much. The pillar is actually touched. On the other hand a very loose form of touching seems to be practised in the singing of the *Sāman*, in which the contact between the *Sāman* and the underlying *Ṛc* is almost lost and this *Ṛc* is hardly recognizable. See author, "*Notes on the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*", *JRAS* 1977, p. 154 on *narcam ubaspṛśed* (*JB*. I. 139). In a note on *PB*. 6. 4. 13 Caland proposes to read *upaspṛśya svāspṛṣṭenaivodgeyam*. My emendation is *upaspṛśya nanv āspṛṣṭena* . . . , in which *āspṛṣṭena* as an adverb refers to the way of singing which implies lightly (*ā*—) touching the *Ṛc*. Perhaps, however, *āspṛṣṭena* should refer to the *Udgātṛ* and be taken as active ("touching"). Cf. *PB*. 8. 7. 6 *prāvṛtenodgeyam*, where the *Udgātṛ* covers himself with his garment, and 8. 7. 5 *parikrāmatevodgeyam*, where, just as in the present passage, he makes the contact between *Sāman* and *Ṛc* rather loose in order to avoid certain risks. The Brāhmaṇa explains that if he should not "pass over" something in his chant, he would near himself too much to Agni Vaiśvānara.
7. The corrupt parallel *KS*. 25. 10: 117-18 *prajāpater vā udgātorg udumbaryāṁ śrayate prajāsv evorjaṁ nyanakti* was emended by Caland, *ZDMG* 72 (1916), p. 17 into . . *udgātorg udumbary ucchrayate*, which is definitely wrong. Read: *prajāpater* (or: *prajāpatir*) *vā udgātorg udumbaro yad udumbaryāṁ śrayate* . . . Cf. *JB*. 1. 72 *sa eṣa ūrji śritaḥ prajāpatiḥ prajābhya ūrjam annādyaṃ vibhajati*, where *śri*— also occurs with the locative.

Sāman. Therefore, the gods eat rather[1] most, when the sacrificial service is performed with a Sāman.

72. The *Udgātṛ* is Prajāpati[2], the *Udumbara* pillar is life-sap. As such this Prajāpati allots life-sap, food, to the creatures, because he is leaning[3] on the life-sap (because he has recourse to life-sap). The *Udgātṛ* sings sitting with his face directed to the north because the *Udgātṛ*-s are connected with the northern deities[4]. Thereby he apportions life-sap to the northern quarter. The *Prastotṛ* sings sitting with his face directed to the west. Thereby he apportions life-sap to the western quarter. The *Pratihartṛ* sings sitting with his face directed to the south. Thereby he apportions life-sap to the southern quarter. The other priests perform their functions directed to the east. Thereby they apportion life-sap to the eastern quarter. Therefore, this quarter, being the strongest of the quarters and affording the best livelihood, is favoured by most people[5]. When, therefore, people fall into[6] absence of livelihood, they go east. For this is favoured by most people as the strongest of the quarters and as affording the best livelihood.

Now they say : "[If the *Udgātṛ*-s (admittedly) are connected with the northern deities, (one may ask then) :][7] For what reason do they (i. e. the *Udgātṛ* and his assistants) perform their functions distributed over the quarters ?"[8] One should say :

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1. For this *bhūyiṣṭham iva* see also D. Schrapel, *Untersuchung der Partikel iva*, thesis Marburg 1970, p. 20-23 ("noch am meisten", "erst am meisten").
2. See no. 2 and 23.
3. See f.n. 7 on p. 80.
4. This clause is found in different positions in the MSS. I suggest to read it here. Elsewhere I place it between square brackets.
5. Caland translates *PB*. 6. 4. 14 ". . . for this (quarter) is favoured by the most (i.e. the plurality of the priests)". The version of *JB*. proves that *bhūyiṣṭhaiḥ* does not refer to the plurality of the priests, but to the majority of the Vedic people. The continuous eastward movement of the Vedic Aryans is meant here. When the earth becomes exhausted, or even after one harvest, one moves east.
6. Read *niyanti* (as is done by Caland in his transcription of the MSS available in University Library of Utrecht).
7. See f.n. 4 above.
8. The author of the Brāhmaṇa seems to acknowledge the special position of the *Udgātṛ*, who is always connected with the north. See also *ŚB*. 13. 5. 4. 24 *udīcy udgātuḥ*. The question is why the other Sāmavedic singers neither agree with their *Udgātṛ*, nor with all the other priests, who are connected with the east. The sentence between brackets probably should fall out (see no. 26). Questions, objections and discussions are mostly introduced by *atha khalv āhuḥ*. Here a new paragraph seems to start with *atha . . . āhuḥ*.

"In order to honour[1] the quarters, in order to please[2] the quarters. Therefore, food is found in all the quarters".

He should offer over the *Udumbara* pillar with the formulas : "Support heaven, fill the air, fasten the earth with your lower part"[3]. "Let Dyutāna, the son of the Maruts, erect you with the stable support of Mitra and Varuṇa"[4]. "Heaven and earth, be pleased with ghee"[5]. "Make the crops bear good grains, hail"[6].

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1. Read *abhīṣṭyai* (in accordance with *PB.*) instead of *abhiṣṭyai.* According to the dictionaries (since Schmidt's *Nachträge*) *abhīṣṭi* should mean "wish" in *PB.* Caland translates "for thesee King of the quarters", which does not make sense. The word occurs a few times in *KS.* and *KapS.* and once in *PB.* See e.g. *KS.* 8. 8: 91.6f. ..*vāso deyam, sarvadevatyaṁ vāso, devatānām abhīṣṭyai,* where neither "seeking" nor "wish" is suitable. The derivation should be from *yaj*–, which does not only mean "to sacrifice" but also (and originally) "to honour". Cf. *aveṣṭi,* which definitely should be derived from *ava-yaj-* and which has the same dative construction. See *KS.* 36. 6 and 7 and *MS.* 1. 10. 10-13 (... *aṁhaso 'veṣṭyai* with *ava-yaj*—in the same context).
2. Read *abhiprītyai* as *PB.* does.
3. In fact this and some of the following formulas should accompany the erection of the pillar rather than the offering of ghee on it. For this formula see *TS.* 1. 3. 1 h and *PB.* 6. 3. 2. The *Udumbara* pillar is described as the axis mundi, which in the cosmogony supports heaven and fastens the earth drifting about in the primordial waters. The version with *upareṇa* is found in *TS.* 1. 3. 6 h. In the formulas of *MS.* 1. 2. 14: 23.15 three parts of the pillar are denoted with *agreṇa*, *madhyena* and *upareṇa*.
4. Cf. *TS.* 1. 3. 1 i and *PB.* 6, 3, 2 (which does not have the complete text). Keith's translation "according to the established law of Mitra and Varuṇa" is doubtful. For the cosmogonic meaning of *dharman* see Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos zum Weltgesetz", *As. Stud.* 21 (1967), p. 31-61. The adjective *dhruva* (from the root *dhṛ*, see Minard, *Trois Ênigmes* II. 596 c) is often associated with fixation, supporting power and the middle. Here *dhruva dharman* qualifies the pillar as the axis mundi, which connects the upper and the nether world and therefore, belongs to Varuṇa and Mitra. The formula should accompany the actual fixing of the pillar in the earth.
5. Cf. *TS.* 1. 3. 1 m, where the root *pṛ* instead of *prī* is used. The latter anly occurs in the version *LŚS.* 1. 7. 7 (*ā prīṇāthām*) and in *JŚS.* 1. 6, which also has the reading *ā priṇīthām* (untenable). Either the reading of *LŚS.* should be adopted or the original form, derived from *pṛ*, should be conjectured. Offering *ghee* on the pillar one recites this formula.
6. Cf. *MS.* 3. 9. 3:117.14 and *JŚS.* 1. 6. The *ghee* with which heaven and earth become filled according to the preceding formula is the rain which fertilizes everything. By pouring out *ghee* one hopes to produce rain.

GARTA AND GARTA-ĀRUK IN THE ṚGVEDA

Sadashiv A. Dange

The word *garta*, which occurs in the *Ṛgveda* eight times, has been generally rendered as "chariot" by scholars, the chariot being actual or symbolic.[1] The tradition as represented by Yāska and Sāyaṇa, also renders it as such generally, except at the place which refers to a brotherless girl ascending the *garta*[2], where it is rendered as "the place where the judges sit"[3] In addition, Yāska renders it as the *Sabhāsthāṇu* ("an elevated platform in the assembly") and also as *śmaśāna-sañcayaḥ*, "elevated erection of stones on a dead body" (Ib.). He also renders it as "chariot". These different meanings could not have been entirely different from one another in the origin; and it is necessary to investigate the original shade of the word. Giving these meanings, and referring to other authorities, B. H. Kapadia[4] has come to the conclusion that originally the word meant a chariot or an elevated seat in a chariot; then an elevated seat in the gambling hall, on which a person is required to sit in order to tell the truth alone; subsequently it meant a house and later the cemetary; and, according to him it is "only in I. 124.7 that *garta*, because of *gartāruk*, can mean a board or a dais on which dice were thrown"[5]. This is a rejoinder to the meaning of the word *garta-āruk* (*ā-ruh*) given by Yāska and explained by Durga, the commentator. Rightly does Kapadia question the propriety of the suggestion of Yāska, as understood by Durga, that here we have reference to a custom current in south India, according to which a sonless widow sits on the gambling dais to prove her

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1. See Sāyaṇa at the places mentioned, except at I.124.7; *The Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, Macdonell and Keith, under "Garta" says that it indicates the "seat in the chariot".
2. *ṚV.* I.124.7.
3. Sāyaṇa; also Yāska, *Nir.* III.5.
4. "The word Garta in the *Ṛgveda*", *J. Ganganath Jha Research Institute*, Vol. XXV, 1969, pp. 216-18; Umesh Mishra Com. Vol. 1970: pp; 221-26.
5. *Ibid.* P. 526.

chastity and gets the share of her husband's wealth from the relations of her husband; otherwise, the share might have gone to them[1]. His reason for not accepting the explanation is that the *Ṛgveda* could not probably refer to a custom in the southern part of India, for the Vedic Aryans had not penetrated to that part as yet. This is to be accepted. His suggestion that, here, the dawn may be compared to a "man ascending a chariot" is understandable, only in so-far-as it does not drag the word "brotherless". What seems true is that here there are four different images, in which Dawn is set : (1) She is compared with a brotherless girl that goes to the *gotra* of her father, as she is technically called "*putrikāsuta*". This type of girl is supposed to be the "son" of her father for all rituals meant for the manes, on such a condition to her marriage; or her son "becomes" the son of her father[2]. The dawn disappears as soon as the sun (her man=husband) appears; hence, she is seen as going away to her father, the sky, and disappear. But this need not have any connection with the second image, which is (2) of the person who ascends the *garta* for the gain of the wealth. Yāska takes this image as that of the son-less widow; and he is believed to give the instance from the south, which poses difficulties as noted above. Here it may be pointed out that all the four images in this verse are of a woman; as such it is doubtful if this second alone could be taken as that of "a man ascending a chariot". But, before we examine this image, let us refer to the other two images. (3) Dawn appears like a married woman, desirously expecting her husband after her period and donning charming garments; and (4) Like a smiling woman (a common woman) she exposes her form (*ni riṇīte apsaḥ*). It is, thus, clear that in all these images the seer describes various types of women. As such, the one who ascends the *garta* need not be a man. These four images need not be mutually connected; and they are not, as the word indicative of comparison (*iva*) is used four times ; *abhrātā-iva* (a), *gartārug-iva* (b), *jāyā-iva* (c), *hasrā-iva* (d). As such, the second type may be so described even if she is not brotherless. She may have a brother, or may not have; but, not having one might lead her to this state, for the gain of money. The text of the *Ṛgveda* does not mention if the second type of woman is without a brother, a son, or even if she is married ! It is Yāska who brings in this point. It is probable that being *garta-āruk* may indicate her profession; and, probably, we have to examine the word *dākṣiṇāji* used by Yāska for this type, in this light.

The word *dākṣiṇāji* used by Yāska, is rendered by Durga as *dākṣiṇātyā strī*. It is clear, hence, that the idea of such a woman being from the "south" is not of Yāska, but of Durga; and it is not improbable that Durga misinterprets Yāska. There is no help for

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1. P. 525.
2. *Yājñavalkya Sm.*II.128 and *Mitākṣarā* which quotes *Vasiṣṭha*; also Kane P. V., *Hist. of Dharmaśāstra* Vol. II-i, pp. 435-6; also *Nirukta* III.4.

direct interpretation of this word used by Yāska; but it should be rather quite acceptable that he would not read in the *Ṛgveda* a custom from the south. What, then, is the explanation of the riddle that haunts this word ? It is to be noted that even Durga, who sees a southern custom here, does not discard the suggestion of Yāska that the act refers to gambling. Yāska says that such a woman ascends the ***garta***, because ***garta*** is a place of speaking the truth (*satya-saṅgaro bhavati*), and that here there is a throw of dice. The words of Yāska are ***tām ta'ra-akṣair ā ghnanti, sā riktham labhate***, which are understood as "striking" with dice (Kapadia; Rajawade and others). Durga himself does not refer to striking with dice; for, these words (***tam...ā ghnanti***) do not occur in the copy of the script used by Durga. It is probable that they were not originally in the version of Yāska and were inserted by some one later. But, the fact seems to be that the woman had to prove her share by submitting to gambling in Yāska's period. Now, what about the word ***dākṣiṇāji*** ? If we read the sentence as Yāska gives, "***gartārohiṇīva dhanalābhāya dākṣiṇāji***", it appears that the word ***dākṣiṇāji***, in essence, explains ***dhanalābhāya*** ("for the gain of wealth"), and does not say anything more; and the "southern woman" might not have even touched the imagination of Yāska. The context shows that the meaning of this word has to be fixed according to Yāska, in the context of gambling, together with that of ***dākṣiṇa/dākṣiṇā***. In this connection, it is to be remembered that the word ***dakṣiṇā*** is itself closely connected with the cow; and it is said that when no other sacrificial gift is mentioned (***dakṣiṇā***), a cow is always meant.[1] In that case, ***dakṣiṇā-jī*** would mean "one who wins the ***dakṣiṇā***=cow". We may compare here a ritual where the cow of the sacrificer is won by the cast of dice[2]. It is true that here we do not have the exact word ***dakṣiṇā***; but the point of gambling with dice and winning is clear. It might be that the word ***dākṣiṇājī*** (***dakṣiṇām jayati; strī***) is used, colloquially for winning the share of the husband by such an ordeal-like ritual (***divya***=divine help). Beyond this the point is dark. Dice-play has been a part of rituals and dice has been worshipped as having divine power.[3] Striking the woman in question with dice is to be seen only as an alternate method wherein the idea should have been to see the truth of the woman's claim by letting the dice actually touch her body and indicate justice as they fall. The proposition, hence, is that the word ***dākṣiṇājī*** is to be understood as a proverbial expression to indicate "the gainer of gifts" (***dakṣiṇām jayati iti dakṣiṇājiḥ***[4] ***dakṣiṇājir eva dākṣiṇājiḥ***; ***strī dākṣiṇājī***),

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1. Macdonell and Keith, *Op. cit.* under "*Dakṣiṇā*".
2. *Gām asya tad ahaḥ sabhāyām dīvyeyuḥ Mait. Sam.* I.6.11.
3. Cf. *Ṛgveda* X.27.17; *Atharva Veda* XIV.1.36; *Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* XVI.1.17.
4. For the form of √*ji*, ending in *ji* see W. D. Whitney, *The Roots, Verb-forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language*, Leipzig, 1885, *P.* 53, under √*ji*, "to conquer". We may also derive as *dakṣiṇāyāḥ āgatam dākṣiṇam* (any gift); *tad jayati iti.*

which has the same sense as in *sanaye dhanānām* in the text of the *Ṛgveda* noted above. *Dakṣiṇā* would, thus, indicate, "money given through courtesy". Yāska, thus, only explains the expression with the word *dākṣiṇājī*, which could not, possibly, be taken to mean a southern woman. It should be noted in this connection that Sāyaṇa, himself a southerner (Vijayanagaram, Humpi), does not render the word as indicating a southern woman, though he quotes the explanation of Yāska. Durga's explanation of Yāska is, hence, questionable.

There is another point. Yāska renders the word *garta* here as *sabhā-sthāṇu*, which would simply mean "a raised seat in the assembly hall". As noted above, the version of Durga does not have the words " *tām tatra akṣair-āghnanti*. The whole reading, then, would be "*gartārohiṇiva dhanalābhāya dākṣiṇājī*; *gartaḥ sabhāsthāṇur gṛṇāteḥ, satya-saṅgaro bhavati, tam tatra yā-aputrā yā-apatikā sā-ārohati*; *sā riktham labhate*". Whether all this is intended by the simple expression from the *Ṛgveda, garta-āruk*, is doubtful; for, *garta* is rendered by Yāska himself as indicating even other things. Out of the places that refer to *garta*, eight in all, three are from the same hymn[1], while each of the rest is from various single hymns. The description of the *garta* at these would give an idea of its size and form. At four places it is associated with Mitra and Varuṇa, and they are called kings. They ascend the *garta* that is golden in hue and has the main pole made of *ayas* (hard metal)[2]; from here these two gods supervise Diti and Aditi, which indicate the whole seen expanse of sky and the earth[3]. This *garta* is structured in an expansive and a holy place, and has honey in it (Ib. 7). The *garta* is spacious[4]. Rudra sits on the *garta*[5]. At one place the *garta* is associated with an archer, in standing posture[6], as Indra is compared with him while standing on his two horses (*tiṣṭhad-harī*).

The references noted above do not so much fit in the concept of a chariot, as of a spacious dais or platform; and even if we take *garta* to refer to a chariot here, the concept has to correspond to the *garta*, that is said to be "ascended" by the *garta-āruk*, who is the woman. There it is clear that the *garta* is a high place, where the judges (or the gamblers) sit.[7] This seems to be a probable concept behind the word *garta*. The explanation of Yāska that it was a place from which only truth could be spoken *satya-saṅgaro bhavati*) adds credibility to this concept. The *astā* (archer) could shoot his arrow

1. *ṚV.* V.62.
2. Ayas is not iron; see Macdonell and Keith, *Op. cit.* under "*ayas*".
3. *ṚV.* V.62.8.
4. *Ibid.* V.68.5
5. *Ibid.* II.33.11.
6. *Ibid.* VI.20.9.
7. cf. Sāyaṇa, *rājapuruṣair nyāya-nirṇetṛbhiśca-adhiṣṭhitam sthānam.*

from this place; and the image of the *astā* seems to be that of an archer in a shooting competition, rather than in a battle; here, probably, we have the glimpse of even the shooting competition at the marriage by choice. The *garta* being *satya-saṅgara* gives also the idea of a dais of proclamation. Honey and other gifts being associated with the *garta* would go well with the high dais whereupon the king sits, rather than with a chariot or a throne[1]. This would show that at the Ṛgvedic period the word *garta* had the connotation of a raised platform primarily, whatever may have been the later connotation. The word *garta-āruh* (k) would indicate ascending the *garta*. Whether *garta* had an association with gambling is doubtful; for, as Kapadia has pointed out, the famous gambling-hymn[2] does not mention it at all; and never in the *Ṛgveda* is there any association of *garta* with gambling. As such, the image of the sonless woman going to the gamling house, or sitting on a seat surrounded by gamblers is not convincing. *Garta-āruk*, hence, would indicate a common woman who ascends a public dais for gaining money, may be by auction or by an art such as dancing. The dawn, who is compared to the *garta-āruk* here, is said to be a dancer at another place[3]. How *garta* came to indicate a pit, or a hollow ground, later may be an interesting point for investigation. Probably, the reason lies in the practice of constructing the performing platform in the middle, while the seats are arranged around it gradually getting raised, as is the case with the amphitheatre[4]. This would make the *garta* a hollow ground; and also a pit, which is its connotation later.

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1. Kapadia connects *garta* with *gaddi*, *gadi* etc.
2. *ṚV.* X.34.
3. *Ibid.* I.92.4 *adhi peśāmsi vapate nṛtūr iva*.
4. Some dancing-grounds are of this nature; see for example the one at Madurai in south India, in the palace of the Nayakars. However, there is no clear evidence from ancient India.

THE CORRECT READING OF ṚG-VEDA 8.35.13-15CD

G. V. Devasthali

It is well-known that unlike the other Vedic Saṁhitās, that of the *RV.* is, on the whole, free from variant readings. If at all variant readings are found in the *RV.* verses, they are not in the *RV.* itself, but in the Samhitās of the other Vedas, where some portions of the *RV.* are found to recur[1]. It would, therefore, be a matter for surprise to come across a variant reading[2] in the *RV.* Saṁhitā proper.

Secondly, the *Padapāṭha* (*PP*), so far as it goes, in conjunction with the *Ṛk-prātiśākhya* (*RPr*), serves as a good means for checking the reading in the *RV. Saṁhitā.*[3] There are certain big or small groups of words, which, if they recur in the *Saṁhitā* exactly in the same form, sequence, and sense, are omitted in the *PP* in all their occurrences except the first.[4] Even such groups of words (in their first occurrence) can serve as a good check for all their later occurrences in the Saṁhitā. Thus in a way it may not be wrong to assume that the *Saṁhitā* and the *PP* can serve as good check on each other; and between them, can help us to get at the correct reading of the *RV* in any doubtful case.

In spite of this generally accepted fact, it is rather striking to find that there has cropped up some doubt regarding the accurate reading of the second hemistich of *RV.* 8.35.13-15.

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1. For these see Bloomfield, *Vedic Concordance*.

2. The only v. l. traditionally admitted in the *RV.* is मँश्चतो (or मांश्चतोर्वरुणस्य) in *RV.* 7.44.3.

3. In fact *RPr.* contains rules for the formation of the *Saṁ Pātha* from the *PP*.

4. These are commonly known by the more significant name *galita*. This phenomenon is as ancient as the *PP.* itself; and has been referred to in the *RPr.* by the name *samaya*.

In the Poona edition of the *RV*. with Sāyaṇa's commentary, Vol. III (1941), the hemistich in question is given as सजोषसा उषसा सूर्येण चादित्यैर्यातमश्विना; and it is similarly given in all the other available editions. And this is quite in keeping with our traditional *pāṭha* also.

But Max Müller in his *Ṛg-Veda Saṁhitā* (2nd edn. of 1892) has given this hemistich with a slight difference as follows : सजोषसा उषसा सूर्येण चादित्यैर्यातमश्विना । It may be observed that in the former the ण (of सूर्येण) is marked with a line below it, while it is left unmarked in the latter[1] (सूर्येण).

It is further striking to note that in all these editions including those of MM, the *PP* of this hemistich is identically given as : सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । च । आदित्यैः । यतिम् । अश्विना ॥

Hence naturally arises the question, if the *PP* is the same; why should there be any difference among these editions in the reading of the *Saṁhitā* of this hemistich ? And if only one of these readings is to be accepted as correct, which of these is so ?

Prima facie, it would appear reasonable to argue that since the reading of the *PP* is identical in all editions, it should be accepted as correct; and an attempt should be made to get the *Saṁhitā Pāṭha* by combining the *pada*-s according to the rules of *ṚPr* and Pāṇini.

Following this method of *pada* combination, we get the Saṁhitā as follows : सजोषसा उषसा सूर्येण चादित्यैर्यातमश्विना । And this is exactly how it has been given by MM in his editions, as noted above.

But, if this reading as found in MM's edition be accepted as genuine, what are we

1. MM. has adopted the same readings (of the *Saṁ*. and *PP*.) in his second (and subsequent) editions of *RV. Saṁ*. with Sāy, Bhāṣya also of the bare *Saṁ*. and the *PP*.

to do about the different reading found in all other editions including that of Poona ? Shall we say that it is obviously wrong ; and reject it, as it appears to have been tacitly done by MM ? But that may not be quite easy to do.

For one thing, we must remember that, at least in the case of the *RV*, our oral tradition has been found to be quite accurate. Hence, generally speaking, the reading traditionally handed down should be accepted as being correct. Naturally, therefore, that which goes against tradition will have to be rejected as being incorrect. But, this we may not be able to do with full confidence, unless and until we can explain how the mistaken reading could have arisen. And this is what we shall try to do in what follows.

Before, however, we take up this topic for consideration, let me draw the attention of the readers to the curious fact that MM in his first edition of 1862 had given the hemistich under consideration as : सजोषसा उषसा सूर्येण चादित्यैर्यातमश्विना । as it is handed down by living oral tradition, and found in all other editions. This indicates that the reading, adopted by MM in his second edition, is only an after-thought, an emendation, for which, however, no explanation appears to have been given.[1] But a little guess work might show that in all likelihood he must have arrived at it on the basis of the *PP*.

At this point we have to face one curious difficulty. If we look to the MSS of the *PP* (of the *RV*), we find that they give a cipher or zero at various places to indicate that at those points some consecutive ***pada***-s have been dropped. But curiously enough, this mode of indicating the omission of some ***pada***-s in the *PP* MSS is connived[2] at in all the available editions where the *PP* is given. And the general practice of the editors without an exception is to give all the ***pada***-s of the *PP*, leaving no occasion for any cipher at all.

Then how are we to know which ***pada***-s are ***galita*** at a particulnr point ? The answer to this question is to be found in the general rule[3] about ***galita***, namely that when a number of consecutive ***pada***-s, generally not less than three, are (in the *Saṁhitā*) found to

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1. In spite of my efforts, I have not been able to trace any explanation; and I should like to request scholars to bring it to my notice, if they come across it anywhere.
2. One really wonders why the system of indicating *galita*-s in the MSS was abandoned by the editors of the *RV*. This deviation on their part, it is very sad to note, has resulted in the sad neglect of the study of the *galita*-s and their importance in Vedic Studies.
3. For these see Shreekrishna Deva, *Galita-pradīpa*, Varanasi (Saṁvat 2016).

recur in the same order (and in the same sense), they are dropped in the *PP*, and represented by one cipher (for any number of them) at all the subsequent occurrences except the first. Thus it may be seen that we can find out the ***pada***-s which should stand in the place of the cipher by finding out the earliest occurrence. This will make it clear that such restoration of the ***pada***-s in place of the cipher in the *PP* is nothing short of editorial activity; and hence, like all editorial activity, it has to be supported and justified by evidence. This evidence may be said to be twofold. In the first instance, since by their very definition ***galita***-s are a set of repeated ***pada***-s, the first occurrence of these groups of ***pada***-s will be one of our means of their restoration. And naturally, our second check will be the ***Saṁhitā*** corresponding to these ***galita pada***-s. The ***Saṁhitā*** that we arrive at on the basis of the ***galita pada***-s (in their first occurrence) must tally exactly with the traditional *Saṁhitā-Pāṭha*. In case, the *Saṁhitā-pāṭha* thus arrived at does not tally exactly with the traditional *Saṁhitā-pāṭha*, we must assume that the error is on our side; and try to correct it. This is the correct way of understanding the comparative strength of the two. For, the ***Saṁhitā***, arrived at on the basis of the ***galita*** in the *PP*, is after all inferential (***ānumānika***), while the traditional one is direct (***pratyakṣa*** or ***śruti***).

With all this in mind, we have to make sure that any *Saṁhitā*, restored by the editor on the basis of the ***galita***, agrees with the traditional ***pāṭha***. For, then alone the restored ***pāṭha*** can be said to be correct. If, on the other hand, it does not agree, we shall have to revise the restored ***pāṭha*** and see how it can be brought in a line with the traditional ***pāṭha***; and restore the ***galita pāṭha*** also accordingly, of course, with proper justification. In the absence of such justification, willy nilly, we shall have to admit that there is a real discrepancy between the ***galita PP*** on the one hand and the *Saṁhitā-pāṭha* on the other.

Bearing all this in mind, let us now turn to the hemistich referred to above. In the *PP* MSS we find it represented as follows : गच्छथः । हवम् ॥ ० । आदित्यैः । यातम् । अश्विना ।[1] (***ṛc*** 13cd, in which all but the last three ***pada***-s are ***galita***; and are represented by one cipher). ***Ṛc*** 14 is represented in the *PP* MSS as : उत । विष्णुऽवन्ता[2] ॥०॥, which shows

1. गच्छथः । हवम् ॥ are the last two *pada*-s of *RV*. 8.35.13ab. The zero after them represents the *galita pada*-s (in 13c), and the three *pada*-s given after it comprise 13d, which here is not *galita*.
2. These are the last two ***pada***-s of *RV*.8.35.14ab; and the zero after them represents whole of cd, which is ***galita***.

that in it the whole of cd is *galita*; while *ṛc* 14cd is the same as *ṛc* 15cd, which in *PP* is, therefore, represented as: गच्छथः । हवम्[1] ॥०॥

Here apparently no difficulty arises in *ṛc*-s 14 and 15, where the whole hemistich is *galita*; and as such, has no *PP* at all. This idea, however, is not correct. For, even in such cases, full compatibility of the *PP* (editorially devised) and the *Saṁhitā* (traditionally handed down) is essential. In *ṛc* 13, on the other hand, cd is *galita* only in part, while the non-*galita* part is actually given in the traditional *PP*. Now if we take सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । ण as the *galita* portion represented by the zero in the *PP* MSS, and आदित्यैः । यातम् । अश्विना as the remaining (=non-*galita*) part actually given in the *PP* MSS, the whole hemistich as we shall have it out of the combination of all these *pada*-s will be: सजोषसा उषसा सूर्येण चादित्यैर्यातमश्विना, which, in the absence of accentuation, fully tallies with what we have in the *Saṁhitā*, accents being left out of consideration. But the *RV.* is handed down in both the *pāṭha*-s with accentuation only, so much so that accentuation cannot be left out. And when we try to combine the *pada*-s as we have got them here, taking into account accentuation also, we get: सजोषसा उषसा सूर्येण चादित्यै-र्यातमश्विना; and when we verify it with the traditional *Saṁhitā*, we find that there is disagreement between the two in one place only. For, whereas traditionally the ण of सूर्येण is marked *anudātta*, it is found unmarked in the improvised *pāṭha*. This makes a vast difference; for, according to the accentuation rules, the चा (after ण) is *udātta* as found in the traditional text, while in the other (improvised text) the same letter, standing after an unmarked ण, will be *anudātta*. This discrepancy between the traditional *Saṁhitā* and the improvised one clearly shows that the latter, differing from the traditional one, has to be rejected as incorrect. Hence, it further follows that the data which has yielded this *pāṭha*

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1. *Gacchathaḥ havam are* the last two *pada*-s of *RV*.8.35.15ab; and the zero thereafter represents the whole of cd. which is *galita*.

must also be incorrect. It appears that MM considered the ***balābala*** of these to be just the reverse of what it should be; and accepted this latter reading of the *Saṁhitā* as being incorrect (possibly because it is only traditional), while the latter was based on the ***PP***, though only improvised. And in this he appeers to have been so much overwhelmed by this idea, that he did not feel that he was doing any injustice to a traditionally handed sacred text.

But we need not find fault with MM here in remaining true to himself, and not accepting the authority of mere oral tradition, the importance and capacity of which could hardly be realised in full by those to whom strict preservation by oral tradition of a whole literature was a very strange and unbelievable phenomenon. But at the same time it may be pointed that the correctness of the text as preserved by oral tradition can be demonstrated by another line of thinking also.

As has been already said above, the hemistich under discussion occurring in three consecutive ***ṛc***-s is partly ***galita*** in one, and wholly so in the other two. Now let us consider ***ṛc*** 13, in which it is partly ***galita***. It is well-known that a group of consecutive ***pada***-s, if repeated, become ***galita*** in the ***PP*** in all their occurrences except the first; and are there represented by a zero in MSS and are altogether omitted in the recitation of the ***PP***.

Now we have to determine the ***galita pada***-s in *RV*.8.35.13. So remembering the common rule for ***pada***-s being ***galita***, let us try to find out where we get these ***pada***-s previously. Looking up the hymn under consideration in the *Saṁhitā* text, it is observed that सजोषसा उषसा सूर्येण च (8.35.1c) has recurred as *pāda* c in all its *ṛc*-s except the last three. This shows that this portion is ***galita*** in them all[1]. The next point to note is that in all the lines[2] where the च stands by itself (and is not combined with the following letter), we find the ण before it to be an unmarked अनुदात्त; while in the *ṛc*-s[3] where the च is combined with the following vowel, it is found that the ण of सूर्येण is a marked ण (i. e. अनुदात्त ण). This shows that the syllable coming after the ण of सूर्येण is *udātta*. This clearly shows that

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1. And actually they are dropped in the *PP* of all these *ṛc*-s. But it must be observed that in some other *pada*-s also are *galita*, so much so that in each *ṛ* we have to find out which *pada*-s are *galita* and verify them with the help of the *Saṁhitā* which, of course, is available in the case of all these.
2. That is, in *ṛc*-s 1-3; 7-9; and 16-18.
3. That is, in *ṛc*-s 4-6; 10-12; 13-15; and 19-21.

in the latter the ण (marked *anudātta*) in all these must be followed by an *udātta* syllable. In *ṛc*-s 4-6, the *PP* clearly shows सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । च । आ । From all these cases it is clear that the ण of सूर्येण will be marked *anudātta* only if it is followed by an *udātta* syllable. But since the *pada* after सूर्येण च (namely आ of आदित्यैः) is *anudātta*, it (i. e. सूर्येण) must be followed by a word initially accented or by the prefix आ[1]. Now since in सूर्येण । च । आदित्यैः, the *pada* आदित्यैः is not initially accented, the desired accent can be had only if the च therein is followed by the prefix आ, which, of course, is followed by आदित्यैः. Thus alone we can get सूर्येण चादित्यैः (= सूर्येण । च । आ । आदित्यैः ।). Thus we see that to have the required (traditional) accentuation in the *Saṁhitā*, we must have the *PP* as : सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । च । आ । and that will be the correct *PP* to improvise in *RV.* 8.35.13-15.

But this last *pada* आ (as shown by the Padakāra[2]) must be *galita* along with the preceding सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । च । (in 8.35.13c). Hence we have to show how the आ thus required therein can be rightly said to be *galita*. About सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । च being *galita*, there can be no doubt. But how does the next आ become *galita* ? The answer to this question is that in *RV.*8.35.4 we have आ after च, as shown by the Padakāra himself. This, because it has occurred in this combination for the first time, cannot become *galita*,

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1. Which is *udātta*. (निपाता आद्युदात्ताः । उपसर्गाश्चाभिवर्जम्, फिट्॰).

2. The *padakāra* does not include it in his *PP*, which shows that he considers it as *galita*.

as shown again by the Padakāra himself. But in *ṛc*-s. 5 and 6 this आ together with the four preceding *pada*-s becomes *galita*, because they have occurred there again in the same order. But because the whole of the hemistich is repeated in 5cd and 6cd, it has become *galita*, the whole of it; and consequently the आ therein fails to be prominently marked. Then after a lapse of six more *ṛc*-s, we get this आ again along with सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । च । In *ṛc*-s. 13-15; but by the time we come to these *ṛc*-s, we become oblivious of the आ that has occurred above (in *ṛc*-s 4-6) and note only the four *pada*-s which are *galita* in all the preceding *ṛc*-s. And the result is that we feel inclined to take only the four *pada*-s (in c) as the *galita*, not caring to verify the accuracy of the *galita* conceived by us. And this is what has happened with all the editors of the *RV*[1].

It may thus be seen that the correct *PP RV*.8.35.13-15 must include the आ (to be taken over from *RV*.8.35.4-6 cd). It will be as follows : सऽजोषसौ । उषसा । सूर्येण । च । आ । आदित्यैः । यातम् । अश्विना । : and then we shall arrive at the *Saṁhitā Pāṭha* as found in all *RV*. editions, and even the editio-princeps (1862) of MM.[2]

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1. All editors without exception have given the *PP*. of these *ṛc*-s in the improvised form, evidently because they could find it in the *PP*. (traditional) of *RV*.8.35. 4.

2. It may be observed that in giving the *PP* of *RV*.8.35.5 and 6, the editors had before them the traditional *PP* of the fourth *pāda* so much so that they could arrive at the correct *PP*. of the whole hemistich by combining it with that of the third *pāda* as found in *RV*.8.35.1c. In the case of *RV*.8.05.13-15, on the other hand, they were misled by the *PP* of the third *pāda* (without आ) occurring so many times, so much so that the first occurrence of आ in *ṛc* 4 along with the third *pāda* and its recurrence in the next two *ṛc*-s easily escaped their notice. The result was that by the time they came to *ṛc*-s. 13-15, being oblivious of the आ being *galita* along with the third *pāda*, they coined the *PP* of 13c (as in the preceding *ṛc*-s) and remained completely oblivious of आ which ought to have been shown as *galita* on the basis of *Ṛc*-s 5 and 6 where it is already so. In spite of all this, however, one wonders how the discrepancy thus arising between the *Saṁhitā* and the *PP* passed unnoticed by all the editors except MM. and further, how MM was inclined to effect a change in the traditional and authentic *Saṁhitā Pāṭha*, instead of adjusting his improvised *PP*. so as to bring it in line with the traditional *Saṁhitā Pāṭha* (which he himself had in his editio princeps).

VEDIC VAṄKŪ

T. Y. Elizarenkova & V. N. Toporov

The meaning of the Vedic adjective *vaṅkú*—cannot be taken for established. An interesting tendency can be traced in its interpretation during the last century. It was treated by the old lexicography as something certain, though the semantic volume of this word in different dictionaries does not coincide: Grassmann—"sich tummelnd, sich rasch bewegend, rührig", Boehtlingk–Roth—'taumelnd, schwankend', Monier–Williams—'going crookedly or hurriedly, hastening, rash'. The development of Vedic studies during the last fifty years (first of all, the complete German translation of the *Ṛgveda* by K. Geldner, translations and linguistic investigations by L. Renou are meant), have resulted in a situation that *vaṅkú*—is ranked among the words with vague meaning in the recently completed Sanskrit etymological dictionary by M. Mayrhofer: "ein nicht einmütig übersetztes, wohl zur Sippe von *vañcati* gehöriges Epitheton".

The word *vaṅkú*—is used in the "*Ṛgveda*" (*ṚV*) where it is met only five times (twice in the same stanza). These stanzas should be closely examined.

Three times *vaṅkú*—is an epithet of the steeds of gods.

I. 51. 11 a-b (in an Indra-hymn):

mándiṣṭa yád uśáne kāvyé sácā̐

índro vaṅkū́ vaṅkutárā́dhi tiṣṭhati

Geldner's translation: "Als er sich bei *Uśanas Kāvya* gütlich getan hatte, besteigt Indra die fliegenden (Rosse), die besten flieger".

Renou's translation of the line b: "Indra monte les deux (chevaux) rapides, plus rapides (de Vāta)".

Sāyaṇa's comments: *vaṅkū vaṅkutarā atiśayena kuṭilaṃ gacchantāv aśvau . . . yad vā vaṅkutarā atiśayena vakraṃ gacchati rathe vaṅkū vakragamanaśilāv aśvau.*

VIII.1.11 (in an Indra-hymn) :

yát tudát sū́ra étaśaṃ
vaṅkū́ vātasya parṇínā
váhat kútsam ārjuneyáṃ śatákratuḥ
tsárad gandharvám ástṛtam

Geldner's translation: "Als (der Wagenlenker) den Etaśa der Sonne peitschte (und) die fliegenden Flügelrosse des Vāta, da fuhr der ratreiche (Indra) den Kutsa, den Sohn des Arjuna. Er stellte dem Gandharva nach, den noch keiner zu Fall gebracht hatte".

Sāyaṇa explains : *vaṅkū vakragāminau.*

Once *vaṅkú* – is an epithet of a god.

I. 114. 4 a-b (in a Rudra-hymn) :

tveṣáṃ vayáṃ rudráṃ yajñasā́dhaṃ
vaṅkúṃ kavím ávase ní hvayāmahe

Geldner's translation: "Wir rufen den funkelnden Rudra, den Opfererfüller, den fliegenden (?) Seher vur Gnade herab". In his comments he expresses his doubt about the possibility of *vaṅkú=vakrá–* .

Renou translates *vaṅkúṃ kavíṃ* as "le poète volant".

Sāyaṇa's comments : *vaṅkúṃ kuṭilagantāraṃ.*

Once *vaṅkú* – is an epithet of a man.

V.45.6 (in a Viśve-Devāḥ-hymn) :

étā dhíyam kṛṇávāmā sakhāyó
'pa yā́ matā́m̐ ṛṇutá vrajám góḥ
yáyā mánur viśiśipráṃ jigā́ya
yáyā vaṇig vaṅkúr ā́pā púrīṣam

Geldner's translation: "Wohlan! Wir wollen das Gebet verrichten, ihr Freunde, durch das die Mutter den Pferch der Kuh aufschloss, durch das Manu den Viśiśipra besiegte, durch das der fliegende Kaufmann den Quell erlangte".

Explaining this verse, Sāyaṇa relates a legend about the *ṛṣi* Kakṣīvat who wanted like a merchant to gain big profit by means of a small deed, and who made his way through the forest in search of water. There is no "flying merchant" in Sāyaṇa's story.

"Flying" is the new meaning of *vaṅkú*– which has appeared in the translations of Geldner and Renou, and which is absent in the old Western interpretations of the text. It should be noted that the two translators can be at variance in this respect dealing with

the same context—cf., e. g., differences in the interpretation of *vaṅkú*—in I. 51. 11: Geldner—"flying", Renou—"quick"; in I. 114. 4. Geldner is not sure about "the flying poet", while Renou does not hesitate.

In the strict sense, one cannot come to the conclusion that *vaṅkú*- means "flying" on the basis of the two contexts where *vaṅkú*- is an epithet of the steeds of Indra or Vāta. This is quite clear about Indra's steeds in I. 51. 11, but less evident in connection with those of Vāta in VIII. 1. 11, because they are called *parṇín*- lit. "having wings". Nevertheless, from the methodological viewpoint it would be wrong to suppose that the meaning of *parṇínā* can motivate not only the grammatical categories, but also the lexical meaning of its attribute *vaṅkú*-, so this context cannot serve as a key to the meaning of *vaṅkú*- either.

In the remaining two passages where *vaṅkú*- is an epithet of a god and of a person the meaning of this word is even less bound by the context. Then, the question arises: why is it so that Geldner translates without hesitations *vaṇíg vaṅkúḥ* in V.45.6 as "the flying merchant"? The reason of it should be concealed by extralinguistic data reconstructed by Geldner on the basis of comparison of a number of contexts of the *ṚV*.

In his comments on V.45.6d Geldner gives a reference to two other stanzas of the *ṚV*, supporting, to the translator's mind, his interpretation. The passages with Geldner's translations are as following.

I.112.11 (in an Aśvinau=hymn):

yā́bhiḥ sudānū auśijā́ya vaṇíje
dīrghá́śravase mádhu kóśo ákṣarat
kakṣī́vantaṃ stotā́raṃ yā́bhir ā́vataṃ
tā́bhir ū ṣú ūtíbhir aśvinā́ gatam

"Durch die, ihr Gabenschöne, für den Kaufman Dīrghaśravas, den Sohn der Uśij, die Kufe Honig träufte, mit denen ihr dem Sänger Kakṣīvat beistandet, mit diesen Hilfen kommt doch ja her, ihr Aśvin!".

Two points are important in this stanza. First, the merchant Dīrghaśravas is called *auśijá*-, that is son of Uśij (name of his mother, according to the traditional commentary). Secondly, he is mentioned together with the laudator Kakṣīvat who is considered to be one of the *ṛṣi*—compilers of the *Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā* (he is the author of the hymns I. 116-126). According to the *anukramaṇī*, Kakṣīvat is a son of Dīrghatamas and Uśij. In the text of the hymns the epithet *pajriyá*-is several times added to the name of Kakṣīvat, which means that his family members are the *pajrā́ḥ*. Besides, Kakṣīvat is also called *auśijá*-, the same as Dīghaśravas. Geldner thinks that as the fathership of Dīrghatamas is not expressed explicitly anywhere in the text, both the *auśijá*-, Dīrghaśravas and

Kakṣīvat, should be brothers. Therefore, when Ṛgvedic poet speaks about a flying *auśijá-* Geldner understands it as a flying merchant. This verse runs as following.

VI. 4. 6 c-d (an Agni-hymn):

citró nayat pári támāṃsy aktáḥ
śocíṣā pátmann auśijó ná d́īyan

"Der Buntfarbige führt über die Finsternis hinweg, (mit Schmalz) gesalbt durch seine Flamme im Fluge wie der fliegende Auśija".

This passage is qualified in the comments as the legend about the flying merchant, which means that the following equality has been deduced: *vaṇig vaṅkúḥ=auśijó d́īyan.*

If the kind of blood relationship between the merchant Dīrghaśravas and the *ṛṣi* Kakṣīvat has not much to do with the aims of this paper (à propos, such close a relationship between two persons representing quite different social functions seems to be not very probable even at that time), the linguistic conclusions drawn from this mythological reconstruction are rather important, for semantically *vaṅkú-* is being equated with *d́īyan.* Hence, the legend about "the flying merchant" who seems to have never existed in the *ṚV* in reality.

Returning to the meaning of the word *vaṅkú-* in the *ṚV*, attention should be drawn to the fact that Sāyaṇa's glosses are either *vakrá-*"crooked, curved, bent, tortuous, twisted, wry, oblique" (derived from the same root *vañc-* "to move crookedly") or *kuṭila-* "bent, crooked, curved etc.; dishonest, fraudulent". The meaning "flying" in connection with *vaṅkú-* remains completely unknown to Sāyaṇa.

The Old Indian data that can be used to establish the meaning of *vaṅkú-* are exhausted by the above cited passages from the *ṚV.* Even if the meaning "flying" is eliminated one cannot establish a safe semantic invariant of this word, using only the scarce information of the *ṚV.*

Though establishing the meaning of a word on the basis of its etymology is usually regarded as a procedure not quite correct, there are circumstances, when it is not only prohibited to use etymology for this sake, but even recommended. This is the case of a situation, when the number of contexts with the given word and their character is limited, which does not allow to establish safely the meaning of the word and makes one face the inevitable choice of only one possibility. To make this choice easier, one should apply to etymological data, including also external comparison. If the etymological solution of the problem is a safe one, and besides, there are convincing typological parallels to the semantic motivation of the word, the choice of the meaning of the word becomes much easier. This is just the case of the Vedic *vaṅkú-* .

It would be appropriate to begin the analysis of *vaṅkú-* with its use in the field of

mythology. First of all, attention should be drawn to the fact that *vaṅkú-* is an epithet of Rudra. A whole series of common characteristics uniting Rudra with Apollo has been demonstrated in its time :

Rudra (arrows)—diseases	Apollo (arrows)—diseases
Healer	Healer
Animal of Gaṇeśa, Rudra's son—mouse	Animal of Apollo—mouse (Ἀπόλλων Σμινθεύς)
Animal of Rudra—mole	Animal of Asklepios, Apollo's son—mole
Gaṇeśa—god of poetry	Apollo—god of poetry etc.[1].

It was pointed out in this connection that there exists correspondence between the description of Rudra as *vaṅkú-* and the epithet of Apollo λοξίας 'crooked', 'twisting', 'tangled' (in one's prophecies) used by the tragedians (Aeschylos, Sophokles and others). In former times this word was also denoting indirect movement, reeling gait like that of a mole or a mouse[2]; cf. λοξο-βάτης 'going aslant', 'having a slant gait', λοξο-πορέω 'to move along a slant line', λοξο-τρόχις 'following crooked ways' (also 'prophesyingin a tangled, vague way', e.g., in connection with Cassandra),

1. See *R. Goossens.* Esquisse d'une étude comparative,—in : *H. Grégoire* (avec la collaboration de R. Goossens et de M. Matthieu). Asklépios, Apollon Smintheus et Rudra. Études sur le dieu à la taupe et le dieu au rat dans la Grèce et dans l'Inde,—"Acadèmie Royale de Belgique. Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques. Mémoires", t. XLV. Bruxelles, 1949, p. 148, also 127 foll.; Cf.

   В.Н. Топоров. Μοῦσαι. 'Музы': соображения об имени и предистории образа, - "Античная балканистика и сравнительная грамматика". M. 1977, p. 66 foll.

2. Cf. particularly, λοξὰ βαίνειν about a crab (Babrius, 109, 1); λοξοβάτης καρκίνος (Batrachomyo-machie, 295); λοξὸς ὄφις (Callim. Epigr., 26) etc.

the same about λοξός combining in itself the meaning 'slant', 'sloping' and 'tangled', 'obscure' (particularly, in connection with answers; cf. λοξὰ ἀποκρίνεσθαι There are good reasons to suppose that the Vedic *vaṅkú-* belonged to the same semantic field, and thus might mean like 'dodgy' 'evasive', 'dexterous', 'shifting', actualizing this way another pole, connected with deviation from straightforwardness (that is adroitness vice versa non-adroitness)

Etymological connections of the Vedic *vaṅkú-* which are usually described in a rather incomplete way[1] give a support to this assumption. Beside the closest internal parallels like Vedic *vañc-* 'to move crookedly' (*"Atharvaveda"*, *"Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā"* etc.) connected with Avestan *vašyete* 'rises in waves', Germ. 'wogt', Vedic *vakrá-* 'crooked', 'bent'[2], *vákva-*, *vákvan-* (fem. *vákvar-i*) 'winding about', 'rolling', bubbling' (as Soma) (only in *ṚV*)[3] special attention should be given to the Baltic facts, actualizing both the variants of the Indo-European root *u̯e-n-k- and *u̯e-n-g-[4], postulated for the most ancient state (cf. Old.-Ind. *vaṅk-*, *vañc-*,[5] but *vaṅg-* 'to go', 'to limp' [*Dhātup.*, grammarians, the same about the Pāli *vaṅgati*] which remains rather vague.

These Baltic examples are the more important because they form a dense net of forms connected with each other, possessing all the possible degrees of vocalism and various types of stems. The main parallels connected with the semantics of Vedic *vaṅkú-* are as following: Lith. *vinklùs* 'dexterous', 'adroit', 'lithe', 'evasive', 'fidgety'[6], *vinkrùs* id. (cf. Old-Ind. *váṅkri-*, but *vaṅkù-*, that is *r* : *u*, while they are combined in Lith. *vink-rù-s*), *vingrus* 'twisting', 'intricate', 'tricky' (also about speech, words, cf. above about λόξιας *vingrùmas*, *vingris* 'dodge', 'trick', *vingrybe; vingùs* 'gewunden', 'durchtrieben', 'wendig', *vingur̃ys*, *vingulỹs*, *ungur̃ys* 'eel'; *vìngis* 'curve', 'winding', 'bend', 'zigzag' etc. (cf. *vingiùoti* 'to get twisted', 'to coil' etc.); *vangùs* 'sluggish', 'slow', 'lazy', *vangùmas*,

1. See M. Mayrhofer. KEWAi. Bd. 4 (Lief. 19), p. 124, cf. also 127. Cf. *J. Pokorny*. Idg. etym. Wb. I, pp. 1134-1135.
2. Cf. Old-Ind. *vaṅkera–* 'the bend of a river', *vaṅka–* id. and especially *váṅkri–* 'a rib.'
3. Here also belong, of course, *Av. vasta–* 'gekrümmt', Lat. (*con*) *vexus* 'gekrümmt', gewölbt', M. Ir. *feccaid* 'bückt sich' etc.
4. J. Pokorny. Idg. etym. Wb. I, pp. 1134-1135, 1148-1149; E. Fraenkel. Litauisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. Heidelberg, 1962, p, 1256 etc. Cf. also F. B. J. Kuiper. Die Indogermanischen Nasalpräsentia. Amsterdam. 1937, p. 142.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Cp. *vinklioti* 'verstricken', 'verwirren' etc.

vángstytis 'to dodge', to evade', 'to avoid' cf. *vángstytis dúoti atsākyma*—about avoiding to answer, cf. λοξὰ ἀποκρίνεσθαι *véngti* 'to avoid', 'to shirk' (cf. *véngti atsākymo* 'to avoid to answer), *iš-véngti*, *venginéti*, *vengìmas* 'evasion', 'shirking', *vengéjas* 'avoiding', 'shirking' etc.

These Lithuanian words are also supported by examples from the other Baltic languages, cp. Prussian *wingriskan* 'resourcefulness', 'cunning' (German 'List'); Latvian "curanisms" *viñgrs* 'elastic', 'strong', 'fresh'', *viñgruôt* 'to go in for gymnastics', *vingrinâties*, 'to practice', *vingrums* 'elasticity' and especially (from the semantic viewpoint) *viñguruôtiês* 'to walk slowy and awkwardly', 'to wind', 'to waste time', 'to be lazy', *vengre* 'tendril', 'runner', *vanga* 'handle of a vessel', loop' cf. Lith. *ãt-vanga* 'rest', 'peace'—*vangùs* 'lazy' or Pruss. *wangan* 'end', *wangint* 'to finish') etc[1]. Naturally, the range of examples can be considerably widened (cf. Gothic *un-wāhs* 'irreproachable', 'stainless', Old English *woh* 'crooked'. 'wrong', Old Saxon *wāh* 'evil', 'misfortune'; Old Icelandic *vā*, **u̯onkō* 'corner', 'trouble' etc). But even the afore-cited examples seem to be sufficient for giving the idea about the scope of the semantic scheme inside which Vedic *vaṅkú-* can be explained. The interpretation and translation of Vedic *vaṅkú-* in a number of the Ṛgvedic passages should be brought in correspondence with the general ideas about the meaning of this word.

Vaṅkú- in the *ṚV* in I.51.11 and VIII.1.11 functioning as an epithet of Indra's or Vāta's steeds, might be translated as 'dexterous', 'nimble' (cf. Russian **вёрткий, увёртливый** from **вертеть** denoting indirect movement); so Renou's translation 'rapide' is practically right, but does not express the historical motivation of the meaning.

Vaṅkú- in V. 45.6, describing the merchant making his way through the forest to the well, means most likely "going a twisting path".

Vaṅkú- in connection with Rudra's name transfers the literal meaning 'twisting

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1. See E. Fraenkel LEW pp. 1195, 1223, 1256-1257. It is important that the infixless forms are preserved in the Baltic languages as well, cf. Latv. *vaigs* 'cheek' etc. It is quite possible that the etymologically vague Lith. *vókas* 'eyelid', 'envelope' (and also Russian ВЬКО can be regarded as a variant of the same root devoid of infix (that is 'bend', 'cover' etc.)

poet', that is a poet who does not speak directly, who speaks obscurely, or in other words, one who masters poetical speech', because it is 'indirect' per definition.

Many typological parallels can be mentioned in connection with the idea 'crooked', 'twisting' as applied to the poet-priest, which is obvious for Ἀπόλλων Λοξίας. It would suffice here to remind of one of the most striking examples. The name of the ancient Lithuanian poet-priests was either *Krìvis Kriváitis* or *Krìvis-kriváitis* from the adjective *krìvas* 'crooked' (cf. *kreìvas* id.) The attribute of such a priest was a crooked club *krivùlis* (it is worth mentioning that up to now in some places of Lithuania there remains still a custom that peasants are called to a meeting by a special herald with a stick *krivùlis*). It is of special importance that the Lithuanian *Krìvis* named Lizdeiko was just a prophet, furtune-teller and poet. The manner of his prophecies, his poetical speech should be sophisticated and vague, so to say 'twisted' and 'crooked'.

This motif, in its turn, leads us to the problem of the "indirect" modus of the archaic poetical speech of the ancient Indo-European poets, like the Old-Indian *kavi-* or the Latin *vātes*[1]. Such a poetical 'crookedness' has survived upto much later times than Indo-European epoch. A good example of it makes the Indian term *vakrokti* (lit. 'a crooked expression') designating an intricate (indirect turn) of speech in poetry used (in somewhat different meanings) in treatises on poetics by Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Ānandavardhana, Vāmana, Rudraṭa and others.

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1. See the posthumously published works of F. de Saussure about poetics.

HINDU PILGRIMAGE AND VEDIC SACRIFICE[1]

Jacob Ensink

Vedic sacrifice is not essential to Hindu pilgrimage, nor is pilgrimage in evidence in the Vedas[2]. In this paper an attempt will be made to show that the association of the two, as formulated in various ways by Hindu tradition, was inspired by the wish to harmonize pilgrimage with the Vedic religion.

In Hinduism it is recommended to perform the *śrāddha* and other sacrifices to the ancestors in certain places of pilgrimage. Gayā, as is well-known, is pre-eminently the place for these rites[3], but many of the important places of pilgrimage[4] are believed to be very auspicious for bringing sacrifices to the fathers. Sidhpur in Gujarat is the special place for performing the rites for the mother and other female deceased relatives[5]. Several later works on pilgrimage[6] deal with different forms of *śrāddha* to be performed in places of pilgrimage in general, but then one should keep in mind that at least some of these texts probably have in view the *tristhalī*, i. e. the three most important holy places, Prayāga, Kāśī and Gayā.

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1. This is the edited text of a paper read to a meeting of Indologists in Leiden, September 18th, 1976. In preparing it I have used the documentation on pilgrimage and fairs of the University of Groningen.
2. Ensink 1974. 67-71.
3. *Yājñ.Sm.* 1. 259 f.; *GayāM.* passim. Cp. Kane *HDh.* 4.654ff.; Vidyarthi 1961. chapt. II; Jacques 1962. pp. VII-XXI.
4. *Vi.Sm.* chapt. 85 (This chapter mentions Puṣkara even before Gayā); Lakṣmīdhara *TVK* 10. Cp. Kane *HDh.* 4.616 f. for Puṣkara also *AgniP.* 109.4-9; for the banks of the Narmadā Lakṣmīdhara *TVK* 199.
5. Kane *HDh.* 4.804 b s.v. Siddhapura; Stevenson 1920. 364. According to *MatsyaP.* 13,23-46 Devī is worshipped here under the name of *Mātṛ*.
6. E.g. Lakṣmīdhara *TVK* 10; Vācaspati Miśra *TC* 10 ff.

The *Brahmapurāṇa*[1] uses the word *tīrtha* (place of pilgrimage) interchangeably with *medhya* (fit for sacrifice) and *karmabhūmi* (land fit for the performance of the rites) :

trayāṇām api lokānāṁ tīrthaṁ medhyam udāhṛtam |
tatrāpi Jāmbavaṁ dvīpaṁ tīrthaṁ bahuguṇodayam ||
Jāmbave Bhāratam varṣaṁ tīrthaṁ trailokyaviśrutam |
Karmabhūmir yataḥ putra tasmāt tīrthaṁ tad ucyate||

'Everywhere in the three worlds a *tīrtha* is said to be fit for sacrifice and Jambūdvīpa is a *tīrtha* which is a source of many virtues. In Jambūdvīpa Bhāratavarṣa is a *tīrtha* renowned throughout the three worlds. As it is a land fit for the performance of the rites, my son, it is called a *tīrtha*'.

Also pilgrimage and sacrifice are put on par by equatig the merit gained by a pilgrimage (*tīrthaphala*) with that derived from one or more great Vedic sacrifices, irrespective of what religious act is prescribed in the holy place concerned.

Statements concerning *tīrthaphala* form an essential element in the *māhātmyā*-s. Sometimes these texts axactly specify the result the pilgrim will reap by a given act in a given sanctuary. This my be release, rebirth in heaven, purification from sin, protection against harmful influences from the stars, recovery from certain illnesses (e. g. leprosy), fulfilment of wishes, beauty, etc., etc.

In other cases, however, only the quantity of the merit gained is indicated by a certain standard. Now the merit of a Vedic sacrifice often is such a standard. E. g. by taking a bath in the confluence of Sarayū and Ghaghara the pilgrim obtains an amount of merit equal to that derived from a thousand *aśvamedha*-s and a hundred *vājapeya*-s or the gift of gold in Kurukṣetra at the time of an eclipse of the sun[2].

The example illustrates that besides the standard of the Vedic sacrifices others may be used, in this case a famous pilgrimage to another holy place. In the same passage (vs. 87) we find the equation with hanging head downwards for ten thousand years.

Sometimes—as in the case of Gopratāra, the most important sanctuary of Ayodhyā—a full catalogue of rituals and the *tīrthaphala* reaped from them is given[3]; to mention a few items only : lighting a lamp with ghee or sesame-oil produces more merit than an *aśvamedha*; presenting a lamp to Keśava in the month of Kārtika the merit of all sacrifices plus the bathing in all holy bathing-places; a bath in the Sarayū near Gopratāra plus the feeding of brahmans equals a *sautrāmaṇi* in merit.

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1. *BrahmaP.* 70.20 f.
2. *SkandaP.* 2.8.6.81-84.
3. *Ibid.* 2.8,6. 176-202,

The purification from the sin of the murder of a brahman also figures as a standard. One of the stereotyped names for holy tanks is *Koṭitīrtha*. It is differently explained[1], but in Gokarn a tank of that name is believed to purify the bather from sins equal to the murder of ten millions of brahmans.

Vedic sacrifices are frequently used as the yard-stick for *tīrthaphala* in one of the oldest texts of the *māhātmya* type, viz. the *Tīrthayātrāparvan* in the third book of the *Mahābhārata*[2].

This long passage first gives a description of a pilgrimage to a great number of holy places, the whole constituting a *pradakṣiṇā* of the subcontinent. Its style is much more succinct than the puranic *māhātmya*-s and it does not always state the nature of the ritual to be performed in the holy place. In some cases just entering the place seems to suffice.

gamanād eva rājendra Dīrghasattram arindama /
rājasūyāśvamedhābhyāṃ phalaṃ prāpnoti mānavaḥ // (80.117)

'Just by going to *Dīrghasattra*, O lord of kings, tamer of enemies, man obtains the result of a *rājasūya* and an *aśvamedha*'.

Sugandhāṃ Śatakumbhāṃ ca Pañcayajñaṃ ca Bhārata /
abhigamya naraśreṣṭha svargaloke mahīyate // (82.9)

'When one has visited Sugandhā, Śatakumbhā and Pañcayajña, O scion of Bharata, best of men, one glories in heaven'.

Naimiṣaṃ prārthayānasya pāpasyārdhaṃ praṇaśyati /
Praviṣṭamātras tu naraḥ sarvapāpaiḥ pramucyate / (*82.54*)

'When a man longs to go to Naimiṣa, half of his sin is annulled. As soon as he has entered it he is freed of all his sins'.

Sometimes *tarpaṇa* to the fathers, the gods and the seers is prescribed, or the offering of a *caru*, often the worship of the god of the place or a stay of a certain duration, in some cases combined with a fast. Though most frequently we meet with the prescription of ablutions (*abhiṣeka*) or a bath (*snāna*).

In this *Tīrthayātrāparvan* too *tīrthaphala* is determined in various ways, but the equation with Vedic sacrifices strongly predominates. These sacrifices moreover are more highly valued than in the purāṇic *māhātmyas*, e.g. the worship of *Mahākāla*, the most important god of Ujjayinī, plus a bath in that holy place equals one *aśvamedha* in merit.

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1. *Ibid.* 5.3 (*Narmadāmāhātmya*) 113.2; 203.6 and 219.1 it is understood as the holy place where the merit of certain acts is multiplied by ten million.
2. *MBh.* 3.80-153.

The constant recurrence of the comparison between pilgrimage and sacrifice seems in tune with the opening of the text. There we find seven *śloka*-s that may be considered a vindication of pilgrimage in terms of orthodox Hinduism. Obviously this passage has been understood as such by later teachers, as appears from its being quoted over and over again in purāṇas, *dharmanibandha*-s and special books on pilgrimage.

'In this world the seers in the Veda have taught the sacrifices in due order and what exactly will be the result of each of them, here as well as hereafter. But those sacrifices are out of the reach of the poor man, O king; sacrifices require many utensils and a large variety of materials. Kings or wealthy men may sometimes perform them, but not people without means, who have no company, are isolated and do not operate jointly. Hear, O king, what rite is within the reach even of the poor and in merit equals the result of sacrifices, O champion of the warriors. This is a most secret teaching of the seers, O excellent Bharata : the meritorious visit of holy places even surpasses sacrifices. He who has never kept a fast for three days and nights, has not visited holy sites and has not given gold nor cows is indeed reborn a poor man. He who has performed the *agniṣṭoma* and similar sacrifices with liberal gifts does not reap such fruit as from the visit of holy places'[1].

Obviously it is only the *śrauta* sacrifices that are thought of here, those that are optional. It should be mentioned in passing that one may by means of a pilgrimage also free oneself of the three religious debts an *ārya* has. In Ayodhyā[2], Benares[3], Kurukṣetra[4], Prayāga[5], and Rāmeśvaram[6] (and in other places as well), there is a sanctuary *Ṛṇa(pra/vi) mocana* ('Freeing from Debts'). By visiting one of those the pilgrim may acquit himself of his debt of sacrifices to the gods, study of the Veda to the seers and procreation to the fathers[7].

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1. *Ibid.* 3.80.34-40. Cp. Ensink 1974. 58 f.
2. *SkandaP.* 2.8.2.22-33.
3. Lakṣmīdhara *TVK* 56.
4. *VāmanaP.* Saro M. 20.6.
5. *KūrmaP. Pūrvārddha* 38.14-16.
6. *SkandaP.* 3.1.42.2-11 ab.
7. However, the explanation given of the name varies. E.g. in *Revākhaṇḍa* (*SkandaP.* 5.3.87 and 208) by 'the three debts' the debts to gods, fathers and men seem to be understood. Cunningham (*ASIR* 14.76) tells us about a tank situated near the upper stream of the Sarsuti: 'a sacred holy tank, called Ṛṇa-mochan, or the "debt-freeing" pool, because the Brahmans of the place affirm that whoever bathes in it becomes at once free of debt. . . . Numbers of people bathe in it daily in the vain hope that something may turn up to relieve them of their debts'. On the other hand in Gayā (*GayāM.* 4.42-47) the sanctuary of Janārdana is said to yield freedom from debts to gods, fathers and seers as a *tīrthaphala*.

Myth also in many cases connects pilgrimage with sacrifice, inasmuch as according to the *Mahābhārata*, purāṇic *māhātmya*-s and other sources gods, notably Brahmā/Pitāmaha/ Prajāpati, have performed sacrifices in several holy places and among these the most important places of pilgrimage.

Such is the case in the myth of Kāśī[1]. Śiva wants to return to his beloved Kāśī, but to that end Divodāsa, the excellent king who reigns in the city, has to be dethroned. This seems possible only if some shortcoming can be found in Divodāsa. Brahmā, sent by Śiva, takes the shape of a brahman and asks the king for assistance in the sacrifices he wants to perform, anticipating that the king will somehow fail to fulfil that task. But Divodāsa liberally supplies all that is needed from his stores and Brahmā performs ten *aśvamedha*-s. The place of sacrifice, until then called Rudrasaras, is given the name Daśāśvamedhatīrtha, now Daśāśvamedh Ghāṭ.

According to tradition[2] the name Prayāga is derived from *prakṛṣṭa* (special; according to Aiyangar[3]; difficult) and *yāga* (sacrifice), a sacrifice performed by Pitāmaha/ Prajāpati in that place.

Dakṣa's well-known sacrifice is localized in Kanakhala[4] near Hardwar.

The *Padmapurāṇa*[5] tells us about Brahmā's sacrifice in Puṣkara; how his wife Sāvitrī became angry and did not want to attend, how Brahmā in order to avoid interruption of the sacrifice, married the girl cowherd Gāyatrī, and how later on Sāvitrī was reconciled and she too got a temple in Puṣkara.

The theme of a quarrel between Brahmā and his wife (now Sarasvatī by name) is also found in the *māhātmya* of Kāñcī[6]. Sarasvatī assumes the form of the river Vegavatī and wants to flood the sacrificial ground, but Viṣṇu lies down to ward off the water with his body until the sacrifice is finished. After that he remains in Kāñcī as Varada-rāja.

According to the *Tīrthayātrāparvan* the place Dīrghasattra, somewhere near the place where the river Sarasvatī disappeared in the desert (*Vinaśana*), derived its name from a long sacrificial session held there by gods, siddhas and seers :

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1. *SkandaP.* 4 (*Kāśīkhaṇḍa*). 2.52; Vallauri 1944. 18.
2. Mitra Miśra *TP* 327. Cp. Lakṣmīdhara *TVK* 136.
3. In his Introduction to *TVK*, p. LXXIX.
4. *SkandaP.* 1.1.2ff.; Vallauri 1934. 4 f. Cp. *KūrmaP.* 2.36.10.
5. *PadmaP.* 1.16-34.
6. Srinivasan 1961. 27 f.

yatra Brahmādayo devāḥ siddhāś ca paramarṣayaḥ /
dīrghasattram upāsante dakṣiṇābhir yatavaratāḥ //[1]

'. . . where Brahmā and the other gods, the siddhas and the supreme seers held a long sacrificial session with appropriate *dakṣiṇā*-s, strict in the observance of their vows.'

The myth of the asura Gaya, on whose body Brahmā together with all other gods performed a sacrifice and remained ever since, has been told in the *māhātmya* of Gayā[2].

Kurukṣetra is styled Brahmavedī and uttaravedi of Pitāmaha in the *Tīrthayātrā-parvan*[3]. In the *Vāmanapurāṇa*[4] the term is reinterpreted as 'Northern altar', Kurukṣetra forming part of a complex of five altars, toghether with Prayāga in the centre, Gayāśiras—a hill in Gayā—in the East, Virajā - nowadays Jājpur in Orissa—in the South, and Puṣkara in the West.

In the myth of Bhṛgukaccha[5], modern Broach, it is the asura Bali who acts as the sacrificer. There he, with the help of the Bhṛgus, performs the *aśvamedha*-s by which he wins the three worlds, there also Viṣṇu in the shape of a dwarf comes to visit him.

The village Hiremagalur[6] in Karnataka is said to be the place where king Janamejaya performed his serpent sacrifice. A stone pillar is believed to have been the *yūpa* in that ritual and curative power against snake-bite is ascribed to it.

To sum up, we have distinguished three manners in which pilgrimage is connected with sacrifice : (1) a sacrifice to be performed in the holy place is prescribed to the pilgrim ; (2) *tīrthaphala* is measured by the amount of merit gained from one or more sacrifices ; (3) a god is said to have performed a sacrifice in the holy place.



Yet sacrifice obviously is not the central rite in Indian pilgrimage. The purāṇic *māhātmya*-s with regard to each sanctuary specify what ritual the pilgrim has to perform.

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1. *MBh.* 3.80.116.
2. *GayāM.* 2.
3. *MBh.* 3.81.177 f.
4. *VāmanaP.* 23. 20cd.
5. *BhāgP.* 8. 18. 20 ff. Cp. Dist. Gaz. Surat-Broach 551 f.
6. Mysore Gaz. 5. 1147 f.

This may be a sacrifice, but often it is a fast, sometimes shaving one's head, naturally the worship of the god or gods of the sanctuary, and nearly always gifts—either specified or not and especially to brahmans—and a bath (*snāna*). It should be kept in mind that not only nearly every place of pilgrimage is situated on the banks of a river or has at least one tank, but also many separate sanctuaries have some bathing-place in their immediate vicinity. Passages like the following are very frequent in *māhātmya*-s.

tatra snānena dānena tapasā ca viśeṣataḥ /
gandhair mālyair dhūpadipair nānāvibhavavistaraiḥ/
Rāmaṁ sampūjya Sītāṁ ca muktaḥ syān nātra saṁśayaḥ //[1]

'When one has taken a bath there, given gifts and especially practised austerities and worshipped Rāma and Sītā with perfumes, garlands, incense, lamps and various costly things, one no doubt will be released.'

Thus the rhyme *snāna-dāna* has become current in the *māhātmya*-s, as has *bhukti-mukti* (happiness in, and release from rebirth).

The older evidence consistently seems to bear out the hypothesis that of old a bath or ablutions were the central rite in pilgrimage.

In a general way the use of the word *tīrtha* pleads for this hypothesis. Its current acceptation of 'place of pilgrimage in general' has developed from the meaning 'a way down to the level of the water'[2].

Moreover, most of the oldest places of pilgrimage are either rivers or places on the banks of rivers or tanks. Apart from Kurukṣetra (in between the rivers Sarasvatī and Dṛṣadvatī and with many tanks) the Ganges with Prayāga, Gayā (on the river Phalgu) and Puṣkara (with sacred lakes) are the most important. Kāśī is not as much in evidence as one might suppose.

Among the apocryphal verses (*khila*) of the *Ṛgveda saṁhitā* one (after *ṚV* 10.75.5; rather late according to editor Scheftelowitz[3] obviously refers to the confluence of Yamunā and Ganges at Prayāga :

sitāsité sarite yátra saṅgaté
tátrāplutā́so divam út patanti /
yé vai tanúaṁ vi sṛjanti dhīrās
te jánāso amṛtatváṁ bhajanti //

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1. *SkandaP.* 2. 8. 6. 8.
2. Ensink 1974. 64.
3. Scheftelowitz 1906. 171, nr. 5.

'Those who plunge in to the water where the white and the black river meet ascend to heaven. Those wise people who give up their lives there obtain immortality'.

More places of pilgrimage are mentioned in the Pāli canon. As one may expect the custom is discussed critically in these texts : whoever is inwardly pure does not need the bath in a *tīrtha*, and who is not so will not be cleansed by all rivers together. In this connection several rivers and bathing-places are mentioned, among them Gayā, the Sarasvatī and Prayāga[1]. From the wide geographical distribution of these places we may conclude that in the days when the Pāli canon got its shape pilgrimages were already made over great distances.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* includes the well-known episode on the descent of the Ganges (*Gaṅgāvataraṇa*)[2]. This is in fact the oldest *Gaṅgāmāhātmya* and one of the oldest *māhātmya*-s in general. It especially exalts the purificatory force of the water of the Ganges.




For pilgrimage as it is described and recommended in the Epic and the Purāṇas, and as it is practised in Hinduism upto the present, the Vedas do not afford any authority. Though in the *Ṛgveda* the waters are frequently addressed, only seldom are they said to purify from sin.

idam āpaḥ prá vahata yát kiṁ ca duritáṁ mayi |
yád vāhám abhidudróha yád vā śepá utānṛtam ||

ā́po adyā́nv acāriṣaṁ rásena sám agasmahi |[3]

'O waters, carry off everything that is sinful in me, the wrong I have done, or the false oath I have sworn. Today I have gone into the waters, I have met the fluid.'

ā́po asmā́n mātáraḥ śundhayantu
ghṛtêna no ghṛtapuaḥ punantu |

viśvaṁ hi ripráṁ pravā́hanti devī́r
úd id ādhyaḥ śúcir ā pūtá emi ||[4]

'The waters, the mothers, may make us clean. Clarified like ghee, may they clarify us with ghee. For the gddesses carry off all dirt. Pure, purified, I come out of them.'

1. *Majjh.N.* 1. 39. Cp. J 6. 198. 3 ff. (543).
2. *Rām.* 1. 37-43.
3. *ṚV* 10.9. 8 f.=1. 23. 22 f.
4. *Ibid.* 10.17. 10.

Even in these verses it probably is the waters in the worshipper's neighbourhood that are thought of, not rivers or tanks that are the goal of pilgrimages.

However, special places are mentioned by name as being very auspicious for performing sacrifices.

ni tvā dadhe vára ā́ pṛthivyā́
Ilāyās padé sudinatvé áhnām |

Dṛṣádvatyām mānuṣa Āpayā́yām
Sárasvatyām revád Agne didīhi ||[1]

'I place you in the best spot of the earth, in Iḷā's place on an auspicious day among the days. Blaze brilliantly on the Dṛsadvatī, on the Āpayā among men, on the Sarasvatī O Agni.'

ṛṣayo vai Sarasvatyām satram āsata ||[2]

'The seers performed a sattra on the Sarasvatī'

Also those curious rituals called *yātsattra* (sacrificial processions[3]) are performed on the banks of the Sarasvatī and the Dṛṣadvatī. The *Sārasvata-yātsattra* begins at Vinaśana, the place where the Sarasvatī disappears into the sand of the desert. Each day the place for sacrifice is arranged as far upstream from the former as the *adhvaryu* has thrown the *śamyā* (a wooden pin). In this way the ritual proceeds until the source of the Sarasvatī at Plakṣa Prasrāvaṇa is reached.

The *Mahābhārata* mentions a twelve-year *sattra* on the banks of the Sarasvatī and, according to a rough calculation of the time needed for the *yātsattra*, this might refer to that ritual. Brahmaṇas and sūtras also define a *Dārṣadvatasattra*, which, with the necessary changes, follows the model of the *Sārasvatasattra*.

In some places in the Vedic texts[4] it is said that the gods performed sacrifices, notably *sattra*-s, in Kurukṣetra; sometimes also Kurukṣetra is designated as their *vedi*. So the *Mahābhārata* poet who styled Kurukṣetra Brahmā's *vedi* had Vedic authority.



It has been a long way which led to the adoption of pilgrimage in brahman orthodoxy. As testimonies to that adoption we may consider the *Mahābhārata* passages on

1. *Ibid.* 3. 23. 4.
2. *Ait.Br.* 2. 19.
3. Hillebrandt 1897. § 81. *On the Sārasvatasattra*-s Ohmann 1971.
4. See Kane *HDh.* 4. 680 f.

tirthayātrā. Apart from the *Tīrthayātrāparvan* already mentioned there is another in the *Śalyaparvan*[1] and a narrative of Arjuna's pilgrimage in the *Ādiparvan*[2] and one in the *Viṣṇusmṛti*[3], which mentions some fifty holy places with their *tirthaphala* The *Mahābhārata* passages are generally considered late additions to the Epic; the chapter in the *Viṣṇusmṛti* according to Jolly (1896.7) is 'a passage of a modern character'. *Tīrthayātrāparvan* and *Viṣṇusmṛti* differ in that in the first text the circle of *tīrtha*-s comprises the whole subcontinent as far as Kanyākumārī, whereas in the *Viṣṇusmṛti* it only reaches as far South as the Kṛṣṇā basin. This however, need not imply a difference in date. Probably we may assign both texts to the first centuries of the Christian era.

The dharmaśāstras, apart from the *adhyāya* in the *Viṣṇusmṛti* just mentioned, refer to pilgrimage very seldom and on the whole do not seem in favour of the custom. The *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*[4] mentions the sacrifices to the ancestors performed in Gayā. In the *Manusmṛti* pilgrimage is only spoken of in a negative sense. In an address which the king-judge makes to the witnesses, admonishing them to speak the truth, he says :

> *Yamo Vaivasvato devo yas tavaiṣa hṛdi sthitaḥ |*
> *tena ced avivādas te mā Gaṅgāṃ mā Kurūn gamaḥ ||*[5]

'If you are in harmony with that divine Yama, the son of Vivasvat, who dwells in your heart, then do not go the Ganges, nor to Kurukṣetra'.

Among the Vedic rites the sacrifices to the ancestors probably were the first to become connected with the cult of bathing-places. This connection may have lain close at hand because the libations of water were preferably made in a river. The *Viṣṇusmṛti* passage referred to above ends with the following 'verses chanted by the ancestors' (*pitṛgitā gāthā*-s)[6].

> *Kule 'smākaṃ sa jantuḥ syād yo no dadyāj jalāñjalin |*
> *nadiṣu bahutoyāsu śitalāsu viśeṣataḥ ||*
> *api jāyeta so 'smākaṃ kule kaścin narottamaḥ ||*
> *Gayāśirse vaṭe śrāddhaṃ yo naḥ kuryāt samāhitaḥ ||*
> *eṣṭavyā bahavaḥ putrā yady eko 'pi Gayāṃ vrajet |*
> *yajeta vāśvamedhena nīlaṃ vā vṛṣam utsṛjet ||*

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1. *MBh.* 9. 29-53.
2. *Ibid.* 1. 207-210.
3. *Vi.Sm.* 85.
4. *Yājñ.Sm.* 1, 259 f.
5. *ManuSm.* 8. 92.
6. *Vi.Sm.* 85. 68-71.

'May the man be born in our family who in rivers rich in water and preferably cool will give us handsful of water. May some excellent man be born in our family who on Gayāśīrṣa near the banyan with concentrated mind will perform a *śrāddha* for us. One should strive to have many sons, that one at least may go to Gayā or bring the horse-sacrifice, or may set a black bull free'.

The *Garuḍupurāṇa*[1] tells us that one should make these libations after having bathed and standing in the water as deep as the navel[2].

To explain why Gayā, so far from the homeland of the Vedas, so early became so important for the rites for the ancestors we might venture the hypothesis that this place, even before the coming of the brahmans, was a centre of the cult of the dead. The history of Indonesian religion shows that pre-Hindu elements may assume such an unexceptionable Sanskrit attire that their prevenance may hardly be traceable.

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ŚUCI

J. Gonda

In religious and ritual terminology 'impurity' includes more than mere filth[1]. It means all that is held to be unclean, afflicted with evil, contaminated, undesirable, sinful. The accumulation of impurity means evil, dwindling of power, increasing impotence, a chance of misfortune or disaster. The ritually unclean destroys the value of objects with which it comes into contact. Loss of value or power is a serious cause for anxiety. An insight into the meaning of 'impurity' can be gained by studying the ritual customs and precepts of almost any religion, not in the last place that of the Veda. But it is a curious fact that authors of books on the essence of religious phenomena have often overlooked not only many pertinent data found in the ancient Indian literature but also some most interesting explanations furnished by the Vedic authors themselves. Vedic literature clearly shows that 'impurity'—in a ritual or religious sense—is from a 'modern' point of view and for an analytic mind a complicated concept. It is both the concretely dirty and the morally and spiritually unclean, and still it is something more. Bu this is not to conclude that Vedic man felt it to be complicated and analyzable.

The terms usually used to denote the 'pure' and 'impure' are *śuci* and *aśuci*. Food that a student obtains by begging is pure (*śuci*)[2], but with curds that are impure (*aśuci*)[3] no sacrificial rite can be performed. A woman in childbed is impure for ten days (*aśaucakāla*)[4] so is her husband, because impurity is considered to be infectious[5]. When a brahmin dies after *upanayana* his *sapiṇḍa* relations are impure for ten days

1. See e.g. G. van der Leeuw, *Religion in essence and manifestation*, London 1938, ch. 49 etc.
2. *Yājñavalkya* 1. 187.
3. *Apast. Dharmas* 1.29.14.
4. Comm. on *KāṭhGs*. 36. 1.
5. See also *VasDhś*. 4. 23.

(*āśaucam*)[1], because the impurity of death is regarded as a source of contamination. Study of the Veda is forbidden when one is impure (*aśuci*) oneself or when the place is impure[2]. One should not touch or look at definite sacrificial material when one is impure (*aśuci*)[3]. That in these 'concepts' what we call ritual motives, morality, hygiene and decency are often mixed up appears, e. g. also from *Viṣṇusmṛti*[4] stating that which is weakened (damaged, *upahatam*) by the dirty excretions of the body, *surā* and intoxicating drinks is weakened in the highest degree. Hence the difficulty found in translating the relevant terms into the 'modern' languages of those for whom 'pure' is either (chemically etc.) uncontaminated, or morally clean and uncorrupted and for whom the belief in contamination by contact with ritually impure persons or objects is irrational. The very necessity to translate ancient Indian terms, according to their context, by more than one English word—in this case by "clear, clean, pure, holy, unsullied, undefiled, innocent, honest, virtuous" (Monier-Williams) often suggests the existence of polysemy in Sanskrit where there is none. This apparent multiplicity of meanings is—like the often divergent explanations and translations of one and the same term—in many cases only a consequence of the impossibility of translating Vedic or in general ancient Sanskrit terms into modern English, French or German[5].

The ultimate motive of 'purification' is not liberation from actual dirt—although it can contribute to what we nowadays call hygiene—; it is release from evil and at the same time the induction of good power or fresh fitness or potency. That this was very well understood in Vedic antiquity appears not only from many rites but also from *ŚatBr.*[6] where *śuci* is said to mean *vīryam*—likewise an untranslatable word : "(manly) power, virtue, energy, vigour"; the author adds in explanation : "when (a child) grows by means of food then there is *vīryam*; and hence, when one has made him grow by means of food, one thereby puts into him that *vīryam*, that *śuci*". *KauṣBr.*[7] dealing with the pure or bright (*śuci*) form of Agni (i. e. the sun) states that *śuci* is regarded as auspicious (*śiva*), effective or powerful (*śagma*) and fit for sacrificial worship (*yajñiya*). It is these explanations of the idea expressed by *śuci* and its relation, or applicability to, fire and the sun that throws some light on the use of *śuci* in ritual contexts.

If appearances are not deceptive the semantic nucleus of the words which in the Veda belong to the *śuc*—is that of "bright(ness)" or rather of "radiating light (and

1. *VaikhGs.* 7. 5.
2. *ĀśvalGs.* 3. 4. 7.
3. *SāmavBr.* 2. 6. 10.
4. 23. 1.
5. See my article The study of ancient-Indian religious terminology, in *History of Religions* 1 (Chicago 1961), p. 243 ff. (=J. Gonda, *Selected Studies*, Leiden 1975, V, p. 1 ff).
6. 2. 2. 1. 8 and 12.
7. 1. 1. 14 f.

heat)"[1]. The adjective *śuci* is often used to characterize the fire or its god as "shining, bright"[2]. This adjective is closely related to the noun *śocis* which, meaning "flame", occurs 53 times in the *Ṛgveda*, where it appears almost exclusively as a characteristic of Agni (twice of Uṣas, once of the sun); 34 of these occurrences are in the singular instrumental *śociṣā* used to denote an important aspect of Agni's activity. This activity is regarded as auspicious, as beneficial to man, the cosmos, and man's ritual undertakings, also in that minority of cases in which Agni's *śocis* is directed against man's enemies[3]. In part of these places[4] this noun is accompanied by the etymologically related adjective *śukra* expressing a similar meaning "bright, clear" and is elsewhere used to characterize Agni himself[5], the sun[6] or Agni's rays of light[7] etc. Some verses of the *RV*[8]. are of special interest, where addressing Agni the poet says *śociṣā śośucac śuce* and *śukréṇa deva śociṣā*...*śukra* illustrating the close relationship of the three words. With their use that of the verb *śuc*—(*śocati*) is in harmony[9].

Is it too bold a supposition that the use of the adjective *śuci* to denote an auspiciously and beneficially 'positive' quality of a phenomenon and power that in the opinion of all those who concerned themselves with the ritual was of the greatest importance was 'transferred' to other objects or concepts in the ritual sphere among them that other important ritual element, power and deity, Soma ? Both figures—or elements of the ritual—have much in common : their significant place in the material equipments of the sacrifice, their being associated with divinity, their terrestrial but—in the speculations of priests and poets—at the same time supermundane production, their being instrumental

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1. Remember the frequent occurrence of e.g. the root-noun *śuc* to denote ideas such as "pain, grief, sorrow", a metaphor of the use in the sense of "glow, heat".
2. E.g.*RV*. 1. 31 17; 1. 66. 2; 2. 1. 1; 2. 1. 14; 5. 1. 3; 6. 6. 3; 6. 15. 1; 6. 15. 7 etc.); cf. especially 3. 5. 7 *didyānaḥ śúciḥ*. . . "shining, bright. . ."; 5. 11. 1 *dyumád vi bhāti*...*śúciḥ* "(Agni) shines forth brilliantly . . . , the bright one"; 7. 15. 10 *agnir* . . . *śukráśocir*...*śúciḥ pāvakáḥ* . . . ; 1. 141. 4 (cf. 5) *ghṛṇā śúciḥ* (where Geldner, whose usual translation is "rein" ("pure"), is forced to translate "radiating brightly with heat"); 2. 7. 4 *śúciḥ pāvaka . . . vi rocase*; 4. 1. 7 *śúciḥ śukró*... *rórucānaḥ*; 7. 10. 1; 8. 43. 13 etc.; Agni's flames (6. 6. 3; 8. 44. 17)—compare also compounds such as *śucijanman* "of radiant birth" (1. 141. 7), *śucijihva* "with a radiant tongue" (2. 9. 1) characterizing Agni—and also (1. 160. 1) the sun (*sūryaḥ śúciḥ*, not, with Geldner "pure" ("rein"); cf. e.g. *AiBr*. 4. 10. 12; *KauṣBr*. 25. 8. 3; *TB*. I. 1. 6. 3 "Agni *śuci* is the sun (*ādityaḥ*)".
3. See also C. J. Blair, *Heat in the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda*, New Haven Conn. 1961, p. 89 f.
4. E.g. 1. 12. 12; 1. 45. 4; 1. 48. 14; 9. 85. 12.
5. 4. 11. 2; 5. 23. 4; 6. 48. 7 *śukréṇa deva śociṣā*. . . *śukra dīdihi*, etc.
6. E.g. 1. 43. 5.
7. 3.6.3.
8. 6. 48. 3 and 7.
9. E.g. *ṚV*. 3.13.6; 5.17.3; 6,16.45.

in bringing the gods to the sacrificial place.[1] In *RV.*[2] Soma is said to be "of brilliant kinship" (*śucibandhu* : he is related to Fire and the Sun). The 'semantic change' is slight, both applications of the adjective involved refer to sensations which are situated in the same sphere of the sensorium, viz. that of sight.[3]

In support of his translation "the shining Soma" for *śuciḥ....somaḥ* in *ṚV.*[4] Bhawe[5] already drew attention to a verse[6], where Soma is said to have illuminated heaven and earth[7]. This translation seems indeed preferable to Geldner[8] "rein, der Reine" and Renou's[9] "pur". The words *śúcir.. pavate sómaḥ*[10] mean "the shining (lustrous) Soma clarifies itself" rather than "the pure Soma..."[11] Notice that the *soma* has not only the adjective *śukra*[12] in common with *agni*, but also *hari* which, denoting a "dazzling, brilliant, lustrous, resplendent, flaming colour (from red to light yellow)", seems to have expressed also the intensity of the colour of the plant or stalk.[13] See also *RV.* 7. 90. 1; 2; 7. 91. 4 (also the compound *śucipā* "drinking the shining draught"). Translations of *RV.* 1. 91. 3 *śuciṣ tvám asi priyo ná mitráḥ* "thou (Soma) art pure like Mitra, the beloved one". Geldner, according to whom *śuci* means here "lauter, i. e. rein und redlich" ("pure, honest, fair") and Renou are, in my opinion, incorrect. Soma is said to be lustrous, bright like Mitra who is very often associated with light and the white colour (cf. e. g. *RV.* 1. 115. 5 : *TS.*

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1. For further particulars J. Gonda, *The dual deities in the religion of the Veda*, Amsterdam Academy 1974, ch. XII.
2. 9. 97. 7.
3. For semantic processes see e.g. S. Ullmann, *The principles of semantics*, Glasgow 1951, p. 314, s. v. transfers. In the compound *śucikranda* the adjective has been metaphorically transferred to a different realm of sensation, viz. that of audition: Bṛhaspati is at *ṚV.* 7. 97. 5. "calling clearly".
4. 9. 24. 7. (Cf. 6) etc.
5. S. S. Bhawe, *The Soma-hymns of the Ṛgveda*, II, Baroda 1960, p. 34; 38; cf. III, Baroda 1962, p. 161; 174.
6. 9. 75. 4.
7. *prá rocáyan ródasī mātárā śúciḥ* and 9. 85. 12 *bhānúḥ śukréṇa śociṣā vý adyaut prārurucad ródasī mātárā śúciḥ*. See also 9. 9. 3.
8. K. F. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda übersetzt*, Cambridge Mass. 1951, III, p. 26 etc.
9. L. Renou, *Études védiques et pāṇinéennes*, VIII, Paris 1961, p. 16; IX, p. 25 etc.
10. 9. 72. 4; 86. 13.
11. The order of words *śúciḥ punānáḥ* is not favourable to Renou's translation either (op. cit. IX, p. 20 "clarifying itself so that it (he) becomes pure"); cf. also 9. 103. 4, *sómaḥ... háriḥ* and 9.70.8.
12. See above; 1. 134. 5.
13. On the colour of the *soma* R. G. Wasson, *Soma*, New York 1968, p 35 ff.

2. 1. 9. 3).[1] The distinction made between the unmixed *soma* juice and that which is mixed with milk etc.—and which in the relevant ṛgvedic passages enumerated by Geldner[2] is clearly referred to only in 1. 30. 2 and 8. 52.10—induced this scholar to translate *śuci* by "pure" in the sense of "unmixed". However, here also the adjective may have denoted the intense brightness of the juice rather than its composition.

The adjective *śuci* is, intelligibly enough, also found to characterize the sacrificial butter (*ghṛta*)[3]. It is further applied to some gods, not only the river goddess Sarasvatī[4] but also to Rudra[5] (described as bearing a weapon), Bṛhaspati[6] where he is said to have a golden axe[7]; Varuṇa[8], the Maruts[9] (they are also said to be *citra*, *citrabhānu*, *viśvabhānu*, *vidyunmat* etc., all of them referring to their brilliance : they are like fires[10]) ; the Ādityas[11] (they are like *soma* 2. 27. 2 ; 9 where they are also said to be golden) ; the horses of Agni[12] and of the Aśvins[13]. In another publication[14] I argued that emphasis laid upon the outward appearance of the Vedic poems and the use of adjectives meaning "bright, brilliant"—among them *śuci*[15]—in connection with them seems to be attributable to the fact that these inspired texts were regarded as being obtained by means of an extraordinary faculty of seeing and given to man through the agency of those gods who are particularly characterized by their relations to light in the literal and metaphorical meanings of this word[16].

Like the Maruts themseslves the oblations offered to them as well as the sacrificial

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1. J. Gonda, *The Vedic god Mitra*, Leiden 1972, ch. III. Mitra and light.
2. Geldner, *op. cit.*, III, p. 6
3. See *RV.* 4. 1. 6; 6. 10. 2; 9. 67. 12—which is elsewhere said to be "gold-coloured, shining with golden lustre" (*hiraṇyavarṇa*, 2. 35. 11); the cauldron (*gharma*, *AiBr.* 1. 22. 8); gold (*ṚV.* 4. 10. 6); dawn (1. 134. 4); milk (1. 121. 5); water. *āpas*, 2. 35. 3; 7. 47. 1, also *AVŚ.* 12. 3. 27 f.) ; an axe (5. 7. 8; 7. 3. 9); the semen virile (1. 71. 8, also called *śukram*).
4. *RV.* 7.95.2.
5. *Idid.* 8.29.5.
6. *Ibid.* 3.62.5; 7.97.7; *TB.* 2.4.6.3.
7. H. P. Schmidt, *Bṛhaspati und Indra*, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 64; 131 correctly "glähzend".
8. *ṚV.* 7.89.3.
9. *Ibid.* 7.56.12; 7.57.5.
10. *Ibid.* 2.34.1.
11. *Ibid.* 2.1.13.
12. *Ibid.* 6.6.4.
13. *Ibid.* 1.181.2.
14. J. Gonda, *The vision of the Vedic poets*, The Hague 1963, p. 167 ff.
15. *Ibid.* 6.8.1; 6.66.11; 7.93.1; 10.29.1; cf. also *TB.* 2.8.5.1, etc.
16. Cf. also *ṚV.* 1.144.1; 7.2.2; 8.44.21.

rite (*adhvara*) undertaken are said to be *śuci*[1]; the sixfold occurrence of the adjective in this stanza is no doubt to underline that the conspicuous quality of the gods should also distinguish their cult. Here the problem arises as to which connotations (supplementary values) of the word are present in addition to "auspicious" and "beneficial" or "positive" that are certainly retained. This problem is still more pressing in cases where a human being, a sacrificer or worshipper himself, is said to be *śuci*[2] : obviously in return for having reached this form of perfection such a person is described as living near water with good pasturage, to reach old age as a sturdy man and to have energetic sons. Here Renou[3] translates *śuci* by "brilliant",which is no doubt better than Geldner's "redlich oder unbescholten" ("honest or blameless"). But has it the connotations of the French word (such as "ingenious, sparkling") or of the English brilliant "having qualities which attract attention or provoke admiration" ? This is not probable. A word like "bright" is in various languages used metaphorically, but the cultural environment, the importance of, and emphasis placed upon, physical, spiritual or intellectual qualities, moral excellence, social adaptability etc. are far from being everywhere the same. In the Veda a word such as "bright" may *a priori* be expected to give rise to a semantic transfer to a ritual (religious) rather than an intellectual sense. For the same use see a verse[4] addressed to Agni where the *śucayaḥ*—but here the Maruts (see above) or other mythological beings—are said to worship the *śuci* god. In another verse[5] it is the "inspired sages" (*vipaścitaḥ*) who are characterized as *śucayaḥ* and *pāvakavarṇāḥ* "of bright colour, aspect or outward appearance" (hardly, with Geldner, "of. . . social class") ; but these sages also may be divine beings[6]. Elsewhere[7] Agni is *śucivrata*, that means : "the manifestations of his functional observance are brilliant" : a semantic transference from the god to his functions and activity. In another context, however, this epithet is with the same meaning—applied to the Aśvins[8], Varuṇa and Mitra[9], Heaven and Earth.[10]

RV. 10.17.10[11] is of special interest. After praying to the Waters (*āpaḥ*) for puri-

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1. *ṚV.* 7.56.12.
2. *Ibid.* 2.27.13.
3. Renou, *op cit.*, V, p. 104.
4. *ṚV.* 1.72.3.
5. *Ibid.* 8.3.3.
6. Gonda, *Vision*, V, p. 104.
7. *ṚV.* 8.43.16; 8.44.21 and 10.118.1.
8. *Ibid.* 1.15.11.
9. *Ibid.* 3.62.17; 6.16.24.
10. *Ibid.* 6.70·2.
11. Cf. *AVŚ* 6.52.2.

fication (*śundhayantu, punantu*) the poet states that they wash away every dirt (*ripram*), adding "out of them I come *śuciḥ... pūtáḥ*". This may of course mean "shining (bright) and cleaned (purified)" or "shining (because I have been) cleaned" but the ritualists[1] prescribe the use of this stanza to those who after attending a cremation step out of the purificatory bath; then the meaning no doubt is "(ritually) pure". It would of course be unwise to suppose that this sense—"(ritually) pure, fit for ritual use or ritual activity"—did not occur before the oldest text-place which proves its occurrence by unquestionable evidence; the metaphorical use may have occurred at an earlier date. An interesting instance is *yo vā rakṣáḥ śucir asmīty āha*[2]" or whatever demoniac say "I am pure" (Whitney-Lanman[3]; "I am innocent", Geldner) : it is clear that neither "bright" nor "brilliant" are adequate translations, the meaning being contrary to what typifies a demoniac (unholy, malignant, destructive, inauspicious). It may be recalled that the time of these demons is the evening or night[4]; in the east they are powerless because they are dispersed by the rising sun[5] and in *st.* 1 of the above hymn Indra and Soma are requested to burn the demon (s) that thrive (s) in darkness.

This is clearly one of those many cases that illustrate the close connection between light and brightness and positive, beneficial power on the one hand and of the identification of darkness, evil, and obstruction on the other[6]. Words for "light", "bright", "clear" etc. are often used metaphorically to denote moral or spiritual illumination, being free from evil or guilt, devoid of sinister motives, virtuous, morally clean. The light of heaven (and fire) is widely regarded as the mightiest manifestation of the divine in nature, symbolizing life and salvation or deliverance from sin and its effects.[7] "All ancient Babylonian hymns dedicated to the Sun attest to the belief that light brings salvation"[8]. It is easily intelligible that in Vedic India also a word such as *śuci* acquired connotations that belong to this semantic field[9].

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1. *ĀśvŚs.* 6.13.11: *ŚŚs.* 4.15.4.
2. *RV.* 7.104.16; *AVŚ* 8.4.16.
3. W. D. Whitney and Ch. R. Lanman, *Atharva-Veda Saṁhitā*, Cambridge Mass. 1905, p. 488.
4. *RV.* 7.104.18; *AVŚ.* 8.4.18.
5. *TS.* 2.6.6.3.
6. See e.g. J. Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, London 1908-1926 (195.), VIII, p. 47 ff.
7. Cf. *AVŚ.* 12.2.11.
8. F. Jeremias, in A. Bertholet und E. Lehmann, *Lehrbuch der Religionisgeschichte*, Tübingen 1925, 41, p. 551.
9. Compare Ullmann, op. cit. p. 152ff. It may be observed that words for "unimpaired, unsullied" came also to express rural, spiritual or religions meanings; e.g. Engl. holy. See also J. Gonda, Sarva in Vedu texts, *Indian Linguistics* 16(1955), p. 53 ff. (=*Selected Studies*, Leiden 1975, II, p. 495ff).

The combination of adjectives qualifying the medicaments (*bheṣajā*) of the Maruts[1] may be due to chance, it shows that being *śuci* the medicine was at the same time regarded as "most wholesome or salutary" (*śaṁtama*) and "restoring, refreshing" (*mayobhū*)[2]. The waters (*āpaḥ*) that are said to be of golden colour, *śucayaḥ* (not, with Whitney-Lanman, "clean") and purifying (*pāvakāḥ*) are implored to be weal and pleasant.[3] The beneficial potency and advantageous influence of something *śuci* is also apparent from a place[4] where the bright waters are requested to purify an amulet so that it becomes 'bright' also (*punántu śucayaḥ śucim*, rather than"...purify thee, that art bright)"[5].

From other places it may be inferred that in order to be admitted to a *śuci* place or to be qualified for contact with something *śuci* one must be *śuci* oneself. This state can be brought about by some form of purification. Thus dealing with deceased sacrificers, we have been informed[6] that "being cleansed, purified with the purifier, and (as a result) undefiled (*śuci*) they go to a *śuci* (undefiled, pure, holy) world"[7]. The gods wish "to drink" only from a *śuci* brahmin[8]. It is the hope of those who pray to Agni Vaiśvānara for purification[9] to become cleansed (*śuddhāḥ*, 4) and (as a result of this) *śuci* so that they "may long see the sun rising"[10]. Similar places are found in the brāhmaṇas. "Agni destroys what is not purified (*apūtam*) of him, and the other one (the sacrificer) comes out pure (*śuciḥ*), (after having been) purified"[11]; the commentator explains *śuciḥ pūtaḥ* by *śuddhaḥ pāparahitaḥ karmayogyaś ca*[12]. For becoming *śuci* and fit for religious observances by a reference to one's faithfulness to Mitra, the *śuci* one (see above) see *TBr.* 1. 7. 4. 3. It would indeed appear to me that the state indicated by *śuci* is often considered to result from a process of cleansing or purification and that some places give the relevant adjectives in the logical order that might be expected : *śuddhāḥ pūtā medhyāḥ śucayo bhūtvā devalokam apiyanti.*[13] In this connection attention may be drawn to a statement[14]

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1. *ṚV.* 2.33.13.
2. cf. *AVŚ* 2.9.5.
3. *AVŚ* 1.33.1 ff.
4. *AVŚ.* 10.6.3.
5. Cf. also *Kauś*, 8.13; *VaitS* 10.3.
6. *AVŚ.* 4.34.2.
7. For this place see J. Gonda, *The Savayajñas*, Amsterdam Academy 1965, p. 95 f.; 277 f.
8. *Jaim Br.* 1.282.
9. *AVŚ.* 6.62.1
10. See also *AVŚ.* 12.2.11; 12.2.28.
11. *PañcBr.* 17.5.7.
12. W. Caland, *Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa*, Calcutta 1931, p. 462 "clean and pure" (likewise, Eggeling, *ŚatBr.* 3.1.2.12.); I would prefer the reverse order. Cf. *TS.* 1.2.1 f.
13. *JaimCr.* 2.374 (cf. 1.282).
14. *TBr.* 1.1.5.10.

"he scatters three oblations. . ., to Agni Pavamāna, Agni Pāvaka, and Agni Śuci. In that he scatters (an oblation) to Agni Pavamāna ("who is purifying himself") he purifies (*punāti*) him (the sacrificer). In that . to Agni Pāvaka ("the pure and purifying one") he renders him cleaned (purified, *pūtam*), irreproachable. In that... to Agni *Śuci*, he finally confers spiritual illustriousness (*brahmavarcasam*) upon him".

Commentators sometimes[1] explain *śuci* by *śuddha* and modern translations not always distinguish between both words. In accordance with its form and function the verbal adjective *śuddha* often occurs in contexts dealing either with some form of cleansing or purification or with substances that are free from pollution or from addition of other material. This meaning may of course imply the connotation of "ritually pure (fit for sacrifice etc.)", but that is not to say that the adjectives are synonyms. See e. g. *AiBr.* "they purify (*pāvayanti*) him with *darbha*; thus clean(sed) and purified[2] (*śuddham*... *pūtam*) they consecrate him"[3]; "having shaken(clear) his body, clean (*śuddhaḥ*) and purified he goes to the gods"[4]; "on this Agni do we wipe off (various forms of) dirt; we have become fit for sacrificial worship (*yajñiyāḥ*) cleansed (*śuddhāḥ*)[5]; the barber is asked to make clean the parts of the body of the boy (tonsure)[6]. A hymn is said to be *śuddha* if no foregin stanzas are added to it[7]. the *praṇava* is *śuddha* if it does not end in *ṃ*[8]. See also *tena pavitreṇa śuddhena pūtāḥ ati pāpmānam arātiṃ tarema*[9].

1. *TBr.* 2.4.6.3.
2. A. B. Keith, *Ṛgveda Brāhmaṇas*, Cambridge 1920, p. 108 gives these adjectives in the reverse order.
3. *AiBr.* 1.3.9.
4. *Ibid.* 4.24.5.
5. *ŚatBr.* 3.8.2.3; *TBr.* 3.7.4.2; *ViSm* 22.73; *AVŚ.* 12.2.13; *ĀpŚs.* 9.3.22.
6. *JaimGs.* 1.11.
7. *ŚāŚs.* 7.15.19.
8. *KBr.* 11.5.1. etc.
9. *TBr.* 3.12.3.4.

THE HOME AND DATE OF DURGĀCHĀRYA

Ram Gopal

Durga alias Durgasiṁha or Durgāchārya is a learned commentator of Yāska's *Nirukta*, who has not only explained every word of the *Nirukta* but has also discussed at some places the readings of the *Nirukta*[1]. He minutely observes the readings as well as the order of the Vedic words compiled in the *Nighaṇṭu*. For instance, in his commentary on N. VI. 18 Durga remarks that since the order of the words *dāváne* and *ákūpārasya* given in the *Samāmnāya* is just the reverse of that given in the *Mantra*[2] cited by Yāska to illustrate their usage this fact shows that the *Samāmnāya* was compiled by the Ṛṣis other than the *Bhāṣyakāra*, i. e. Yāska; otherwise the same author would not have disturbed in the *Nighaṇṭu* the order of these words contained in the *Mantra*. Therefore, Durga's commentary is highly important not only for the understanding of the *Nighaṇṭu* and the *Nirukta* but also for constructing and correcting the text of the *Nirukta*. Besides, Durga has fully explained in his commentary all the *Mantra*-s cited by Yāska in full or in part. The commentary which bears an eloquent testimony to the profound and vast erudition of Durgāchārya has undoubtedly influenced the later Vedic commentators. The intepretation of the Vedic *Mantra*-s attempted by Durga in his commentary was considered to be so authentic by the later Vedic commentators like Sāyaṇa that they followed it *in toto* in several cases. For instance, Sāyaṇa in his *Bhāṣya* on *ṚV*. X. 29. 1 copies *verbatim* Durga's explanation of *vayo nyadhāyi* etc. as "*vāyam ātmīyam putram vidadhāti*" etc. against the interpretation of *vāyo* as a nominative singular suggested by the other commentators[3].

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1. In his commentary on the *Nirukta* V. 17 Durga rejects the readings *avasphurasi* and *śṛṇoti* and suggests instead *avasphuriṣyati* and *śroṣyati* which have been accepted by Dr. L. Sarup in his edition. Moreover, Durga mentions the variants *avanenānnam* and *anenānnam* in his commentary on *Nirukta* VI.4.
2. *ṚV* V. 39.2.
3. Following Yāska, Veṅkaṭamādhava explains *vāyaḥ* as "*pakṣi*" (as a nominative singular form), whereas Durga followed by Sāyaṇa interprets the same as an accusative singular (*vāyam ātmīyam putram*) which is not in keeping with even Yāska's analysis of the *Saṁhitāpāṭha*.

Moreover, Sāyaṇa in his *Bhāṣya* on *ṚV.* X. 30. 11 acknowledges the fact that the commentary on this stanza is a quotation from the *Nirukta-Ṭīkā* which is obviously Durga's commentary on the *Nirukta* as is clearly proved by its *verbatim* agreement with Sāyaṇa's quotation.

It is a special feature of Durga's commentary that the commentator does not mention by name any of his predecessors, *Veda-Bhāṣyakāra*-s, or any other authority, but employs such general terms as *anye, apare, kecit* etc. to refer to the views expressed by the other commentators. Durga often cites passages from the Brāhmaṇas in support of his explanation. In his commentary on *N.* VIII . 4, Durga quotes a *śloka* of *Vārtikakāra* with regard to the view of Śākapūṇi on the order of names of *Āprī* deities.[1]

Most of the present information about the life and date of Durga is based on mere conjectures, because unlike the other commentators Durga has not furnished any clue about himself in the introduction as well as in the colophon of his commentary. Although the colophon given at the end of Durga's commentary on almost all the *Adhyāya*-s in some later manuscripts and uncritical editions of the commentary reads "*ṛjvarthāyām nirukta-vṛttau jambūmārgāśrama-ācārya-bhagavaddurgasya kṛtau .. adhyāyah samāptaḥ*", according to the earliest manuscript of the commentary examined by Dr. L. Sarup[2] the colophon at the end of the commentary on the 11th *Adhyāya* alone reads "*ṛjvarthāyām niruktavṛttau jambūmārgāśrama-nivāsinā ācārya-bhagavaddurgasimhasya kṛtau ṣoḍasāsyadhyāyasya caturthaḥ pādaḥ samāptaḥ*", whereas the colophons at the end of the commentary on the other Chapters do not contain any reference to Durga's name or to his honorific title. It shows that the colophons which do not mention Durga's name or his honorific title were compared by the commentator himself, while the colophon at the end of the commentary on the 11th *Adhyāya* might have been added after Durga's death by some disciple who probably completed the unfinished task of his master. Perhaps Durga lived to comment up to a portion of the 11th *Adhyāya* only. Another point of distinction noted by Dr. Sarup between the last mentioned colophon and the other colophons is that, while the latter simply say that such a chapter has come to an end, the former remarks that such a *Pāda* of the 11th chapter has come to an end. Dr. Sarup opines that this distinction is another point in favour of the view that the colophon at the end of the commentary of the 11th *Adhyāya* was written by a person other than Durga himself. Therefore, the obvious conclusion is that the colophon of his commentary on the 11th Chapter of the *Nirukta*, which

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1. Durga on *Nirukta* VIII. 4—*Śākapūṇistu pṛthivīnāmabhya svayam eva sarvatra krama-prayojanam āha. Taduktam Vārtikakāreṇa—*

   Krama-prayojanam nāmnām Śākapūṇyupalakṣitam|
   prakalpayed anyadapi na prajñām avasādayet||

2. Preface to the *Nighaṇṭu* and the *Nirukta*, pp. 28. ff.

declares the commentator, *Āchārya Bhagavad Durgasiṁha*, to be a resident of *Jambūmārgāśrama*, does not seem to be his own statement but seems to have been added by an admirer or disciple of Durga, because no author would employ for himself the honorific title of *Bhagavad* nor is such a statement found in the colophon of any other chapter of his commentary.

Even if the above statement made by any of Durga's admirers or disciples is accepted as based on facts, the identification of *Jumbūmārga* is not free from doubt. Dr. Sarup identifies *Jambūmārga* with Jammu[1]. However, Pandit Bhagavaddatta identifies *Jambūmārga* with a place named *Jambū-sara* near Baroda in Gujarat on the plea that Durga in his commentary often quotes from the *Maitrāyaṇī-Saṁhitā* which was prevalent in Gujarat at that time[2]. The evidence available from the Purāṇas and the *Mahābhārata* militates against Dr. Sarup's view and favours Pandit Bhagavaddatta's conjecture on this point. According to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, *Jambūmārga* was a vast forest teeming with deer[3]. The *Mahābhārata* four times speaks of *Jambūmārga* as a sacred *Tīrtha*. In the *Mahābhārata* *Jambūmārga* is mentioned after the river *Narmadā*[4] and the Tīrtha named *Śūrpāraka* but before some other Tīrthas of Western India such as *Kokamukha*, *Kanyāhrada* and *Prabhāsa*; and in a passage[5] of the Epic the Tīrtha *Jambūmārga* figures after *Puṣkara* but before the river Narmadā and some Tīrthas situated in Western India. The *Mahābhārata* mentions *Jambūmārga Āśrama* along with the rivers, mountains and the Tīrthas of Western India, such as the rivers *Narmadā* and *Viśvāmitra*, the *Maināka* mountain, and *Puṣkara*[6]. In the *Mahābhārata* the sacred Tīrtha *Jambūmārga* is mentioned after the river *Sindhu* but before *Hiraṇvatī*[7]. The tenor of the Epic clearly suggessts that *Jambūmārga Āśrama* was a sacred Tīrtha situated in Western India—most probably in Gujarat[8]. On the other hand, there is no literary evidence to identify *Jambūmārga* with modern Jammu situated in northern India. Similarly there is not much force in Dr. Sarup's another argument[9]:—"The fact that he (Durga) lived in a hermitage and was addressed as *bhagavat* indicates that he was an ascetic and belonged to some particular order of Sannyāsa." For *Jambūmārga Āśrama*, as pointed out above, was the name of a sacred Tīrtha[10] and not a hermitage of ascetics

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1. *Ibid.* p. 29.
2. *Vaidika Vāṅmaya kā Itihāsa*, Vol. 1, Part II (The commentators of the Vedas), Lahore, 1931, p. 224.
3. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* II. 13. 33—*Jambūmārge mahāraṇye jāto jātismaro mṛgaḥ*.
4. *Mbh.* XIII. 25.51
5. *Ibid.* III. 82.40.
6. *Ibid.* III. 89.13-14.
7. *Ibid.* III. 165.24.
8. *Ibid.* III. 89. 13-14.
9. L. Sarup; *op. cit.*, p. 29.
10. Cf. *Mbh.* III. 89.13-4.

as assumed by Dr. Sarup. Moreover, the addition of the honorofic title *Bhagavat* to Durga's name by any of his disciples or admirers does not necessarily prove that Durga was a Sannyāsin, because this title is found added to the names of many ancient Āchāryas, e. g. *Bhagavān Baudhāyanaḥ.*[1] There is also another circumstance which indicates that Durga was not a Sannyāsin. In his commentary on *Nīrukta* IV. 14 Durga does not explain the Ṛgvedic stanza III. 53. 22, saying : "The stanza where this word (*lodham*) occurs expresses hostility towards Vasiṣtha, and I am a descendant of Vasiṣṭha, belonging to the Kapiṣṭhala *Śākhā*. Therefore, I do not explain this stanza." Durga's mention of his *Gotra* and *Śākhā* shows that he was not a Sannyāsin, because those who have entered the order of Sannyāsa renounce all distinctions of *Gotra*, *Śākhā*, etc., as rightly pointed out by Pandit Bhagavaddatta[2]. Dr. Sarup's conjecture appears to be probable that Durga himself wrote his commentary up to the end of the 11th chapter, whose colophon as pointed out above was added by a disciple who also wrote the commentary on the 12th chapter, and faithfully refrained from adding the name of Durga in the colophon of the 12th Chapter[3].

The most dependable piece of evidence about the lower limit of Durga's date is a manuscript of his commentary dated 1387 A. D. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. It is stated in the manuscript that it was copied at *Bhṛgukṣetra* during the reign of Mahārāṇā Durgasiṃha Vijaya. Since *Bhṛgukṣetra* where Durga's commentary was copied is identified with Broach, this fact lends further support to the view that Durga wrote his commentary in Gujarat at *Jambūmārga Āśrama*. The copying of Durga's commentary in 1387 A.D. conclusively proves that he had flourished much earlier than this date. This lower limit of Durga's date is corroborated by Sāyaṇa, who in his *Ṛg-Bhāṣya* quotes Durga's interpretation of *ṚV*. X. 30. 11 and copies verbatim Durga's interpretation of *ṚV*. X. 29.1 as pointed out above.

There is, however, a sharp difference of opinion among scholars with regard to the upper limit of Durga's date. Dr. Sarup regards Durga as posterior to or contemporaneous with Devarāja Yajvan, the author of the *Nīghaṇṭu Bhāṣya*, on the plea that Devarāja who is familiar with the extant commentaries on the Vedas, the *Nighaṇṭu* and the *Nirukta*, does not mention Durga in the long list of the authorities used by him (Devarāja) for the purpose of his work[4]. On the basis of this *argumentum ex silencio* Dr. Sarup puts the upper limit of Durga's date later than the beginning of the 14th century A. D. On the other hand, Pandit Bhagavaddatta assigns Durga to the 6th century A. D.

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1. *India in Vedic Kalpa Sūtras*, p. 56.
2. Bhagavaddatta, *Op. cit.*, p. 223.
3. L. Sarup, *Op. cit.*, p. 31.
4. *ibid*, *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

and regards him as anterior to Udgītha and Skanda on the ground that the close similarity between Durga's commentary and the Udgītha-Bhāṣya on the *ṚV.* as well as between Durga's commentary and that of Skanda Maheśvara indicates that both Udgītha and Skanda-Maheśvara had before them Durga's commentary at the time of writing their respective commentaries[1]. I have carefully compared Durga's commentary with the Udgītha-Bhāṣya on a number of *Ṛk*-s and found striking verbal agreements between them[2]. A minute examination of such close verbal agreements between these two authors indicates that it is Durga who succinctly and discreetly copies Udgītha but sometimes either explains a difficult word of the Udgītha-Bhāṣya or paraphrases it by an easy word. For instance, Durga in his interpretation of *ṚV.*X. 5. 5 first copies Udgītha's explanation of ***aruṣīḥ*** as "*ārocanāḥ*", then adds the explanation of *ārocanāḥ* as "*dīptā ityarthaḥ*", and similarly copies Udgītha's interpretation of *Vāvaśānaḥ* as "*vāvaśyamānaḥ atyarthaṁ śabdāyamānaḥ*" as "*kāmayamāno vāvasyamāno vā, śabdam kurvāṇaḥ*"[3]. In his interpretation of another ***mantra***[5] Durga not only copies verbatim some portions of the Udgītha-Bhāṣya but seems to refer to its explanation of ***akrata*** as "they acquire the knowledge of speech[5]". A comparison of Durga's interpretation of a number of *Ṛk*-s with their Skanda-Bhāṣya shows close agreements between them and makes it abundantly clear that Durga is indebted to Skandasvāmin[6]. Since Udgītha and Skandasvāmin are regarded as contemporaries and co-authors of a *Ṛg- Bhāṣya* according to Veṅkaṭamādhava, Durga who copies verbatim from their commentaries is later than both of them. As regards the ***Nirukta-ṭikā*** ascribed to (Skanda) Maheśvara, it explicitly mentions Durga as an earlier commentator of the ***Nirukta*** and is not the work of the famous Veda-Bhāṣyakāra Skandasvamin. So no substantial help can be derived from this fragmentary work in determining the date of Durga. However, another source which has hitherto remained untapped seems to throw important and welcome light on the date of Durga. A minute comparison of Durga's iterpretation of certain Vedic *Mantra*-s with Uvaṭa's *Vājasaneyi-Saṁhitā-Bhāṣya* reveals some very close and striking agreements between them and leaves no doubt that either of them copies verbatim from the other[7]. A close examination of such agreements shows

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1. Ehagavaddatta, *Op. cit.*, pp. 9-14, 223.
2. Cf. *ṚV.* X.5. (N. V. 1); 10.10 (*N.* IV. 20); 27.24 (*N.* V. 19); 27.22 (*N.* II.6); 43.5 (*N.* V. 22); 45.1 (*N.* IV. 24); 71.2 (*N.* IV. 10); 79.3 (*N.* V. 3).
3. *Nirukta* V. 1.
4. *ṚV.* X. 71.2.
5. *Nirukta* IV. 10.
6. *ṚV.* I. 34.10 (*N.* III. 20); 50.3 (*N.* III. 15); 34.7 (*N.* IV. 17); 89.1 (*N.* IV. 19); 89.10 (*N.* IV. 23); VI. 47.13 (*N.* VI. 7).
7. *VS.* 15.32 (*N.* III. 21); 7.38 (*N.* IX. 8); 11.27 (*N.* VI. 1); 3.24 (*N.* III. 21); 3.26 (*N.* V. 23); 12.68 (*N.* V. 28).

that Durga not only copies verbatim from Uvaṭa but also paraphrases the difficult words of his predecessor by easy words. For instance, in the interpretation of *VS*. 12. 68 Uvaṭa employs in his commentary the original words of the text *yunakta* and *vitanudhvam* without explanation whereas Durga paraphrases them by such easy words as *yojayata* and *vitanuta*[1]. In the interpretation of *VS*.29.1 Durga copies Uvaṭa's explanation of *pinvamānaḥ* as "*pibannityarthaḥ*" omitting other explanatory preceding words of the Uvaṭa-Bhāṣya.[2]. It, therefore, follows that Durga is later than Uvaṭa who in the colophon of his commentary on the *Vājasneyi-Saṁhitā* claims to have written it residing at Ujjain during the reign of King Bhoja. As the period of King Bhoja's reign is generally held to be between 1018 A. D. and 1060 A. D., Uvaṭa might have written his commentary in the first half of the 11th century A. D. Accordingly, Durga who betrays his acquaintance with the Uvaṭa-Bhāṣya of the *VS*. cannot be dated earlier than the end of the 11th century A. D. On the other hand, Sāyaṇa who flourished in the 14th century A. D. refers to and copies verbatim from Durga's commentary, a manuscript of which is found dated 1387 A. D. as pointed out above. The above-mentioned evidence taken as a whole points to the conclusion that Durga wrote his commentary sometime between 1150 A. D. and 1250 A. D. Since most of the scholars assign Devarāja to the beginning of the 14th century A. D. on sound grounds, non-mention of Durga's commentary by Devarāja in his *Nighaṇṭu-Nirvacana* can be accounted for by the circumstance that the interval between the works of these two writers was so short that Durga's commentary written in the Western part of India had not become very famous all over India by the time Devarāja wrote his work in the South. However, Durga's commentary had definitely reached the Deccan prior to the composition of the Sāyaṇa-Bhāṣya on the *Ṛgveda*. It is inconceivable that if Durg's commentary had been written in the 6th century A. D. prior to Skandasvāmin and Udgītha as conjectured by Pandit Bhagavaddatta, it would not have been mentioned by Devarāja and the other commentators. So the probability supported by the above cited evidence is that it is Durga who has been influenced in the composition of his commentary by the earlier writings of Udgītha, Skandasvāmin and Uvaṭa.

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1. *Ibid.* V. 28.
2. *Ibid.* III. 20.

YAJÑAPĀRŚVE

AN UNPUBLISHED PARIŚIṢṬA OF THE ŚUKLA YAJURVEDA SCHOOL

C. G. Kashikar

Pariśiṣṭa-s form an important class of Sanskrit Literature—particularly the Vedic literature. *Pariśiṣṭa*-s of a supplementary character are often regarded by the tradition as a part of the original text itself. There are *Pariśiṣṭa*-s which belong to the Sūtra-literature. Eighteen *Pariśiṣṭa*-s belonging to the *Śukla Yajurveda* have been recorded in the *Pratijñā Pariśiṣṭa* (31.2) and the *Caraṇavyūha* (2.4) as follows : 1. *Yūpalakṣaṇa* 2. *Chāgalakṣaṇa* 3. *Pratijñā* 4. *Anuvākasaṅkhyā* 5. *Caraṇavyūha* 6. *Śrāddhakalpa* 7. *Śulba* 8. *Ṛgyajuṣa* 9. *Pārṣada* 10. *Iṣṭakāpūraṇa* 11. *Pravarādhyāya* 12. *Mūlyādhyāya* 13. *Uñchaśāstra* 14. *Nigamāḥ* 15. *Yajñapārśve* 16. *Hautrika* 17. *Prasavotthāna* and 18. *Kūrmalakṣaṇa*. These include the two *Pariśiṣṭa*-s in which these eighteen *Pariśiṣṭa*-s have been included. Fifteen out of these are published.[1] The three *Pariśiṣṭa*-s so far unpublished are : 1. *Hautrika*, 2. *Yajñapārśve* and 3. *Nigamāh*. Karkopādhyāya has written a commentary on the

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1. *Pratijñā* with commentary *pradīpa* edited by Aṇṇaśāstri Vare, Nasik 1944, *Anuvākasaṁkhyā* printed at the Nirnaysagar Press, *Srāddhakalpa* with three commentaries printed at Venkatesh Press, Bombay; Śulba, with Karka's commentary published at Varanasi; bare text printed at other places; *Pravarādhyāya* printed at Venkatesh Press, Bombay. The following ten *pariśiṣṭa*-s edited by Śridharśastri Vare have been published by the Śukla-Yajurveda-Mādhyandina-Madhyavarti-Maṇḍala under the title *Kātyāyanīya pariśiṣṭadaśaka* :—

   1. *Yūpalakṣaṇa* 2. *Chāgalakṣaṇa* 3. *Anuvākasaṅkhyā* 4. *Caraṇavyūha* 5. *Iṣṭakāpūraṇa* 6. *Pravarādhyāya* 7. *Mūlyādhyāya* 8. *Uñchaśāstra* 9. *Prasavotthāna* 10. *Kūrmalakṣaṇa*. Amongst these the *Anuvākasaṁkhyā* was formerly published. The *Iṣṭakāpūraṇa* is printed with Devayājñika's commentary. Others are furnished with a commentary called *Viṣamapadālaṁkriyā* written by the editor.

Hautrika[1]. Śridharśastri Vare has stated that Gaṅgādhara and Rāma Vājapeyin have also written commentaries on the same. The present paper is intended to give a survey of *Yajñapārśve*.

An attempt has been made to classify the eighteen *Pariśiṣṭa*-s topic wise[2]. I would like to classify them as follows :

(i) Those dealing with the *Śukla Yajurveda* and ancillary literature :—1. *Pratijñā* 2. *Anuvākasaṅkhyā* 3. *Caraṇavyūha* 4. *Ṛgyajuṣa* and 5. *Pārṣada*.

(ii) Those dealing with the *Śrauta* rituals :— 1. *Yūpa-Lakṣaṇa* 2. *Chāgalakṣaṇa* 3. *Śulba* 4. *Iṣṭakāpūraṇa* 5. *Pravarādhyāya* 6. *Mūlyādhyāya* 7. *Hautrika* and 8. *Kūrmalakṣaṇa*.

(iii) Those dealing with the *Gṛhya* rites :— 1. *Śrāddhakalpa* and 2. *Uñchaśāstra*.

(iv) Those dealing jointly with *Śrauta* and *Gṛhya* rituals :— 1. *Nigamāḥ*[3] and 2. *Yajñapāśve*.

(v) Dealing with Dharmaśāstra —*Prasavotthāna*.

The eighteen *Pariśiṣṭa*-s have been enumerated in the same order in *Pratijñā* and *Caraṇavyūha*. The purpose of the order is not clear. It is difficult to say anything definite about the authors of the *Pariśiṣṭa*-s and their chronology. They are known as *Kātyāyanīya-pariśiṣṭa*-s in the tradition. One cannot, however, attribute them to Kātyāyana. They may have been composed by different authors in different times. It could only be said that the tradition of the *Pariśiṣṭa*-s had already been fixed before the composition of the *Pratijñā* and *Caraṇavyūha Pariśiṣṭa*-s. The *Yūpalakṣaṇa*, *Chāgalakaṣṇa* *Mūlyādhyāya*, *Yajñapārśve* and *Kūrmalakṣaṇa* consist of *Kārikā*-s composed in *Anuṣṭubh* metre ; the rest are composed in *sūtra*-style. This difference in composition may be regarded as a criterion of the different periods of their composition.

Manuscripts of *Yajñapārśve* (=*YP*) are available in the collections of the Bharata Itihasa Saṁśodhak Maṇḍala, Pune. Out of the three available manuscripts, I have studied two (No. 22, 799 and 36.87)[4]. The name of the work is in dual. The dual form is explained on the ground of two parts of the work.[5] This is hardly satisfactory. In my

1. A critical edition of *Hautrika* together with Karkopādhyāya's commentary and an English translation prepared by me will soon be published.
2. Preface to the *Kātyāyanīyapariśiṣṭadaśqka*.
3. I have no information so far about this.
4. I thank the authorities of the Bhārata Itihāsa Saṁśodhaka Maṇḍala for having allowed me to use the manuscripts.
5. *Yajñapārśve iti dvivacanaṁ pūrvottarabhāgavivakṣayā*—Comm. on *Pratijñā* by Aṇṇaśastri Vare. A similar statement is made by Śridhara Śāstri Vare in his comm. on *Caraṇavyūha*.

view the dual form may reflect the two aspects of deliberations in the text, namely, *Śrauta* and *Gṛhya.* The MS. No. 36.87 does not number the *Kārikā*-s, while the other M.S. (22.799) numbers them. The first part ends with 98 Kārikās with the remark : *iti Kātyāyana Yajñapārśvākhyam prathamam pariśiṣṭam.* The second part numbers 1-100 and records the total 200; again numbers 1-100 and records 300, and finally numbers 1-30 with the remark *iti Kātyāyanīyam pariśiṣṭadvitīyam yajñapārśvākhyam.* The first *Kārikā* of the *Pariśiṣṭa* reads as follows :

अधुना वच्मि यत् सूत्रे परिशिष्टं च वाक्यतः ॥
अनन्वयं यथापद्यं यथाशास्त्रानुसारतः ॥

The author aims at supplementing the *vākya*-s i. e. *sūtra*-s from the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* and *Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra.* He adds that he was doing so without following any specific order and that the construction was in verse. This is testified even at the outset. He elaborates a *Śrauta* Topic, namely, churning of fire at the beginning and immediately proceeds to the discussion of the *Āvasathyāgni* and *Pañcamahāyajña*—the *Gṛhya* topics. The nature of contents of *YP* may be laid down as : a reference to a *Śrauta* or a *Smārta* rite, its clarification and supplement, certain additions, mention of new contingencies and rites pertaining to them, and expiation-rites to be performed to remove the deficiencies which may be caused under changed circumstances. The *Smārta* topics are smaller in number. Some salient features of *YP* may now be noted.

In an *Iṣṭi* the sacrificial cake is to be baked on a specific number of potsherds. *YP* says that in case the number of potsherds is not mentioned, one should arrange eight potsherds. For Agni stands for all deities[1]. The *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* does not say anything about the patterns of the *Śrauta* fire-places. *YP* mentions their patterns and measurements. It also speaks about the patterns of implements to be used in an *Iṣṭi* and a Soma-sacrifice (K. 218-235).

The *Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra* prescribes the setting of the *Āvasathya* fire either at the time of marriage or at the time of the division of ancestral property. *YP* supports the time of the marriage which is advocated by all other Vedic schools[2]. It also draws attention towards the manifold significance of maintaining the domestic fire. It is a violation of religious injunction if a younger brother marries before the elder or sets up

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१. पुरोडाशकपालानां यत्र सङ्ख्या न विद्यते ।
अष्टाकपालः कर्तव्यो ह्यग्निः सर्वा हि देवताः । १८१

२. कृतदारो नैव तिष्ठेत् क्षणमप्यग्निना विना ।
यदि तिष्ठेद् द्विजो व्रात्यस्तथा च पतितो भवेत् ॥ ३७

sacred fires before the elder. There are of course certain exceptions to this rule. *YP* has extended the list of these exceptions. The additions are : in case the elder brother is a step-brother faithless, dull, fool, *unmatta*, *patita*, following the Yogapath, a eunuch, settled in a distant country, a *mahapātakin*, a *sannyāsin*, or permitted by the elder brother[1]. In subsequent portion some of these eventualities have been repeated. A few more are the following : if the elder brother is hunch-backed, short, stammering, born-blind or deaf, a leper or a consumptive.[2]

The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* have prescribed renewing of the sacred fires (*punarādheya*) in certain situations. Under the pressure of circumstances a sacrificer is likely to violate the rules concerning the vicinity of the sacred fires and the *agnihotra*-offering; hence *YP* has discussed this topic at length. It mentions the following contingencies for the renewing of fires : if the sacrificer's wife passes a night outside the village (while the sacrificer is away), if the sacrificer's wife travels beyond a sea-going river without carrying the sacred fires, if she alone leaves home carrying the fires (according to some teachers it is admissible to do so through fright), if the sacrificer goes on a journey carrying his fires when his wife is menstruating or when he is undergoing *āśauca* by birth or death, if he goes on a journey through greed leaving out his fires, if he goes on a journey with his fires while his wife is menstruating or is lying ill. One should not go on a journey at the time of *agnihotra*-offering or on a *parvan*-day. One should not go on a journey unless there is a specific purpose. One may go for obtaining wealth. One should not go on a pilgrimage (?). If *agnihotra* is not offered two times or if the full-moon sacrifice is not performed, one should renew the sacred fires, this is Bhārgava's view. One need not renew his fires if he uses new kindling woods because the old kindling woods were reduced considerably. Either the sacrificer or his wife must be present

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१. पितृपुत्रांश्च सापत्नाः परनारीसुताश्च ये ।
दाराग्निहोत्रसम्बन्धे न दोषः परिदीयते ॥
श्रद्धाहीने जडे मूर्खे उन्मत्ते पतिते तथा ।
योगशास्त्राभियुक्ते च न दोषः परिदीयते ॥
क्लीवे देशान्तरस्थे च महापातकसङ्गते ।
प्रव्रजिते स्थिते ज्येष्ठे न दोषः परिदीयते ॥
अग्रजस्तु यदानग्निरधिकारोऽनुजे कथम् ।
अग्रजानुमतिं कृत्वा अधिकारी भवेत्तु सः ॥ ८८-९१

२. कुब्जवामनषण्ढेषु गद्गदेषु जडेषु च ।
जात्यन्धबधिरे मूके न दोषः परिदीयते ॥ १२४-१२६

at home when the sacred fires are burning in the fire-hall. If both of them go out, fires must be renewed. (K. 52-61).

Sometimes it becomes impossible for a sacrificer to procure the prescribed substances. In such a contingency it becomes necessary to find a suitable substitute by resorting to some *arthavāda* or reasoning. *YP* has shown a way out in such cases. Generally clarified butter prepared out of cow's milk is to be used in a sacrifice. Sometimes such clarified butter cannot be procured. In such a contingency *YP* says that even if the *Adhvaryu* takes up edible oil in the ladle for *Prayāja*-offerings, the *Hotṛa* should not modify the relevant formula; he should utter the very same formula, namely, *ghṛtavatīm adhvaryo srucam āsyasva*... (K. 174).

In a Soma-sacrifice and certain other rituals, particles of gold are required to be used. Sometimes a sacrificer found it difficult to procure gold. *YP* says that one may take up clarified butter in place of gold, because both are said to be 'Lustre' (K. 258). *YP* has referred to a practical difficulty sometimes felt in funeral rites. If the funeral pyre of a dead sacrificer becomes extinguished by rain after it is set to fire, one should generate fire by churning and use additional fuel (K. 281-283). If the sacrificer dies while he is away from his home and if his bones did not become available, one should collect 360 stalks of *palāśa* leaves, pile them up and proceed with the funeral rite. If he gets bones later on, he should repeat the rite. If the dead person was an *anāhitāgni*, one should take *darbha*-blades instead of *palāśa*-stalks (K. 284-289).

YP furnishes some interesting details. A *Kārikā* enumerates that in the *Agniṣṭoma* there are 20 *puroḍāśa*-s, 3 *caru*-s and 796 *āhuti*-s.[1] Churning by means of the lower and upper kindling woods is explained in the Brāhmaṇa by the metaphor of the union of male and female. Stretching the concept further, *YP* has assigned female limbs to the lower kindling wood; "the lower kindling wood is 24 *aṅgula*-s long, 6 *aṅgula*-s wide and 4 *aṅgula*-s high. Dividing the length in six parts, one should assign the female limbs as follows : I *aṅgula* each would constitute respectively the head, eyes, ears and mouth; 2 *aṅgula*-s below the neck, 2 *aṅgula*-s below the bosom, 1 *aṅgula* below it the heart; 2 *aṅgula*-s abodomen, 1 *aṅgula* waist, 2 *aṅgula*-s below it the lower belly, 2 *aṅgula*-s below it the womb; 4 *aṅgula*-s below it the thighs, 3 *aṅgula*-s legs and 1 *aṅgula* feet. This makes 24 *aṅgula*-s. One should churn at the spot located as the womb[2].

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१. अग्निहोत्रे पुरोडाशा विंशतिश्चरवस्त्रयः ।
चतुरूनशतान्यष्टावाहुतीस्तेषु याज्ञिकाः ।।

२. चतुर्विंशाङ्गुला दीर्घा विस्तारेण षडङ्गुला ।
चतुरङ्गुलमुत्सेधा अरणी परिकीर्तिता ।।

It is prescribed that food should be offered to Brahmans for the fructification of a sacrificial performance.[1] No details can, however, be expected in any Brāhmaṇa or Sūtra-text. *YP* comes forward to give these details. The number of Brahmans to be fed on different occasions is mentioned therein as follows : *Garbhādhāna* and other rites 10, marriage 100, *upanayana* 50, setting of the *Āvasathya* fire 33, setting of the sacred fires 100 and above, any other domestic rite 8, a Soma-sacrifice 1000, an animal-sacrifice 100, *Cāturmāsya*-s 400, *Sautrāmaṇī* 500, *Vājapeya* 10000, *Aśvamedha* 40000, *Āgrāyaṇeṣṭi*. 10, *Prāyaścitteṣṭi* 5.[2]

While stressing the significance of *agnihotra*, *YP* says, "Brahman, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Sūrya, Cow, Brāhman, the Pitṛs, nay, vratas, Tīrthas and Tapas—all these reside in the hall of sacred fires". (K 40, 328, 329). Therefore, those who cannot set up sacred fires themselves should patronise the *agnihotra*; thereby they reach the highest Bliss. (K 271.).

षड् भागान् कल्पयेत्तत्र तेष्वप्यवयवांश्चरेत् ।
मूर्धाक्षिकर्णवक्त्राणि ह्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रकाण्यथ ॥
कन्धरा द्व्यङ्गुला ज्ञेया द्व्यङ्गुलं वक्ष उच्यते ।
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं हृदयं द्व्यङ्गुष्ठमुदरं स्मृतम् ॥
एकाङ्गुष्ठा कटिर्ज्ञेया द्वौ बस्ती द्वौ च गुह्यकौ ।
उरू जङ्घे च पादौ च चतुस्त्र्यैकैर्यथाक्रमम् ॥
अरण्यावयवा ह्येते यज्ञविद्भिः प्रकीर्तिताः ।
यत्तु गुह्यमिति प्रोक्तं तत्र मथ्यो हुताशनः ॥

१. *ŚBR.* I. V. 3. 28 :— (ब्राह्मणस्यैव तृप्तिमनु तृप्येयमिति तस्मात्) संस्थिते यज्ञे ब्राह्मणं तर्पयितवै ब्रूयाद्यज्ञमेवैतत्तर्पयति ।

२. गर्भाधानादिसंस्कारे ब्राह्मणान् भोजयेद्दश ।
शतं विवाहसंस्कारे पञ्चाशन्मेखलाविधौ ॥
आवसथ्ये त्रयस्त्रिंशत् श्रौताधाने शतात् परम् ।
अष्टकं भोजयेद् भक्त्या तत्तत्संस्कारसिद्धये ॥
सहस्रं भोजयेत् सोमे ब्राह्मणानां शतं पशौ ।
चातुर्मास्येषु चत्वारि शतानि पञ्च सुराग्रहे ।
अयुतं वाजपेये च अश्वमेधे चतुर्गुणम् ॥
आग्रायणे प्रायश्चित्ते ब्राह्मणान् दश पञ्च च ॥ ८४-८७

One comes across certain typical terms in *YP*. Thus *bhikṣā* means a lump of grains, 4 *bhikṣā*-s make an *uddhṛta*, and 4 *uddhṛta*-s make a *hantakāra*.[1] The word *pakṣapa* has occurred in connection with the fanning of the fire (K 174); it may perhaps mean a fan. The words *cātra* and *ovilī* or *vovalī* have been used (K 138, 151), in connection with churning. *Ovilī* or *Vovalī* which is 12 *aṅgula*-s long is the uppermost part of the churning implement which is held perpendicularly and is pressed down. *Cātra* which is also 12 *aṅgula*-s long is joined to the lower end of the *Ovilī* or *Vovalī* and is turned round by means of a cord. A piece of *Uttarāraṇi*, called *pramantha*, is fixed within the *Cātra* and moves round along with the *cātra*. The *pramantha* is 8 *aṅgula*-s long.[2] These words have been used in the commentaries on the Sūtra-texts belonging to *Śukla Yajurveda*, they do not occur at any other place. The word *Cātra* is recorded in the dictionaries of the Hindi language, these words may, therefore, be current in north India. *Tejanī* ordinarily means a grass-mat; commentaries on the *Pāraskara Gṛahyasūtra* (1.5.2) have given the same meaning. According to *YP*, however, it means the hide of the red cow given away at the *Madhuparka*.[3]

Certain ungrammatical forms are met with e. g. *mathet* (K-164), *hunet* (K.12), *ādadhet* (K.43), *ālabhanti* (K. 127), *ādaranti* (K. 66), *nivartitaḥ* (causal, K. 302) etc. Such forms are used probably for metrical reason. Sometimes *sandhi* has not been observed. Sometimes the construction is loose and artificial. The word *yathāśāstrānusārataḥ* in the very first *Kārikā* is not a happy one. The form *hunet* is often found in mediaval religious tracts.

YP mentions the names of two teachers, Bhārgava[4] and Kauśika.[5] Bhārgava seems to be the name of some teacher of the *Śukla Yajurveda* School. The word Kauśika is found also in the *Pratijñā Pariśiṣṭa* (*Kauśikapakṣaḥ*, 21.5) where it is explained by Aṇṇaśastri Vare in his commentary as Yājñavalkya belonging to the Kauśika gotra.

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१. ग्रासमात्रा भवेद्भिक्षा उद्धृतं नु चतुर्गुणम् ।
उद्धृतानि च चत्वारि हन्तकारो विधीयते ॥ २३, १२८

२. अष्टाङ्गुलः प्रमन्थः स्याद्यच्चात्रं स्याद् द्वादशाङ्गुलम् ॥
ओविली द्वादशैव स्यादेतन्मन्थनयन्त्रकम् ॥

३. मधुपर्के यदा धेनुमालभन्ति मनीषिणः ।
तस्या आलोहितं चर्म तेजनी तां विनिर्दिशेत् ॥

४. होमद्वयात्यये चैव पौर्णमासात्यये तथा ।
कर्तव्यं पुनराधानमिति भार्गवसम्मतिः ॥ ५९

५. अन्येष्वपि च वेदेषु विभागं प्राह कौशिकः । २९१

Another name, Laugākṣi,[1] the author of the *Kāṭhaka Gṛhyasūtra*, occurs in the concluding portion of *YP* in connection with the sacrificer going on a journey.

YP consists of two parts; the second is more than double the first. Probably, *YP* consisted originally of a single part; the second one was added later on. The first part deals with *araṇi*, *parivedana* and *punarādhāna*, these have been elaborated in the second part. K. 63—*yo dahed agnihotreṇa* (Part 1) is repeated as K. 277 (Part 2) with a little modification. The statement that many deities reside in the fire-hall (K. 40, part 1) is made in other words in K.328-329 (Part 2), K. 23 (Part 1) defining ***bhikṣā***, ***uddhṛta*** and ***hantakāra*** is repeated ***ad verbatim*** as K.128 (part 2). Part 1 is characterised by both the Śrauta and Gṛhya elements; hence the dual term *yajñapārśve* appropriately suits it.

None of the available commentaries on the *Katyāyana Śrautasūtra* refers to *YP* even though the latter has discussed Śrauta topics to a large extent. The ***Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra*** is commented upon by Karkopādhyāya, Jayarama, Harihara, Gadādhara and Viśvanātha. There is also a commentary by Rāmakṛṣṇa composed in the 18th century. Karkopādhyāya and Jayarāma have not referred to *YP*. Harihara (*PārGS* 1. 2, comm.) has cited a *Kārikā* from *YP* while describing churning. Gadādhara (comm. on Paras 1.2) has cited *Kārikā*-s from *YP* at five or six places. Even in his commentary on the ***Śrāddhakalpa,*** he has cited at least at two places *Kārikā*-s from *YP* defining ***darbha*** and ***camasa.***[2] Viśvanātha has quoted four *Kāikā*-s from *YP* without mentioning its name while speaking about the contingencies for *Punarādhāna*. Gadādhara lived after 1500 A. D. Viśvanātha also flourished about the same time. Harihara lived between 1150 and 1250 A. D.[3] Since Jayarama and Karkopādhyāya have not mentioned *YP*, the latter might have been composed about their time or later. Karkopādhyāya lived before 1100 A. D.[4] *YP* may, therefore, be taken to have been composed in the eleventh century A. D.[5]

YP is an important means of understanding the history of Śrauta and Gṛhya rites according to the *Śukla Yajurveda* School. Annaśāstri Vare is reported to have written a commentary on *YP*. A critical edition of *YP* together with the commentary would be welcome.

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१. न क्लाप्यारम्भणं किञ्चिल्लौगाक्षिश्रुतिशासनात् । ३२२

2. Gadādhara has cited at two places (Comm. *PārGS* 1.2) *Kārikā*-s called *Yajñapārśvasaṁgraha-Kārikā* or simply *Kārikā*. It seems certain that other *Kārikā*-s were composed in a sebsequent period on the lines of *YP*.

3. Cf. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra* I. pp. 342ff.

4. Cf. J. Gonda, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I Fasc. 2, Wiesbaden 1977, pp. 602, 650.

5. Because the *Pratijñā* and *Caraṇavyūha Pariśiṣṭa*-s mention 18 *Pariśiṣṭa*-s including *Yajñapārśve*, they may be said to have been composed after 1100 A. D.

PRAKĀMÓDYA–ITS RELEVANCE TO THE ĀKHYĀNA THEORY

M. A. Mehendale

The word *prakāmodya* is attested only four times in the Vedic literature. Its occurrences in the *Vāj. Saṁ.* (30.9) and the *Taitt. Br.* (3.4.5.6.1) are not useful for determining the meaning of the word. It occurs twice in the *Śat. Br.* (3.2.4.16 and 3.5.3.11) but since the two sentences in which it occurs are identical, we are, in effect, left with only one attestation on the basis of which we have to interpret the word.

The Adhvaryu priest repeats the *mantra cid asi manási dhír asi dákṣiṇāsi*[1] while addressing the cow with which Soma is to be purchased. While commenting on the words *dhír asi* in the above *mantra* the *Śat. Br.* (3.2.4.16) says : *dhiyā́ dhīyā hỳ etáyā manuṣyà jújūṣanti ánūkteneva prakāmódyeneva gā́thābhir iva tásmād āha dhír asíti* "all men seek their sustenance according to their respective knowledge; (some) by the recitation of the *mantra*-s, (some) by *prakāmódya*, (some) by the singing of the *gāthā*-s. That is why he (i. e. the Adhvaryu) says '*dhír asi*''.

The meanings of the words *ánūkta* and *gā́thā* in the above passage are clear. They refer respectively to the Vedic *mantra*-s which the priests learn and recite in the Vedic ritual and the *gāthā*-s which are sung on special occasions.[2] Both these are fixed and are traditionally handed down among the classes which make use of them. The meaning of the word *prakāmódya* alone remains to be determined.

Sāyaṇa explains the word *prakāmódya* as *icchayā laukikabhāṣaṇam* i. e. everyday conversations done as desired. Böhtlingk-Roth give the meaning 'Geschwätzigkeit' and Monier-Williams gives 'talking to the heart's content, talkativeness'. Eggeling in his translation of the *Śat. Br.* renders it as 'readiness of speech'.

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1. *Vāj. Saṁ* 4.19.
2. Cf. for example *Śat. Br.* 13.1.5.1 ff., 13.4.2.8. The also formed part of an *ākhyāna*.

None of these renderings seems to fit into the context in which the word is used. The context is of earning one's livelihood (*jujyūṣanti*) which is done with the recitation of the *mantra*-s on the one hand and the singing the *gāthā*-s on the other.

The *Ṛgveda* contains some hymns which are known as the *saṁvāda sūkta*-s (dialogue hymns). It is well known that H. Oldenberg in 1883 put forward his *ākhyāna* theory with regard to these hymns. Recently Prof. L. Alsdorf has sought to uphold this theory by furnishing some additional evidence from the Jaina literature.[1] According to the theory of Oldenberg, the dialogue hymns are the remnants of a literary form which once existed and which he calls as *ākhyāna*. These *ākhyānā*-s contained both verses and prose portions. Whereas the verses were 'fixed', the prose portions were not and were supplied on each occasion by the narrator of the *ākhyāna* as desired by him. These prose portions were consequently lost with the result that in the *saṁvāda* hymns of today we have only the verses and not the prose portions.

Thus, according to the theory of Oldenberg, the old *ākhyāna*-s consisted of the Vedic *ṛc*-s, preserved in the *saṁvāda* hymns, and the prose portions which were supplied by the narrator. That some of the *ākhyāna*-s contained, besides the *ṛc*-s and the prose portions, also the *gāthā*-s becomes clear from the following description of the Sunaḥśepa story in the *Ait. Br.* 33.6 : *tad etat pararkśatagātham śaunaḥśepam ākhyānam* and of the Trita sotry in the *Nirukta* 4.6 : *tatra brahmetihāsamiśram ṛṅmiśraṁ gāthāmiśraṁ bhavati.*

It is, therefore, possible to suggest that the word *prakāmódya* which occurs in the *Śat. Br.* by the side of *anūkta* and *gāthā* and which refers to a means of livelihood means 'to be spoken as desired'. It would refer to the prose passages in the *ākhyāna* which the narrator added each time as desired by him.

Eggeling seems to have come close to this interpretation of *prakāmóda* when in foot note 8 to his translation he adds : "Prakāmodya, rather either 'fondness for talk' or 'effusive speech'. It seems to refer to story-tellers (amusing speech)".

If this interpretation of the word *prakāmódya* is correct it will be an additional argument in support of Oldenberg's *ākhyāna* theory.

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1. The Ākhyāna Theory Reconsidered, *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda, Vol. 13, pp. 195-207, 1963-64.

अग्नि का आविष्कार कैसे हुआ ?

नरेन्द्र प्रताप श्रीवास्तव

अथर्वन्, जिनको अङ्गिरस् या अथर्वाङ्गिरस् भी कहा जाता है, अग्नि के आविष्कारक हैं।[1] ऋग्वेद के अनुसार, अग्नि अथर्वन् के द्वारा उत्पन्न हुई थी।[2] अथर्वन् ने अग्नि का आविष्कार कैसे किया, इस पर विद्वानों के भिन्न-भिन्न मत हैं।

ऋग्वेद की 'त्वामग्ने'[3] ऋचा और शुक्ल यजुर्वेद के 'पुरीष्योऽसि'[4] मन्त्र का भाष्य करते हुए सायण[5]

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१. भारतीय विज्ञान के कर्णधार, डॉ० सत्य प्रकाश, पृष्ठ ३।

२. अग्निर्जातो अथर्वणा। ऋ०, १०.२१.५

३. त्वामग्ने पुष्करादध्यथर्वा निरमन्थत।
मूर्ध्नो विश्वस्य वाघतः॥ ऋ०, ६.१६.१३

४. पुरीष्योऽसि विश्वंभरा अथर्वा त्वा प्रथमो निरमन्थदग्ने।
त्वामग्ने पुष्करादध्यथर्वा निरमन्थत।
मूर्ध्नो विश्वस्य वाघतः॥ शु० य०, ११.३२

५. पुष्करपर्णे निरमन्थत। अरण्योः सकाशात् अजनयत्।
सायण, ऋ० भा०, ६.१६.१३

वेङ्कटमाधव[1] और महीधर[2] ने तथा अनुवाद करते हुए विलसन[3] ने "कमलपत्र पर अरणियों से मथकर अग्नि को उत्पन्न किया", आशय लिया है। ग्रिफ़िथ ने एक अभिनव ढंग का अर्थ किया है—'विश्व नामक पुरोहित के सिर पर कमल के सङ्घर्षण से उत्पन्न किया।'[4]

यज्ञ के विकास-क्रम में अग्नि का आविष्कार मानना भूल ही होगी। अथर्वन् को यह बात कैसे सूझ गयी कि दो अरणियों में सङ्घर्षण किया जाय और उनके नीचे कमल का पत्ता रख कर अग्नि की चिनगारियों को प्रदीप्त कर लिया जाय ? ऐसा तभी सम्भव है जब पहले कभी वन आदि में दो लकड़ियों के सङ्घर्षण से अग्नि को उत्पन्न होते देखा गया हो। यदि बन में अग्नि उपलब्ध ही होती; तो 'अग्निर्जातो अथर्वणा' न कहा गया होता।

ग्रिफ़िथ की मौलिक कल्पना भी व्यावहारिक नहीं है। किसी जीवित मनुष्य के सिर (के बालों) पर कमलपत्र रगड़ कर अग्नि उत्पन्न करना असम्भव भले न हो, किन्तु दूर की कौड़ी लाना ही कहा जायेगा। अग्नि का आविष्कार तो मानव का प्रथम आविष्कार और सभ्यता का प्रारम्भ ही है।

इनके अतिरिक्त, उवट एक तीसरा अर्थ करते हैं—"पहले प्राण ने जल के समीप से अग्नि को उत्पन्न किया।"[5] किन्तु उवट ने मन्त्र के अन्तिम पाद का अर्थ बिल्कुल दूसरे ढंग से किया है—"पुरोहित तो अरणियों के सिरों से सब कर्मों के अङ्गभूत (तुम अग्नि) को उत्पन्न करता है।" दोनों मन्त्र-भागों का समन्वय वे "पुरोहित" के आगे "तु" शब्द का अध्याहार करके करते हैं,[6] किन्तु उवट अगले मन्त्र में[7] 'अथर्वा' का अर्थ

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१. पुष्करपर्णात् अधि अथर्वा ऋषिः निः अमन्थत।
वे०मा०, ऋ० भा० ६.१६.१३

२. पद्मपत्रस्योपरि त्वां निरमन्थत। महीधर, शु० य० भाष्य, ११.३२

३. ......Extracted thee from upon lotus leaf..... H. H. Wilson, R. V. Tr., VI. 2. B

४. ......Brought thee forth, by rubbing, from the lotus-flower,
The head of Viśva, of the priest.
R. T. H, Griffith, *The Hymns of Ṛgveda* 6.16.13

५. ......पुष्करादुदकात् अधि सकाशात् अथर्वा अतनवान् प्राणो निरमन्थत् निर्जनितवान्।' 'आपो वै पुष्करं प्राणोऽथर्वा' इति श्रुतिः। उवट, शु० य० भाष्य, ११.३२

६. 'आपो वै पुष्करं प्राणोऽथर्वा इति श्रुतिः।......वाघत इति ऋत्विङ्नामसु पठितम्। वाघतस्तु मूर्ध्नः शिरस्तः अरण्योर्जनयति सर्वस्य कर्मणोऽङ्गभूतम्।
वही

७. तमु त्वा दध्यङ् ऋषिः पुत्र ईधे अथर्वणः।
वृत्रहणं पुरन्दरम्॥ ऋ० वे०, ६.१६.१४; शु० य०, ११.३३

प्रस्तुत मन्त्र में लिए गये अर्थ की तरह "प्राण" न कर 'ऋषि' करते हैं। वे इस दूसरे मन्त्र में स्पष्ट रूप से 'अथर्वा ऋषि के पुत्र दध्यङ्' आशय लेते हैं। इसके बाद तीसरे मन्त्र में[१] वे 'पाथ्यो वृषा' का अर्थ 'मन' लेते हैं। उनके द्वारा किये गए तीनों मन्त्रों के अर्थों में कोई तारतम्य नहीं है, जबकि ऋग्वेद और शुक्ल यजुर्वेद में मन्त्र एक ही क्रम से हैं। इसके विपरीत सायण, वेङ्कटमाधव और विलसन इन तीनों मन्त्रों का ऐतिहासिक अर्थ लेते हुए, उन में क्रमशः अथर्वा की तीन पीढ़ियों का नामोल्लेख स्वीकार करते हैं।

'त्वामग्ने' ऋचा में 'पुष्करात्' पद को और अधिक स्पष्ट करते हुए तैत्तिरीय ब्राह्मण के आधार पर सायण[२] और वेङ्कटमाधव[३] ने सृष्टिरचना में भी 'पुष्करपर्ण' की भूमिका का उल्लेख किया है। विलसन भी उनके अर्थ का ही अनुहरण करते प्रतीत होते हैं।[४]

फिर भी ये अर्थ हमें अग्नि के आविष्कार के सम्बन्ध में इङ्गित मात्र कर के और कुछ दूर ले जाकर ही छोड़ देते हैं।

तैत्तिरीय संहिता में कहा गया है कि "अग्नि देवताओं से छिप गया, उसे अथर्वा ने फिर देखा, 'अथर्वा त्वा प्रथमो निरमन्थदग्ने' ऐसा कहा, क्योंकि उसने इसे इस प्रकार फिर देखा, इसलिए ही इस (अग्नि) का (यज्ञ–कुण्ड में) सम्भरण करते हैं। 'त्वामग्ने पुष्करादधि' ऐसा इसलिये कहा क्योंकि इसे पुष्करपर्ण पर लगा हुआ पाया ?[५] इसके पूर्व यज्ञ में अग्निसम्भरण कर्म में कमलपत्र और कृष्णाजिन

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१. तमु त्वा पाथ्यो वृषा समीधे दस्युहन्तमम्।
धनञ्जयं रणे रणे ॥ ऋ० वे०, ६-१६-१५, शु० य०, ११-३४

२. पुष्करपर्णे हि प्रजापतिर्भूमिमप्रथयत् 'तत्पुष्करपर्णेऽप्रथयत्' (तै० ब्रा० १-१-३-६) इति श्रुतेः। भूमिश्च सर्वजगत आधारभूतेति पुष्करपर्णस्य सर्वजगद्धारकत्वम्। अत्र पुष्करशब्देन पुष्करपर्णमभिधीयत इति। एतच्च तैत्तिरीयके विस्पष्टमाम्नातं—'त्वामग्ने पुष्करादधीत्याह पुष्करपर्णे ह्येनमुपश्रितमविन्दत्' (तै० सं० ५-१-४-४) इति ॥ सायण, ऋ० वे० भाष्य, ६.१६.१३

३. पुष्करपर्णात्… । 'पुष्करपर्णे ह्येनमुपश्रितमविन्दत्' (तै० सं० ५।१।४।४) इति ब्राह्मणम्। वें० मा०, ऋ० भा०, ६-१६-१३ [वेंङ्कटमाधव ने प्रस्तुत उद्धरण भूल से ब्राह्मण का होना बताया है, वस्तुतः यह उद्धरण संहिता का है।]

४. Extracted thee from upon the lotus-leaf, the head, the support of the universe.
—H. H. Wilson, R. V. Tr., VI. 2, 1, 13

५. अग्निर्देवेभ्यो निलायत तमथर्वाऽन्वपश्यदथर्वा त्वा प्रथमो निरमन्थदग्न इत्याह य एवेनमन्वपश्यत् तेनैवैनं संभरति त्वामग्ने पुष्करादधीत्याह पुष्करपर्णे ह्येनमुपश्रितमविन्दत्। तै० सं०, ५.१.४.३-४

दोनों के द्वारा अग्नि को दोनों ओर से पकड़ते हैं।[1]

इस क्रम में तैत्तिरीय संहिता के 'अग्निचिति' से सम्बद्ध 'मृदाक्रमण' प्रसङ्ग के कुछ मन्त्रों पर ध्यान देने से उनमें पृथ्वी के अन्दर विद्यमान अग्नि को खोदने का आशय प्राप्त होता है।[2] इनमें से 'आक्रम्य वाजिन् पृथिवीम्' मन्त्र प्रो० ए० बी० कीथ के अनुसार घोड़े से उस स्थान पर जाने और अपनी शक्ति से अग्नि को ढूंढ़ने, उस स्थान की ओर मुँह कर के बताने के लिए कहा गया है "जिससे हम उसे (अग्नि को) खोदकर निकाल सकें।"[3]

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१. इयं वै कृष्णाजिनमसौ पुष्कर्णभाभ्यामेवैनमुभयतः परिगृह्णाति।

तै० सं०, ५ १.४.३

२. पृथिव्याः सधस्थादग्निं पुरीष्यमङ्गिरस्वदच्छेह्यग्निपुरीष्यमङ्गिरस्वदच्छेमोऽग्निं पुरीष्यमङ्गिरस्वद्भरिष्यामोऽग्निं पुरीष्यमङ्गिरस्वद्भरामः ॥

आगत्य वाज्यध्वनः सर्वा मृधो वि धूनुते ।
अग्निं सधस्थे महति चक्षुषा नि चिकीषते ॥
आक्रम्य वाजिन् पृथिवीमग्निमिच्छ रुचा त्वम् ।
भूम्या वृत्वाय नो ब्रूहि यतः खनाम तं वयम् ॥ आदि...

तै० सं०, ४.१.२. ६, ८, ९ आदि

३. Coming to earth, O steed,
Do thou seek Agni with thy radiance;
Turning from earth tell us
Whence we shall dig him up.

A. B. Keith, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittiriya Saṁhitā*, p. 291.

प्रो० फतेहसिंह के अनुसार, 'पुष्कर' का अर्थ "सृष्टि की प्रारम्भिक स्थिति में जल" है।[१] शतपथ ब्राह्मण में जल को 'पुष्कर' कहा गया है[२] तथा उसके सम्बन्ध में विस्तार से निरूपण किया गया है कि "जो जल का रस (सार) था, उसका ऊर्ध्वभाग संदोहन किया, उसे इसके लिए पुर (निवास) बनाया, और (क्योंकि) उसे इसके लिए पुर बनाया इसलिए (उसे) पुष्कर या पूष्कर (कहते हैं), (इसीलिए) उस परोक्ष को पुष्कर ऐसा कहते है।"[३]

तैत्तिरीय संहिता के अनुसार, पुष्करपर्ण "जल का पृष्ठ है।"[४] शतपथ ब्राह्मण में कहा गया है कि "आपः (अर्थात् जल) ही पुष्कर है, उनका ही यह पर्ण है, जैसे यह पुष्करपर्ण जल पर अध्याहित था, वैसे ही यह (भूमि) जल पर अध्याहित है, वह यह (भूमि) अग्नि का जन्मस्थान है क्योंकि यह (भूमि) अग्नि है।"[५] पुनश्च यह पुष्करपर्ण "इस पृथ्वी के सब ओर से बढ़ता हुआ है।"[६]

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् में कहा गया है कि "जो जल का 'शर' था, वह संहत हो गया, वह पृथ्वी हुआ।"[७] इसका भाष्य करते हुए शङ्कराचार्य ने कहा है कि "वहाँ वह जो जल का शर जैसा, दही के शर

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१. Primeval water (*Āpaḥ*) ....
Prof. Fateh Singh, *The Vedic Etymology*, p. 161.

२. आपो वै पुष्करम्। श० ब्रा०, ६.४.२.२, ७.४.१.८

३. योऽपां रस आसीत्तमूर्ध्वं समुदौहंस्तामस्मै पुरमकुर्वंस्तद्यदस्मै पुरमकुर्वंस्तस्मात्पुष्कर पूष्करँ ह वै तत्पुष्करमित्याचक्षते परोक्षम्। श० ब्रा० ७.४.१.१३

४. अपां वा एतत् पृष्ठं यत् पुष्करपर्णम्। तै० सं० ५.१.४.२

५. आपो वै पुष्करं तासामियं पर्णं यथा ह वाऽइदं पुष्करपर्णमप्स्वध्याहितमेवमियमप्स्वध्याहिता सेयं योनिरग्नेरियं हि अग्निः। श० ब्रा०, ७.४.१.८

६. अपां हीयं पृष्ठं योनिर्हीयमग्नेः समुद्गमभितः पिन्वमानमिति समुद्गो हीमामभितः पिन्वते वर्धगानो महाँऽआ च पुष्करऽइति वर्धमानो महीयष्व पुष्करऽइति।

श० ब्रा०, ७.४.१.९

७. यदपां शर आसीत्तत्समहन्यत। सा पृथिव्यभवत्। बृह० उ०, १.२.२

की तरह मण्डभूत था वह सङ्घात को प्राप्त हुआ।"[1] स्पष्ट है कि 'पुष्करपर्ण' जल के ऊपर पड़ी मिट्टी की पर्त या पपड़ी का ही नाम है। इस प्रकार 'त्वामग्ने' ऋचा और 'पुरीष्योऽसि' मन्त्र में 'पुष्करात्' का अर्थ 'मिट्टी की पर्त' ही है।

ए० बी० कीथ के अनुसार यजुर्वेद के 'देवस्य त्वा सवितुः प्रसवे' मन्त्र के एक भाग[2] का अर्थ है "मैं अङ्गिरस् के ढङ्ग से धूलि से युक्त अग्नि को खोदता हूं।"[3]

'पुरीष्योऽसि' मन्त्र का भी अर्थ करते हुए कीथ ने कहा है कि "हे अग्ने! तुम धूलि-युक्त और सर्वाश्रय-भूत हो, अथर्वा ने सर्वप्रथम तुम्हें बाहर निकाला।"[4] तैत्तिरीय संहिता का यह मन्त्र शुक्ल यजुर्वेद के पूर्वोक्त 'पुरीष्योऽसि' मन्त्र के प्रथम दो पादों के तुल्य ही है।

इस सम्पूर्ण विवेचन से स्पष्ठ है कि अथर्वा ऋषि पृथिवी के उस विकास-क्रम के समय हुए थे, जब पृथिवी पर मिट्टी की हलकी पर्त जम चुकी थी। इसके पूर्व, इन्द्र आदि देवताओं के समय पर वह पर्त कुछ ही भागों पर थी और अग्नि धरती में यत्र-तत्र-सर्वत्र खुली हुई मिल जाती थी। अथर्वा के समय में अग्नि की खोज के पूर्व तक वह उपलब्ध न थी। अथर्वा ने उस अग्नि को किसी स्थान पर मिट्टी की पर्त के नीचे पुनः पाया। उस मिट्टी की पर्त और कृष्णाजिन के सहारे से उसने प्रयत्न करके अग्नि को बाहर निकाल लिया। इस प्रकार 'त्वामग्ने' ऋचा का अर्थ यह है कि "हे अग्ने अथर्वा ने तुम्हें सबकी धारक और ऊपर विद्यमान मिट्टी की पर्त से यत्नपूर्वक ऊपर निकाला।"

अग्नि की इस खोज में अश्व का महत्वपूर्ण योगदान रहा है, यह बात तैत्तिरीय संहिता के 'आक्रम्य वाजिन्" से प्रकट होती है। उस समय सम्भवतः अङ्गिरा के देश की जलवायु अत्यन्त शीत थी। अश्व को अग्नि का आभास हुआ और उसने अपने खुर से ऊपर की मिट्टी की पर्त को ठोकर मारी। इस पर अथर्वा ने उस स्थान की मिट्टी की पर्त उखाड़ दी जिससे उसे अग्नि प्राप्त हो गयी।

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१. तत्तत्र यदपां शर इव शरो दध्न इव मण्डभूतमासीत्तत्समहन्यत संघातमापद्यत।

बृह० उ० शाङ्करभाष्य, १.२.२

२. पृथिव्याः सधस्थादग्निं पुरीष्यमङ्गिरस्वत्खनामि।

शु० य०, ११.२८, तै० सं०, ४.१.३.१

३. I dig Agni of the dust in the manner of Aṅgiras.

A. B. Keith, *The Veda of the B. Y. S. entitled T. S.* 4.1.3.1

४. Thou art of the dust, all-supporting : Atharvan first pressed out thee, O Agni.

Ibid., 4.1.3.6

मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रार्थविमर्शः

सत्यव्रतसिंहः

परम्परातः मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्र इति प्रथां प्राप्तः मन्त्रः एवंवर्णकः–

त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे सुगन्धिं पुष्टिवर्धनम् ।
उर्वारुकमिव बन्धनान्मृत्योर्मुक्षीय मामृतात्[1] ।।

मन्त्रोऽयं रुद्रदेवताकः। रुद्र एव अघोरः। अघोरश्च शिवः। शिवश्च शम्भुः। शम्भोश्च महादेवस्य नामान्तरं त्र्यम्बक इति तु वेदविदां निर्विवादं मतमित्यत्र न कस्यापि विमतिः। कदा प्रभृति मन्त्रोऽयं मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रतां प्राप्त इति विचारणीयोऽयं विषयः। वस्तुतः श्रुतिलिङ्गसहकृतवाक्यप्रमाणादेव मन्त्रस्यास्य मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रता प्रमीयते। अत एव शौनकीये ऋग्विधाने पुरुषायुषपर्यन्तं सुखजीवनायैतन्मन्त्रजपविधिर्दृश्यते[2] य एवंविधः –

त्रिरात्रं नियतोऽपोष्य श्रपयेत् पायसं चरुम् ।
तेनाहुतिशते पूर्णं जुहुयात् संशितव्रतः ।।
समुद्दिश्य महादेवं त्र्यम्बकं 'त्र्यम्बके'त्यृचा ।
एतत् पर्वशतं कृत्वा जीवेद् वर्षशतं सुखी ।।

एतच्छौनकवचनादर्थद्वयं सिध्यति। प्रथमस्त्वर्थो यत् 'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्यादिरूपा या ऋक् तस्या एव मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रत्वम्। द्वितीयोऽर्थो यदेतन्मन्त्रजप एव मृत्योर्मोक्षणोपाया नान्यमन्त्रजप इति।

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१. ऋग्वेदः ७.५९.१२

२. २.३१४.१२

कात्यायनीये श्रौतसूत्रे[1] विनियोगोऽपि मन्त्रस्यास्य वर्णितो यथाहि तत्र ब्रह्मा परियञ्जपेदिति धानञ्जप्यः तिष्ठन्निति शाण्डिल्यः त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे इति । अर्थात् धानञ्जप्यमतेन वेदीं परिक्रममाणो ब्रह्माख्यः ऋत्विक् एतन्मन्त्रजपं कुर्यात्, शाण्डिल्यमतेन तु स्वासनस्थ एवेति। अत्र यो विनियोगभेदः स सार्थक एव यतो हि याज्ञिकसम्प्रदाये मन्त्रस्यास्य मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रत्वे वैमत्याभावेऽपि जपकर्मणि यद् विनियोगवैमत्यं तत् स्पष्टमनुमापयति यन्मन्त्रोऽयं सुखजीवनसिद्धौ परीक्षितसामर्थ्यः यथारुचि यथार्थित्वं यथाव्युत्पत्ति च पायस-चरुहोमकर्मणि जपकर्मणि च बहोः कालात् प्रथितप्रचार इति। अद्यत्वेऽपि भारते रोगशोकाद्युल्लाघकर्मणि पुरोधोमुखेन स्वयं वा मन्त्रस्यास्य जपः क्रियमाण एव दृष्टचरः।

जपार्थविनियोगादस्य मन्त्रस्य विनियोगान्तरमपि श्रौतादिसूत्रेषु दृश्यते । तथाहि त्र्यम्बकदेवतायै त्रैयम्बकाः अपूपा एककपालसंस्कृताः क्रतुकर्मणि हव्यद्रव्यरूपेण प्रयोक्तव्या इति कात्यायनीयादेव श्रौतसूत्रात् स्पष्टमधिगम्यते।[2]

अत्र 'त्र्यम्बके' ति ऋङ्मन्त्रे या त्र्यम्बकदेवता परामृष्टा सा किंस्वरूपेति विमृशामः। वाजसनेयिनां संहितां[3] व्याख्यातुकामौ वेदाचार्यावुवटमहीधरौ यद् ब्रूतस्तदेवंरूपम्—

'अत्र रुद्रमदीमह यद्देवं त्र्यम्बकम्। यथा नो वयसस्करत् यथा नः श्रेयसस्करत् यथा नो व्यवसाय-यात्।' अत्र त्र्यम्बकमिति त्रीणि अम्बकानि नेत्राणि यस्य तादृशं देवम् इति।

त्र्यम्बकः खलु देवः त्रिनेत्रः त्रिनयनो विरूपाक्ष इति तैत्तिरीयारण्यकस्य दशमप्रपाठकान्तर्गते द्वादशेऽनुवाके यद्वचनं तत उन्नीयते । तत्रेयमृक् पठ्यते यथा हि—

ऋतं सत्यं परं ब्रह्म पुरुषं कृष्णपिङ्गलम् ।
ऊर्ध्वरेतं विरूपाक्षं विश्वरूपाय वै नमः ॥'

तदुपरि सायणीयं व्याख्यानमेवंविधम्—

'यदेतत् परं ब्रह्म तत् सत्यमबाध्यम्। सत्यं च द्विविधम्—व्यावहारिकं पारमार्थिकञ्च। हिरण्य-गर्भादिरूपं व्यावहारिकं सत्यम्। तन्निवारणेन पारमार्थिकं सत्यं प्रदर्शयितुं ऋतं सत्यमिति विशेष्यते। अत्यन्तं सत्यमित्यर्थः। तादृशं ब्रह्म स्वभक्तानुग्रहाय उमामहेश्वरात्मकं पुरुषरूपं भवति। तत्र दक्षिणो महेश्वरभागः कृष्णवर्णः। उमाभागो वामे पिङ्गलवर्णः स च योगेन स्वकीयं रेतः ब्रह्मरन्ध्रे धृत्वा ऊर्ध्वरेता भवति । त्रिनेत्रत्वाद् विरूपाक्षः। तादृशं परमेश्वरमनुसृत्येति शेषः।

अत्र सायणाचार्यैः बिरूपाक्षस्त्रिनेत्र इति प्रस्पष्टं प्रतिपादितम्। किन्तु 'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्यादि मन्त्रव्याख्यानावसरे त्र्यम्बको विरूपाक्ष इति तैर्नोक्तम्। तत्र 'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्यादेर्मन्त्रस्य 'त्रयाणां ब्रह्म-विष्णुरुद्राणामम्बकं पितरं त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे पूजयाम इति रूपा व्याख्या विहिता। रुद्रदेवताके मन्त्रे रुद्र एव

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१. ५.३.६
२. तदेव
३. ३.५८

त्र्यम्बक इति दृष्ट्या रुद्रस्य पितुः परामर्शोऽधिगतैतन्मन्त्ररहस्यानां सुधियां न मनस्तोषमावहति । त्र्यम्बकेति पदस्य बहूनि निर्वचनानि भवन्ति । यथाहि—

१. त्रीणि अग्निरविचन्द्रात्मकानि अम्बकानि नेत्राणि यस्य स त्र्यम्बक इति ।

२. त्रिषु अग्निरविचन्द्रेषु अम्बकं नयनं यस्य, 'अम्बकं नयनं दृष्टिरिति' हलायुधवचनात्, इति त्र्यम्बक इति ।

३. त्रयाणां लोकानामम्बकः पितेति त्र्यम्बक इति ।

४. त्रीन् वेदान् अम्बते शब्दायते वेति त्र्यम्बक इति ।

५. त्रिषु लोकेषु कालेषु वा अम्बः शब्दो वेदलक्षणो यस्येति त्र्यम्बक इति ।

६. त्रयः अकारोकारमकारा अम्बाः शब्दा वाचका यस्य वेति त्र्यम्बक इति ।

७. तिस्रो द्यौर्भूम्यापोऽम्बा यस्येति त्र्यम्बक इति ।

अमरकोषेऽपि[1] त्र्यम्कशब्दस्य पर्यायाः प्रतिपादिताः । तथाहि—

'कृशानुरेताः सर्वज्ञो धूर्जटिर्नीललोहितः ।
हरः स्मरहरो भर्गस्त्र्यम्बकस्त्रिपुरान्तकः ॥

अमरकोषप्रमाणेन त्र्यम्बक एव त्रिपुरान्तक इति स्पष्टावगमः । त्रिपुरान्तकस्तु देवो महादेवः शिव एव । स च विरूपाक्षः त्र्यम्बकत्वात्, त्र्यम्बकश्च विरूपाक्षत्वादिति स्पष्टमेव । कविकुलगुरुः कालिदासोऽपि स्वरचिते काव्ये नाटके वा यथाप्रसङ्गं क्वचन शिवस्य विरूपाक्षतां क्वचन त्र्यम्वकतां क्वचन त्रिलोचनतां क्वचन नीललोहितरूपतां कृष्णपिङ्गलतामुमामहेश्वरैकरूपतां वा निर्वर्णयति । तथाहि कुमारसम्भवमहाकव्ये—

वपुर्विरूपाक्षमलक्ष्यजन्मता दिगम्बरत्वेन निवेदितं वसु ।
वरेषु यद्बालमृगाक्षि लक्ष्यते तदस्ति किं व्यस्तमपि त्रिलोचने ॥[2]

इत्यत्र शिवस्य विरूपाक्षरूपतां निरूपयति । नाटके चाऽभिज्ञानशाकुन्तले तस्यैव नीललोहितस्वरूपतां निध्यायति, यथा हि—

ममाऽपि च क्षपयतु नीललोहितः पुनर्भवं परिगतशक्तिरात्मभूः ॥

आस्तामेतत्सर्वम् । मन्त्रार्थोऽधुना प्रतिपदं प्रदर्शयितुं प्रक्रम्यते ।

तत्र त्र्यम्बकमिति प्रथमपदम् । नात्र त्रयाणां ब्रह्मविष्णुरूद्राणामम्बकं पितरं (यजामहे पूजयामः) इति सायणीयं व्याख्यानं विचारचतुरस्रं प्रतिभाति । रूद्रदेवताकोऽयं मन्त्रः, न सच्चिदानन्दैकरसब्रह्मदेवताकः । ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरामर्शकत्वे सति 'सुगन्धी'ति प्रथमं विशेषणपदं विशेषस्वरूपनिष्कर्षकतया व्याख्यानमर्हति । किन्तु सायणीये व्याख्याने सुगन्धीति शब्दः "शोभनः शरीरगन्धः पुण्यगन्धो वा यस्यासौ सुगन्धिः[3]—'यथा वृक्षस्य सम्पुष्पितस्य दूराद्गन्धो वाति, एवं पुण्यस्य कर्मणो दूराद् गन्धो वाति'[3] इति श्रूतेः" इत्यादि श्रुतिसंवलितनिरुक्तिपुरस्सरं प्रसारितपुण्यकीर्त्यर्थकः गृहीतः । एवमेव 'पुष्टिवर्धने'ति द्वितीयं विशेषणपदमपि न ब्रह्मस्वरूपपराम-

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१. १. १. ३३

२. ५.७२

३. तैत्तिरीयारण्यकम् १०.९

र्शकतया व्याख्यातम् । सायणाचार्यैः पदमिदं 'पुष्टिवर्धनं जगद्बीजम् । उरुशक्तिमित्यर्थः । उपासकस्य वर्धनम् । अणिमादिशक्तिवर्धनम् । अथवा पुष्टिं शरीरधनादिविषयां वर्धयतीति पुष्टिवर्धनः तादृशं त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्यादि विवरणपूर्वकं विवृतम् । किन्तु यथोक्तार्थकं विशेषणपदद्वयं न त्र्यम्बकेति विशेष्यपदेन समन्वेतुमलम् । यतो हि परात्परस्य त्र्यम्बकेतिसंज्ञितस्य शिवस्य ब्रह्मणः सच्चिदानन्दस्वरूपस्य पुण्यकर्मकर्तृत्वमुपासकस्याणिमादिशक्तिवर्धकत्वञ्च न ब्रह्मविदां परिषदि किञ्चिदपि प्रामाण्यमर्हति । अतो भवितव्यमर्थान्तरेणात्रेति निश्चिनुमः । किं तदर्थान्तरमिति विमर्शनीयम् ।

आदौ तावत् 'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्यस्य पदकदम्बकस्य 'त्वामेव शम्भुं शरणं प्रपद्ये' इति रूपो निर्गलितार्थ एव साधिष्ठः प्रतिभाति । 'त्वामेव शम्भुं शरणं प्रपद्ये' इति परिनिष्ठितार्थोऽपि किञ्चिदर्थरहस्यामृतं निश्च्योतन् विभाव्यते । तदर्थरहस्यमेवंविधं भवितुमर्हति–त्र्यम्बकं शम्भुं स्वात्मदेवतास्वरूपं सदात्मकमनुत्तरश्रेयः स्वभावं ननु मायान्तश्चारिणं स्वभिन्नं कञ्चन देवं यजामहे, अपि तु पराहन्ताचमत्कारैकस्वरूपं स्वात्मानं समाविशामीति परामृशामीति वा । वस्तुतः त्र्यम्बकयजनं नाम चिदानन्दैकघनः स्वतन्त्रोऽस्मीति मानवमेव त्र्यम्बकस्य परमार्थतः स्वात्मदेवस्वरूपत्वादिति । श्रीमद्भिर्योगराजाचार्यैरभिनवगुप्तपादाचार्यकृतपरमार्थसारविवृतौ त्र्यम्बकयजनस्यालौकिकयागत्वं साधितम्—

'अत्रेन्धनं द्वैतवनं मृत्युरेव महापशुः ।
अलौकिकेन यत्नेन तेन नित्यं यजामहे ॥'

इति श्लोकप्रामाण्यात् । श्रीयोगराजोक्तमर्थरहस्यं शान्तेन दान्तेन सुसमाहितेन च चेतसा 'मामेव शम्भुं शरणं प्रपद्ये' इति रूपं मनसि कृत्यैतन्मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रार्थः बुद्धौ विनिवेशयितव्यः । पाञ्चरात्रागमान्तर्गतास्वहिर्बुध्न्यसंहितासु मन्त्राणां स्थूल–सूक्ष्म-परार्थता निर्णीता । यथोक्तं तत्रैव[१]—

'स्थूलः सूक्ष्मः परश्चेति भावो मन्त्रे त्रिधा स्थितः ।"

अनयैव मन्त्रार्थदृष्ट्या 'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्यादिमन्त्रगतत्र्यम्बकपदस्य यः परो भावार्थः स एवं समुन्मीलितः–

इच्छा ज्ञप्तिः क्रिया चेति तिस्रो लोकस्य मातरः ।
तिस्रस्तु यस्य विद्यन्ते जगद्भाविन्य ऊर्जिताः ।
त्र्यम्बकस्स तु विज्ञेयो ज्ञानशक्तिक्रियान्वितः ॥[२]

अथ च 'यजामहे' इति पदस्यार्थोऽपि परमार्थदृष्ट्या तत्रैवरूपो वर्णितो यथा हि—

इच्छा ज्ञानक्रियाकारं शोभनाख्यं जगत्प्रियम् ॥
स्वाकारज्ञापितैश्वर्यं शुद्धं संविन्मयं परम् ।
ईशानं सर्वलोकानां पुरुषं पुरुषेक्षणम् ॥
देवतां स्वां समुद्दिश्य स्वात्माख्यद्रव्यमुत्तमम् ।
यजाम इति मन्त्रस्य पूर्वभागार्थ ईदृशः ॥[३] इति

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१. ५१.९
२. ५७.६५
३. ५७.७२--७४

एतत्सर्वं प्रमाणं वस्तुत एतदर्थप्रत्यायकं यच्छैवागमाचार्या यथा 'शिवो भूत्वा शिवं यजेदिति' न्यायमनुसरमाणाः शिवाहन्तापरामर्शरसास्वादमेव त्र्यम्बकयजनेऽनुभवन्ति तथैव वैष्णवाचार्या अपि पाञ्चरात्रिकास्तत्र परम्परातः विष्णुर्भूत्वा विष्णुं यजेदिति न्यायमेवानुसरन्तः विष्णोस्त्र्यम्बकतां भावयन्तः विष्ण्वहन्तापरामर्शरसमास्वादयन्ति स्मेति। आस्तामेतत् विषयान्तरस्पर्शि सदर्थवस्तुजातम्। किन्त्वेतेनेदमेव सिद्धं यत् त्र्यम्बकयजनं स्वात्मदेवतास्वरूपपरामर्शनमेवेति । अमुमेवाभिप्रायमाश्रयितव्यतया मत्वा मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रान्तर्वर्तिनामन्येषामपि पदानां पदकदम्बकानां वा प्रातिस्विकः परस्परं संवलितश्चार्थो निपुणमवबोधपदवीमानेतव्यो भवति।

तथा ह्यत्र त्र्यम्बकेति पदस्यार्थ एवंरूपः–तिसृणामिच्छाज्ञानक्रियाख्यानां शक्तीनामम्बको जनकः, यथोक्तं श्रीमत्स्वच्छन्दतन्त्रोद्योते महामहेश्वरेण श्रीमता क्षेमराजाचार्येण—

"तिस्रो देव्यो यदा चैनं नित्यमेवाभ्युपासते ।
त्र्यम्बकस्तु तदा ज्ञेयः ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ॥

इत्यादि। 'आत्मा वै पुत्रनामाऽसी'ति श्रुतेः शिवशक्तित्वयस्य जन्यजनकभावस्वाभाव्यादेकरूपतायामेव वस्तुतोऽर्थपरमार्थता परिच्छिद्यते। अथवा तिस्रः इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाख्याः शक्तयः सामरस्यतया अम्बा याचकाश्शब्दाः यस्य स त्र्यम्बक इति। अथवा त्रयाणां मृत्पिण्डोपमशक्त्यण्डचक्रोपममायाण्डदण्डोपमप्रकृत्यण्डानां विश्वब्रह्माण्डभाण्डकारणीभूतानामम्बको जनयिता दुर्घटघटनापटीयान् महादेवस्त्र्यम्बक इति।

त्र्यम्बकपदस्योपर्युक्तमर्थरहस्यमनुसन्धाय तद्विशेषणतयोपात्तस्य सुगन्धिपदस्याप्यर्थः समञ्जसतया प्रस्फुटीकर्तुं शक्यः। अत्राहिर्बुध्न्यसंहिताऽपि पाञ्चरात्रागमान्तर्गता मार्गदर्शनं कुर्वन्ती विराजते। यथा हि—

शोभनं सूचयन् सर्वः सुगन्धिरति शब्द्यते ।
यः सुष्ठु सर्वतत्त्वानि गन्धयत्यात्मतेजसा ॥
गन्धयत्यनुवेद्येन स्वस्वरूपीकरोति यः ।
गन्धादीनि पृथिव्यादिभूतान्येवाखिलानि च ॥
शोभनं यस्य तिष्ठन्ति वशे देवस्य शासितुः ।
स सुगन्धिः समाख्यातो ज्ञानात्मा सर्वविद्वशी ॥[1]

एवं च सुष्ठु शोभनो गन्धो यस्य तादृशो देवस्त्र्यम्बक इति। अर्थात् पराहन्ताचमत्कारसारमयः त्र्यम्बकः शम्भुरनवच्छिन्नानन्दैकघनमकरन्दामोदभरसम्भृततया सुगन्धिर्भवतीति। गन्धेति पदस्यैकोऽद्भुतो भावार्थः कुलार्णवतन्त्रे[2] परिभाषितः। तत्रत्यं वचनं यथा—

गम्भीरापारदौर्भाग्यक्लेशनाशनकारणात् ।
धर्मज्ञानप्रदानाच्च गन्ध इत्यभिधीयते ॥

एवं स्वरूपो यो गन्धस्तेन त्र्यम्बकश्शिवः सर्वात्मना सुरभित एव यतो हि स एव गम्भीरापारदौर्भाग्यक्लेशस्य

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१. अहिर्बुध्न्यसंहिता ५७. ६७-६९

२. १७.७३

बीजभूतायाश्शैवनयप्रसिद्धाया आणवमायीय-कार्ममलवासानाया प्रज्ञयापादकः अथ च भुक्तिमुक्तिप्रदस्य कुलधर्मस्य स्वात्मस्वरूपशिवाद्वयज्ञानस्य च प्रदानानुग्रहपर इति। अथवा अभेदाख्यो य आमोदभरो भेदाख्यपूतिगन्धव्यतिरिक्तस्ततोऽपि स्वात्मस्वरूपपरमेश्वरः सततं सुरभित एवेति सुगन्धिरित्युच्यते। अथवा विश्वलक्षणादुद्यानादुत्पन्नानि सुगन्धीनि प्रकाशपरिमलपरिस्फुरणोद्भटानि गन्धादीनि पञ्चप्रसूनानि सततं समाजिघ्रन् सुगन्धिरेव देवः नित्यलीलाशीलः स्वात्मरूपः शम्भुस्त्र्यम्बक इत्यर्थोऽपि समञ्जस एव बोद्धव्यः।

एवमेव द्वितीयं 'पुष्टिवर्धनेति' विशेषणपदमपि पूर्वनिरूपितेन त्र्यम्बकस्वरूपेण सङ्गतार्थतयैव व्याख्यानमर्हति। शरीरधनादिविषयामणिमादिशक्तिविषयां वा पुष्टिं वर्धयतीति पुष्टिवर्धन इति निरुच्यमानार्थकः पुष्टिवर्धनशब्दो न स्वविशेष्यस्य देवाधिदेवस्य त्र्यम्बकस्य स्वभावं लेशतोऽपि स्प्रष्टुमलम्, प्रागेव निष्क्रष्टुम्। अतोऽन्य एव खलु त्र्यम्बकस्वरूपेण सह समरसी भवितुमर्होऽन्तर्निगूढमहार्थः कश्चनार्थोऽनुसन्धेयः। स त्वेवंरूपो भवितुमर्हति पुष्ठिश्चिद्रूपस्य भगवतस्त्र्यम्बकस्य 'विश्वं भवामीति' विमृशतो विश्वभवनस्वभावमयी सर्वभावानां बीजभूमिर्या स्वतन्त्राऽऽनन्दसंवित् तया वर्धत इति कृत्वा देवस्त्र्यम्बकः पुष्टिवर्धन इति स्पष्टमुन्नेतुं शक्यते। अथवा पुष्ट्याऽण्डचतुष्टयाविष्करणवैभवशक्त्या वर्धमानः परिबृंहितः इति पुष्टिवर्धन एव देवस्त्र्यम्बको यतो हि स एव स्वात्ममहेश्वरः इच्छा-ज्ञान-क्रियासामरस्यलक्षणं यदन्तर्निमग्नसंविदानन्दसन्धुक्षणस्वरूपं मधु तद्द्वारा सर्वदाऽत्यन्तं परिबृंहितं समुल्लसमानाह्लादातिशयं स्वात्मानमनुभवन् लोकातिशायिनि स्वमहिम्नि विराजमानः 'पुष्टिवर्धने'ति प्रथां प्राप्तुं प्रभवति नान्यो हिरण्यगर्भादिर्देव इति।

पाञ्चरात्रागमशास्त्रस्वरूपिण्या 'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इति मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रे व्याख्यातुं धृतसंरम्भायामहिर्बुध्न्यसंहितायामपि[1]। विष्णुः पुण्डरीकेक्षणो देवाधिदेवोऽनयैव रीत्या पुष्टिवर्धन इत्युक्तस्तथा हि—

> पुष्टिर्भूतिः समाख्याता या सा सदसदात्मिका।
> शक्तिर्विष्णुमयी विष्णोः स तां वर्धयति स्वयम्॥
> सङ्कल्पेन समुद्भाव्य वितत्य विविधात्मना।
> सन्धार्य संनियम्याथ प्रतिसंहरते च ताम्॥
> ततोऽसौ भगवान् विष्णुः कथ्यते पुष्टिवर्धनः॥ इति।

एवमुपर्युक्तस्वरूपस्य महाविष्णोः महाशिवस्य वा त्र्यम्बकस्य भगवतः स्वात्मदेवतास्वरूपस्य यद् यजनं न तद् बाह्यदेवालयादिप्रतिष्ठापिततदर्चादिपूजनरूपमेव, किन्तु स्वदेह एव देवगृहे 'स्वात्मैवदं सर्वम्' इति यदामर्शनं सर्वपदार्थानां सततं संविद्रूपतया पूर्णाहन्ता विश्रान्तिलक्षणं पूर्णाहन्तास्फुरणस्वरूपं परामर्शनं तत्स्वरूपमिति। स्वदेहे देवमन्दिरे परमाद्वयचिदानन्दैकघनोऽस्मि, ममेव विश्वमिदं स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिविजृम्भणमात्रवपुष्कमिति एवात्मज्ञानं विहाय नान्यन्मायीयं नियतिशक्तिसमुद्भूतं षोडशोपचारपूजनादिकर्म प्रगल्भत इत्यर्थ एव सर्वतस्सामञ्जस्यं बिभर्ति। तत्तद्विधस्य त्र्यम्बकयजनस्य दृष्टं फलं जीवन्मुक्तिः अदृष्टं तु परमशिवतत्वमित्यपि मन्तव्यं सुधीभिरिति।

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१. ५७.७०-७१

अधुना मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रान्तर्वर्तिनः 'मृत्योर्मुक्षीय माऽमृतादि'ति चतुर्थपादस्य तात्पर्यार्थोऽन्वेष्टव्यस्तदनन्तरञ्च 'उर्वारुकमिव बन्धनादित्युपमानीभूतस्य तृतीयपादस्येति । तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मणे[1] यथैतच्चतुर्थपादव्याख्यानं तदुद्ध्रियते । तत्रोक्तम्–'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्याह 'मृत्योर्मुक्षीय माऽमृतादिति वावैतदाहे'ति । अत्र तात्पर्यमिदमेव यत् स्वात्मदेवतास्वरूपस्य त्र्यम्बकस्य यद् यजनं भावनं वा तदेव संसारसागरसन्तरणं यन्मोक्ष इत्युच्यते । नात्र कस्याश्चनाप्युपायोपेयभावकल्पनायाः किमपि प्रयोजनमुत्पश्यामः ।

आस्तां तावदेतत् । 'उर्वारुकमिव बन्धना'दिरूपे मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रगततृतीयपादे वेदविदांवरैश्श्रीसायणाचार्यैर्याऽर्थयोजना कृता सेयंरूपा । यथाहि—

'त्वत्प्रसादेन मृत्योर्मरणात् संसराद्वा मुक्षीय मोचय, यथा बन्धनादुर्वारुकं कर्कटीफलं मुच्यते तद्वन्मरणात् संसाराद्वा मोचय । किं मर्यादीकृत्य ? आऽमृतात् सायुज्यतामोक्षपर्यन्तम् । अथवा लोके यथा उर्वारुकफलानि बन्धनाद् वृन्तात् स्वयमेव मुच्यन्ते तद्वदहं त्र्यम्बकप्रसादेन मृत्योर्मुक्षीय मोचनयुक्तो भूयासम् अमृतात् चिरजीवितात्स्वर्गादेर्वा मा मुक्षीये'ति । एवमेव वाजसनेयिनां संहितां[2] ब्याख्यातुकामैर्महीधराचार्यैरपि त्र्यम्बकेत्यादिकाया ऋचो द्वितीयार्धं एवं व्याख्यातः–

'त्र्यम्बकं नेत्रत्रयोपेतं रुद्रं यजामहे पूजयामः । ततो रुद्रप्रसादान्मृत्योर्मुक्षीय अपमृत्योः संसारमृत्योश्च मुक्तो भूयासम् । अमृतान्मा मुक्षीय स्वर्गरूपान्मुक्तिरूपाच्चामृतान्मा मुक्षीय मुक्तो मा भूयासम् । अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसरूपात् फलद्वयान्मम भ्रंशो माभूत् । उर्वारुककर्कन्ध्वादेः फलमत्यन्तपक्वं सद् बन्धनात् स्वस्य वृन्तात्प्रमुच्यते तद्वदि'ति ।

अत्र बहु विचारणीयमापतति । आदौ तावत् त्र्यम्बकेत्यादिमन्त्रे किं फलमुर्वारुकाख्यं फलमुच्यते ? तच्च किं बन्धनात् स्वयं मुच्यते, उताहो कर्षकपुरुषप्रयत्नेन बन्धात्तन्मोक्षः ? श्रीसायणाचार्यैरुर्वारुकपदेन कर्कटीफलं (यद्देशभाषायां ककड़ीत्युच्यते) गृह्यते महीधराचार्यैश्च कर्कन्ध्वादिफलम् (यद्देशभाषायां बेर इत्युच्यते) । द्वावपि वेदभाष्यकारौ वस्तुतः उर्वारुकफलस्य स्वयमेव वृन्तान्मोक्ष इति वदतः । किन्तु यैः कर्कटीलताः धान्यादिक्षेत्रेषु बालुकाबहुलेषु दृष्टास्ते जानन्त्येव यत् कर्कटीफलानि (यानि देशभाषासु 'फूट' इत्यादि कथ्यन्ते) न स्वयमेव बन्धनाद् वृन्ताद्वा मुक्तानि जायन्ते, किन्तु शनैः शनैरङ्गुल्यग्रभागैः फलार्थिभिर्मोच्यन्ते । अमरकोशे[3] कर्कटीफलस्य 'ईर्वारुरिति', 'एर्वारु'रिति, त्र्यम्बकेत्यादिश्रुतेः पृषोदरादित्वेनातेरुत्वे 'उर्वारूरिति त्रीण्यभिधानानि पठितानि । तथाहि–कूष्माण्डकस्तु कर्कारुः ईर्वारुः कर्कटीस्त्रियौ' । कथं कर्कट्या ईर्वारुरित्यभिधानान्तरम् ? कर्कटीनां व्रततीततयः क्षेत्रभूमावितस्ततः ईरते प्रसरन्तीति हेतोरिति । अथवा कर्कटीलैता ईरं ईरणमूषरं वा वृणोति स्वोत्पत्तिक्षेत्रत्वेन स्वीकरोतीति हेतोः । ईरणमूषरं विस्तृतेर्वारयति निरुणद्धीति हेतोर्वेति । कर्कटीफलमेव 'उर्वारुकमिव बन्धनात्' इति श्रुतेः पृषोदरादित्वेनातेरुत्वे कृते 'उर्वारुको' वेत्यप्युच्यते । यद् भवतु तद् भवतु । किन्त्वेतत्तु निश्चप्रचमेव यत् 'त्र्यम्बके'त्यादि मन्त्रे वृद्धकर्कटीफलमेव (यद्धि भाषायां 'फूट'

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१. १.६.१०.२

२. ३. ६०

३. २. ४. १५५

इत्युच्यते) उर्वारुकमिति विवक्षितम् । उर्वारुकं खलु कर्कटीलतायाः फलं न कस्यचन वृक्षविशेषस्य । उर्वारुकं च फलं न स्वयमेव बन्धनान्मुच्यते किन्तु कर्षककौशलेनेति प्रत्यक्षमेवोर्वारुकोत्पत्तिक्षेत्रदर्शिनां पामरप्रायाणामपि । अत एव मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रे यथोर्वारुकफलस्य कर्षकप्रयत्नकृतं व्रततिबन्धनापसरणं तथैव त्र्यम्बकयाजिकृतं स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्य देहाद्यभिमानलक्षणग्रन्थिबन्धनापसरणमिति साधर्म्यगर्भा वाक्योपमावाचोयुक्तिरत्र स्वीकरणीया भवति । न सायणभाष्यं महीधरभाष्यं चैतत् साधर्म्यं स्पष्टीकुरुतः । अतिसुन्दरमिदमुपमानं वेदयुगीनसप्तसैन्धवप्रदेशसम्भववानस्पत्यपरिस्पन्दपर्यवेक्षणं प्रत्याययति मन्त्रदर्शिनामृषीणामित्यत्र काव्यरसिकाः सहृदया एव प्रमाणम् । उर्वारुकफलस्य बन्धनं यथा स्वव्रततिसन्ततिपरिवारितत्वमात्रतः साहजिकं भवति, तथैव शरीरधारिणो जीवस्य देहात्माभिमानित्वमात्रतः साहजिकं भवति स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्वरूपस्याप्रत्यभिज्ञानमात्रत्वादिति । 'अहमेव त्र्यम्बकः' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायामाविर्भवन्त्यां देहात्माहङ्क्रियारूपिणी रज्जुबन्धनी तत्क्षणमेव त्रुट्यति । 'सर्वो ममायं विभवः' इत्यानन्दापरनामस्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिसमुल्लासे बन्धस्य का वार्ता ! मोक्षस्य वा का चिन्ता ! तस्यैवानन्दस्य मोक्षापरपर्यायत्वादिति ।

यः खलु त्र्यम्बकं यजते स तत्क्षणमेव त्र्यम्बिकामपि यजते । रुद्रापराभिधानो देवस्त्र्यम्बक एवार्धाम्बिकेशवपुष्कोऽर्धनारीश्वरो वा, शक्तिशक्तिमतोरभेदात् । एवं सति शक्तिमदुपासनायागे तच्छक्त्युपासनाऽन्तर्भवत्येव । त्र्यम्बकोपासनं खलु स्वात्मदेवतोपासनमेव । यथोक्तं महामाहेश्वराचार्यैरभिनवगुप्तपादैः—

"आत्मानमनभिज्ञाय विवेक्तुं योऽन्यदिच्छति ।
तेन भौतेन किं वाच्यं प्रश्नेऽस्मिन् को भवानिति ॥'

अन्यच्च—

स्वतन्त्रः स्वच्छात्मा स्फुरति सततं चेतसि शिवः
पराशक्तिश्चेयं करणसरणिप्रान्तमुदिता ।
तदा योगैकात्म स्फुरति च समस्तं जगदिदं
न जाने कुत्रायं ध्वनिरनुपतेत् संसृतिरिति ॥

सुस्थे शरीरे त्र्यम्बकयजनं स्वात्मदेवतोपासकं वा स्वयमेव मुक्तिर्या खलु जीवन्मुक्तिरित्युच्यते । यो जीवन्मुक्तो भवति स एव मृत्युञ्जयः । स यदि स्वात्मानं यजते यजतां प्रकामम् । तस्य यजनं स्वाह्लादसाक्षात्कारसम्पत्सौभाग्यस्यैव नामान्तरम् । एतर्हि यजने संसृतिरिति भ्रान्तिरपुनरुत्थानं भ्रश्यति । संसरणमेव मरणं मरणं वा संसरणम् । सुष्ठूक्तं पाञ्चरात्रागमान्तर्गतायां श्रीमदहिर्बुध्न्यसंहितायां[1] मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रस्य प्रतिपदं व्याख्याने समनोभियोगं रतायाम्—

'मृत्योर्मुच्येय संसारान्नानादुःखमहोदधेः ।
उर्वारुकं यथा पक्वमक्लेशेन स्वबन्धनात्
मुच्यते, मृत्युतस्तद्वदहं मुच्येय बन्धनादि'ति ।

अनया दृष्ट्या जीवन्मुक्तस्य कृते सर्वमेतत् स्वात्मशम्भुमहेश्वरस्य लीलायितमेव । महानयं त्र्यम्बकमखो-

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१. ५६. ७६-७७

त्सवः वेदयुगीनानां क्रान्तदर्शिनां तत्त्वविदामृषीणाम्, यः खल्वद्यापि भारते महादेशे मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रजपरूपेण लोकेषु प्रथते लोकैश्च सम्भाव्यते ।

अयं खलु त्र्यम्बकमखमहोत्सवः पुराणयुगवर्तिनां तत्त्वचिन्तकानां मुनीनां भावनायां देवीमाहात्म्यचिन्तनरूपेण इव प्रतिभाति । तथा हि मार्कण्डेयपुराणे यद्देवीमाहात्म्यवर्णनमस्ति, यत्खलु 'देवीसूक्तरूपेण' दुर्गासप्तशतीरूपेण वा शारदीये वासन्तिके च नवरात्रमहापर्वावसरेऽद्यापि भारतमहादेशे पठ्यते, कीर्त्यते वा । तत्र या देवी वर्ण्यते सा त्रिनेत्रैव वर्ण्यते, तथैव च ध्यानविषयीक्रियते । तथा हि देवीसूक्तस्य प्रथमाध्याये 'त्रिनयनां सेवे महाकालिकाम्', तृतीयाध्याये···'त्रिनेत्रविलसद्वक्त्रारविन्दश्रियं'······वन्दे, चतुर्थाध्याये'······त्रिनेत्रां··· ध्यायेद् दुर्गाम्'; षष्टाध्याये'··· नेत्रत्रयोद्भासिताम् ···पद्मावतीं चिन्तये'; नवमाध्याये'··· त्रिनेत्रमर्धाम्बिकेशमनिशं वपुराश्रयामि;' दशमाध्याये '···रविचन्द्रवह्निनेत्रां···कामेश्वरीं हृदि भजामि'; एकादशाध्याये '··· नयनत्रययुक्तां···प्रभजे भुवनेशीम्'; द्वादशाध्याये 'दुर्गां त्रिनेत्रां भजे'; त्रयोदशाध्याये च '···त्रिलोचनां···शिवां भजे' इत्यादिध्यानसूक्तिषु त्र्यम्बकस्य देवस्य शक्तिरेव दुर्गादिरूपेण स्तूयते या त्रिनेत्रेति, त्रिनयनेति त्रिलोचनेति बहुभिः पदैः प्रतिपाद्यमाना वस्तुतः त्र्यम्बिकात्मिकैव प्रतिपाद्यते । देवीपूजनं त्र्यम्बिकायजनं वा त्र्यम्बकदेवतायजनमिव न बाह्यदेवालये पुष्पादिपूजाद्रव्यसम्भाराहरणपूर्वकं क्रियमाणं किञ्चिद्वाह्यं कर्म, किन्तु 'अहमेव स्वात्मस्वरूपत्र्यम्बिकास्वभागे सर्वदा सर्वत्र विश्वात्मना स्फुरामी'ति स्वात्मज्ञानपरिशीलनदार्ढ्यस्वभावं भावनात्मकमलौकिकमन्तश्चमत्कारसारं कर्मेति । एतत्सर्वमनुसृत्यैव 'अहमित्येव विभावये भवानीम्' (अर्थात् भवानीं त्रिनयनां दुर्गामहमित्येव विभावये भावनाविषयीकरोमि ध्यायामि वा) इति दुर्गासप्तशतीध्यानश्लोके रक्तबीजवधाध्यायप्रारम्भे प्रस्पष्ट उल्लेखः परिदृश्यते । अतो यथा 'त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे' इत्यादि मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रान्तर्वर्ति रक्तकदम्बकं 'मामेव शम्भुं शरणं प्रपद्य' इत्यर्थरहस्यमभिव्यनक्ति, तथैव 'दुर्गां त्रिनेत्रां भजे' इत्यादि 'मामेव दुर्गां प्रभजे त्रिनेत्राम्' इत्यर्थरहस्यमाविष्करोतीति ।

अत्र मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रे क्रान्तदर्शिना ऋषिकविना निबद्धेन बन्धनमरणयोरुपमानोपमेयभावेन कः मृत्युरिति मृत्युरहस्यं हृदयङ्गमीकर्तुं शक्यते । अर्थं चात्रैव मन्त्रे समुपात्तस्यामृतपदस्य सन्निधिरपि तन्मृत्युमहारहस्योद्घाटने सहाय्यमेवाचरति । अमृतं नाम परतन्त्वस्वरूपमत एव तत्र तत्र दिव्येति विशेषणपदेन विशेषितं वर्ण्यते । एतदपेक्षया मृत्युः परतत्त्वस्वरूपविषयकमज्ञानमेव न देहकञ्चुकवियोगादिरिति निश्चितमेव । अज्ञानं हि नामात्मन्यनात्माभिमानपूर्वकोऽनात्मनि वा देहादावात्माभिमानस्वरूपो मोहः । एतादृङ् मोह एव वस्तुत आत्म–स्वरूपसङ्कोचदायित्वाद् देहाद्यभिमानसमुल्लासको बन्ध इत्युच्यते । एवंस्वरूपाद् बन्धाद् यो निरतिशयो मोक्षस्स तु स्वात्मशक्त्यभिव्यक्ततारूप एव न पदार्थान्तरम् । अत एव यथोर्वारुकफलं कदाचन बन्धनान्निरायासं स्वयमेव मुच्यते, कदाचन स्वल्पप्रयत्नविशेषपूर्वकं मोचयितुमलम् तथैव मृत्युञ्जयमन्त्रजपयोगी कदाचन तीव्रानुग्रहाख्याया त्र्यम्बकशक्त्याः पातेन निजहृत्कमलावतरणेन जीवन्नेव मुक्तो भवति । शरीरस्थस्य पूर्णानन्दमयतैव जीवन्मुक्तिरिति हेतोरिति । अत्र साधूक्तं केनचिज्जीवनमुक्तेन महावीरेण—

'पूजकाः शतशः सन्ति भक्ताः सन्ति सहस्रशः ।।
प्रसादपात्रमाश्वस्ताः द्वित्रा सन्ति न पञ्चषाः ।। इति ।।

SECTION III

Dharmaśāstra, State and Government

RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA OF KAUṬILYA

K. M. Agrawal

Violation of the various canons of moral laws had been, in most cases, regarded as sin and was required to be atoned for by observing various penances (*prāyaścitta*-s) prescribed by ancient law-givers.[1] Kauṭilya is rather very strict with such religious offenders and prescribes different kinds of corporal and pecuniary punishments for them.

At the very outset, we should be clear in mind that while the laws of other peoples on the subject revel in blood, the laws relating to religious offences as propounded by Hindu law-givers are on the whole characterised by humanitarianism and toleration. Religious persecution is not a feature of the Hindu law. R. P. Dasgupta has rightly remarked, "While in most countries heresy and apostasy have been punished with extreme barbarity, the Hindus have generally given religious reformers and preachers of new religions a free hand to propagate their faith, provided they did not make any direct attack on the Vedas. Not only was toleration showed to other religions, some of their founders were even honoured, sometimes apotheosised. Thus the Buddha, the arch-enemy of Hinduism, was in later times, admitted into the Hindu pantheon. It is for this ideal of religious toleration that so many religious systems took their rise in India. Yet the Hindus were an extremely religious people. Their whole life was permeated with a religious ideal. That a people so thoroughly religious could take such a sane and tolerant attitude towards other religions is a unique phenomenon in the ancient world. Not only were they tolerant of other religions, their treatment of religious offences also was

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1. *Manu*. (XI. 44) narrates various contingencies which made a man liable to penances. He says, "A man who omits a prescribed act, or performs a blamable act, or cleaves to sensual enjoyments, must perform a penance".

   Akurvanvihitam karma ninditam ca samācaran/
   Prasaktaścendriyārtheṣu prāyaścittīyate naraḥ// *Manu*. XI.44.

   Cf. : *Yājñ*. III. 219, 226; *Gaut*. XIX.7-10; *Vas*. XX.1-3; *Baudh*. III.10.

generally lenient. Most of the offences which have elsewhere been punished with extreme penalty of the law, were comparatively leniently dealt with in this country."[1]

Temples and the idols installed therein were not simply religious things but were also the representatives of the cultural heritage and artistic standard of the people. As such they were regarded as the national property, and their maintenance and protection was the responsibility of the State. So anybody who disfigured or stole the idols and destroyed the temple was a criminal and was liable to severe punishment.

Kauṭilya also fully realises the great importance of temples and idols in the national life of the people. He declares that a person who simply defamed gods and temples was to be punished with the award of the highest amercement.[2] But for stealing the images of gods and goddesses from temples he prescribes severer punishments. He recommends capital punishment or the highest amercement in cases of stealing such images as were made of costly metals and were under active worship.[3]

Most probably in cases of stealing such images as were made of costly metals and were under active worship, capital punishment was to be awarded, but in cases of stealing such images as were made of ordinary material or had ceased to be worshipped, he recommends the award of only the highest amercement. Perhaps the value of the material constituting the images determined the nature of punishment. The fact whether the image was under active worship or had been out of worship was also taken into consideration in view of the fact that the stealing of such images as were under active worship touched the sentiments of the people more deeply than the stealing of images not in worship. So, the award of the capital punishment in the former cases and the award of the highest amercement in the later cases have been recommended.

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1. *Crime and Punishment in Ancient India,* Part II, p. 38.
2. .. *ākrośāddaivacaityānāmuttamam daṇḍamarhati. Kauṭ.* 3.18.12.

   Blasphemy was a punishable offence in ancient India. Everyone had the right to hold any religious belief he liked, but had absolutely no right to wound the religious susceptibilities of others by aggressive propaganda or by abusing their religion and gods.

   Yājñ. (II.211) and M. P. (CCXXVII.188) are of the same opinion as Kauṭilya.
3. *Deva ..pratimā. .apahāriṇaḥ uttamo daṇḍaḥ, śuddhavadho vā. Kauṭ.* 4.10 16.

   Śaṅkha prescribes a fine of eight hundred *paṇa*-s as well as the repair of the idol. (*Robbery and Other Violence*—V. Chin).

   According to Kātyāyana (*Robbery and Other Violence*—V. Chin) he who cut, stole or burnt the images of gods or destroyed temples was to be fined two hundred and fifty *paṇa*-s.

   In the *Yaśastilakacampū* of Somadeva, a spy relates to the king about a minister who broke and melted down valuable idols and replaced them by another of lesser value. From *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (V. 52 ff) we learn that during the reign of Avantivarman, a prominent feudal baron was beheaded for the crime of robbing the temple of Bhūteśa.

Not only stealing the idols of gods from a temple was a crime punishable under law, even stealing the belongings and assets of a temple such as cattle, persons, fields, houses, money, gold, gems or crops was not less serious a crime. For such offences also, Kauṭilya prescribes the same punishment as in case of stealing the images.[1] Even concealing the temple-property was a punishable crime. In cases of the commission of such crimes Kauṭilya prescribes a fine of eight hundred *Paṇa*-s or blinding both the eyes of the offender by applying poisonous collyrium to his eyes.[2] Also for causing injury to or cutting of trees in holy places, penance-groves and cremation grounds persons were liable to be punished. In such cases Kauṭilya prescribes half the fines[3] laid down for causing harm to trees in city parks.[4]

Riding a temple animal, a stud bull or a cow not yet calved was also a religious offence and so Kauṭilya prescribes a fine of five hundred *paṇa*-s for the offence; for killing these, the highest amercement.[5] Places of pilgrimage, temples and idols placed therein, were sacred things. So high standard of cleanliness was to be maintained there. Spiritual practices can be carried on only in the atmosphere of purity. This is the reason why stress has been laid on keeping these places thoroughly neat and clean and anybody, who destroys the purity of the place, is deemed punishable. Like other ancient law-givers, Kauṭilya also prescribes punishment for persons who desecrated the sacred places. He lays down that if a person intentionally, in order to show contempt, excreted faeces in places of pilgrimage and temples was to be fined from one *paṇa* upwards according to the nature of the offence, half these for passing urine. But if these were due to medicine, illness, fear or old age, there was no offence and consequently Kauṭilya prescribes no fine.[6]

Every serious student of ancient Indian History knows that every one in ancient India was granted absolute freedom of conscience and worship. Among the various

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1. . . . *paśu . . . manuṣyakṣetragṛhahiraṇyasuvarṇaratnasasyāpahāriṇa uttamo daṇḍaḥ, śuddhavadho vā. Kauṭ.* 4.10.16.
2. . . . *devadravyamavastṛṇato . . . yogāñjanenāndhatvam, aṣṭaśato vā daṇḍaḥ. Kauṭ.* 4.10.13.
3. . . . *puṇyasthānatapovanaśmaśānadrumeṣvardhadaṇḍaḥ. Kauṭ.* 3.19.29.
4. For cutting the shoots of trees in city-parks that bore flowers or fruits or yielded shade the fine was to be six *paṇa*-s, for cutting small branches, twelve *paṇa*-s for cutting stout branches twenty-four *paṇa*-s, for destroying trunks, the lowest fine for violence and for uprooting the tree the middle fine. *Kauṭ.* 3.19.28.
5. *Devapaśumṛṣabhamukṣāṇam gokumārīm vā vāhayataḥ pañcaśato daṇḍaḥ, pravāsyata uttamaḥ. Kaut.* 4.13.20.
6. *Puṇyasthānodakasthānadevagṛharājaparigraheṣu paṇottarā viṣṭhādaṇḍaḥ, mūtreṣvardhadaṇḍaḥ. Kauṭ.* 2.36.28-29.

religious orders and different sects there were no fundamental conflicts and bloody wars. No doubt, there occurred for a period, some conflict and persecution but even then toleration was the rule and intoleration the exception. Most of the Hindu rulers, as a rule, worshipped Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina deities and extended patronage to the followers of each and every religious order. There was no image-breaking or temple-destruction and no blood-shed in the name of religion. The edicts of Aśoka, one of the greatest of the Emperors in India, enjoins the people to revere all religious sects and their followers. But, though Aśoka himself appears to have embraced Buddhism, he was by no means an intolerent zealot. On the contrary, he bestowed due honour and patronage on all the sects then prevailing. He granted cave-dwellings to the Ājīvikas and inculcated the virtues of liberality and seemly behaviour towards the votaries of different creeds—Brāhmaṇas, Śramaṇas, Nirgranthas etc. He believed that the followers of all sects aimed at 'restraint of passions and purity of heart', and, therefore, he desired that they should reside everywhere in his empire.[1]

Yuan Chwang bears testimony to the religious toleration of Harṣavardhana. Though himself a devout Buddhist, Harṣavardhana maintained the eclactic character of his public worship and officially honoured the brahamanical deities, like Āditya and Śiva, in the Prayag assembly. He also fed the brāhmaṇas and the heretics and gave them alms without stint.[2]

Kauṭilya prescribes punishments even for such persons as did not believe in God and belonged to heretical sects. He lays down that those persons, who did not believe in God were to be administered poison when sipping water or washing themselves and declared a case af divine curse or to be condemned to death by being bitten by a cobra.[3] He further prescribes a fine of one hundred *paṇa*-s for a house-holder who fed Buddhists and other heretical monks at rites in honour of gods and manes.[4]

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1. R. S. Tripathi : *History of Ancient India*, p. 165.
2. Ibid., pp. 308-10.
3. *Aśraddahānānāmācamanaprokṣaṇeṣu rasamupacārya devatābhiśāpam brūyāt, abhityaktaṁ vā daṁśayitvā. Kaut.* 5.2.44.
4. . . . *śākyājīvakādīn vṛṣalapravrajitān devapitṛkāryeṣu bhojayataḥ śatyo daṇḍaḥ. Kauṭ.* 3.20.16.

   Manu. (IX.225) prescribes punishment even for such persons as hate the Vedas and observe vows and practices repugnant to the Vedas and Smṛtis and do not believe in the existence of other world. He recommends that persons belonging to heretical sects shall be simply banished from the capital.

ŚŪDRA'S POSING AS BRĀHMAṆA

The Hindu society was prominently based upon caste system and its ideal was that every caste should perform the duties assigned to it and live according to the precepts laid down in the śāstras. People believed that if there were any violation of this principle, the society would be disorganised and religious confusion would arise. The distinction between the fair-skinned and highly cultured Āryans and dark-skinned and less civilized non-Āryans formed a Chinese wall between them. This distinction, of course, explains the psychology of the ancient Āryans to keep themselves distinct from the non-Āryans, the Śūdras. Kauṭilya lays down that if a Śūdra, with a view to cheating people, falsely says that he was a brāhmaṇa and to appear like a brāhmaṇa put on the distinctive marks of a brāhmaṇa—sacrificial thread, sandal-paste, and red mark on the forehead—he was to be either compelled to lose his eyes by the application of poisonous collyrium or was liable to pay a fine of eight hundred *paṇa*-s[1]

SORCERY[2]

Ancient Indians too, like all ancient peoples of the world believed that many strange things could be done with the help of magic and incantations. They were also well-acquainted with the evil effects of the use of these incantations. But, they did not disturb such persons as long as they did not injure others. It was only when they used it for criminal and immoral purposes that they were punished. These practices were prevalent in the days of Kauṭilya also who seems to be well acquainted with them. But, he does not regard these practices as crimes unless they were intended to harm anybody. He says that incantations meant to arouse love in an indifferent maiden by her lover or in a wife by her husband was no offence. But he is definitely against the misuse of such incantations. He prescribes the employment of spies[3] to find out those who profess to

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1. *Śūdrasya brāhmaṇavādino . . . yogāñjanenāndhatvam aṣṭaśato vā daṇḍaḥ. Kauṭ.* 4.10.13.
   Manu. (IX.224, 260) views this offence of impersonation more seriouly than Kauṭilya and prescribes the award of capital punishment to the offender.
   Yājñ. (II.304) on the other hand, views it very leniently. He simply prescribes a fine of five hundred *paṇa*-s only.
2. There is a very discerning and interesting paper entitled "Witchcraft in Ancient India. *I. A.*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 71ff.
3. As regards the method to be applied by the spy for detecting the black magicians Kauṭilya lays down that if the secret agent considers anyone as a user of occult means for winning love with incantations or rites with herbs and rites in cremation grounds, he should say to him, 'I am in love with so and so's wife, daughter-in-law or daughter; make her reciprocate my love and take this money'. If he were to do so, he was to be exiled as a user of occult means for winning love,

use charms for securing illicit love and banish them and adds that persons engaged in witchcraft to injure others were to be severely dealt with. In case of injury, caused by use of incantations, Kauṭilya prescribes the award of the middlemost amercement.[1]

This very method was to be applied to the practisers of black-magic and sorcery. *Kauṭ.* 4.4.14-16.

According to Bṛhaspati (XXII.16) if a person procured gain by spells he was to be compelled to disgorge it, if he practised incantations with roots he was to be banished.

In the times of the Peśawās wizards and raisers of ghosts appear to have been frequent and were severely dealt with by the people themselves by being put to death : but the State generally confiscated the property or cut off the alleged wizard's finger. Vide : *Selections from Peśawās records*, Vol. 43, pp. 25-26.

1. *Kṛtyābhicārābhyām yatparamāpādayet tadāpādayitavyaḥ. Kāmam bhāryāmanicchantyām kanyāyām vā dārārthino bhartari bhāryāyā vā saṁvadankaraṇam. Anyathā hiṁsāyām madhyamaḥ sāhasadaṇḍaḥ. Kauṭ.* 4.13.27-29.

SOCIETY AND STATE IN ANCIENT INDIA

(BASED ON SANSKRIT SOURCES, MAINLY ON THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA)

G. M. Bongard-Levin & A. A. Vigasin

It was only towards the close of the 18th Century, with the translation into English of the first monuments of Sanskrit literature that the Western world was literally fascinated by the masterpieces of ancient Indian literature, although for many years following the amazing discovery a whole set of objective and subjective factors precluded a truly scientific study of society and state in ancient India.

For quite a long period, Western Indology was dominated by the notion of a stagnant ancient Indian culture and of an undeveloped character of society and state in ancient India. The well known British scholar James Mill even objected to the use of the term "civilization" to describe ancient Indian culture. Such a lop-sided and biased approach drew justified criticism from Indian scholars, some of whom not infrequently went to another extreme—that of opposing ancient India to all other ancient societies and states and stressing only its exclusiveness and unique identity while ignoring the general laws of historical development.'[1]

It is, of course, necessary to take due account of the enormous contribution of both European and Indian historians of the 18th-19th centuries to the emergence and development of Indology. The West has produced a brilliant galaxy of gifted scholars whose works reveal a desire for and objective and comprehensive analysis of ancient India's history, culture, society and state.

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1. **For the critics of this conceptions see R. Thapar, *Ancient Indian Social History—Some interpretations*, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 1.25; G. M. Bongard-Levin, G. F. Ilyin, *Ancient India*, Moscow, 1969 (in Russian).**

Besides W. Jones, one should also mention the names of H. Colbrooke, Ch. Wilkins, H. Kern, T. Rhys-Davids, G. Jakobi, G. Bühler, J. Jolly, R. Garbe, A. Keith, V. Smith, L. de la Valle Poussin, and in Russia—I. P. Minaef, F. I. Scherbatsky, S. F. Oldenburg.

Of major importance for Indology was the setting up of the Asiatic Society in Calcutta, the Archaeological Survery of Nothern India and, somewhat later, the Archaeological Survey of India. The formation of Indology here dates back to the second half of the 19th century. A prominent role in the process belongs to the outstanding historian R. Bhandarkar. Thoughtful and original works were written by A. Altekar, H. Raychaudhuri, K. P. Jayaswal, P. V. Kane and R. Mookerjee.

On indepedence, India entered a qualitatively new stage in the study of society and the state of ancient India. In recent years, interesting archaeological and ethnographical material was produced which helped update the traditional views on the development of the ancient Indian civilization. Major works appeared by prominent Indian scholars on problems of political and social development, including works by D. D. Kosambi, R. S. Sharma, D. C. Sircar, Romila Thapar, D. R. Chanana, R. P. Kangle and others. Major achievements in recent years have been scored in the study of ancient India's society and state by scholars from Europe, the USA, Australia, the number of studies being so great that it is impossible to mention even the most prominent ones. These are works by J. Filliozat, J. Gonda, A. Basham, W. Ruben, G. Ilyin, V. Rau, F. Wilhelm, O Botto.

The achievements of world Indology and the overall progress of science made it possible to adopt, in many respects, a new approach to the study of society and state in ancient India and take a fresh look at the sources at the disposal of scholars.

One of the basic principles of modern science resides in an integrated approach to the study of ancient Indian society and state; a comprehensive view of that society, its socio-economic and political structures, ideology and culture is a must if we are to avoid a lopsided view of reality. Like other societies of antiquity, the ancient Indian society was not static but rather in continuous process of evolution, transformation and change. The pre-class, primitive communal structures grew into class societies, first slave-owning and then feudal. Only a genuinely historical approach to the study of political and social processes makes it possible to understand the nature of society, the stages in its formation and development as well as the causes underlying the evolution. Here, the researcher comes vis-a-vis a major problem—that of identifying successive historical periods. On the one hand, it is clear that the Vedic period differed sharply from the Mauryan, which, in turn, differed from the Gupta epoch in social relations and political organisation. On the other hand, however, ancient India, at any given historical period

represented a complex synthesis of different societies and cultures at differing stages of development. Even in the Gupta period, alongside the Ganges valley as the centre of empire with a highest development of social relations, there existed a number of areas where the process of formation of classes was still not completed. The non-uniform nature of the historical and cultural development of the ancient societies must be taken due account of in recreating even the most schematic image of society and state in ancient India.

For a long time, Indology was dominated by the notion of a rather belated origin of state in India. A number of research works affirmed that developed culture appeared in India only with the advent of Aryan tribes and that it was the Aryans who had brought to India even the very idea of statehood. At present, this unscientific, outdated viewpoint cannot be regarded even as a probable hypothesis. The discovery and study of the Harappan culture clearly confirms the existence in India, back in the 3rd millennium B. C., of a highly developed pre-Aryan civilization. Archaeological finds provide convincing proof of a substantial social and propertywise stratification, development of political organisation, the appearance of writing and a complex system of religious notions. It is a matter of regret that the Harappan script has kept its secrets despite the intensive efforts to decipher it and for the time being it is difficult to state with certainty the nature of political power and social structure of society. But even the current level of our knowledge, however, makes it possible to presume the existence of state in ancient India, in the Harappan period; topologically, the society of that period can be compared to synchronous societies of Mesopotamia and Egypt.

Despite the importance of the archaeological finds, unquestionably the chief source for the study of society and state in ancient India are the texts in Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākṛts.

Among the various Sanskrit sources providing the basis for the attempts at recreating the social and political fabric of ancient India, a prominent place belongs to "*Arthaśāstra*" which tradition ascribes to Kauṭilya.[1] In fact, although works by Kauṭilya's predecessors and contemporaries failed to reach us, one can hardly doubt that his treatise belonged to the vast literary tradition of *Arthaśāstra* which had flourished even in the ancient period. Traces of this enduring tradition can be seen in the epics and purāṇas, Buddhist writings and classical Sanskrit literature. And, finally, Kauṭilya's text itself is the chief proof of the erstwhile existence of a vast *arthaśāstra*

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1. See A. Hillebrandt, *Altindische Politik.* Übersicht auf Grund der Quellen, Jena, 1923; N. N. Law, *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity*, vol. I-II, L—Calcutta, 1914; R. P. Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, vol. III, *Study*, Bombay, 1964; L. Sternbach, *Bibliography of Dharma and Artha in Ancient and Medieval India*, Wiesbaden, 1975.

literature[1] (we mean not the specific references to individual political authorities in Kauṭilya's polemic since these have mostly turned out to be fictitious,[2] but rather the well elaborated topics and stable terminology).

We would be quite justified in saying that despite definite similarity of *arthaśāstra* literature with *dharmaśāstra*-s the early schools of political thought in ancient India had been largely independent of the Brahman "codes of law". Moreover, a large number of "state" and "political" plots were borrowed by the authors of *dharmaśāstra*-s from *arthaśāstra* literature.

Since the discovery of Kauṭilya's work, scores of studies have made their appearance devoted to the problem of dating his writing and now one can affirm with some degree of certainty that the text which has reached us was written at the beginning of A. D. Such a dating, however, does not preclude possibilities of using Kauṭilya's text as a historical source. It is possible that the text was composed of several independent treatise and thus its individual components should have different datings. Still more important, however, is the fact that, similar to *dharmaśāstra*-s, Kauṭilya's text represents, par excellence, a statement of the secular traditions of its subject. Sources like *dharmaśāstra*-s and Kauṭilya cannot be lined up in an approximate chronological succession to recreate India's social history by moving from one text to another. Kauṭilya is not an adequate reflection of Indian reality of a specific chronological period—be that Mauryan or the beginning of our era. The difficulties of dating the text are not accidental. They reflect the fact that the śāstras are not the works of individual authors or writings called upon to reflect the specific conditions of their time. But it is exactly for this reason that the problem of exact dating is not a matter of paramount importance for the historian. The śāstras' value resides in that they provide a generalised picture of ancient India without regard for the infinite varieties of time and space.[3]

On the other hand it is clear that the very reflection of reality in śāstras must of necessity be complex, which confronts the researcher with such sourcewise problems as the sources and the shaping of a tradition, the overall thrust of the śāstra, and the benchmark viewpoint to approach the social reality.[4] The analysis shows that the tradition preserved by Kauṭilya has more unity and system to it than *dharmaśāstra*. It

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1. J. J. Meyer, *Uber das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften*, Leipzig, 1927; B. Breloer, *Kauṭalīya-Studien*, Bd. I-III, Bonn-Leipzig, 1898-1934; J. M. D. Derret. A newly-discovered Contact between Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstra: the Role of Bhārucin, *ZDMG*, Bd. 115, 1965.
2. F. Wilhelm, *Politische Polemiken im Staatslehrbuch des Kauṭalya*, Wiesbaden, 1960.
3. See U. N. Ghoshal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas and Institutions*, Oxford, 1959.
4. See, for example, J. S. Negi, *Some Indological Studies*, vol. I, Allahabad, 1966, pp. 1-11.

provides a fuller and more reliable description of society and state of ancient India. This, apparently, may partly be due to both the basic outlook organic to *arthaśāstra* (a kind of "philosophy of *artha*") and a probable influence of the documentary evidence (recorded customs, instructions, decrees, etc.) on the overall presentation of this genre (*śāstra*-s).

Given the general tendentiousness of the author (or the authors) of "*Arthaśāstra*", tendentiousness characteristic of all writings of that remote epoch, the latter's spirit of practicism and rationalism[1] makes Kauṭilya's treatise one of the most attractive sources for the reconstruction of the political and social structure of the ancient Indian society.[2]

One could identify several most general and important problems facing the student of society and state in ancient India. These, above all, are the problems of the socio-economic development, the role of slavery, village community, the emergence and development of the class and caste system, the nature of the state system, relations between the institutions of a class society and the archaic traditions of the primitive communal system. These general problems also arise in the analysis of the text of "*Arthaśāstra*".[3]

Recent decades have seen the appearance of a number of studies (G. Ilyin,[4] W. Ruben[5], D. R. Chanana[6], M. Shetelin[7] and others) into slavery and other forms of exploration in ancient India. Of great importance in clarifying the plight of the lower strata of population is the work by R. S. Sharma on śūdras in ancient India.[8] One may

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1. See Debiprasad Chattopadbyaya, *Indian Materialism*, "Neue Indienkunde", Festschrift Walter Ruben zum 70. Geburstag, Berlin, 1970; G. M. Bongard-Levin, *Ancient Indian Culture and Materialism* (*Kauṭilya and Lokāyata*), "Vestnik Drevney Istorii" (*Journal of Ancient History*), 1977, No. 1 (in Russian).
2. H. Scharfe, *Untersuchungen zur Saatsrechtslehre des Kauṭalya*, Wiesbaden, 1968; T. R. Trautmann, *Kauṭilya and the Arthasāstra. A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text*, Leiden, 1971; R. Lingat, *Les sources du Droit dens le systeme traditionnel de l'Inde*, Paris, 1967.
3. See G. M. Bongard-Levin, Some Problems of the Social Structure of Ancient India, "*History and Society*" (Essays in Honour of Professor Nihar Ranjan Ray), Calcutta, 1978, pp. 199-227.
4. See for example, G. M. Bongard-Levin, G. F. Ilyin, *Ancient India*, Moscow, 1969 (in Russian).
5. W. Ruben, *Die Lage der Sklaven in der altindischen Gesellschaft*, Berlin, 1957; ibid, *Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im alten Indien*, Berlin, Bd. I (1967), Bd. II (1968).
6. D. R. Chanana, *Slavery in Ancient India*, Delhi, 1960.
7. E. Ritschl, M. Schetelich, *Studien zur Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, Berlin, 1933; Y. Bongert, Réflexions sur le problème de l'esclavage dans l'Inde ancienne à propos de quelques ouvrages récents, *BEFEO*, 1963. t. LI. No. 1. pp. 143-114.
8. R. S. Sharma, *Śūdras in Ancient India*, Delhi, 1958.

recall that Indology abounded in conflicting nations of absence of slavery in ancient India and the existence of a whole caste—a *varṇa* of slaves, namely the śūdras. At present, there are no adherents of these concepts in these extreme forms,[1] although some similar trends still manifest themselves in the stress on the specificity of slavery in ancient India (kind and humane treatment of slaves, etc.)[2] as well as in the theory which likens the śūdras to Spartan helots.

A correct notion of the situation of the slaves in ancient India must, above all, consider the distinction drawn in Sanskrit sources, especially in Kauṭilya, between "slaves" proper and those temporary dependents in a slave position. In Sanskrit texts the term *dāsa* occurs both in the broad and the narrow sense and meaning. Confusion of data describing different forms of dependence still causes serious differences of opinion in indological publications.

A slave (*dāsa*) in the narrow sense of the word is[3] a man born in the house of the master of a slave couple, or purchased by the master as a result of a transaction, or inherited by him or given to him as a present or reward, etc. The above four cases represent not a division of slaves into categories but rather a description of all the possible ways of acquiring slaves and a definition of a slave. In a narrow sense, a slave is a slave for life, who is the property of the master acquired through one of the ways of acquiring any personal property. Similar definitions of the slave are provided by some classical authors. From the viewpoint of ancient Indians, there are no categories among the slaves proper. As was the case with other slave-owning societies, in India the master had a practically unlimited power to dispose of the person of the slave and his labour. A man, who as a slave was the property of another, was not a member of a civic society. He could not become a member of *varṇa*. A *varṇa* member was not supposed to be turned into a slave. Still, if he did become one, he ceased belonging to a *varṇa*.[4] The right of the master to dispose of the person and labour of the slave did not mean, however, utter rightlessness of the slave. The right of the slave to own property was recognised, among others. The master could, almost without any limitations, sell or pledge his slave but he could not seize or inherit the property of his slave if the latter had relatives.[5] Neither could the owner violate the ransom contract with the slave.

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1. See M. Schetelich, Zum Charakter der Sklaverei im *KA*, in E. Ritschl, M. Schetelich, *Studien zum Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, Berlin, 1973; A. A. Vigasin, *Precepts on Slaves in the Kauṭilīya Arthasāstra*, "*Vestnik Drevney Istotii*" (*Journal of Ancient History*), 1976, N 4 (in Russian); G. M. Bongard-Levin, *India in the Mauryan Period*, Moscow, 1973 (in Russian).
2. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India*, L., 1969.
3. *KA*. III. 13.20.
4. *Ibid*. III. 13.1-4; *Nārada*. V. 37 and others.
5. *KA*. III. 13.22.

In a broad sense, considered as slaves were all those who at a given moment were in a state of dependence akin to that of a slave. Such a broad use of the term "slave" is also current in other ancient and early medieval societies.[1] The bulk of those "slaving" was evidently constituted by bondage debtors, the "pledged ones" (*āhitaka*) as well as a whole set of lesser categories. While the "*caturvarga*" formula was used to describe slaves proper, the abundance of forms and conditions of temporary dependence, or bondage made it impossible to find an umbrella term to describe all those bonded except to refer to them as "pledged" (*āhitaka*) according to the most widespread type of bondage for a specified period.[2] There were a number of differences between those in temporary dependence and the slaves proper. The former having "served his term", was restored in his previous social status. Prohibition of ill-treatment with regard to these pledged demonstrates that he or she was considered to be a personality and not the property of the master.[3] The prohibition to coerce the bonded into performing ritually impure operations[4] is a proof that even in slave bondage the bonded did not forfeit his right to be restored in his *varṇa*. The temporary dependent could not be sold or pledged, he got his freedom regardless of the will of the master.[5] According to Kauṭilya's *arthaśāstra* only barbarians—*mleccha*-s, outside *varṇa*-s and persons of non-Aryan society (the Aryans here including śūdras) could be slaves in the proper sense of the word.[6] It is difficult to judge to what extent the rule was actually followed, but the attempts to limit the scope of bondage and to reduce the possibilities of turning free members of community into slaves are typical of many ancient societies.

On the whole, the data of "*Arthaśāstra*" indicate the desire on the part of the state to somehow regulate the status of slaves and to systematise and introduce clarity into the problem of slavery. Especially visible is the tendency to protest free men from slavery and to come up with ways of delivering those who have, for a time, found themselves in a slave status.

Also of no small interest is the problem of hired labour and the status of a hired labourer (*karmakara*, *bhṛtaka*.[7]) Some researchers approach hired labour in ancient India as comparable to hired labour in modern capitalist society. There is, on the other

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1. Cf. Quint. VII. 3.26 qui servitutem servit, or: qui in servitute est ee jure quo servus.
2. *KA*. III. 1.12, IV. 13.31, IV. 9.24, II. 24.2.
3. *Ibid.* III. 13.9-12.
4. *Ibid.* III. 13.9.
5. *Ibid.* III. 13.15–17; cf. *Nārada*. V. 29-35.
6. *Ibid.* III. 13.4-5, III. 13.18, III. 16.28.
7. E. Ritschl, M. Schetelich, *Studien zum Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, Berlin, 1973,

hand, the viewpoint that both the *karmakara*-s and the *bhṛtaka*-s had in effect been reduced to the status of slaves. One should hasten to add here, however, that the very meaning of the terms "*karmakara*" and "*bhṛtaka*" did not at all coincide with the notion of "hired labour or labourer". In Sanskrit sources the terms "*karmakara*" and "*bhṛtaka*" mean any persons doing a service for wages. That is why "*karmakara*" includes craftsmen working to order, and servants, brahmans getting remuneration for an offering, metayers, healers, prostitutes and, finally, persons rescuing others for a pay.[1] Thus, the Sanskrit sources do not identify hired labour as a special socio-economic category, it being clear, moreover, that the *karmakara*-s and *bhṛtaka*-s as a group were far from constituting a single social stratum. In ancient times, the hiring relations were determined by the dominant relations in society. The Sanskrit texts make it possible to state that for some categories of those working, deprived of the means of production, hired labour meant downward slide in the social hierarchy. In some cases, hire was akin to mortgaging or self-pledging-forms of temporary dependence close to slavery, and not a contract freely concluded between equal sides. Free labour was the public ideal exactly because a lack of economic independence limited personal freedom to varying degrees.

One of the most contentious remains the problem of ownership of land, which in the conditions of antiquity remains the chief means of production. In Indology there exists a viewpoint to the effect that the state was the supreme owner of all the land, the taxes being regarded as a form of land-tax. According to another viewpoint, the real landowners were the village communities which gave land plots to individuals to be passed as hereditory possession. And, finally, a third opinion is that in ancient India there was private property on land. We are inclined to take the view that private property, in its modern interpretation, did not exist in ancient times. All the land cultivated belonged to private individuals (or, more precisely, to large patriarchal families). As a rule, however, it was impossible for an individual family to lead an isolated life and to carry out some economic activity. Possessors of land were part of the village community. Their land plots were part of the land in possession of the village community. Land was not the property of the community in the full sense of the word. Without weighty reasons, the village community could not evict any of its members, assume possession of or dispose it without the consent of the owner. The fate of an ownerless plot of land could be decided not by village community but rather by the king. Thus the relations between the village community and a free member thereof cannot be viewed as those between the landowner and the hereditory possessor. On the other hand,

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1. *Ibid.* III.13.26 and further.

an individual community member cannot be described as a full-fledged private owner of land. If the farmer had left the land plot untilled, another had every right to assume temporary possession of the plot and, if the owner absented himself much longer, to own it for good. Thus, the dominant principle was that of actual ownership. Moreover, there existed the clear notion that land was supposed to yield the largest possible income and that was why one could feel that he would be justified in building an irrigation network in a neighbouring plot if the benefits would be great while the damage to the other plot small. Here, the right of private property yielded to the principle of the greatest productivity. Only the owner (the master—*svāmin*), acting as the representative of the family collectively had the right to exercise plot alienation. Land alienation was not, however, completely free. There existed the right of preferential purchase, under which the land was first to be offered to the members of the large family and relatives (*jñāti*) and then to members of the territorial community (neighbours—*sāmanta*). Ownership of a land plot inside the territory of the village community was connected with the whole set of rights and duties, participation in common activities, holidays, etc. Forests belonged to the entire village community, while the arable lands were private property, which, however, was closely tied to membership in the community, circumscribed by and expressing itself through the latter. Besides the ownership of land, the very life of the individual depended on the village community. With reliance on the data available it is possible to affirm that the theory of the king's supreme ownership of the land is unacceptable. True, all the land belonged to the king as a territory over which he exercised his public authority as a ruler.

It is quite a different thing that authority could be sufficiently broad, among others, with regard to the property of the subjects and themselves as persons. Judging by the Sanskrit sources, in ancient India, as in other societies of antiquity the notions of *svāmin*—master and *svāmin*—owner are not always clearly differentiated (compare Latin dominus-dominium). The king was the owner in the full sense of the word only with regard to a special category of land, the royal lands—*sīta*, though in this sense he was not different from the rest ("private") owners of land.

A most characteristic feature of the ancient Indian society which meets the eye while analysing Sanskrit sources, especially Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* is the communal structure in the full sense of the word. *Arthaśāstra* gives a classification of ancient Indian communities : the family (*kula*), caste (*jāti*), village (*grāma*), and district (*deśa*), as well as association (*saṅgha*).[1] Thus, practically the whole of society consists of various types of associations-communities, big and small, penetrating or crossing through each other.

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1. *Ibid.* III.7.40, 10.45; III.18.12; XIII.5.9; II.7.2.

Each man belongs to communities—territorial, kindred, occupational, etc. Each community has its own self-government and is mostly guided by unwritten custom, its special dharma.[1] In the light of this social structure of ancient India it will be clear why the available written sources are incapable of reflecting the structure specifically, adequately and fully.

Despite a widespread notion to the contrary, the Sanskrit sources, especially Kauṭilya, confirm the view that the basic features of the caste system had taken shape back in ancient times. This is confirmed not so much by the traditional lists of the so-called "mixed castes", which have a rather artificial nature, as by the indications that each man belongs to a prticular *jāti*[2] and that the *jāti* is considered as a kind of a real and functioning collectively—a community with its own customs and self-government.[3] The caste as described in Kauṭilya is, above all, an endogamous association of gens going back probably to the tribe of the period of the archaic, primitive society.

The question of the structure of the ancient Indian state deserves a special study.[4] Thanks to the numerous works, chiefly by Indian scholars it was possible to discard the former views of the excessively despotic nature of state in ancient India. The most diverse ancient sources—Pāli, Sanskrit and especially Kauṭilya—reveal the major importance of collective and deliberation bodies of state power, such as "the king's assembly" (*rājasabhā*) and the council of the dignitaries (*mantripariṣad*).

Another and no less important aspect of Indian statehood is the problem of organisation of the administrative system. The first impression of the state, described in Kauṭilya as a sprawling bureacratic organisation will probably change substantially as a result of a careful analysis of Kauṭilya (among others, the theory of a "circle of states" *maṇḍala* and the notions of *vallabha* and *sāmanta*) and through understanding of the importance of the different kinds of corporative ties and communities in the ancient Indian state. One of the striking features of the state structure of ancient India was the existence, side by side with monarchies, of republican forms of government. The role of these units in the historical development of ancient India was indeed great, which means that without studying the internal structure of *gaṇa*-s and *saṅgha*-s it is impossible to evaluate the general processes of the development of society and state in ancient India.[5]

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1. *Ibid.* II.7.2; III.7.40; III.10.45.
2. *Ibid.* III.1.17; IV.6.2; II.36.2 etc.
3. *Ibid.* III.10.45 etc.
4. K. P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*, Bangalore, 1955; U. N. Ghoshal, *Political Ideas and Institutions of Ancient India*, Oxford, 1959; R. S. Sharma, *Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions of Ancient India*, Delhi, 2 ed., 1968.
5. See G. M. Bongard-Levin, *Republic in Ancient India*, "Vestnik Drevney Istorii (*Journal of Ancient History*", 1966, N 3, pp. 8-35 (in Russian).

The recent years have seen the publications of several works devoted to the history of ancient Indian states[1] (the authors are developing by the eminent Indian scholar K. P. Jayaswal)[2] but many cardinal problems of both the political and the social structure of these state entities have so far remained unresolved.

Of *gaṇa*-s and *saṅgha*-s we already know from the Vedic texts, although it is only from the epoch of the formation of big states in the Ganges valley that we can speak of the existence of states with non-monarchical (republican) form of government.

The written sources draw a clear distinction between monarchical and non-monarchical power, underlining their basic difference, namely that in monarchy power is in the hands of one while in non-monarchical state it is in the hands of many.[3]

Another important question is that of the actual power in republican units, the composition of the highest council of authority in charge of practical administration of the country. It is clear that the nature and the degree of democratism in those republics was largely detemined by whether the highest organ of power represented the people or the small stratum of aristocracy. Sources available to scholars make it possible, albeit in a general way, to single out different types of republican power in ancient India. In some of the republic states the chief role was that of the popular assembly of *gaṇa*, in others power was practically vested in the council of aristocracy consisting of kṣatriya-rājās. While the former may be considered as democratic republics or a form transitional from a democracy to an aristocratic republic, the latter are aristocratic with power actually in the hands of the privileged stratum of kṣatriyas.

Comparison of data about the class organisation in monarchical and non-monarchical states reveals that while in monarchies the chief divisions were between the free men and the slaves and between the "twice-born", above all the first two *varṇa*-s, and the "once-born", in republics (above all in those of aristocracy), with their basic divisions also into the free and the slaves and the position of śūdras sharply differing from the

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1. See W. Ruben, *Some Problems of the Ancient Indian Republics*, "Ashraf—Gegabhudd", Berlin, 1966; J. P. Sharma, *Republics in Ancient India* (1500-500 B. C.), Leiden, 1968; U. Bhattacharya, *Glimpses of the Republic of Vaiśālī*, *JHQ*, 1947, vol. 23, N 1.
2. K. P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*.
3. See R. S. Sharma, *Aspects of Political Ideas* . . . , U. N. Ghoshal, *Studies in Indian History*, V. S. Agrawala, *India as Known to Pāṇini*, Lucknow, 1953; B. N. Puri, *India in the Time of Patañjali*, Bombay, 1957; *Kaśikā*, *A Commentary on Pāṇini's Grammatical Aphorisms* by Paṇḍit Jayāditya. ed. by Bāla Śāstrī, Benares, 1876; Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, L., 1903; B. C. Law, *India as Described in Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism*, L., 1948; *Avadānaśataka* ed. by J. S. Speyer, vol. II, Petrograd, 1802, p. 102; *Civaravastu*. *Gilgit Manuscripts*, ed. by Nalinaksha Dutt, vol. II, N 1, Śrinagar, 1942, pp. 5-7.

status of other *varna*-s, the *varna*-s were divided by their belonging or not to the ruling kṣatriya families.[1]

Studies of the class organisation in *saṅgha*-s and *gaṇa*-s which already emerge as full-fledged states give basis for concluding that the form of political power did not determine the class structure of society, while, it is true, affecting it and having impact on the relationships between the *varna*-s and their social and political role. The causes underlying society's division into the *varna*-s and their subsequent evolution were similar both in monarchical and non-monarchical states. They lay outside the sphere of political organisation and were connected with a particular stage in the historical development of society and with its socio-economic basis.

The data cited in the present paper reflect only a small part of the enormous wealth of material contained in "*Arthaśāstra*" but they provide sufficiently convincing proof of the importance of the studies of society and state in ancient India. At present one can state with certainty that ancient India passed through the same stages of historical and cultural development as did other countries of the antiquity and that despite the specificity of some of its features, its society, state and culture evolved in keeping with the general laws of historical progress.

Apart from purely academic interest, studies of ancient India are highly important for understanding the nature of some of the processes which have outlived the times of antiquity. Many traits in the development of modern India can be assessed correctly only with account for the cultural heritage of ancient India. It would, however, be too bold to state that the notable successes scored by modern Indology to-date are sufficient to provide us with an adequate and comprehensive understanding of the vast cultural heritage bequeathed to us by the ancient Indian civilisation. That is why what is called for is further scientific quest, new discoveries and publications as well as comprehensive research efforts of an interdisciplinary nature involving the participation of historians, linguists, philologists, ethnographers, students of literature and archaeologists. This would accord with the chief principle of science—unravelling of mysteries, hopes of success and the search for the truth.

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1. See G. M. Bongard-Levin, *Specific Features of the Caste Organisation in Gaṇas and Saṅghas of Ancient India*, *"Castes in India"*, M., 1965, pp. 109-132 (in Russian).

MANU'S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT

R. M. Das

The necessity of a ruler has been well emphasised in several works of ancient India. Manu too dwelling upon the supreme importance of the king says, "The Creator created the king for the protection of all this world when everything ran, through fear, hither and thither, there being no ruler in the world."[1] And in order to re-inforce the power of the king and make it effective in protecting the people, the Creator simultaneously created *daṇḍa* from his own body.[2] According to Manu ***daṇḍa*** is the real protector, the king being a mere instrument. He clearly lays down, "Punishment is in reality the king and the male, the manager of the affairs, the ruler and the surety for the four orders' obedience to the law."[3] Regarding the indispensibility for the king in the administration of the kingdom Manu says that if a king does not sedulously employ ***daṇḍa*** for punishing those that deserve it, there would be chaos and destruction everywhere, the stronger would roast the weaker as a fish on a pike.[4] Stressing its indispensibility further,

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1. *Arājake hi loke'smin sarvato vidrute bhayāt/*
   Rakṣārthamasya sarvasya rājānamasṛjatprabhuḥ// *Manu.* VII.3.
2. *Tasyārthe sarvabhūtānām goptāram dharmamātmajam/*
   Brahmatejomayam daṇḍamasṛjat pūrvamīśvaraḥ// *Ibid.* VII.13.

   Giving the derivation of *daṇḍa Gautama* (II.28) says that the word *daṇḍa* is derived from the root *dam* (to control) and that the king should control by means of *daṇḍa* those who observe no restraint. *Matsya Purāṇa* (ccxxv.17) states that the *daṇḍa* is so called because it suppresses those that are not restrained (from the root *dam*) and punishes those that are imprudent (from the root *daṇḍa*).
3. *Sa rājā puruṣo daṇḍaḥ sa netā śāsitā ca saḥ/*
   Caturṇāmāśramāṇām ca dharmasya pratibūḥ smṛtaḥ// *Ibid.* VII.17
4. *Yadi na praṇayedrājā daṇḍam daṇḍyeṣvatandritaḥ/*
   Śūle matsyānivāpakṣyandurbalānbalavattarāḥ// *Ibid.* VII.20.

   Kauṭilya (I.IV.13) also says that if *daṇḍa* is not employed it gives rise to the condition of ***mātsyanyāya***.

Manu goes on to say that it is not the king who rules and protects the subjects but it is the *daṇḍa* which rules and protects, as during the time when even the guardians of the law sleep it is the *daṇḍa* which being the real upholder of the world is awake, keeping in control the evil forces in the world.[1]

As regards the all pervading power of *daṇḍa* Manu further says that the whole world is kept in order by means of *daṇḍa*, for a guiltless man is hard to find; it is through the fear of punishment alone that the whole world yields the enjoyment which it owes;[2] the gods, the *dānava*-s, the *gandharva*-s, the *rākṣasa*-s and the birds and the serpents all these tend to bring about enjoyment being pressed down by *daṇḍa* to do so.[3] It is through the fear of *daṇḍa* alone that all created beings both the immovable and the movable allow themselves to be enjoyed and swerve not from their duty.[4] Kane rightly observes, "These eulogies of *daṇḍa* presuppose the theory that people obey the law and dictates of the *śāstra*-s through the fear of punishment."[5]

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1. *Daṇḍaḥ śāsti prajāḥ sarvā daṇḍa evābhirakṣati/*
Daṇḍaḥ supteṣu jāgarti daṇḍam dharmam vidurbudhāḥ// *Manu.* VII.18.
2. *Sarvo daṇḍajito loko durlabho hi śucirnaraḥ/*
Daṇḍasya hi bhayātsarvam jagadbhogāya kalpate// *Ibid.* VII.22.
3. *Devadānavagandharvā rakṣāṁsi patagoragāḥ/*
Te'pi bhogāya kalpante daṇḍenaiva nipīḍitāḥ// *Ibid.* VII.23.
The *Bhagavadgītā* (X.38) identifies *daṇḍa* with divine Kṛṣṇa. "I am *daṇḍa* in hands of those who control others".
cf. *Bhayādagnistapati bhayāttapati sūryaḥ/*
Bhayādindraśca vāyuśca mṛtyurdhāvati pañcamaḥ// *Kāṭhaka Up.* II.VI.3.
4. *Tasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni sthāvarāṇi carāṇi ca/*
Bhayādbhogāya kalpante svadharmānna calanti ca// *Manu.* VII.15.
For inevitability of *daṇḍa* particularly in the matters of the State and its administration see *Manu.* VII. 65, 102, 103, 159.
The western writers on law and politics also do not rely on the natural moral impulses of man and on his will to do the right thing. Jeremy Taylor says, "A herd of wolves is quieter and more at one than so many men unless they all have one power over them (as quoted at *Hist. Dh. S.* Vol. III. p. 238). Salmond (*Jurisprudence* p. 65) states, "Man is by nature a fighting animal and force is the *ultima ratio* not of kings alone but of all mankind. Machiavelli (in *Discourse* 1.3 quoted by H. Butterfield in '*State-craft of Machiavelli*'. p. 111) says, "Those who have discussed the problems of civic life demonstrate and history is full of examples to confirm the fact that whoever organises a state and arranges laws for the government of it must presuppose that all men are wicked and that they will not fail to show their natural depravity whenever they have a clear opportunity, though possibly it may be concealed for a while".
The present state of affairs in our country fully corroborates the truth of the above statement of Machiavelli.
5. *Hist. Dh. S.* Vol. III. p. 22.

In order to magnify the importance of *daṇḍa* and stress its indispensibility Manu narrrates in detail the evil consequences of the absence of *daṇḍa.* He says, "If the king does not, without tiring, inflict punishment on those worthy to be punished, stronger will roast the weaker like a fish on a spit; the crow would eat the sacrificial viands and ownership would not remain with anyone, the lower ones would usurp the place of the higher ones."[1]

But this *daṇḍa* is not to be administered arbitrarily. Before inflicting it the king had to consider many aspects instead of arriving at a hasty conclusion. There was to be a searching enquiry into the nature of the offence, its time and place, ability and motive of the offender and other allied considerations before deciding the infliction of *daṇḍa.* Manu categorically says that the king was to be a just inflictor of punishment.[2] He declares. "Having fully considered the time and place of the offence, the strength and the knowledge of the offender, the king shall justly inflict the punishment on men who act unjustly."[3] This provision means that Manu does not hold that the same punishment must be meted out for the same offence irrespective of the antecedents, characteristics or physical and mental conditions of the offenders; the extenuating circumstances should always be taken into consideration before the award of the punishment.

Manu again says, "Let the king having fully ascertained the motive, the time and the place of the offence, and having considered the ability of the criminal to suffer and the nature of the crime, cause punishment to fall on those who deserve it."[4]

When Manu says that regard must be paid to time and place and other considerations at the time of awarding punishment he is evidently contributing to the school of

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1. *Yadi na praṇayedrājā daṇḍam daṇḍyeṣvatandritaḥ/*
Śūle matsyāniva pakṣyān durbalān balavattarāḥ//
Adyātkākaḥ puroḍāśaṁ śvā ca lihyāddhavistathā/
Svāmyam ca na syātkasmiṁścitpravartetādharottaram// *Manu.* VII. 20-21.
2. *Ibid.* VII.26.
3. *Tam deśakālau śaktim ca vidyām cāvekṣya tattvataḥ/*
Yathārhataḥ sampraṇayennareṣvanyāyavartiṣu// *Ibid.* VII. 16.

Bṛhaspati is quite clear and emphatic on this point. 'No sentence' says he, "should be passed merely according to the law. If a decision is arrived at without considering the circumstances of the case, violation of justice will be the result". *Bṛ.* II. 12.
4. *Manu.* VIII. 126. On this Medhātithi makes a striking remark that this is the fundamental verse about all offences. *Uktānuktadaṇḍeṣvaparādheṣu mātṛkāśloko'yam/ Etadarthānusāreṇa sarvadaṇḍaklṛptiḥ kartavyā/*

cf. The principal object of punishment is the prevention of offences and the measure of punishment must consequently vary from time to time according to the prevalence of a particular form of crime and other circumstances. An amount of severity may be very appropriate at one time which would be quite uncalled for at another. I. P. C. Sec. 53. Comment.

thought which holds that the so called criminal acts are mostly due to biological, physiological, pathalogical or sociological conditions and also due to the upbringing and the environment of the person charged with crime.

Narrating the good and the evil consequences of the just and the unjust administration of *daṇḍa* Manu says that if the *daṇḍa* is properly inflicted after due consideration it makes people happy but inflicted without consideration it destroys everything.[1] Enumerating the evil consequences of the ill-administered *daṇḍa* he says, "All castes would be corrupted, all barriers would be broken through and all men would rage against each other in consequence of mistakes with respect to the award of *daṇḍa*."[2] Rightly administered *daṇḍa* on the other hand, destroys the sinners and keeps the subjects peaceful and prosperous.[3]

The just and the unjust administration of *daṇḍa* not only concerns itself with the subjects, the country and the administration alone but it also affects the king himself who administers it. Manu says that a king who inflicts punishments properly prospers with respect to the three means of happiness but one doing otherwise on account of voluptuousness, partiality and meanness, is destroyed together with relations; as by not justly administering the *daṇḍa* he has fallen from his exalted royal position.[4] Unjustly administered *daṇḍa* does not stop its operations here, it proceeds further and destroys his (king's) castles, territories, the whole world together with the movable and immovable creation and also inflicts, on account of the stoppage of the offerings of oblations, the sages and the gods who live on oblations offered by men on the earth.[5]

But the just administration of the *daṇḍa* is not an easy task. *Daṇḍa* which

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1. *Samīkṣya sa dhṛtaḥ samyaksarvā rañjayati prajāḥ/*
Asamīkṣya praṇītastu vināśayati sarvataḥ// *Manu.* VII.19.
2. *Duṣyeyuḥ sarvavarṇāśca bhidyeran sarvasetavaḥ/*
Sarvalokaprakopaśca bhaveddaṇḍasya vibhramāt// *Ibid.* VIII.24.
cf. *Adharmadaṇḍanam loke yaśoghnam kīrtināśanam/*
Asvargyam ca paratrāpi tasmāttatparivarjayet// *Ibid.* VIII.127.
3. *Yatra śyāmo lohitākṣo daṇḍaścarati pāpahā/*
Prajāstatra na muhyanti netā cet sādhu paśyati// *Ibid.* VII.25.
4. *Tam rājā praṇayan samyak trivargeṇābhivardhate/*
Kāmātmā viṣamaḥ kṣudro daṇḍenaiva nihanyate//
Daṇḍo hi sumahattejo durdharaścākṛtātmabhiḥ.
Dharmādvicalitaṁ hanti nṛpameva sabāndhavam// *Ibid.* VII.27-28. Cf. *Ibid.* VII.33-34.
5. *Tato durgam ca rāṣṭram ca lokam ca sacarācaram/*
Antarikṣagatānścaiva munīn devāṁśca pīḍayet// *Ibid.* VII.29.
Kullūka explains how the sages and gods suffer on account of ill-administration of *daṇḍa*— "*Haviḥpradānajīvano devāḥ iti śrutya haviḥpradānābhāve'ntarikṣagatān ṛṣīn devāṁśca pīḍayediti*".

possesses a very bright lusture can be justly inflicted by only such a king as is pure and faithful to his promise, acts according to the institutes of the sacred law and has good assistants and is himself wise[1]; it is hard to be administered justly by one who has no assistants, nor by a fool, nor by a covetous man, nor by one who has not learnt the *śāstra*-s nor by one addicted to sensual pleasures[2].

Punishment is not an end in itself but a means to an end—the maintenance of society and the protection af all creatures. This end it achieves in many ways. First, it deters the potential offenders from the commission of crime and deviation from the path of duty by the example of the sufferings of the offenders. That Manu has this function of punishment in view becomes quite evident from his following statement: "Let him place all prisons near a highway where the sufferings and disfigured can be seen."[3] This implies that the passersby would be deterred from the commission of crime by the sight of the miserable plight and sufferings of the prisoners. At another place Manu says, "Then having caused the crimes, which they committed by their several actions, to be proclaimed in accordance with the facts, the king shall duly punish them according to their strength and their crimes."[4] The object of proclamation before inflicting punishment is evidently to deter people by example of the fate of the offenders.

Secondly, punishment prevents the commission of crime. If a culprit is imprisoned, amputated or is put to death he is prevented from repeating the crime. Manu lays down that a king should repress miscreants by the three lawful punishments of imprisonment, enchainment and the various forms of corporal punishment.[5] Here evidently these punishments are not only to deter others but also to prevent the culprit from repeating the crime.

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1. *Śucinā satyasandhena yathāśāstrānusāriṇā/*
   Praṇetum śakyate daṇḍaḥ susahāyena dhīmatā// *Manu.* VII.31.
2. *So'sahāyena mūḍhena lubdhenākṛtabuddhinā/*
   No śakyo nyāyato netum śaktena viṣayeṣu ca// *Ibid.* VII.30.
3. *Bandhanāni ca sarvāṇi rājamārge niveśayet/*
   Duḥkhitā yatra dṛśyeran vikṛtaḥ pāpakāriṇaḥ// *Ibid.* IX.288.
4. *Teṣām dośānabhikhyāpya sve sve karmaṇi tattvataḥ/*
   Kurvīta śāsanam rājā samyaksārāparādhataḥ// *Ibid.* IX.262.

   This purpose of punishment is well brought out in the *Mṛcchakaṭika* when the sentence passed on Cārudatta for the alleged murder of Vasantasenā is proclaimed to the citizens by the executioners. *Mṛch.* Act. X. after verse 11.

   cf. *Mbh. Śānti.* 15.5-6.

   ***Matsya Purāṇa* (ccxv.16-17) has almost the same words.**
5. *Adhārmikam tribhirnyāyairnigṛhṇīyātprayatnataḥ/*
   Nirodhanena bandhena vividhena vadhena ca// *Manu.* VIII.310.

Thirdly, punishment reforms the evil-doers. Manu is obviously refering to this aspect of punishment when he says: "A wife, a son, a slave, a pupil and a younger brother of the fullblood who have committed faults may be beaten with a rope or a split bamboo"[1] and lays down heavy punishment for those who violate it.[2] Kullūka makes the corrective aspect of the punishment all the more clear when he says that this beating is to be done to keep them on the right line.[3]

Fourthly, the punishment gives consolation to the victim. The person wronged feels a great urge for revenge and if allowed shall immediately pay the offender in his own coin with compound interest; but this state of affairs shall lead to chaos and disorder resulting in the rule of the jungle. So the State does not allow the individual to take the law in his own hands,[4] but itself sees to it that the emotion for revenge in the victim, is to some degree, satisfied by the award of adequate punishment to the wrong-doer. Manu prescribes that with whatever limb a thief in any way commits an offence, the king shall deprive him of that limb.[5]

Fifthly, the punishment purifies the offender. Whenever a man commits a crime, he commits a sin also. But if the offender is punished by the king he is cleared off his moral guilt or sin as the punishment is also a sort of expiation which purges the man of his sinful promptings and reforms his character. Manu lays great stress on this aspect of punishment. He states that men who are guilty of crimes and have been punished by the kings go to heaven becoming pure like those who perform meritorious deeds.[6] So, according to him, if a thief is killed by the king he is purified of the guilt but if he is

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1. *Bhāryā putraśca dāsaśca preṣyo bhrātā ca sodaraḥ/*
   Prāptāparādhāstāḍyāḥ syu rajjvā veṇudalena vā// *Ibid.* VIII.299.
2. *Pṛṣṭhatastu śarīrasya nottamāṅge kathañcana/*
   Ato'nyathā tu praharan prāptaḥ syāccaurakilbiṣam// *Ibid.* VIII.300.
3. *Sikṣārtham tāḍanavidhānāt.* On *Manu.* VIII.299.
4. As a general rule in ancient India an individual was not allowed to take the law in his own hands except as to the recovery of debts when a creditor was allowed to harass the debtor even by the use of personal violence to realise his dues. *Manu.* VIII.48-50.
5. *Yena yena yathāṅgena steno nṛṣu viceṣṭate/*
   Tattadeva harettasya pratyādeśāya pārthivaḥ// *Ibid.* VIII.334.
   Cf. *Manu.* (VIII.279-80) where also Manu prescribes cutting off of the offending limb of the offender.

   To give satisfaction to the victim the *lex talionis* (an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth) prevailed in all ancient societies. "If a man has caused the loss of a gentleman's eye, his eye one shall cause to be lost. If a man has made the tooth of a man that is his equal to fall, one shall make his tooth to fall out". *Hammurabi's Code.* Sections 196 and 200.
6. *Rājabhiḥ kṛtadaṇḍāstu kṛtvā pāpāni mānavāḥ/*
   Nirmalāḥ svargamāyānti santaḥ sukṛtino yathā// *Manu.* VIII.318.

forgiven the guilt falls on the king.[1] Medhātithi remarks that the culprit is purified of his crime only when the punishment is a corporal one and not when it is merely monetary.[2]

Punishment not only purifies the culprit but also the king. Manu clearly lays down that by punishing the wicked and by favouring the virtuous, kings are constantly sanctified just as twice-born men by sacrifices.[3] It also leads him to heaven because by protecting those who live as Aryans and by removing the thorns, the kings reach heaven.[4]

Sixthly, the punishment helps the society to get rid of the criminal. When the penalty of death or life-long exile is awarded to a criminal, the society gets rid of him for all time to come; thorn is removed from the body of the society. This aspect of punishment is made quite clear from the recommendation of Manu that gamblers, actors, cruel men, heretics, people following others' occupations and wine-sellers shall be immediately banished from the State.[5] These men are to be punished not because they are offenders in a legal sense, but because their presence is prejudicial to the best interests of the State.

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1. *Śāsanādvā vimokṣādvā stenaḥ steyādvimucyate/*
   Aśāsitvā tu taṁ rājā stenasyāpnoti kilbiṣam// *Ibid.* VIII.316.
2. On. *Manu.* VIII.318.
3. *Nigraheṇa hi pāpānāṁ sadhūnāṁ saṅgraheṇa ca/*
   Dvijātaya ivejyābhiḥ pūyante satatam nṛpāḥ// *Manu.* VIII.311.
4. *Rakṣaṇādāryavṛttānām kaṇṭakānāṁ ca śodhanāt/*
   Narendrāstridivam yānti prajāpālanatatparāḥ// *Ibid.* IX.253.
   cf. *Manu.* VIII.386-87, IX.255.
5. *Kitavān kuśīlavān krūrān paṣaṇḍasthāṁśca mānavān/*
   Vikarmasthān śauṇḍikāṁścaiva kṣipram nirvāsayet purāt// *Ibid.* IX.225.
   Kauṭilya (IV.215) says that it is the duty of the State to employ spies to detect wicked persons living by foul means and to banish them as the disturbing elements of peace.

FORBIDDEN OCCUPATIONS IN SMṚTI AND THEIR AFTERMATH

J. Duncan M. Derrett

In a short tribute to Dr. Ludwik Sternbach I am happy to raise some questions which do not figure in his esteemed *Juridcal Studies in Ancient Indian Law*. Recently I took up the question why Brahmins who take advantage of the permission to earn their livings,[1] in a time of *āpad*, by having recourse to the way of life of a Vaiśya, must nevertheless avoid the sale of certain objects.[2] I found that the reason might well be that the ethics of the pious Jaina householder were adopted by śāstric sages as appropriate to serve as a control,as it were, on the activities of Brahmins who, in spite of the *vṛtti* appropriate to their *varṇa*, found themselves obliged (or supposed themselves to be obliged) to enter the field normally monopolised by Vaiśyas. Jainas were, after all, themselves well entrenched, so I supposed, in what, amongst Hindus, would be typical Vaiśya occupations. The clue to this otherwise impenetrable mystery I obtained from the wonderful summary of Jaina ethics available in R. Williams' *Jaina Yoga*.[3] I used also S. B. Deo's work[4] and for our present purposes these two compendia are sufficient.

One might ask whether it had ever been suspected before that Jaina learning or Jaina prejudices had invaded the *dharmaśāstra*. Since many typical Hindu concepts, regarding rebirth, regarding penance, and regarding sacrifices and *śrāddha*-s, are anathema to Jainas, it is highly unlikely on the face of it that there should have been an influence. And yet Jainism is the senior religion, if by Hinduism we mean the form of Hinduism consecrated in the *dharmaśāstra* from the *dharmasūtra*-s onwards. Studies of Buddhist and Jaina texts have long since convinced us that the caste system, in particular, as found in

1. *Manu*. X.81.
2. The topic is dealt with by P. V. Kane in *History of Dharmaśāstra* II, pt. 1 (Poona 1941), 126-130.
3. R. Wiliams, *Jaina Yoga* (London 1963).
4. S. B. Deo, *History of Jaina Monachism* (Poona 1956).

smṛti literature, was not to be seen in all its ideal fullness in the centuries B. C., prior, perhaps, to the compilation of Manu and his successors.[1] Just as we know that Buddhism was responsible for popular dissatisfaction with some Hindu notions, e. g. animal sacrifice, and to that extent modified Hinduism,[2] so it is not impossible that gaps in the Hindu ethical system could suitably be filled from Jaina notions, if the Jainas were ahead of the Hindus in the particular degree of scrupulosity concerned, and especially if particular status needed to be developed by Hindu sages from a previously crude or ethically questionable beginning.

There are, after all, several passages in Manu himself which, as they stand, have a strangely Jaina sound about them. Taking them in serial order, rather than intellectual order, I find Manu intriguing.[3] This is the *brahmacāri* : the things from which he must abstain are those of Jaina monk, and likewise of the pious Jaina householder under the typical *vrata*-s.[4] It is the production of these pleasures which constitute forbidden commerce in the texts to which we shall be referring. *Manu*. III. 64 and 68 are likewise reminiscent of Jainism : families deficient in the knowledge of the Veda (and therefore twiceborn families) 'quickly perish'[5]. It is notorious that personal agriculture, trading in or hiring cattle and particularly *carts*[6] were forbidden occupations for the pious Jaina. By the same token there were very few crafts or trades which did not involve the destruction of *jīva*-s. Further :

pañca sūnā gṛhasthasya cullī peṣaṇyupaskaraḥ|
kaṇḍanī codakumbhaśca badhyate yāstu vāhayan||[7]

The concept of the five slaughter-houses is common to Jainism and Hinduism, but it is typically Jaina.[8] The curious status of the *snātaka* (which has never been accounted for properly) provides our next illustrations. *Manu*. IV. 70 runs :

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1. B. C. Law, *India as Described in Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism* (London 1941); J. C. Jain, *Life in Ancient India as Depicted in the Jain canons* (Bombay 1947); N. Wagle, *Society at the Time of the Buddha* (Bombay, 1966).
2. The objection to animal sacrifices actuated the maxim *asvargyaṃ loka-vidviṣṭam* (*Yājñ*. I.156), and surfaced as a *kalivarjya*. Discussed by me in *A. B. O. R. I.* 48-49 (1968), now in *Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law* (*SCMHL*), I (Leiden 1976), 207-216.
3. *Varjayan madhu māṁsañca gandhaṁ mālyaṁ rasān striyaḥ|*
   Śuktāni yāni sarvāṇi prāṇināṁ caiva hiṁsanam||
4. I find a use for Samantabhadra's *Ratnakaraṇḍa-śrāvakācāra* (ed. C. R. Jain, Arrah 1917), to illuminate Williams' work, and to illustrate points made in this paper.
5. *Śilpena vyavahāreṇa śūdrāpatyaiśca kevalaiḥ|*
   Gobhir aśvaiśca yānaiśca hṛṣyā rājopasevayā|| —*Manu*. III. 64.
6. Note *śakaṭa-karman* among the fifteen forbidden trades: Williams, 118, §3.
7. *Manu*. III. 68.
8. Williams, 122.

na mṛlloṣṭaṃ mṛdnīyān na cchindyāt karajaistṛṇam/
na karma niṣphalaṃ kuryān nāyatyām asukhodayam//

It is notorious that Jainas object to crushing soil or tearing up grass, and useless action[1] is as much condemned by them as by Hindu writers much their juniors. IV. 75 is interesting :

sarvaṃ ca tila-saṃbaddhaṃ nādyād astamite ravau/
na ca nagnaḥ śayīteha na cocchiṣṭaḥ kvacid vrajet//

Jainas objected strongly to sesamum (whence I suggest the Hindu texts prohibiting the sale of sesamum), and, of course, to eating after dark.[2] IV. 78 is perhaps not so clear, but it has not been explained :

adhitiṣṭhen na keśāṃstu na bhasmāsthikapālikāḥ/
na kārpāsāsthi na tuṣān dīrgham āyur jijīviṣuḥ//[3]

The substances are all forbidden commodities, and testify to the destruction of living beings. We are still with the *snātaka*, whom I see as a sort of Hindu quasi-monk, and IV. 177 has a typical Jaina injunction for him :

na pāṇi-pāda-capalo na netra-capalo'nṛjuḥ/
na syād vākcapalaścaiva na paradroha-karmadhīḥ//

Moving to the ascetic, we find other similar material. ***Manu.*** VI. 46 is very explicit :

dṛṣṭipūtaṃ nyaset pādaṃ vastrapūtaṃ jalaṃ pibet/
satyapūtāṃ vaded vācam manaḥpūtaṃ samācaret//

All the injuctions we have seen are special to peculiar stages of life, they are not Hindu normalities. The Jaina idiosyncracy proper to the monk and householder under a vow reappears in *Manu.* VI. 68 :

saṁrakṣaṇārthaṃ jantūnāṃ rātrāvahani vā sadā/
śarīrasyātyaye caiva samīkṣya vasudhāṃ caret//

He must scan the ground even to his own prejudice.

This is not in any way exhaustive. What is interesting is that our rules regarding forbidden commodities were internalised to such an extent that we find them from Gautama up to the *Dharmasindhu* of Kāśinātha Upādhyaya, a work written in 1790-1. If we ignore abortive attempts to abolish the rules as *kalivarjya,* they are found in three types of statement, which are form-critically distiguishable. There is firstly the statement regarding allowable occupations for a householder (naturally a Hindu one, of Brahmin caste). Such is ***Manu.*** X. 86ff. :

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1. The *dig-vrata* (Williams, 99ff.), and *anartha-daṇḍa-vrata* (*ibid.*, 123ff.) See *Ratnakaraṇḍa-śrāvakācāra, vv.* 74, 80, 81.
2. *rātri-bhojana*: Williams, 107ff.
3. J. Jolly, *Hindu Law and Custom,* trans. Batakrishna Ghosh (Calcutta 1928), 324, claims that the taboo was still observed.

sarvān rasān apoheta kṛtānnaṃ ca tilaiḥ saha/
aśmano lavaṇaṃ caiva paśavo ye ca mānuṣāḥ//86
sarvaṃ ca tāntavaṃ raktaṃ śāṇa-kṣaumāvikāni ca/
api cet syuraraktāni phala-mūle tathauṣadhīḥ//87

and so forth.[1] Of the same type is Nārada (*ṛṇādāna* 58-59 from the *Nāradiya-manu-saṃhitā*) :

māṃsaudana-tila-kṣauma-soma-puṣpa-phalopalāḥ/
manuṣya-viṣa-śastrāmbu-lavaṇāpūpa-virudhaḥ//58
nīla-kauśeya-carmāsthi-kutapaikaśaphā mṛdaḥ/
udaśvit-keśa-piṇyāka-śākādyauṣadhayas tathā//59

The text goes on with the list. It is important because Nārada places it in the section of recovery of debts, and therefore, regards it as having a bearing on occupations which can be allotted to debtors for the working off of their debts, or in keeping with their demands for credit. At *v.* 63 he ends the section with the injunction to the king (who is, after all, in charge of the administration of justice) :

avikreyāṇi vikriṇan brāhmaṇaḥ pracyutaḥ pathaḥ/
mārge punar avasthāpyo rājñā daṇḍena bhūyasā//63

A further group of texts speaks of the *avikreyāṇi* or *apaṇyāni*, as they are technically known, only in contexts of *loss of caste.* If one constantly sells the objects, especially in combination, one becomes a member of a caste known to sell such things.[2] The Brahminhood is lost. But some will say, surely that is true only if the offenders do not perform their penances.

The third group of texts, and it is an eloquent one, almost without exception later in date than the others,[3] mentions the *avikreyāṇi* only in connection with the penances appropriate to those that sell them. From these texts I gather that breach of the taboos was common. This is not surprising if the list derives from Jaina piety of

1. Other texts located in the area of *vṛtti-niyama* are *Gaut.* VII.7-21 (*āpad-vṛttayaḥ*); *Āp.* I.20, 10-21, 4; *Vas.*II.24-26, 29-39; *Nārada* II (falsely I), 56.61-67. Does Uśanas in Lakṣmīdhara, *Kṛtyakalpataru, Gṛhasthakāṇḍa,* 203 belong here? The text looks truncated.
2. Texts located in the area of loss of caste are *Manu.* X.92-93; *Vas.* II.27; *Nār.* II (falsely I), 60, cf. 186. Śaṅkha-Likhita and Hārīta in Lakṣmīdhara, op. cit., 206-7. *Upanayana* must be done again: so several texts say.
3. Texts located in the *prāyaścitta* region of the *śāstra* are *Bau.* II.2, 26-29; *Yājñ.* III.36-38; *Viṣṇu* LIV.17-22; Paiṭhīnasi in *Keśava-vaijayantī* on *Viṣṇu* LIV 20; Śātātapa ibid. 21; Hārīta in *Aparārka* on *Yājñ.* III.267-8 (p. 1113); Śaṅkha-Likhita, ibid.; *Caturviṃśatimata* (ibid.) (p. 114); Śaṅkha (ibid.) (p. 1115). Yama in Lakṣmīdhara ubi cit, 204. Cf. *Mahābhārata* and *Chāgaleya* ibid., 205. *Manu.* XI.193-4 can be brief on the subject because the weight is carried in X.82-94,

some centuries B. C. Even Jainas did not observe them scrupulously. But what is astounding is that the learning (as I have said) persists so long. Since the particulars crop up in three different types of text, and with the forbidden articles, now amounting to over forty items, some of them actually *classes* of items, stated very clearly by every single author in a different order (!), so authoritatively, one can fully believe that the public had internatoinalised the ideas, even though their history was totally lost. A Brahmin, even when trading, must not give any encouragement, even indirectly, to activities in which *jīva*-s are destroyed.

Kāśināthа wrote in 1790-1. The rules were perfectly well known in the Tamil country and in Mysore in 1817, because Abbé J. A. Dubois speaks of them as actually in use :'...only there are many things which Brahmins are not allowed to sell, and which consequently they cannot include in their operations such, for instance, as red clothes, the seeds and oil of sesamum, husked rice, liquids of every kind, salt, perfumes, fruits, vegetables, poisons, honey, butter, milk, sugar, etc.'[1] Now we know that Abbé Dubois knew his South Indian Hindu intimately, and he combined information both from observation and from scripture. Thus we can be quite sure that some *śāstric* work, confirmed in general by observation, lies behind this information. Now there is no surviving Sanskrit text running '*rakta-vastra-tila-taila-kṛtānna-rasa-lavaṇa-gandha-phala-śāka-viṣa-madhu-ghṛta-kṣīra-guḍa*... But there very well *could* have been one because our abundance of texts does not exhaust the richness that there was even a century and a half ago.

I move now to consider what effect these texts were supposed to have on those who still admitted their validity (though, if I am right, they did not know their origin) at the beginning of the period of the British as dispute-processers in India.

When an activity is prohibited, and a penance is set for defiance of the prohibition, and when the prohibition is backed up with the threat of loss of caste, one can very well ask what legal effects might follow. To take an imaginary case : a Brahmin, who is permitted to have and to give sesamum, but only prohibited from selling it; or a Brahmin who is permitted to have and to enjoy metal objects, and is required in some situations to give them,[2] but is prohibited *selling* them, sells sesamum, or sells a spade, for example, to another Brahmin who is anxious to have the object in question. The seller takes the money, fails to deliver the object, and pleads as his excuse that he is

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1. Abbé Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, 3rd edn. (Oxford 1906), 292. This passage is found in the French edition of 1825 (p. 411). (Dubois was in India 1792-1823), but missing from the English versions published in 1817, 1862, and 1879. The circumstances are described by the editor of the third edn. (supra) at p. xvii. Dubois cotinually added to his master copy which is the basis of the current English version.

2. *Gaut.* XXII.23-25; *Yājñ.* III.273.

prohibited by the Hindu law from selling it.[1] It is an illegal contract ! How are illegal contracts dealt with ? It is no simple question.

The matter agitated many subtle Hindu minds. Where a transaction is forbidden, is it null and void ? Or is it valid and the actor liable to (a) punishment and/or (b) penance ? There is a third position, and it is one which (as is well known) appealed to a leading *mīmāṃsaka*,[2] namely that the transaction is void, and the actor is liable to penalty.

The laws of Europe have had to face these problems. There are two well known maxims. *Quod fieri non debuit, factum valet* : the action which in the moral aspect is reprehensible and even forbidden, may yet be valid when done, if the law does not provide explicitly for its nullity.[3] One such tangle has actually found its way into the (Indian) Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, where, in spite of the prohibition of damanding, giving, and taking a dowry (as defined in the Act) the dowry once given must be held in trust for the bride.[4] The second important maxim is directly relevant to immoral or illegal contracts : *in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis/defendentis* (where both parties are in equal wrong the position of the possessor, or defendant, is stronger—the court will let the money or the property lie where it is, in other words the court will not connive at wrong doing).[5] There was a good example of this during the War, when a non-commissioned officer in the Army obtained bribes for associating himself with smugglers. The government took the money from him, and he was unable to get it back (though the government had no right to it) because the court would not allow him to profit from his own wrong.[6]

When therefore, the British judges in the earliest days of Anglo-Indian law were faced with the plea that Brahmins should not engage in the forbidden trades they were not unable to grapple with the perplexity. In the case of *Jye Narain Mookerjee* v.

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1. A not dissimilar plea (in relation to an illegal dowry agreement) was raised in *Ramekbal* v. *Harihar* All India Reporter (AIR) 1962 pat. 343.
2. Śaṅkara-bhaṭṭa, *Dharma-dvaita-nirṇaya* (c. 1580-1600), discussed by me in 'Prohibition and nullity: Indian struggles with a jurisprudential lacuna', *B. S. O. A. S.* 20 (1957), 203-215, now in *ECMHL* I.266-279.
3. Broom, *A Selection of Legal Maxims*, 8th edn. (London 1911), 147, 10th edn. (London 1939), 115, discussed by me in *ECMHL* III (Leiden 1977), 1-24.
4. *Abbas* v. *Kunhipattu* [1975] Kerala Law Times 604. See R. Deb, *Law Quarterly* (Calcutta), 15/1 (1978), 65-9.
5. Broom, op. cit., 8th edn., 557.
6. *Reading* v. *Attorney-General* 1951, 1 All England Reports 617 (House of Lords). On contracts see J. L. Dwyer, 'Immoral contracts', *Law Quarterly Review* 93 (1977), 386-397; C. Szladits, 'Illegality of prohibited contracts: comparative aspects', *Yntema Volume* (Leiden 1961), 221-231.

Bal Ram Rai,[1] which arose in 1823 or thereabout and was settled in 1825, we are fortunate enough to have the original *vyavasthā*.[2] Two Brahmins were in partnership in the brandy trade; as we find out from the *vyavasthā* they were actually trading in the *vessels* in which liquor was conveyed. There was an action to recover profits of the partnership. A clever lawyer argued that the action could not lie, since the Dewani Adalat could not connive at a breach of the Hindu law (vide the injunction of Nārada above) relative to forbidden trades for Brahmins. The Second Judge, Courtenay Smith, Esq., heard the case at first instance and put the following question to the Hindu Law Officers, Vaidyanātha Miśra and Ramtanu Śarmā Vidyāvāgīśa : 'If two Brahmins engage in a partnership trading in wine vessels, is this species of trade correct or not according to the *śāstra*-s current in Bengal and Hindosthan ? And if it be improper, can one partner sue the other for a share of the profits ?' The pandits' answer was as follows :

brāhmaṇa-jāter madirā-pātra-vyāpāraḥ śāstra-siddho na bhavati. yadyapi ninditatvena tena karmmaṇā dvayor brāhmaṇayoḥ saṃbhūya-kāriṇor utpannaṃ dhanam, tatra dvayoḥ samāṃśa iti śāstrānusāriṇī vyavasthā. tatra pramāṇam : 'yājanādhyāpana-pratigrahair dvijo dhanam arjjayet' iti Dāyabhāga-Mitākṣarā-dhṛtam anuvacanam. 1. yadā tu svatvaṃ laukikaṃ tadā : asat-pratigrahādi-labdhasyāpi svatvāt iti Mitākṣarā-likhanañceti.

The English version of this in summary appears in the report of the case. The pandits had not troubled themselves to go over the ground with Manu, Yājñavalkya, Viṣṇu and others who prohibited the wine-trade and therefore, in the view of those pandits, apparently trade in the vessels also. They gave their minds to the *factum valet* aspect. Their reference to the *Dāyabhāga* (of Jīmūtavāhana) has been reprehended,[3] since the quotation cannot be found in our copies. But as a matter of fact it is to the *Dāyabhāga* itself that we look for the principle of *factum valet* in its Indian dress.[4] Further, they rightly noticed, for the Hindus of 'Hindosthan', the *Mitākṣarā* principle that though the *dharmaśāstra* be defied in matters of acquisition of property, the acquisition is good for legal purposes. The sin of breach of the injunction lies on the one that breaks it.[5]

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1. (1825) Sadar Dewani Adalat, Bengal, 4 Select Reports 107—7 Indian Decisions (Madras Reprint) 79.
2. Subhadra Jha, ed., *Dharmaśāstrīya-vyavasthā-saṅgraha* (Allahabad, U. P. Govt. Press, 1957), 63 (no. 21).
3. By the editor of no. 21 (last note).
4. Jīmūtavāhana, *Dāyabhāga* II.30 (Colebrooke's divisions); Jagannātha, *Vivāda-bhaṅgārṇava*—Colebrooke's *Digest* I (Madras 1864-5), 410ff. The matter is discussed by P. Sen, *General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence* (Calcutta 1918), 83-94.
5. *Mitākṣarā* I.i, 7-12, 15-16 (Colebrooke's divisions), discussed by me in *Religion, Law and the State in India* (London 1968), 138-142. Roman law took the opposite view at any rate between 130 and 228 A. D. (see Justinian, *Digesta* X.2.4, 2).

The next question for the appellate court was what notice the court should take of the illegality. The court was no longer a court of conscience, if it had ever been one. Questions of caste were determined by the *dals* of Bengal, and by the appropriate *rāja* (at one time Warren Hastings delegated the state's interest in readmission to caste to *Rāja Rādhakānt Deb*).[1] Since it was the Sadar *Dewani* Adalat it could not deal with criminal matters. Therefore, what we are told is that, '...the punishment of Brahmins for dealing in wine was not a matter for the consideration of a civil court.' The upshot of the matter was that from 1825 it became generally known that breach of such rules was a (mere) caste matter, and if the castes did not submit the offenders to penance (as it seems they did not) the rules from Gautama and Āpastamba right down to the *Dharmasindhu* were frustrated. There was no means whereby they could be enforced.

One might think that that was that. *Factum valet.* Not quite. The rules regarding forbidden trades have had a secret life of their own, unknown to every observer. For a long time the public has taken the view that debts incurred in the trades forbidden to the respective caste ought to be *avyāvahārika*,[2] that is to say, 'illegal or immoral' and so irrecoverable from the debtor's sons out of family property.[3] Of recent years this has been denied,[4] and the point is obsolete. But it is interesting that it continually arose at one time. On the other hand trade in liquor is *avyāvahārika*. Debts incurred in respect of the liquor trade, and in respect of enjoyment of women (which would include pimping), are irrecoverable from the sons[5]. Now the rationale behind this notorious rule of law has never been explained to everyone's satisfaction.[6] It is noticeable that

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1. On the role of the *rāja* in these matters see Shib Chunder Bose, *The Hindoos as They Are*, 2nd edn. (Calcutta 1883), 174 *et alibi* (Rājā Krishna Chandra Rai of Krishnaghar, about 60 miles N. of Calcutta).
2. *Gaut.* XII.71 (*vaṇik-śulka*: is it a *dvandva* or a *karmadhāraya* compound? it is now a days usually understood to be the latter). See S. N. Deshmukh, *The Doctrine of Tainted Debts in Hindu Law* (Thesis, Ph.D., London, 1978), 70-74, 312ff.
3. *Girdharee Lall* v. *Kantoo Lall* (1874) 1 Indian Appeals (I. A.) 321; *Suraj Bunsi Koer* v. *Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879) 6 I.A.88; and many decisions of the Privy Council and Supreme Court of India since.
4. *Achutaramayya* v. *Ratnajee* (1925) *Indian Law Reports* (ILR) 49 Mad. 211 (see Deshmukh, sup., 312); *Rajagopal Pillai* v. *Veeraperumal* (1927) 53 Madras Law Journal 232; *Annabhat* v. *Shivappa* (1928) ILR 52 Bom. 376; *Parmanand Jain* v. *Firm Babulal* A. I. R. 1976 M. P. 187 (Deshmukh, 315).
5. *Gaut.* XII.38 (*madya*), *Vas.* XVI.56, *Manu.* VIII.159, *Yājñ.* II.47 (*surā-kāma-dyūta-kṛtam*). So Vṛddha-Hārīta VII.249. Bṛhaspati in the Wai *Dharmakośa*, 708. Deshmukh, 116ff.
6. The word *avyāvahārika* appears in Uśanas (quoted in the *Mitākṣarā* on *Yājñ.* II.47) and Vyāsa (in the *Vivāda-ratnākara*, 58). It is believed in general that sons ought not to support and guarantee their father in his vicious propensities. But the word *avyāvahārika* itself has been open to too

unpaid tolls and fines come within the same rule.[1] It is my suggestion that here we have the last fragment of Jaina learning : the *asteya-vrata* required that the votary should not profit from any contrarity with the royal regulations in matters of property.[2] And, if I am right, these are a few remaining provisions of the ancient Hindu law, originating in a Jaina evironment, which are to this very day part of Anglo-Hindu law, though no one knows their origin. The king (i. e. the state) has, to this day, the duty to advance piety and enforce morality, to the extent that he can. *Factum valet*, perhaps, but not entirely in the case of one who has given credit to a person engaging in one of the *avyāvahārika* transactions. Such a person cannot obtain his money from the debtor's sons, for they are under no pious obligation to pay it.[3] The man himself, of course, is liable under the Indian Contract Act, if the cause of the debt is not illegal under the general law of India (the case of the liquor seller would not be illegal, that of the pimp would be). But in respect of the sons' interest in joint family property the ancient law still holds, and I trust I have at least raised a *prima facie* case for attributing it to a very early, pre-Manu stage of Hinduism, when it was thought desirable to borrow many a leaf out of the Jainas' book.

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many different interpretations (Deshmukh, 160ff.) In Deshmukh's view (publication of his thesis is awaited) it meant what was not good, not proper (ibid., 170).

1. *Gaut.* XII.41, *Vas.* XVI.31, *Manu.* VIII.159, *Bṛh.* XI.51, *Yājñ.* II.47. The sources are remarkably agreed. Deshmukh, 56ff, 830ff.
2. Williams, 81 (*viruddha-rājyātikrama*).
3. It is an aspect of joint-family law untouched by statute. See Derrett, *Introduction to Modern Hindu Law* (Bombay 1963), §§506-511.

SAMBHŪYASAMUTTHĀNA

Eva Ritschl and Maria Schetelich

In his "*Juridical Studies of Ancient Indian Law*" Vol. I, chapt. XIV L. Sternbach amply deals with the relations between employers and employees and with working conditions of the *karmakāra*. In defining the term *karmakāra* he rightly follows the view of the Dharmaśāstras that *karmakāra* is called any person working for another person on the basis of a contract of service. Concentrating his study mainly on those *karmakāra*-s who are workers *sensu stricto* (i. e. those who get a reward or wage for their work from the employer) and thereby leaving aside such *karmakāra*-s as the *śiṣya* or the *antevāsin*, Sternbach draws inter alia the attention to the point that in the case of workers' associations "in many cases it is doubtful if the society, from the legal point of view, has to be considered a cooperative society or a civil-law partnership" (494). As the basis of all partnerships he mentions joint contribution of funds (according to *Nārada* 3.2) and as chief condition of the existence of an association the joint performance of work by all members of the society. His aim being "to present to the reader a juridical system concerning the working conditions, as they are reflected in ancient Indian Dharmaśāstra-s and Arthaśāstra-s" (468), he also casually dwells on the rules on associations and partnerships, collected in the Dharmaśāstras under the headline of "*sambhūya-samutthāna*".

For the illustration of the peculiarities of ancient Indian juridical thinking it is interesting and useful to analyze this topic and find out the system lying behind the classification.

Not every legal text deals with *sambhūyasamutthāna* to the same extent and in the same way. The most elaborate on the subject are the Dharmaśāstras of Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. The *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* also has a special chapter on *sambhūyasamutthāna* and some rules applying to the subject are included in the *sāhasaprakaraṇa*. Manu is very short on this point, dealing only (and far less exhaustive as, say, Bṛhaspati or Nārada) with priests officiating at a sacrifice.

The Dharmasūtras do not contain passages on *sambhūyasamutthāna*. P. V. Kane is of the opinion that the Sūtras do not deal with this subject because at the time of their origin the practice of *sambhūyasamutthāna* was not yet flourishing. But this is not the only possible explanation. It seems more convincing that originally the rules regarding *sambhūyasamutthāna* were handed down in the line of *Arthaśāstra*-tradition preceding the Kauṭilīya *Arthaśāstra* (*KA*) and only later on were included into the Dharmaśāstras together with other parts of *rājadharma* or *vyavahāra*.

Under the headline *sambhūyasamutthāna* Dharmaśāstras (DhS) and *KA* deal with common undertakings by groups of persons and the legal implications possibly arising out of them for the members of the group, in some cases also for the employer or the king.

As examples for *sambhūyasamutthātāraḥ* are mentioned groups of different professions and different social and legal status-traders, artisans, peasants, priests, musicians, robbers and others. The connecting link which allowed the legal writers to treat their activities under a common headline is that all of them do some work collectively with the aim to get reward (*vetana*) or to win profit (*lābha*). In the course of our study we call the first associations and the second civil-law partnerships.

Although he does not state it explicitly, it is this point which Sternbach in the passage cited above wanted to stress : that *sambhūyasamutthāna*—apparently being a union of independent persons—has certain relations to the rules regarding *karmakāra*-s and *bhṛtaka*-s.

There is a difference between DhS and *KA* in this respect. DhS mostly deal with partnerships not clearly discerning them from associations. At the other side, the *KA* deals with *sambhūyasamutthāna* immediately after *bhṛtaka*-s in the same *adhyāya* (3.14), mentioning *karṣaka*-s, *vaidehaka*-s and priests. While in the case of priests it is clear that they do their work as an association of employees, this cannot be said with certainty of the *karṣaka*-s and *vaidehaka*-s, although it seems probable that Kauṭilya also had in mind not partnership but employees associations. In the following, therefore, the rules of the *KA* regarding *karṣaka*-s and *vaidehaka*-s will not be discussed separately but only in addition to the rules of the DhS related to groups 1 and 3 of the *sambhūyasamutthātāraḥ*.

Under the aspect whether the professional groups mentioned as *sambhūyasamutthātāra*-s in DhS and *KA* constitute associations or civil-law partnerships one can discern three types : the pure civil-law partnership (group 1), the strictly organized, permanent association of employees (group 2) and casual unions of employees for a definite purpose (group 3).

GROUP 1—CIVIL LAW PARTNERSHIP

A. Merchants (*Bṛhaspati 14*, *Kātyāyana*, *Nārada 5*, *Yājñavalkya 2*)

(a) They are partners equal in rights and should be of good qualification.[1]

(b) It there exists a common fund; the shares contributed by the partners can be equal, smaller or larger.

(c) The purpose of the partnership is trade business.

(d) The aim is to win profit (*lābha*).

(e) The authority is the partnership as a whole resp. one partner who is authorized by the others.[2]

(f) *Lābha* is distributed according to the shares (*Bṛh.*) or *yathāsambhāṣita* (*Kāty.*)

(g) Loss : if caused by vis major (*rāja-cora-daiva-salila-agni*) has to be borne by all partners according to their shares; if caused by negligence of one partner not authorized by the others, loss has to be compensated by this partner.[3]
A partner who by his own efforts preserves the common stock from a danger caused by the king or the fate, shall get a reward (one tenth of the common stock).[4]

(h) Death or deficiency of a partner :

Only death is mentioned. If a partner dies of negligence (*pramādataḥ*, it is not clear whose negligence), all his goods (*bhāṇḍa*) shall be shown to the king's officers[5]. Then his heirs may get his property, after having proved their right. If there is no heir, the king shall take the property after the lapse of three years. (The property of a brāhmaṇa he shall bestow on brāhmaṇas).[6]

(i) Additional rules :

1. Appeal to be honest towards the other partners (*Vyāsa*, *Yājñ.*)
2. Penal rules : *Yājñ.* in the *sāhasaprakaraṇa*[7] and Kauṭilya in the *kāṇṭakaśodhana*[8] mention rules for the punishment of merchants who manipulate the prices either by retaining goods or by pressure on artisans.

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1. Cf. qualities which are desired and not desired. *Bṛh.* 14.1-2.
2. *Bṛh.* 14.15.
3. *Ibid.* 14.19; *Yājñ.* 2.22.260.
4. *Yājñ.* 2.22.260; *Bṛh.* 14.10 and *Nārada.* 1.5.6.
5. *Bṛh* 14.11
6. Cf. also *Yājñ.*
7. 2.20.249-250.
8. 4.2.18.

B. Peasants[1]

(a) They are partners equal in rights and should also be equal in their economic position, i. e. "in point of cattle, workmen, seeds and the like as well as implements of husbandry".[2]

(b) They all contribute to a common stock for the undertaking.

(c) The purpose of the undertaking is tillage of (additional fallow) fields.[3]

(d) The aim is realization of field produce (*phala*, resp. *sasya*).

(e) Authority is the partnership as a whole; the single partner being responsible to it in case of damage.

(f) The mode of distribution is not mentioned either by *Bṛh.* or by *KA.*

(g) While in the case of merchants losses are mentioned to be caused by *vis major* or by the partners themselves, in the case of peasants *Bṛh.* discusses only the latter case. Loss of produce due to lack of draught animals or seeds has to be made good to the partners by him who causes it.[4]

(h) Death or deficiency of a partner is not mentioned by *Bṛh.* The *KA*[5] says about *karṣaka*-s who fall ill at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of a common undertaking for gaining *sasya* that they should either put up a substitute or get a part (of the produce, viz. the *vetana*) according to the work done by them.

(i) Additionl rules : Fields and draught animals should be of good quality, the work should be done timely.[6]

GROUP 2—EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (*SAṄGHABHṚTA*)[7]

(a) Probably a more or less permanent association of employees (*saṅghabhṛta*).

(b) The purpose of the association is to work for an employer.

(c) The aim is the common earning of wages (*vetana*).

(d) Authority is the association (*saṅgha*). It is the *saṅgha* who deals with the employer

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1. *Bṛh.* 14.21-26.
2. *Ibid.* 14.21.
3. *Ibid.* 14.22-23.
4. *Ibid.* 14.24.
5. 3.14.20.
6. *Bṛh.* 14.22-24.
7. *KA.* 3.14.

and is responsible for the completion of the work. The contract of service is made between the employer and the *saṅgha.*

(e) The wages are distributed either in equal shares (*sama*) or *yathāsambhāṣita.*

Difficult to understand is the passage—*teṣām ādhiḥ saptarātram āsita tato 'nyam upasthāpayet, karmaniṣpākaṃ ca*[1]. Kangle thinks that *ādhi* means the person (employee) who is sent by the *saṅgha* in order to perform some work for the employer. After seven days the *saṅgha* should recall him and send another person to complete the work. Kangle is of the opinion that by this rule a closer contact between employer and employee should be avoided. Another possible interpretation is that this passage is meant for protecting the *saṅghabhṛta*-s : The contract of service (*ādhi*) should remain valid for seven days. Afterwards the employer may charter another employee in order to finish the work. Kangle's interpretation seems to be more convincing, because according to it the *saṅgha* is responsible for the completion of the work and therefore, fits to the nature of the contract. Moreover, in the following sentences Kauṭilya speaks of the *saṅgha* who sends and recalls *bhṛta*-s to/from the work.

GROUP 3—TEMPORARY ASSOCIATION OF SPECIALISTS

A. Priests

(a) They are a group of specialists forming a temporary association. Although equal in status, in *Bṛh. DhS*[2] and in *Nār. DhS*[3] are mentioned three kinds of priests whose relations to the *yajamāna*, and therefore, their position in the association is different: The hereditary (*kramāgata*) and the priest chosen by the sacrificer (*svayaṃkṛta*) could not be sent away at will by the *yajamāna* once the sacrifice has begun. The third, called *āgantuka* or *yādṛcchika* (one who accidentally approaches the *yajamāna*), has no such privilege.

(b) They have a special qualification for their work, being *śrotriya*-s.

(c) The purpose of their joining is to perform work for another person (a Soma-sacrifice of longer duration for the sacrificer). Their work is regulated by contract (most probably of the kind mentioned by Kauṭilya : *nānyasya tvayā kārayitavyo, mayā vā nānyasya kartavyam*).[4]

(d) The aim is gaining *dakṣiṇā* (classified as *vetana* in *KA*)[5]

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1. *Ibid.* 3.14.16-17.
2. 14.16.
3. 3.10-11.
4. 3.14.5.
5. 3.14.28.

(e) It is not quite clear from the very fragmentary prescriptions who is the legal authority; the single priest or the whole body of priests. According to *Nār.* and *Bṛh.* it seems as if the *yajamāna* deals with each of them separately when he invites them to officiate at the sacrifice or sends them away. Kauṭilya, on the other hand, who is the most elaborate on the subject, treating the priests as temporary association of wage-earners, probably stresses the corporative nature of their union by making a difference between priests bound by the contract and others, called *svapratyaya* (*sannānām ā daśāhorātrāccheṣabhṛtāḥ karma kuryuḥ, anye vā svapratyayāḥ*).[1] If (some) of them fall ill, the rest of them who are under contract shall do their work (in addition to their own) up to ten days or others, who are acting on their account.'

(f) The distribution of their earnings shall be *yathāsambhāṣita* or *sama*, as with the *saṅghabhṛta*-s, only the four main priests get something in addition due to them because of their function at sacrifice.[2]

(g) Each priest has to bear the loss of *dakṣiṇā* (*vetana*) incurred by him if he has to leave the sacrifice, e. g. in the case of illness or an urgent business abroad. The *KA* gives detailed information about the amount of the loss at the different stages of the sacrifice[3], but does not mention a substitute which the priest himself has to put up and pay, although *vaidehaka*-s and *karṣaka*-s have to do so in the same situation. *Manu*[4] and *Nār.*[5] only state that the priest which has to finish the work, should also get a part of the *dakṣiṇā*.

Additional rules : Generally neither the *yājaka* nor the *yajamāna* is allowed to leave the sacrifice.[6] Kauṭilya says that the sacrifice has to be brought to an end even if the *yajamāna* falls ill.[7]

B. Artisans, *vaidehaka*-s, musicians, robbers (*Bṛh. Kāty. KA*)

(a) Possibly temporary association of different specialists not strictly organized.

(b) Existence of a special qualification for the work. *Bṛh.* resp. *Kāty.* mention different stages of qualification in the case of artisans (*śiṣyaka*), *abhijña, kuśala, ācārya*) and of robbers (*mukhya, śūra, samartha*).

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1. *KA.* 3.14.34.
2. *Manu.* 8.206-10.
3. 3.14.29-32.
4. 8.207.
5. 3.8.
6. *Manu.* 8.206f; *Nār.* 3.9; *KA.* 3.14.36.
7. 3.14.35.

(c) The purpose of forming the association is the common performing of a definite work. *Bṛh.* mentions the construction of a house or temple, digging of a pool, making articles of leather, jewellery or other things and making acts of robbery on behalf of an employer (in the case of robbers he is called *svāmi*).

(d) The aim is gain of *vetana* (*Kāty.*), resp. *nirveśa* (*Bṛh.*) or booty.

(e) The authority : Either the members of the association themselves or some leading persons, for instance *pramukha* (in the case of artisans, *Bṛh.* 14.29), *mukhya* in the case of robbers (*Kāty.* and *Bṛh.* 14.31 f).

(f) *Vetana* should be distributed according to the work done (*Bṛh.*), or according to the qualification (*Kāty.*), in equal shares (*Kāty.*, *KA*) or *yathāsambhāṣita* (*KA*). The booty of robbers shall be distributed according to their contribution to the success of the work.[1]

(g) Loss of *vetana* caused by illness of a member of the association or by leaving the work before it is finished is treated only in the *KA*[2]- Kauṭilya gives some rules on this topic : One falling ill at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of the work, he shall get *vetana* only for the work done. If he puts up a substitute, he gets his full share of the *vetana*. If a *vaidehaka* falls ill, when the goods already brought some profits, he shall get his full share too. A healthy person must not leave the work, otherwise he would be punished. Kauṭilya relates these rules especially to *karṣaka*-s and *vaidehaka*-s, leaving out artisans, robbers and the like (which he does not treat at all in this chapter). Therefore, one cannot make out the way in which they regulated losses of their gain.

CONCLUSION

There are three different groups listed as *sambhūyasamutthāna* by the texts. Their common juridical mark is the common work for gain of profit (*lābha*) or wages (*vetana*). In all other points they differ from each other. While some are working on their own account (group 1) forming a civil-law partnership, the others are working by order of an employer being associations of employees (group 2, 3). Some are a union of equal partners (1), the others, however, are subordinate to an organisation with or without *mukhya*-s (2, possibly 3). There are also differences as to the duration of such associations. Civil-law partnership could probably be formed for a single undertaking only, say, a caravan trip. In the case of the 2. group, the *saṅghabhṛta*-s, things are different. While in the case of the two other groups *sambhūyasamutthāna* is the cause for the uniting of the

1. *Bṛh.* 14.32.
2. 3.14.19-24

sambhūyasamutthātāraḥ here the association (*saṅgha*) already exists, *sambhūyasamutthāna* being only the form by which they realize their working activities in general.

It is imposible to describe all juridical implications related to the different groups. Each source treats the subject of *sambhūyasamutthāna* under peculiar aspects stressing only certain points. Moreover, they do not agree in terminology.

But without any doubt one can state that *sambhūyasamutthāna* played an important role in ancient Indian every-day life. By this form of organisation of work nearly all professions—from the priests down to the robbers-were touched.

THE SŪTRAS AND ŚĀSTRAS ON THE EIGHT TYPES OF MARRIAGE

Ludo Rocher

This is not a study of the different types of marriage described in the classical Sanskrit texts; studies of this kind are available elsewhere in the scholarly literature. This article intends to examine the *sūtra* and *śāstra* texts dealing with the forms of marriage. A variety of texts—prose and verse; *dharma*, *artha*, and *gṛhya*—lay down rules for the same subject-matter. What are their individual characteristics ? How do they relate to one another ? No definitive answers will be obtained from a restricted analysis such as this. This is only a case study, leading to a number of general observations. But if the same type of analysis is repeated for various other topics, we may hope to come to a better understanding of the nature and scope of this branch—or, these branches—of Sanskrit literature.

Ten different texts will be drawn into the discussion : four prose dharmasūtras, one gṛhyasūtra, three versified dharmaśāstras, one *dharma* text in which prose and verse alternate, and one text on *artha*. They are the following :

Āpastamba (*Āp*) 2. 5. 11. 17-12.2
Gautama (*G*) 4. 4-11
Baudhāyana (*Bau*) 1. 11. 20. 2-9
Vasiṣṭha (*Va*) 1.30-35
Āśvalāyana (*Āśv*) 1. 6. 1-8
Manu (*M*) 3. 27-34
Yājñavalkya (*Y*) 1. 58-61
Nārada (*N*) 12. 40-43
Viṣṇu (*Vi*) 24. 19-26
Kauṭilya (*Kau*) 3. 2. 2-9

Eight of these ten texts agree in listing eight different types of marriage. The

names are identical, but for one exception. *Y* alone includes a type called ***kāya***, which obviously stands for the usual ***prājāpatya*** : ***ka*** is an accepted synonym for ***prajāpati***.[1] Two texts, both dharmasūtras (*Āp*, *Va*), have only six types of marriage : they omit ***prājāpatya*** and ***paiśāca***. Moreover, one of them (*Va*) replaces the ***āsura*** and ***rākṣasa*** types of all other texts by ***mānuṣa*** and ***kṣātra***, respectively. Yet, even in these two cases the definitions, which will be examined later in this paper, make it clear that the difference is one of terminology only, not of substance.

Besides the names, we may also look at the order in which the types of marriage have been introduced in the individual texts. The order in which the texts are arranged in the following table, from left to right, is determined by the fact that they can clearly be divided into three groups.

	G	*Bau*	*N*	*Kau*	*M*	*Y*	*Vi*	*Āśv*	*Āp*	*Va*
brāhma	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
prājāpatya	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	3	–	–
						kāya				
ārṣa	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	3
daiva	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	3	2
gāndharva	5	5	5	5	6	6	5	5	4	4
āsura	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	6	5	6
										mānuṣa
rākṣasa	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	6	5
										kṣātra
paiśāca	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	–	–

Group I comprises *G*, *Bau*, *N*, and *Kau*. In these four texts the order is perfectly identical.

Group II, composed of *M*, *Y*, *Vi*, and *Āśv*, is less uniform. The most striking difference with group I is that, here, ***prājāpatya*** and ***daiva*** have been interchanged. Within the group we further notice that *M* and *Y* are more closely related with one another than they are with *Vi* or *Āśv*. In fact, their order is identical except for *Y* replacing ***prājāpatya*** by ***kāya***. *Vi* differs from *M* and *Y* in that it interchanges ***gāndharva*** and ***āsura***—in agreement with group I. *Āśv* does the same, and adds two more interchanges of its own : ***prājāpatya/ārṣa***, and ***rākṣasa/paiśāca***.

The remaining two texts (*Āp*, *Va*) make up group III, mainly because in them two items in the list of eight are missing. Except for this they are closer to group I than

1. Cf. also *M*. 3.38.

to group II. With *prājāpatya* missing in *Āp*, the next five types simply move up by one, in the order of group I. *Va* has two inversions vis-a-vis *Āp*, and, as stated earlier, it uses two different terms.

To sum up, the way in which the texts can be grouped does not necessarily correspond to their nature and composition. One identical group comprises two dharmasūtras, one—relatively late—*dharmaśāstra*. and the *arthaśāstra M* and *Y*, which are practically identical, form a group with the mixed *Vi* and a *gṛhyasūtra*.

A look at the table horizontally, and moving from top to bottom, is revealing for a different reason. *M*, for example, states explicitly that the order in which the forms of marriage are introduced also indicates their relative importance and acceptability, from better to worse—*paiśāca* is *pāpiṣṭho vivāhānām*. Other texts make similar suggestions.

From this point of view we can distinguish four layers. Layer I consists of *brāhma* only. All texts—including *Āp* and *Va*—place it at the top : the best of all forms of marriage is the sole type to have the same position throughout.

The second layer is also the widest : *prājāpatya*, *ārṣa*, and *daiva*. Excluding *Āp* and *Va*, which are more difficult to include in this comparison, and with the exception of *Āśv*, *ārṣa* seems to be the pivot around which the other two revolve, more or less equally.

Gāndharva and *āsura* interchange within layer III, but less evenly than the items in layer II. *M* and *Y* alone go against the general trend represented by the other six "complete" texts, to which we may also add *Āp*.

Finally, layer IV—*rākṣasa* and *paiśāca*—shows even less variation. Here only one text (*Āśv*) reverses the order, against a majority of seven.

Again to sum up, the order in which eight—eventually six—items in a list are introduced in different texts displays variability, but only in a limited way. First, no item in the list is displaced by more than two digits—*prājāpatya* and *daiva*. Second, there is more variation at the centre, and it diminishes towards the extremes. In fact, there is no variation at all at the top, and very little at the bottom. The surprising thing is that, in two texts, the normal bottom category is absent.

Finally, we can compare the form and wording of the definitions in the individual texts. In the three versified texts (*M*, *Y*, *N*) we notice that *M* alone formulates the definitions in such a way that they each occupy a complete *śloka*. *N* is equally uniform, but more succinct : each form of marriage is given half a *śloka* only. The internal uniformity of *M* and *N* is missing in *Y*. The first (*brāhma*) and fourth (*kāya*) definitions are extended to full *śloka*-s ; the second (*daiva*) and third (*ārṣa*) share one *anuṣṭubh*—Y immediately attaches to the definitions the respective benefits of the first four types, whereas *M* treats these separately at 3.37-38— ; the last four types are combined within a single *śloka*, each occupying one *pāda*.

The prose definitions are of uneven length. In some of them, especially those of *Āp*, *G*, *Bau*, and *Va*, there is a tendency to be longer and more detailed for the highest types of marriage, and gradually become shorter for the lower types. Only *Vi*, and even more so *Kau*, reduce the definitions to a strict minimum throughout; in most cases there is not more than a single word.

I shall now reproduce the text of the definitions, eliminating every element which is not strictly part of the definition—e. g., *brāhmo dharmaḥ prakīrtitaḥ* (*M*). This procedure will make it possible more clearly and in detail to see what the texts have in common, and where they differ. For each type of marriage the prose texts will be given first, followed by the versified *śāstra*-s.

BRĀHMA

Āp *bandhuśīlaśrutārogyāṇi buddhvā prajāsahatvakarmabhyaḥ pratipādayecchaktiviṣayeṇa alaṅkṛtya.*
G *vidyācāritrabandhuśīlasampannāya dadyād ācchādya alaṅkṛtām.*
Bau *śrutiśīle vijñāya brahmacāriṇe 'rthine dīyate.*
Va *icchata udakapūrvāṃ yāṃ dadyāt.*
Vi *āhūya guṇavate kanyādānam.*
Āśv *alaṅkṛtya kanyām udakapūrvāṃ dadyāt.*
Kau *kanyādānaṃ kanyām alaṅkṛtya.*
M *ācchādya cārcayitvā ca śrutiśīlavate svayam āhūya dānaṃ kanyāyāḥ.*
Y *āhūya dīyate śaktyalaṅkṛtā.*
N *satkṛtya āhūya kanyāṃ dadyād alaṅkṛtām.*

PRĀJĀPATYA

Āp ——
G *saṃyogamantraḥ saha dharmaś caryatām iti.*
Bau *ācchādya alaṅkṛtya eṣā saha dharmaś caryatām iti.*
Va ——
Vi *prārthitapradānena.*
Āśv *saha dharmaṃ carata iti.*
Kau *sahadharmacaryā.*
M *sahobhau caratāṃ dharmam iti vācānubhāṣya kanyāpradānam abhyarcya.*
Y *ity uktvā caratāṃ dharmaṃ saha yā dīyate 'rthine.*
N *saha dharmaṃ carety uktvā.*

ĀRṢA

Āp *duhitṛmate mithunau gāvau deyau.*

G *gomithunaṃ kanyāvate dadyāt.*
Bau *pūrvāṃ lājāhutiṃ hutvā gomithunaṃ kanyāvate dattvā grahaṇam.*
Va *gomithunena.*
Vi *gomithunagrahaṇena.*
Āśv *gomithunaṃ dattvā upayaccheta.*
Kau *gomithunādānāt.*
M *ekaṃ gomithunaṃ dve vā varād ādāya dharmataḥ kanyāpradānaṃ vidhivat.*
Y *ādāya godvayam.*
N *vastragomithunābhyām.*

DAIVA

Āp *yajñatantra ṛtvije pratipādayet.*
G *antarvedy ṛtvije dānam alaṅkṛtya.*
Bau *dakṣiṇāsu nīyamānāsv antarvedy ṛtvije.*
Va *yajñatantre vitata ṛtvije karma kurvate kanyāṃ dadyād alaṅkṛtya.*
Vi *yajñasthaṛtvije.*
Āśv *ṛtvije vitate karmaṇi dadyād alaṅkṛtya.*
Kau *antarvedyām ṛtvije dānāt.*
M *yajñe vitate samyag ṛtvije karma kurvate alaṅkṛtya sutādānam.*
Y *yajñasthaṛtvije.*
N *antarvedyām ṛtvije karma kurvate.*

GĀNDHARVA

Āp *mithaḥ kāmāt saṃvartete.*
G *icchantyāḥ svayaṃ saṃyogaḥ.*
Bau *sakāmena sakāmāyāṃ mithaḥ saṃyogaḥ.*
Va *sakāmāṃ kāmayamānaḥ sadṛśīṃ yonim uhyāt.*
Vi *dvayoḥ sakāmayor mātāpitṛrahito yogaḥ.*
Āśv *mithaḥ samayaṃ kṛtvā upayaccheta.*
Kau *mithaḥ samavāyāt.*
M *icchayānyonyasaṃyogaḥ kanyāyāś ca varasya ca maithunyaḥ kāmasambhavaḥ.*
Y *samayān mithaḥ.*
N *icchantīm icchataḥ.*

ĀSURA

Āp *śaktiviṣayeṇa dravyāṇi dattvā vaheran.*
G *vittenānatiḥ strīmatām.*
Bau *dhanenopatoṣya.*

Va [*paṇitvā dhanakritām.*]
Vi *krayeṇa.*
Āśv *dhanenopatoṣya upayaccheta.*
Kau *śulkādānāt.*
M *jñātibhyo draviṇaṃ dattvā kanyāyai caiva śaktitaḥ kanyāpradānaṃ svācchandyāt.*
Y *draviṇādānāt.*
N *śulkasaṃvyavahārataḥ.*

RĀKṢASA

Āp *duhitṛmataḥ prothayitvā vaheran.*
G *prasahyādānāt.*
Bau *prasahya haraṇāt.*
Va *yāṃ* (*balena sahasā pramathya*) *haranti.*
Vi *yuddhaharaṇena.*
Āśv *hatvā bhittvā ca śīrṣāṇi rudatīṃ rudadbhyo haret.*
Kau *prasahyādānāt.*
M *hatvā chittvā ca bhittvā ca krośantīṃ rudatīṃ gṛhāt prashya kanyāharaṇam.*
Y *yuddhaharaṇāt.*
N *prasahya haraṇāt.*

PAIŚĀCA

Āp ——
G *asaṃvijñātopasaṃgamāt.*
Bau *suptāṃ mattāṃ pramattāṃ vā upagacchet.*
Va ——
Vi *suptapramattābhigamāt.*
Āśv *suptānāṃ pramattānāṃ vā apaharet.*
Kau *suptamattādānāt.*
M *suptāṃ mattāṃ pramattāṃ vā raho yatra upagacchati.*
Y *kanyakāchalāt,*
N *suptapramattopagamāt.*

One cannot help being impressed by the amount of material which is common to several texts in the definitions of each type of marriage. In fact, cases in which one particular text exhibits formulas which are different from all other texts are rare.

Examples :

Vi prārthitapradānena prājāpatyaḥ ;
N adds *vastra* to the common *gomithuna*, in *ārṣa* ;
Y paiśācaḥ kanyakāchalāt.

In most cases the texts use a variety of synonyms, but the basic idea remains the same. For instance, in the case of the *āsura* marriage, we find :

śulka *N, Kau*
dravya *Āp*
draviṇa *M, Y*
dhana *Bau, Āśv* (both with *upatoṣya*)
vitta *G*
kraya *Vi*

One of the best examples to show how synonymous expressions can alternate concerns the *daiva* marriage. The dative *ṛtvije* appears in all the ten texts. To this, four texts add either *antarvedyām* (*N, Kau*) or *antarvedi* (*G, Bau*). The other additions display a most interesting variation :

Y and *Vi* add the same adjective, *yajñasthaṛtvije* ;
Four texts have separate, but very similar locatives :

Āp *yajñatantre*
Va *yajñatantre vitate*
M *yajñe (tu) vitate samyak*
Āśv *vitate karmaṇi* ;

Three texts have the same formula : *ṛtvije karma kurvate*, i. e., a perfect even *pāda* of a *ślaka*. This is to be expected in *M* and *N*, but it also occurs in the prose—*Va.*

Any effort to determine whether two or more individual texts are consistently more closely related to each other than they are to other texts seems, under these circumstances, futile. There are a few cases in which two or more texts contain elements by which they clearly distinguish themselves from the others ; however, in each case the group of texts is a different one. Examples :

Brāhma

āhūya *Vi, M, Y, N*
udakapurvām *Va, Āśv*

Gāndharva

mithaḥ samayāt *Āśv, Y* (*Kau samavāyāt*)
emphasis on the root *iṣ* *G, M, N*
emphasis on *kāma* *Āp, Bau, Va, Vi*

Rākṣasa

striking correspondence *Āśv* (ca. a half *śtloka*), *M*
yuddha° *Vi, Y.*

I have indicated earlier in this article that no final conclusions on the nature and interrelation of the texts can be derived from an analysis of so small a body of materials. Yet, it at least allows us to venture a few suggestions, which may be either confirmed or denied by similar analyses of other topics. First, no "one later text" can be shown to have derived its material directly from "one earlier text" or even "earlier texts". Second, even in the prose texts we meet with versified sections, which makes us wonder whether the generally accepted thesis that "the versified śāstras are more recent than the prose sūtras" has absolute validity. Third, perhaps too much stress has been laid on the differences between the texts. They rather tend to express the same or very similar ideas on each "point of law." If so, whenever the texts differ, the emphasis should be on reconciling the variants rather than look for historical, geographical and other justifications. Fourth, even though I have restrained from doing so in this paper, word by word comparison of all sources on specific topics may help us establish better readings for a number of passages which, especially in the sūtras, are at present still very uncertain.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ANCIENT INDIAN LAW (THE PROPERTY)

A. M. Samozvantsev

The aim of this paper is to follow the evolution of the idea towards private property and towards the system of the foundation of the private property in Ancient India on the basis of investigation of using the term *āgama* in śāstras and by its semantics. The conception of *āgama* was the central one in the complex of legal ideas which we call the theory of property or *āgama*- theory. Thus, the evolution of the semantic content of the term in juridical and non-juridical context surely gives us the reflection of some changes in the practice of the relations of property.

Thus the author takes as the aim to carry out an analysis of the evolution of property in its juridical content and not in its socio-economic content. But it is possible that the analysis will throw a light to a certain extent upon the genesis of the socio-economic content of property during a long period of time—up to the middle of the Ist millennium B. C. when the evolution of the theory of property came to the end having had produced a universal system of foundation of property rights (*āgama-pramāṇa*-s-system) which has not changed noticeably later on.

However, to answer the raised issues as far as possible, we have to make some remarks of methodical nature. It is necessary to found our angle of considering *śāstra*-s as the literature which can fix different stages of the evolution of ideas towards property.

Up to now there is a view in scientific literature that the process of the evolution of *śāstra*-s is identical in its main features with the process of the development of the law. From this point of view they also consider *dharmasūtra*-s as a stage of the evolution of dharmical juridical literature. In reality *dharmasūtra*-s are much more complex reflection of law practice as compared with simple incorporation of juridical stuff. This process is

studied in a work of A. A. Vigasin and V. N. Romanoff, who investigated the determinatives of the evolution of dharmical literature[1].

The research of the composition and the principles of composing *dharmasūtra*-s and first of all the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* enabled the authors to make a conclusion that we need to find a starting point, i. e. a precondition for the implantation of juridical stuff into *dharmasūtra*-s in reconsidering the sacrifice in *Upaniṣad*-s. The basis for such a reconsideration in its turn is the idea of purgatorial victim which lays as embryo in the conception of *ātmayājin* of the Brāhmaṇa period. The consequence of the generalization of this principle in *Upaniṣad*-s (i. e. what purges this is a victim) is to consider the whole life as well as a separate dharmical action to be a purgatorial sacrifice which has achieved the *ātman* as the highest purpose. This comparison of life and sacrifice served for the ritualists as a basis for the interference with and the explanation of the field of human practice they had never been interested in before. And as soon as a a *sūtrakārin* has become interested in different aspects of life from the ritual point of view he has got in his sphere of interests the juridical aspects as well.

Thus we have to take into consideration that (1) this was the main reason to reflect juridical practice in *dharmasūtra*-s and (2) we have to keep in mind the speciality of the reflection. Juridical practice went through the prism of ritualistic imaginations of purity, purgatorial victim etc. The latter moment seems also to have served as an initial push that has produced later on a new composition of the *śāstra*-s through a complex of complicated phenomena which characterized the evolution of dharmical literature.

They took as the basis for composition of *dharmasūtra*, according to A. A. Vigasin and V. N. Romanoff, *āśrama* temporal principle, i. e. the scheme of human life consisting of the following stages : schooling, wedding, impregnation, giving in marriage the daughters, separation of the property between the sons (*dāyavibhāga*), death and *śrāddha* in honour of the late. After this *dharmasūtra* of Āpastamba gives an account of the themes of forest anchoret and ascetic. This stuff is in absolute correspondence with dharmical conceptions of *dharmasūtra* which also show a composition relation with *gṛhyasūtra*-s.

Law in Āpastamba is investigated in two parts : II.13.I–15.I is devoted to inheritance law and II.26.I8–II.29.I0, to all other divisions of law. Inheritance law is stated just before the description of the ceremony of *śrāddha* and stands in close relation to it : he who gets a part of inheritance performes *śrāddha*. In that way from the dharmical ideas' point of view the inclusion of law stuff in the division is quite well-grounded. In

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1. A. A. Vigasin, N. V. Romanoff. Nablyudeniya nad compositsiey dharmashastr. In the book *"Drevniy vostok i antichniy mir"*, issue II (in print).

the second case law is a part of the description of a king's *dharma* as the basic duty of a king is to protect his subjects as from enemies as from criminals. In the division *vyavahāra* proper is included. The latter contains the duties of a king as a protector of his subjects, the appointment of officials to assure the security of townfolk and countryfolk. It gives also some examples of crimes and corresponding punishments as well as the order of legal proceedings, interrogatory of the witnesses in particular. It is remarkable that the themes of *vyavahāra* which are included in the general sphere of king's duties exceed the bounds of *dharmasūtra*'s composition, as following *āśrama*-principle, and therefore, seem to be an addition to dharma of *āśrama*-s, while the whole *rājadharma* dedicated to the duties of a king to a brāhman is dharmic in the respect. This is no mere chance, undoubtedly. A. A. Vigasin and V. N. Romanoff suppose that the including of law stuff into *dharmasūtra* broke the *āśrama* temporal principle and made a progressing incorporation of *vyavahāra*'s stuff into *dharmasūtra* impossible, for it would contradict the basic conceptions of the compilers of *dharmasūtra*-s, as an incorporation of non-dharmical stuff.

A. A. Vigasin and V. N. Romanoff consider that the progressing incorporation of *vyavahāra* into *dharmasūtra*-s became possible only with the appearance of *varṇa*-composition of *Manusmṛti* and the posterior śāstras which was connected with the disappearance of the theme of four *varṇa* members' dharmical occupations, as a separate division. Dharmical occupations of *kṣatriya* is inserted in *Manusmṛti* into division of *rājadharma* which is followed by the division stating dharmical occupations of *vaiśya* and *śūdra*. So the authors suppose that we can take it as a principle composition reconsideration, i. e. *rājadharma* was stated out of *varṇa*-s' *dharma* in *Āpastambadharmasūtra* but in the *Manusmṛti* in the composition aspect it is interpreted as *kṣatriya*'s *dharma*, the main part of *Āpastambadharmasūtra* has contained *dharma*-s which were common for all the twiceborns, but in *Manusmṛti* this *dharma* became *dharma* of brāhman as well. On the other hand, the progressing inclusion into *śāstra*-s of non-dharmical stuff in the close connection with the theme of king became the main reason for the development of this new composition principle—these two moments have been interconnected—which connects the stuff with dharmical conception and promotes, in its turn, the progressing incorporation of *vyavahāra*.

As far as further evolution of *vyavahāra* in *dharmaśāstra*-s is concerned, it proceeded as follows: *vyavahāra* in *Manusmṛti* is fully absorbed in the bounds of *rājadharma*. To that latter not only chapter VII dedicated which states 'king's duties' proper, but also chapters VIII and IX up to *śloka* 324 which reads as follows—

evaṃ caransadā yukto rājadharmeṣu pārthivaḥ |
hiteṣu caiva lokasya sarvānbhṛtyānniyojayet ||

The next *śloka* reads—

eṣo'khilaḥ karmavidhirukto rājñaḥ sanātanaḥ |
imaṃ karmavidhiṃ vidyātkramaśo vaiśyaśūdrayoḥ ||

Then *dharma* of *vaiśya* and *śūdra* is stated. Meanwhile, all the eighteen divisions of *vyavahāra* are enumerated in chapters VIII and IX up to *śloka* 250—

udito'yaṃ vistaraśo mitho vivadamānayoḥ /
aṣṭadaśasu mārgeṣu vyavahārasya nirṇayaḥ //

In *Yājñavalkyasmṛti vyavahāra* exceeds the bounds of *rājadharma* proper, but grows up from it directly and presents as if it is continuation of the theme. Here *rājadharma* is stated in the last sixty *śloka*-s of book I of the *dharmaśāstra*; the whole book II is dedicated to *vyavahāra*—just to the *vyavahāra* which is included in the limits of *rājadharma* in *Manusmṛti*.

Thus, the evolution of *vyavahāra* in *dharmaśāstra*-s should be considered as the evolution of *rājadharma* whether it proceeds in the tight bounds of *rājadharma* proper or out of them.

The satiation of *Nāradasmṛti* with *vyavahāra* should be considered from the same point of view. In *Nāradasmṛti rājadharma* is placed in the 18th section of *vyavahāra,* i. e. in *prakīrṇaka* (or "miscellanea"), and the *vyavahāra* going out of its bounds (the legal theory, jurisprudence and legal procedure) is the only theme of the *dharmaśāstra*. The stuff of *vyavahāra* in late *śāstra*-s continues to remain dharmic just because it is explained in the context of *rājadharma* which is interpreted as the relation between a kṣatriya king and a brāhman. *Nārada* remains the dharmic one in spite of the absence of ritual and themes connected with ritual in it, as it goes in the course of general dharmical tradition beginning from *Manusmṛti*.

The satiation of *śāstra*-s with the *vyavahāra's* stuff proceeds little by little, in the bounds of religious-ethics compositions of brāhmaṇas. We have to agree with A. A. Vigasin and V. N. Romanoff that the process of development of dharmical literature can be in no way identified with the process of elaboration of law. And, from our point of view, juridical subjects were being developed by *śāstrin*-s only to such an extent to what the stuff that was incorporated from one composition to another is subject to certain changes, while the juridical stuff was incorporated into *dharmaśāstra*-s from outside. The idea was expressed at one time by J. J. Meyer[1], and it is thoroughly grounded in the work of A. A. Vigasin and V. N. Romanoff. And if it is true, then we can come to the conclusion that a superposition takes place there, i. e. onto ritual stuff of *dharmaśāstra*-s *vyavahāra's* stuff is superposed, which was much earlier than the compositions which it was being incorporated into.

The thing often taken as a development of juridical ideas in *śāstra-s*—and the development means in fact the development of law—in reality is just a technological

1. J. J. Meyer. *Uber das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften und ihr Verhaltnis zu einander und zu Kauṭilya*. Leipzig, 1927, s. VI.

complication of legal procedure. We illustrate the thesis by the following example. Let us assume that there is some main juridical regulation, then represent a circle on a plane and imagine that the regulation forms the centre of the circle. All the remaining area of circle should be occupied then by the minor and additional regulations, which explain the major one keeping in mind its using in a row of similar cases of juridical practice. It goes without saying that the main juridical regulation cannot be formed before the numerous threads which tie the centre and the periphery together appear. A rule cannot be constituted if it is unknown when and how it ought to be used. But it is characteristic for early *śāstra*-s that the text contains only a basic legal idea and not the periphery, though the latter is impiled. In later *śāstra*-s a main juridical rule is linked with more numerous segments of the circle, which just make up its juridical periphery. Thus, we are talking not of a qualitative development of a given legal idea but only of this latter's technical reglamentations. For example *Manusmṛti*[1] contains a juridical conception from the field of legal theory, namely if there is use and there is no *āgama*, then *āgama* and not usage is the legal ground. This conception presupposes some juridical practice, certain jurisprudence. But *Manusmṛti* does not contain the juridical periphery, it appears in *Yājñavalkya* and becomes especially apparent in *Nārada* (see *śloka* 84 and the successive ones of *śāstra* after Asahāya). Thus, a transition from the field of legal theory to jurisprudence has taken place.

The technological complication of legal procedure indicates the fact that *dharma-śāstra*-s adopt legal conceptions which have become a tradition and which are taken as everlasting and timeless ones (here we omit a question of the sources from which the stuff of *vyavahāra* is incorporated into *dharmaśāstra*-s. The question needs a special research). So, the evolution of legal ideas which is nevertheless observed in a number of cases in *śāstra*-s and the character of which will be dealt with below is not contemporary to this kind of ancient Indian literature. On the contrary, the evolution should reflect the whole tradition of *vyavahāra*'s constitution for a long period of time. The latter process proceeded as a parallel to the exceptionally complicated process of formation of dharmical literature.

We can also conclude that an investigation of the evolution of *vyavahāra* and the theory of property in particular is possible only with the using of the stuff of *śāstra*-s which formed in the early centuries of our era, while to search the evolution in earlier dharmical composition, e. g. in *dharmasūtra*-s, would be of no use.

The research of *śāstra*-s' stuff makes us convinced of the possibility of three ways for the genesis of law in the *śāstra*-s' literature itself. First, it could be an evolution of

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1. VIII.200.

legal ideas from one *śāstra* to another. The process could be accompanied or not accompanied by an evolution of semantics of terms, expressing the ideas (A=way). The second type of the evolution of law is the same logical evolution, i. e. the evolution on the level of legal ideas. But in this case we observe it in the limits of every separate treatise (B=way). It is obvious that the saying of *śāstra*-s, and what is more of traditional one we have to exclude the diversified in types of evolution of legal conceptions in different treatises even from a range of theoretical versions. At last, we see the third way of legal evolution in *śāstra*-s in the semantics evolution of the terms which is general for all the treatises (C=way).

A=way means the legal ideas which have been fixed in later *śāstra*-s and have been in certain way corrected qualitatively as compared with earlier ones. Naturally, such amendments can also be introduced into the terminology as well. The way implies the evolution of the law contemporary to the evolution of the literature itself. In this case legal stuff which was incorporated into *śāstra*-s having been in a way considered should get there, of course, with a certain "delay" as only a phenomenon which had become traditional and was getting into *śāstra*-s. B and C=ways would mean the treatise or treatises contained chronologically in heterogeneous legal stuff. They would also mean an evolution of legal ideas that took place before forming the mentioned literature.

Anyway, up to the moment we have been talking of the ways or evolution of law in *śāstra*-s, which is possible in principle. But in fact *śāstra*-s offer rather a homogeneous stuff, studies of the texts make it possible to come to the conclusion that the later treatises as compared with the earlier ones on the level of the legal ideas do not show any qualitative correctives. Thus, speaking of the *śāstra*-s we cannot talk of the evolution of law as of the evolution of legal ideas from one treatise to another and of the same evolution of the semantics of the terms. Practically we cannot observe any evolution of legal ideas which is not homogeneous for all the treatises. We suppose stuff of the *śāstra*-s to permit picking out only the third way of the evolution of law, viz. semantic evolution of legal terms of different shades of meanings, the evolution to be homogeneous for all treatises. And furthermore, the evolution allows us sometimes to judge the evolution of the level of legal ideas.

We also suppose that since a legal idea was formed in the past—which is the chronological past for *śāstra*-s—in every treatise certain semantic variations of one or another juridical term should correspond with different stages of the formation of legal theory.

There are some other reasons which make us believe that it is possible to follow separate stages of the evolution of the theory of law. First, a structural analysis allows us to ascertain that the structure of the *āgama* early *śāstra*-s in and late ones differ as the idea

of *āgama* in *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* and *Nāradasmṛti* is more often expressed by means of a system of *pramāṇa*-s, the idea of *pramāṇa* is used for the conveying of an idea of the *āgama* rather often. To the contrary, early *śāstra*-s do not fix the system of the *pramāṇa*-s and the idea of *āgama* means not the combination of two or more *pramāṇa*-s, the presentation of which in court is the ground for the right of a claimant, but most often a legal transaction or just getting or acquiring of a property. This meaning of the idea of *āgama* corresponds with the semantic roots of the term of *āgama* and for conveying of the idea just that very term is used exclusively. But it does not follow that the late *śāstra*-s reflect the later stages of forming of theory of property, and the early *śāstra*-s reflect the earlier ones respectively. *Vyavahāra*'s stuff was superposed onto every *śāstra*, and each *śāstra* represents different stages of the evolution of *āgama*[1] but with different intensity. (This is one more illustration of the fact that the evolution of legal ideas which can sometimes be observed in *śāstra*-s is not contemporary to the evolution of the literature. So, we cannot talk of the development of the ideas by *śāstra*-s). In later *śāstra*-s the process goes especially intensively, and it is natural since *Vyavahāra*'s stuff is covered more widely, so the universal theory of property is exposed here more broadly, in different aspects. Second, the term *āgama* is not a polysemantic one, it has been derived from the verb *āgama*, the meanings of which are rather limited, viz. "to come", "to arrive", "to reach", "to get". Accordingly, the term *āgama* has the meanings "arrival", "approach", "origin", "flow", "receipt", "acquisition". This is one of the frequent cases in Sanskrit when by means of research of the etymology of some juridical term we can ascertain its initial meaning. The term *āgama* in the context implies "receipt" of some object. If all the above is true, we can investigate the cases of use of the term *āgama* in the sources when it has these or close in sense meanings and define the stages of the evolution of the theory of property which had preceeded the final formation of the theory as system of the *āgama-pramāṇa*-s.

I

We consider that it is reasonable to start the investigation of the evolution of the theory of property from its end, i. e. from the universal system of grounding property rights which was characteristic of European law as well. (It proves that typologically Indian and European law were developed in similar ways). The system was discussed in detail in our monograph, therefore, we limit here ourselves to some remarks.[2]

The advisability of such an approach is dictated by the stuff itself since it just characterized most fully the late stages of the formation of the theory of property and only

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1. *Manusmṛti* VIII.200 and X.115.
2. A. M. Samozvantsev. Teoriya sobstvennosty v. drevney Indii. Moscow, 1978.

fragmentary the early ones. To show the evolution from the latter to the former ones seems to us to be rather difficult without a characteristic of the theory of property.

Āgama, as it is fixed in *dharmaśāstra*-s—*Yājñavalkya*, *Nārada*-and it also applies to a certain extent to *Manu*—means legal right of property. The right is acquired through *pramāṇa*-s which are juridical authorities brought into certain line with each other, i. e. through triple-term *pramāṇa* meaning document, witnesses and use. In practice of the relations of property *āgama* is formed as a combination of two or more *pramāṇa*-s one of them to be obligatory use. It is pointed out—

> *bhuktyā kevalayā naiva bhuktiḥ siddhimavāpnuyāt* /
> *āgamenāpi śuddhena dvābhyāṃ sidhyati nānyathā* //[1]

Asahāya in his commentary on *Nārada* says—

> *atra tu sākṣilikhitayorapi pramāṇayorbhuktirpramāṇaṃ vinā durbalatvamupadarśitam* / . . . *ekaikaṃ pramāṇamapyapramāṇam* / *yadubhayapramāṇasampannaṃ vastu tadavicalam pramāṇam.*[2]

Rāghavānanda's commentary on *Manu* is the same unambigious—*āgamo na pramāṇaṃ kintūbhayam.*[3] A pure *āgama* which is point at issue usally opposed to a "weak" one or "not fully valid" one, i. e. a document improperly drawn up. Mostly a "pure" *āgama* was formed as a combination of two types of *pramāṇa*-s, i. e. if a buyer or a recipient of a gift after the purchase or the act of granting of the gift had in his disposal document-*pramāṇa* and began to use the object, *āgama* appeared as a combination of "document" and "use" *pramāṇa*-s. The other type of *āgama* was the *āgama* caused by a prescription of use. It took place when an illegal user for a long time and under some special circumstances used other's property while the legal owner of it ignored the fact. In the circumstances the illegal user became first a legalized one and after the expiration of prescription he became a legal owner. In the last case *āgama* was formed as a combination of "witness" and "use" *pramāṇa*-s, the "use"-*pramāṇa* to be of a paramount importance. This situation implies an availability of witnesses which confirmed that the necessary conditions had been observed to enable the belongings become a legal possession and a legal property later on. An *āgama* of such a type is talked about by Vijñāneśvara in his commentary on *Yājñavalkya*[4] and Asahāya in his commentary on *Nārada*[5]. The first of them mentions—*bhuktirāgamarahitā sākṣyādibhiḥ sādhitāpi*. . . The second commentary reads—

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1. *Bṛhaspatismṛti* I.VII.30.
2. I.77.
3. VIII.200.
4. II.29.
5. I.76.

evamanāgamāyā bhukterdurbalatvamātram pratiṣṭhate | tasyāḥ pūrvaṃ pramāṇaṃ sākṣiṇa uktāḥ | te ca yadi sthāvarasyāgamapratiṣṭhākāriṇo bhavanti | tato bhuktiḥ pratiṣṭhate | nānyathā |

In both the cases *āgama* should be read as "document".

A pure *āgama-pramāṇa* or a combination of *pramāṇa*-s is often found in treatises as an antithesis to use[1]. It is especially opposed to the use which does not have it. For instance, in accordance with *Nārada*[2]--

bhogaṃ kevalato yastu kīrtayennāgamaṃ kvacit |
bhogacchalāpadeśena sa vijñeyastu taskaraḥ ||

On the other hand, the same use is considered to be a legal one if it is connected with document and witnesses-*āgama*[3] With the *āgama* deprived, the use broke off.[4] Though, in certain cases a use was even more important than document-*āgama*. It was observed when document-*āgama* was not supported with "use"-*pramaṇa*[5]. The fact that *āgama-pramāṇa* is talked about here is pointed to their commentaries by Aparārka (...*cā'gamaḥ sākṣyādipramāṇaparicchinno*...) and Viśvarūpa (*agamo lekhyam*...).

Apart from the context which speaks of a use without *āgama* or with it[6], *āgama-pramāṇa* is found in treatises unconnected with the use.[7] But such examples show less frequently.

II

To continue the retrospective research of *āgama*'s roots we have to name as the theory of the stage of property evolution which preceded its very end in the system of *āgama-pramāṇa*-s the cases of using the term *āgama* in which it means an acquisition of belongings into property on a legal ground, legal transaction. The idea of *āgama* as of a legal acquisition of belongings into property by transaction was expressed in a system of

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1. *sambhogo dṛśyate yatra na dṛśyetāgamaḥ kvacit |*
   āgamaḥ kāraṇaṃ tatra na sambhoga iti sthitiḥ|| Manu. VIII.200.
2. I.86.
3. *Āgamena viśuddhena bhogo yāti pramāṇatām |*
   aviśuddhāgamo bhogaḥ prāmāṇyaṃ nādhigacchati ||
4. *Bhujyāte 'nāgamaṃ yattu na tad bhogo' tivartate—Nārada* I.77. *Yājñavalkya* II.29.
5. *āgamo'bhyadhiko bhogādvinā pūrvakramāgatāt |*
   āgame'pi balaṃ naiva bhuktiḥ stokāpi yatra no || Yājñyvalkya VII.29.
6. *Nārada* I.87-88, 92 Asahāya's version.
7. *anyathārthamarthahīnaṃ ca pramāṇāgamavarjitam |*
   lekhyaṃ hīnādhikaṃ bhraṣṭaṃ bhāṣādoṣātūdahṛtāḥ||
   Nārada Intr. II.8.—See also *Nārada* Intr. II.12.

substitutes of an *āgama* in comments. Explaining the term *āgama* which appears in *dharmaśāstra*-s, the commentators express various views—Medhātithi in his commentary on *Manu*[1] says—*rikthapratigrahādirāgamaḥ svāmyapādakastatrāgamo balavat*.. Commenting on the same text Rāghavānanda points out—*āgamaḥ pratigrahakrayādih*... Vijñāneśvara in his commentary on *Yājñavalkya*[2] says—*svatvahetuḥ pratigrahakrayādiḥ āgamaḥ*. The examples of such an interpretation of the term *āgama* in comments can be seen over and over. As models of an *āgama* the commentators named receipt of a gift and purchase, i. e. acts meaning simultaneous complete loss and acquisition of a right of property as well as inheritance. The idea of *āgama* meaning a legal way of acquisition of belongings as property, is found in *dharmaśāstra*-s. For instance, Manu says—

sapta vittāgamā dharmyā dāyo lābhaḥ krayo jayaḥ |
prayogaḥ karmayogaśca satpratigraha eva ca ||[3]

Bhāruci in his commentary on Manu[4] uses the expression *dhanāgama*. In fact, the same *āgama*-s are implied by the compiler of *Bṛhaspatismṛti* when he says—

sarveṣām varṇānāmevam dharmyo dhanāgamaḥ|[5]

The word-combination *dhanāgama* is found in the *Mahābhārata*[6], the one of *draviṇāgama* in *Pañcatantra*[7]. *Svatvahetu* as a "ground for the right of property", i. e. *āgama*, is mentioned by Vijñāneśvara when he gives in his extensive commentary on *Yājñavalkya*[8] the well-known phrase from the *dharmasūtra* of Gautama—

"*svāmī rikthakrayasaṃvibhāgaparigrahādhigameṣu brāhmaṇasyādhikaṃ labdhaṃ, kṣatriyasya vijitaṃ, nirviṣṭaṃ vaiśyaśūdrayoḥ*" *ityaṣṭāveva svatvakārakahetūn gautamaḥ paṭhati na bhogam.*

It is remarkable that on the stage of the evolution of the theory of property *āgama* is never explained as possession—use[9]. We shall return to the point below. The use of the term *āgama* in *Yājñavalkya* is typical.[10] In his commentary on this text Vijñāneśvara says—

yena puruṣeṇa bhūmyāderāgamaḥ svikāraḥ kṛtaḥ sa puruṣaḥ "kutaste kṣetrādikam" ityabhiyuktastamāgamaṃ pratigrahādikaṃ likhitādibhiruddharet...

1. VIII.200.
2. II.27.
3. X.115.
4. VIII.198.
5. I.VII.13.
6. II.1210.
7. VII.15.
8. II.24.
9. See also above Commentry of Vijñāneśvara.
10. *āgamastu kṛto yena so'bhiyuktastamuddharet |* II.28.

III

The next and more ancient stage of the theory of property is *āgama* as a legal acquisition of belongings. There is an illustration of a use of the term *āgama* in this meaning in the *Arthaśāstra*.[1] The term *ādhipracchanna* is not to mean that the belongings are kept as a mortgage (though here we certainly meet with the mortgage ***gopya***, i. e. "intended for keeping") but it means that the belongings being kept at the same time are "hidden", "covered" from the interested persons, and nothing was known about them.

Considerable here is that the mortgagee answering the judge's question what is his *āgama*[2] testifies that the said belongings were kept by him, i. e. he possessed them. At last two conclusions can be drawn from it : first, the belongings are kept legally, and the holder is unanswerable before trail. Second, the term *āgama* implies a legal way of acquiring of belongings with no consideration of the fact if they were acquired as property or in possession. Commenting on the term *āgama* Asahāya in his commentary says—

athāgamaḥ /
anvayakrītamādhattaṃ labdhiprītyāpti[3] . . .//

Here again we see legal ways of acquisition of belongings, with no consideration of the fact if they were acquired as property or in possession.

Thus, this stage of the theory of evolution of property is distinguished from the later one. The theory of *āgama* deals with not mere legal acquiring of belogings, but legal acquiring of them as property. By so doing the idea of *āgama* did not include *ādhāna* any more, because the latter meant acquiring of belongings in a legal way, but acquiring in possession, not as property.

The fact that the stage of evolution of *āgama* "acquiring in legal way" precedes the stage "acquiring in a legal way as property" can be proved, because in the ***āgama-pramāṇa***-s system, which concludes the theory of property, possession is not considered as ***āgama***, the sense of which can be expressed in the formula ***'svatvahetu'***—"the basis of ***svatva*** (the right of property)"—see above, as it is not at the same time a ***pramāṇa*** constituting the *āgama*.

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1. *taccenniveditamāsādyeta, rūpābhigṛhītamāgamaṃ pṛcchet "kutaste labdham" iti / sa ced brūyāt "dāyādyādavāptaṃ, amuṣmāllabdhaṃ krītaṃ kāritaṃ ādhipracchannaṃ, ayamasya deśaḥ kālaścopasaṃprāpteḥ, ayamasyārghaḥ pramāṇaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ mūlyaṃ ca" iti, tasyāgamasamādhau mucyeta/ nāṣtikaścettadeva pratisandadhyāt, yasya pūrvo dīrghaśca paribhogaḥ śucirvā deśastasya dràvyamiti vidyāt /* IV.6.7-9.
2. *Yājñavalkya* II.28.
3. *Nārada*. I.144.

Possession-use could become *āgama* under specific conditions and in a long period. In the last case there was a double transformation : "use"-*pramāṇa* was becoming *āgama* and possession—use was turning into property. And characteristic of this stage of evolution was the fact that *ādhilekhya*—mortgage—being a *pramāṇa* i. e. legal authority, proving in court the mortgagor's and the mortgagee's rights, stated in it, was not *āgama*. In this respect *krayalekhya* and *dānalekhya*—purchase-deed and settlement on the one hand and the *ādhilekhya* on the other hand, were differenciated.

It seems logical to draw another conclusion, which is likely to be the only possible explanation of the following phenomena : why in the text of *Arthaśāstra*[1] and commentary of Asahāya on *Nārada*[2] the formulas of acquiring of belongings are synthetic : they include *kraya*—purchase, *pratigraha*—getting of gift, as well as *ādhāna*—pawn. The same answer, that they are aimed to show the legal ways of acquiring belongings will be reasonable but not complete. The real cause of this phenomena lays down in the facts that this formula is retrospective and was formulated at the period of Indian history and the evolution of the theory of property in which no difference was made between property and possession as well as between acquiring in possession and acquiring in property. Only one concept existed at that time and the carrier of this concept was one and single *āgama*—legal and illegal acquiring of a thing. This ancient concept is transferred in the *Arthaśāstra* on the ground of later ideas of *āgama* as legal acquiring of belongings as property, as the ways of acquiring in property and in possession are mentioned in the text.

Logically there arises a question : how this evolution of the theory of property can be traced in time ? We can suppose that it had been finally formulated by the middle of the Ist millennium B. C. In this aspect both *Yājñavalkya*[3] II.22 and *Vasiṣṭha-dharmasūtra*[4] (the same formula is fixed in *Nārada*[5] after Asahāya's version) despite certain antiquity of the second treatise in comparison with the first one, reflect the same tradition of the middle of the Ist millennium B. C. It indicated places in these *śastra-s* where a tripleterm *pramāṇa* is mentioned : document, witnesses and use ; the compilers of *Vasiṣṭha* and *Nārada* add, that the owner through this *pramāṇa* acquires belongings after acquiring them as property—

likhitaṃ sākṣiṇo bhuktiḥ pramāṇaṃ trividhaṃ smṛtam |
dhanasvikaraṇaṃ pūrvaṃ dhanī dhanamavāpnuyāditi ||

1. IV.6.7-9.
2. I.144.
3. II.22.
4. XVI.10.
5. I.65.

The development of the theory of property, parallelled to the development of relations of property, took place in the first part of the Ist millennium B. C. and it is quite impossible to make sharper time indications for particular stages of the evolution. We can only show the consequence of these stages.

IV

On the early stage of the theory of evolution of the property in Ancient India the belonging of a thing to a person was though indicated, there was no system of grounds for the rights of the person for the thing that belongs to him, there was no coreresponding law argumentation for it. The fact that we are using the sentence "theory of ***property***" does not mean that there was a constituted idea of "property" in this period or in the later stage of the evolution of *āgama*, that have been described above. The society, character of which is discovered on the basis of *Ṛgveda*, has more developed property relations when there was a system of grounds for "legal" acquiring of belongings. So, here we should speak of even earlier stage of social development, the stage of decomposition of primitive communal system which had means of main production as collective property.

It is obvious that this archaic *āgama* could not have been fixed in our sources as such, but the term *āgama* in its original meaning meets it in semantic roots : "acquiring", "appropriation" both of belongings or anything else. Though in the cases when the term *āgama* will be met below, the sentences ***arthāgama*** etc. does not and cannot mean that archaic *āgama*, are used in "uncontemporary" texts, reflecting for later social relations, they are based on the initial "appropriation"—*āgama*. We are speaking about the cases of the use of the term *āgama* of Manu—

na mitrakāraṇādrājā vipulādvā dhanāgamāt /
samutsṛjetsāhasikānsarvabhūtabhayāvahān[1] //

Rāmāyaṇa says—

āgamaścāpi kartavyo yathā doṣo na jāyate/[2]

Mahābhārata says—

tasmādarthāgamāḥ sarve lobhamohavivardhanāḥ/[3]

Or, we can see in *Manu*—

yatra varjayate rājā pāpakṛdbhyo dhanāgamam /
tatra kālena jāyante mānavā dīrghajīvinaḥ[4] //

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1. VIII.347.
2. I.17.8.
3. III.88.
4. IX.246.

The most widely spread conjunctions of the term *āgama* with the terms meaning belongings are *arthāgama, dhanāgama, vittāgama, dravyāgama*. Rarely the conjunction *draviṇāgama* can be met.

The *Manu* texts are worth mentioning[1]. The first of them reads—

nādharmeṇāgamaḥ kaścinmanuṣyānprati vartate ||

In the second one we read—

itareṣvāgamāddharmaḥ pādaśastvavaropitaḥ ||

Here the term *āgama* has the meaning of acquiring, mainly acquiring of belongings. Kullūka commenting on *Manu*[2] directly replaces the term *āgama* for *arjana*, i. e. acquiring... *āgamād dhanārjanāt*... In his commentary on *Manu*[3] acquiring-*āgama* is again spoken about ... *dhanavidyāderāgama*... It is likely that acquiring receipts-*āgama* is implied in the text of *Arthaśāstra*[4].

The sources prove that there was the use of the term *āgama* in other initial meanings close to "acquiring", "appropriation". The meanings are : "arrival", "intaking", "place of origin"—of the goods and other things. Manu says—

āgamam nirgamam sthānam tathā vṛddhikṣayāvubhau |
vicārya sarvapaṇyānām kārayetkrayavikrayau ||[5]

In the *Mahābhārata* *āgama* is also mentioned as arrival[6] (this phrase is very like *Manu*)[7]—

āgamam nirgamam sthānam (sarvapaṇyānām).

To complete the picture of use of the *āgama* with the same primary meanings but concerning immaterial subjects *Manu* lays down—

pratyakṣam cānumānam ca śāstram ca vividhāgamam |
trayam suviditam kāryam dharmaśuddhimabhipsatā[8] ||

To our mind quite correctly this text is translated by J. D. M. Derrett, following the Bhāruci's commentary[9]. Hence, here is said not about the *śāstra*-s "embracing different teachings" (as in the Russian translation of the treatise), but about the "accessability" "attainment", "acquiring" of the *śāstra*.

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1. I.81-82.
2. I.82.
3. I.81.
4. VII.12-30.
5. VIII.401.
6. III.8868.
7. VIII.401. See also *Arthaśāstra* I.20.23; II.30.1.
8. XII.105.
9. Cf. *Rāmāyaṇa* V.87.23.

Now we can show the consequence of the evolution of the idea of private property in Ancient India, as we see it in accordance with the studied texts, indicating its stages as A—B—C—D, beginning with the earliest and ending with the latest one.

A. *Āgama*—appropriation of belongings. There is no system of grounds of a person's right for the thing that belongs to him and corresponding legal basis.

B. *Āgama*—legal acquiring of belongings, Ideas of "legal" and "illegal" acquiring are differenciated. Ideas of "property" and "possession" are not differenciated.

C. *Āgama* is a term for private property, right of property appearing legally and most often as a result of transaction.

D. *Āgama* is universal system of grounds for the right of property, expressed in the system of triple-term *pramāṇa*-s—document, witnesses and use.

We have to close down with the observation of some features of the text of *dharmaśāstra*-s which make them differ from the ones of the *Arthaśāstra.* Juridical stuff in these treatises disposes in various parts of a monument; the parts are distinguished one from another by the chronology, contexts, terminology, showing textual and logical discrepancies, an interlacing of different ideas. Juridical stuff in the *Arthaśāstra* disposes in parts II-IV of the monument which are characterized by editorial and logical unification of the text, uniformity of the terminology and comparatively limited polysemantics of the terms as well. It leads to the inward harmony of the text of the *Arthaśāstra.* Besides, it gives us a possibillty to presume that the *Arthaśāstra* contains a chronologically homogeneous layer of juridical ideas.

The investigations of scholars made it possible to presume an incorporation of juridical stuff connected with the theme of *rājadharma* (duties of a king) and a practice of a state's life from *arthaśāstra*-s to *dharmaśāstra*-s. So, the Yājñavalkya's considerable juridical stuff was borrowed by its author from the *Arthaśāstra.* An integration of the stuff of both the different literature-genres in *dharmaśāstra*-s can possibly explain at last some features of their text and their composition and structure as well, in particular a polysemantics of the juridical terminology.

From our point of view the early *dharmaśāstra*-s of Manu and Yājñavalkya are characterized by a polysemantics to a greater extent than the late ones. We can explain that by incorporating juridical stuff from *arthaśāstra*-s just to the early *dharmaśāstra*-s. So, the collision of both the genres and an integration of juridical stuff have led to certain "indignations" in a text. They can explain an introduction of a con-

crete untraditional juridical stuff, i. e. not combined in traditional *vyāvahārikārtha*—civil actions. Secondly, the main process of a constitution of the genre itself (*cāturvarṇya*'s duties instead of *āśrama*'s duties), drawing up of the principles of the composition and structure in the early *dharmaśāstra*-s takes place. From juridical viewpoint they are less systematic than the late ones and, thanks to that and to incorporation of untraditional juridical stuff, can be nearer to a reality.

SECTION IV

Literature

THE MEANING OF NĀṬYA ACCORDING TO BHARATA : A NOTE ON BHĀVĀNUKĪRTANAM*

Pratap Bandyopadhyaya

In the first chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* it has been described how the demons created obstructions to the first theatrical performance which depicted the annihilation of the *daitya*-s and *dānava*-s by the gods. The demons thought that the dramatic art created by Brahmā had been meant for the gods only and that the demons had been utterly despised in it. There had been a great deal of misunderstanding on the part of the demons about the real nature of the drama which Brahmā tried to explain to them. In the following verse occurring in this context, the universal appeal of the drama has been revealed :

naikāntato' tra bhavatāṁ devānāṁ cānubhāvanam /
trailokyasyāsya sarvasya nāṭyaṁ bhāvānukīrtanam //[1]

'In it (i. e., the *nāṭya*) there is no exclusive consideration of you or of the gods; the drama is the revelation of the states of all the three worlds'. While commenting on the verse, Abhinavagupta takes the word *anukīrtana* in the sense of *anuvyavasāya*[2] or 'mental

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*The content of this paper, now revised with additional information, was originally presented in the Annual Meeting of the American Oriental Society at New York in 1969.

1. *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharatamuni with the Commentary *Abhinavabhāratī* by Abhinavaguptācārya, Vol. I edited by M. Ramakrishna Kavi, Second Revised Edition by K. S. Ramaswami Sastri, Śiromaṇi, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXXVI, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1956: I.107.

2. The word *anuvyavasāya* in the Nyāya philosophy means 'one's consciousness of the perception' This has got nothing to do with the present context. In the Vedānta philosophy, *anuvyavasāya* means 'the perception of a sentiment or judgement', i.e., the mental perception of something of which preception with ordinary sense-organs is not possible. It seems that Abhinavagupta has used the word in a similar sense. Raniero Gnoli (*The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta,* Second Edition, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. LXII, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1968: pp. 93-101) renders the word as're-perception', obviously, because this happens after the perception of the actors who lose their identity as such.

perception' and not *anukaraṇa* or 'imitation'. According to him, imitation, like the senses of similarity (*sādṛśya*), illusion (*bhrānti*), superimposition (*āropa*), identity (*adhyavasāya*), fancy (*utprekṣā*), image (*pratikṛti*), sudden magic creation (*tātkālikanirmāṇendrajāla*) and appearance caused by tricks (*yuktiviracitatadābhāsa*), makes the spectator indifferent (*udāsīna*), because in none of these cases the object is generalized, and as such aesthetic relish becomes impossible in these cases. If the subject-matter be specific (as in the case of similarity, etc.), literary production is not possible and the author will not be able to avoid the fault of impropriety; the spectator will have only the worldly feelings of delight, anger, etc. as at the sight of a couple of lovers in the ordinary world. Hence the drama is not imitation. Bharata says that out of the imitation of other's actions laughter arises.[1] On this ground Abhinavagupta thinks that imitation can produce laughter, not real drama. The gist of his further argument is this : One might say that the drama may not be the imitation of specific things, but what is the harm if it be the imitation of a universal thing common to the three worlds (*aniyatānukāra*) ? This is simply impossible. Only a specific thing can be imitated. But the imitation of Rāma, etc. is not posssible (as they no longer exist). Again, inner feelings like grief (*śoka*), anger (*krodha*), etc. cannot be imitated. How can the actor give expression to Rāma's feelings which do not belong to the former ? If they try to do so, it is anything but imitation. It is the external manifestations (*anubhāva*-s) of these feelings that can be reproduced. Even then, exactly those *anubhāva*-s belonging to historic characters like Rāma cannot be the subject of reproduction. (How can the actor know what external manifestation actually belonged to Rāma who is no longer present there ?) At best some *anubhāva*-s of a common category (*sajātīya*) can be presented. This is why Abhinavagupta does not approve 'imitation' to be the meaning of *anukīrtana* in the expression *bhāvānukīrtanam*.[2]

It is noteworthy that in many places in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* Bharata himself calls the drama *anukaraṇa* ('imitation'). Thus, in the very first chapter he says : *lokavṛttānukaraṇaṁ nāṭyam etanmayā kṛtam* ('this drama I have devised as the imitation of the conduct of people')[3]; *saptadvīpānukaraṇaṁ nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati* ('this drama will be an imitation

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1. *paraceṣṭānukaraṇāddhāsoḥ samupajāyate*/ *Nāṭyaśāstra* VII.10. A-B, quoted by Abhinavagupta under discussion (p. 36).
2. The argument offered here has been partly repeated in the sixth chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī* where Abhinavagupta refutes Śaṅkuka's theory of *anukaraṇa* as the correct interpretation of Bharata's *rasasūtra* (see *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol I, GOS edn., pp. 274-76).
3. I.112.C-D. Manomohan Ghosh (The *Nāṭyaśāstra* attributed to Bharatamuni, Vol. I, Completely translated for the first time from the original Sanskrit with an Introduction, Various Notes and Index, Revised Second Edition, Manisha Granthalaya Private Ltd . Calcutta, 1967) translates *anukaraṇa* as 'mimicry'.

of the (world with its) seven divisions').[1] The first dramatic performance presented by the sons of Bharata has been clearly called an imitation of the incident where the demons were defeated by the gods.[2] It is hardly possible that such a common word like ***anukaraṇa*** or ***anukṛti*** occurring in the text of Bharata would mean something other than imitation. Evidently, Bharata understands imitation as the basic thing meant by the dramatic art. Actors (*naṭa*) imitate the actions of the characters depicted in the drama (cf. the terms ***anukartṛ*** and ***anukārya*** for the actor and the character respectively). One cannot argue that it is not possible to imitate the actions of a person who is not physically present. Even when a person is absent physically, he can appear before one's 'inward eye' and be an object of imitation. Under ***Daśarūpaka***, IV. 2, Dhanika clearly says that the ***vibhāva***-s do not require any external appearance, but may flash in the mind of the connoisseur even by their mere mention in words.[3] Abhinavagupta's explanation seems to be based on the apparent impossibility of connecting ***anukīrtana*** with ***bhāva*** in the expression ***bhāvānukīrtanam***. If we take ***anukīrtana*** in the sense of ***anukaraṇa***, ***bhāvānukīrtanam***, a case of ***ṣaṣṭhisamāsa*** (***bhāvānām anukīrtanam***), would mean 'imitation of states or inner feelings (like grief, etc.).' But these abstract feelings cannot be the object of imitation. Hence ***anukīrtana*** should mean just 'representation' or, from the spectator's point of view, 'mental perception'. It is true that feelings or states of the mind cannot be imitated directly, but this is possible indirectly. The imitation of ***bhāva***-s means the revelation of ***bhāva***-s through the imitation of actions. Dhanañjaya also defines the drama as ***avasthānukṛtir nāṭyam*** ('the drama is the imitation of states').[4] It is not correct to think that according to Bharata only laughter arises out of imitation. The text quoted by Abhinavagupta from Chapter VII of the ***Nāṭyaśāstra*** does not represent the view of Bharata, but is a citation from some other source in support of a view of Bharata. The full implication

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1. I.117.C-D.
2. *tadante'nukṛtir baddhā yathā daityāḥ surair jitāḥ//* I.57.C-D.
3. *amīṣāṁ cānapekṣitabāhyasattvānāṁ śabdopadhānād evāsāditatadbhāvānāṁ sāmānyātmanāṁ svasvasambandhitvena vibhāvitānāṁ sākṣād bhāvakacetasi viparivartamānānām ālambanādibhāva iti na vastuśūnyatā/ tad uktaṁ bhartṛhariṇā—śabdopahitarūpāṁs tān buddher viṣayatāṁ gatān/*
   pratyakṣam iva kaṁsādīn sādhanatvena manyate//
   iti (*Vākyapadīya* III, *Sādhanasmuddeśa* 5)—*Daśarūpaka* of Dhanañjaya with the Commentary *Avaloka* by Dhanika and the Sub-commentary *Laghuṭīkā* by Bhaṭṭanṛsiṁha edited T. Venkatacharya, The Adyar Library Series, No. 99, Adyar, Madras, 1966: pp. 168-69. [I am indebted to my teacher Professor T. Venkatacharya Śiromaṇi of the University of Toronto who drew my attention to the comments of Dhanika and removed much of my difficulties in understanding the implication of the text of *Abhinavabhāratī*].
4. *Daśarūpaka*, I.7.A. Similarly, Viśvanātha Kavirāja also defines *abhinaya* ('acting') as *bhaved abhinayo'vasthānukāraḥ—Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Chapter VI (5th Edition by Haridasa Siddhantavagisha Bhattacharyya, Calcutta, 1875 Śaka era: p. 287).

of the citation will not be clear unless we can see the source. Bharata's own view is expressed in the preceding lines where *paraceṣṭānukaraṇa* is mentioned along with some other factors, viz., jugglery, irrelevant talk, fault-finding, foolishness, etc., out of which *hāsa* or laughter arises. Here *paraceṣṭānukaraṇa* does not appear to mean mere 'imitation of others' actions', but 'mocking at others', which actually gives rise to laughter. Even if this means simply the imitation of others' actions, the implication is probably that it gives rise to laughter under certain circumstances as in the case of other factors referred to above. It would be interesting to see the commentary of Abhinavagupta on this portion of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, but, unfortunately, the same is missing.

Aristotle, who deals with the tragedy, comedy and epic as different varieties of the poetic composition, speaks of *mimesis* or 'imitation' as the common principle of the art of poetry. He says : "The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must of necessity imitate one of three objects—things as they were or are, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be."[1] In the epic the poet imitates through narration, in the tragedy through action. This action consists in the performance of the actor on the stage. The difference between the tragedy and the comedy, according to Aristotle, is that, the former imitates the higher type of character, whereas the latter imitaies the lower type. These two varieties conform to what we call the drama.[2] Following the treatment of Aristotle we may say that the drama is the imitation of men through actions. Aristotle has explained how imitation, as the basic principle of the dramatic art, can give us pleasure : "The instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated. We have evidence of this in the facts of experience. Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity : such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies. The cause of this again is, that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to philosophers but to men in general; whose capacity,

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1. *Poetica*, translated by S. H. Butcher, XXV.1 (*Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* with a Critical Text and Translation of the *Poetics* with a prefatory Essay 'Aristotelian Literary Criticism' by John Gassner, Fourth Edition, Dover Publications, Inc., printed in the U. S. A., C 1951) : p. 97. Butcher (Ch. II, p. 121) informs us that imitation as the common characteristic of the fine arts was not originated by Aristotle and that in this application the phrase first occurs in Plato though it may have been already current in popular speech as maiking the antithesis between fine art and individual production. The term *anukaraṇa* may have been likewise current in popular speech bearing the same implication, but it is not known whether Bharata was the first person to use it in the context of the dramatic art.
2. *Op. cit.*, I, II & III.

however, of learning is more limited. Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, 'Ah, that is he'."[1]

It must, however, be noted that though Bharata calls the drama imitation, he emphatically says that no dramatic presentation is possible without the development of *rasa* or aesthetic relish : *na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate.*[2] As to what *rasa* is ,he says : *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ*. This *rasasūtra* of Bharata was variously interpreted by his commentators. According to Śaṅkuka, the *rasa* of the drama is the imitation of the permanent sentiment of Rāma or the like (i. e., the character) by the actor who communicates the same to the spectator through the process of inference on the part of the latter.[3] We know how this theory was refuted by Abhinavagupta after his preceptor Bhaṭṭatauta.[4] Now a question naturally arises : If we admit imitation to be the basic principle of the dramatic art, are we to accept Śaṅkuka's theory as the correct interpretation of Bharata's *rasasūtra* ? The truth remains that though the drama basically means imitation, that is not the last word of the art. By means of the imitation of actions the actor brings to light the sentiment of the character and thereby reveals the same lying dormant in the heart of the *sahṛdaya* spectator. This revelation of the spectator's sentiment, which is generalized by the dramatic performance, has been elaborately explained by Abhinavagupta as the correct meaning of what Bharata calls *rasaniṣpatti.*[5] In other words, even if we admit 'the imitation of states' as the meaning of the expression *bhāvānukīrtanam* occurring in the text of Bharata, it is still possible and desirable to interpret the *rasaniṣpatti* of Bharata as the revelation of sentiment as done by Abhinavagupta.

Abhinavagupta's philosophical interpretation of *bhāvānukīrtanam* appears to be an attempt at placing the art of drama at a higher level than that of the ordinary mode of imitation in order to bring it to the same line with the unique theory of *dhvani* propounded by Ānandavardhana and later on developed by Abhinavagupta himself into his theory of

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1. *Op. cit.*, IV, 2-5 (p. 15).
2. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Ch. VI, GOS edn., Vol. I, p. 272. Also a little later Bharata says :
bhāvābhinayasambaddhān sthāyibhāvāṁs tathā budhāḥ |
āsvādayanti manasā tasmān nāṭyarasāḥ smṛtāḥ || (VI.33)
On this Abhinavagupta comments : *nāṭyāt samudāyarūpād rasāḥ | yadi vā nāṭyam eva rasāḥ | rasasamudāyo hi nāṭyam |* (Op. cit , p. 290).
3. *Op. cit.*, pp. 272-73.
4. *Op. cit* , pp. 274-76.
5. *Op. cit.*, pp. 278-87.

rasa, the *dhvani* or suggestion *par excellence.*[1] Lest one should think that in the drama merely others' actions are imitated and thereby misses the intrinsic spirit of the aesthetic taste, Abhinavagupta strikes at the very root of the theory of imitation and lays stress on the extraordinary type of consciousness on the part of the connoisseur. He does not actually challenge Bharata by saying that the drama is not imitation. This seems to be more logical when we consider Abhinavagupta's remarks at the end of his comments on the verse under discussion :

yadi tvevaṁ mukhyalaukikakaraṇānusāritayā' nukaraṇam ityucyate tan na kaścid doṣaḥ|

('If, however, one says that it is imitation in the sense that it follows the actual worldly actions, there is nothing wrong.)'[2]

Even in the text of Aristotle, imitation does not mean a mere mechanical imitation of actions. Had it been so, he could not have said, "It is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen—what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity.... Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and higher thing than history : for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular."[3] S. H. Butcher rightly comments : "The first distinguishing mark, then, of poetry is that it has a higher subject-matter than history; it expresses the universal not the particular, the permanent possibilities of human nature."[4] This would remind us of the concept of universalization (*sādhāraṇīkṛti*) in the *rasa* theory which places the poetic art at a higher level than that of mere imitation. What is true of poetry in general is also true of the drama in particular.[5]

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1. Suggestion offered by my teacher Professor Dr. Anthony Kennedy Warder of the University of Toronto.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 37.
3. *Poetica*, IX.1-3 (p. 35).
4. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, Ch. III, p. 161.
5. It is interesting to note here what Tagore says while pointing out the distinction between mental creation and literary creation : The mind gathers images from nature and literature gathers the same from the mind Creative faculty is highly required in order to bring about an elated external manifestation of the treasure of mind. This process of reflection from nature to the mind and from the mind to the literary art is far above imitation.

   —'Sāhityer Vicāraka', *Sāhitya, Rabindra Racanāvalī*, Birth Centenary Edition, Thirteenth Volume—Essays, Government of West Bengal, Calcutta, 25 Vaiśakh, 1368 (Beng.) : p. 746.

SANSKRIT SUBHĀṢITAS QUOTED IN CLASSICAL SIṀHALA LITERATURE

Heinz Bechert

1. Sanskrit is the major language in which the *subhāṣita* literature of Indian origin has spread over the countries of South and Southeast Asia. In his fundamental works on this gnomic literature of India and "Greater India", Prof. Sternbach has dealt with almost every aspect of the wide field of the tradition of Sanskrit *subhāṣita*-s in these countries including Sri Lanka (Ceylon)—"On the Sanskrit Nīti Literature of Ceylon"[1] and "Sur la litterature didactique et gnomique laïque d' origine sanscrite a' Ceylon".[2] A number of stanzas belonging to the *Cāṇakyaniti Text Tradition* and found in "*Greater India*" is collected in Annex I of L. Sternbach, "*The Spreading of Cāṇakya's Aphorisms over Greater India*" (Calcutta 1969), pp. 71-118. In the present paper, I propose to add a few additional details on the history of the Sanskrit *subhāṣita* literature in Ceylon.

2. Sri Lanka occupies a particular place in South Asian culture in so far as the use of Sanskrit and Pāli is concerned. Whereas Sanskrit has retained its function as the language of the sacred texts as well as of scientific and literary writing in Hindu tradition, a particular kind of trilingualism has developed in the culture of the Buddhist Siṁhala people in Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Here, Pāli was used as the sacred language of the religious tradition, i. e. of Buddhism, whereas Sanskrit served other functions. It was the language of higher secular education and the language for the cult of the *deva*-s and related purposes of the non-Buddhistic practices of the so-called "popular religion".[3]

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1. *Brahmavidyā*, Adyar Library Bulletin, vols. 31-32, 1967-68, pp. 636 and vol. 35, 1971, pp. 258-269.
2. *Journal Asiatique*, vol. 260, 1972, pp. 79-87.
3. For more details, see H. Bechert, "On the Popular Religion of the Sinhalese", *Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries*, ed. H. Bechert, Goettingen 1978, pp. 217-233.

Siṁhala, however, can be used for any of these purposes. This situation is quite different from the linguistic situation in the Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos). Here, the use of Sanskrit was neglected and Pāli was adopted for higher education not only in the religious sphere, but also in the secular field.

3. It is in this context of the particular function of different languages in one and the same cultural complex that the different ways of tradition of the *subhāṣita* or *nīti* literature in these countries may be explained. In Burma and in Thailand, the gnomic verses have been translated partly into Pāli and partly into the national languages. The Pāli *nīti* works of Burma (*Dhammanīti*, *Lokanīti*, *Mahārahanīti* and *Rājanīti*) will be published in the near future in a volume of the series af the Pāli Text Society in London. These works are also known as part of the Pāli literature of Thailand.

4. In Sri Lanka, however, collections of *nīti* verses in Sanskrit have been used for educational purposes in the monastic schools of the pre-colonial age.[1] The main texts of this tradition are *Vyāsakāra* and *Pratyayaśataka*.[2] As a result of the vicissitudes of the history of the island of Ceylon, the number of Sanskrit works that have survived the decay of Siṁhala culture during the colonial occupation of major parts of the island is not very large. Therefore, a study of the Sanskrit literature as known in ancient and mediaeval Ceylon cannot be based on a survey of the Sanskrit works preserved in Siṁhala tradition only, but it must be based to a great extent on an evaluation of the influence of Sanskrit on the literature in Siṁhala language.

5. For tracing the influence of Sanskrit on Siṁhala authors, an evaluation of the quotations is, of course, of particular importance. The present author has collected the Sanskrit quotations from the classical Siṁhala works, i. e. from works composed before the end of the Kandyan kingdom in 1815. In classical Siṁhala prose literature, it was customary not to translate verse quotations from Pāli and Sanskrit literature, but to include such stanzas in their original language. On the other hand, Siṁhala authors, with very few exceptions, never quoted Siṁhala or Tamil stanzas in Siṁhaḷa prose literature so that all verse quotations in classical Siṁhala texts are either Pāli or Sanskrit verses. Siṁhala verse literature ("*kavi*"), however, was written in pure Siṁhala language without the extensive use of Sanskrit words which is so characteristic of Siṁhala prose works. Under these conditions, we can make use of the direct Pāli and Sanskrit quotations as a reliable guide to determine the source material used by the authors of prose works, but not for a study of the sources of Siṁhala poetic works.

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1. For details, see H. Bechert, "Uber Sanskrit-Bildung und Schulsystem in Burma und Ceylon" *Wiener Zeitschrift fuer die Kunde Sued-und Ostasiens*, vol. 7, 1963, pp. 1-12.
2. See also L. Sternbach's contributions quoted above, § 1.

6. There are a few poetic collections of *subhāṣita*-s in Siṁhala language, and the most famous of these is Alagiyavanna's *Subhāṣitaya*, a work of the 16th century. In the present contribution, I do not, however, propose to deal with *subhāṣita*-s in Siṁhala language, but only with the *subhāṣita*-s quoted in works of the classical Siṁhala prose literature in their original Sanskrit form. Most of these stanzas are introduced by one of the usual Siṁhalese formulas denoting quotations (e. g. *eyin kīha* "therefore they say"). From my list below, § 9, I have excluded such stanzas which are directly borrowed from one of the classical Sanskrit *kāvya*-s or from works like Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa*. I have included stanzas which belong to the stream of Sanskrit *subhāṣita*-s as represented in the *subhāṣita* collections and *subhāṣita*-s which are quoted in the *kathā* literature (*Pañcatantra, Hitopadeśa* etc.). The Siṁhala texts which were evaluated in my list comprise the prose literature composed before 1815 and the *Kāvyasaṅgrahaya.* The latter work was compiled more recently, but only from older traditional material, and it includes a few Sanskrit stanzas besides a large number of Siṁhala verses.

7. In the list below, § 9, I reproduce the *pratika*-s of the stanzas as found in the passage of the particular Siṁhala work referred to; evident textual errors are corrected, but textual variants were not changed. The *pratika* is followed by the reference to the passage in the Siṁhala work. Finally, the places in Sanskrit literature and in the collections of Sanskrit *subhāṣita*-s are listed, where the particular stanza can be traced. I have, however, not reproduced the large number of parallels which were collected by L. Sternbach in his works, particularly in "*Mahāsubhāṣitasaṃgraha*", "*Cāṇakya-Nīti-Text-Tradition*" and "*The Kāvya Portions in the Kathā-Literature*", because it seemed sufficient to refer readers to these works.

8. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN MY LIST :

(a) SIṀHALA TEXTS

(abbreviations mostly adopted from "*A Dictionary of the Siṁhalese Language*, begun by the Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch...", vol. I, part 7, pp. XIV ff,) :

BōvGp=(*Bōdhivaṃsa-Gäṭapadaya* or) *Mahābodhivaṃsa-Granthipada-Vivaraṇaya*, ed. Śrī Sumaṅgala, Colombo 1910.

Dhmpdp=*Dharmapradīpikāva hevat Mahābodhivaṃśa Parikathāva* of Guruḷugōmī, ed. Śrī Dharmārāma, 6th ed., Kelaniya 1951.

Dūt=*Dūtajātaka-Vyākhyānaya* of Ripusiṃha Vīramāpā, ed. Robert Baṭuvantuḍāvē, (Colombo) 1930.

JAGp=*Jātaka-Aṭuvā Gäṭapadaya*, Part I, ed. D. B. Jayatilaka, Colombo 1943.

JanV=*Jātibhedalakṣaṇaya hevat Janavaṃśaya* of Buddharakṣita, ed. V. Vijayasiri, Colombo 1957.

Juṇh=*Juṇhajātaka-Padārthavarṇanāva*, ed. R. Śāsanālaṅkāra, (Colombo) 1912.

KSg=*Kāvyasaṃgrahava hevat Kav-Saṅgarāva*, publ. by Ratnākara Press, Colombo 1947.

Pjv=*Pūjāvaliya* of Mayūrapāda Buddhaputra, ed. B. Śraddhātiṣya, Panadura 1930.

RjRk=*Rājaratnākaraya* of Vilgampāyē Mahathera, ed. P. N. Tisērā, (Colombo) 1929.

SasSn=*Sasadāvata* with ancient *sannaya*, ed. A. Dhammapāla, 2nd ed., Välitara 1925.

SiṃhBo=*Siṃhala-Bodhivaṃśaya* of Vilgammula Saṅgharāja, ed. V. Amaramoli, Colombo 1951.

SṅghC=*Saṃgharāja-Sādhucariyāva* of Ayittāliyädde Muhamdiramrāḷa, ed. H. Piyānanda, Colombo 1954.

Subdh=*Subodhālaṅkāra-Sannaya* in *Subodhālaṅkāra* of Saṅgharakkhita with ancient *sannaya* ed. U. Dhammarakkhita Tissa, Randombe 1910.

VīdgAtt=*Eḷu-Attanagaluvaṃśaya* of Vīdāgama Maitreya, ed. A. W. Kaluāracci, Colombo s. d.

VīdgAtt(S)=*Eḷu-Attanagaluvaṃśaya* of Vīdāgama Maitreya, ed. S. H. N. Silva, Matara 1953.

VismSn=*Viśuddhimārga-Mahāsanyaya*, ed. B. Śraddhātiṣya, 4 parts, Kalutara 1949-1955.

Vmkt=*Skandhādīngē Vibhāgaya* .. *Vimuktisaṅgrahava*, ed. H. Sīlaratana, 2nd ed., Colombo 1954.

(b) SANSKRIT AND PĀLI WORKS AND COLLECTIONS OF SUBHĀSITAS

AK=*Amarakośa* of Amarasiṃha with *Amarapadavivṛti* of Liṅgayasūrin and *Amarapadapārijāta* of Mallinātha, ed. A. A. Ramanathan, Part I, Madras 1971.

BhP=*Bhojaprabandha* of Ballāladeva, Madras 1944.

BhŚ=*Śatakatrayādi-Subhāṣitasaṃgraha* of Bhartṛhari, ed. D. D, Kosambi, Bombay 1948.

Bodhic=*Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva, ed. V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1960.

CGI=L. Sternbach, *The Spreading of Cāṇakya's Aphorisms over "Greater India"*, Calcutta 1969, Annex I, pp. 71-118.

Cr=L. Sternbach, *Cāṇakya-Nīti-Text-Tradition*, vol. II, part 1-2, Hoshiarpur 1967-1968.

Dhn=*Dhammanīti*; in *PNTB*.

H(Sternb)=*Hitopadeśa*; quoted from *KPKL*, vol. II.

IS=O. Böhtlingk, *Indische Sprüche*, 2nd ed., 3 vols., St. Petersburg 1870-1873.

KāD=*Kāvyādarśa* of Daṇḍin, ed. S. K. Belvalkar, Poona 1924.

Kāvyān=*Kāvyānuśāsana* of Hemacandra, 2nd ed., Bombay 1934 (*Kāvyamālā* 70).

KN=*Kāmandakiyanitisāra*, Bombay 1952.

KPKL=L. Sternbach, *The Kāvya-Portians in the Kathā-Literature*, 3 vols,, Delhi 1971-1976.

Ln=*Lokaniti* (*pāli*) ; in *PNTB*.

Manu=*Manusmṛti*, 10th ed., Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay 1946.

Mhn=*Mahārhaniti*; in *PNTB*.

Mil=*Milindapañha*, ed. V. Trenckner, London 1880.

MK(Sternb)=*Mādhavānalakāmakandalākathā* ; quoted from *KPKL*, vol. 3.

MSS=*Mahā-Subhāṣita-Saṃgraha* by L. Sternbach, vols. I-III, Hoshiarpur 1974-1977.

P(Sternb)=*Pañcatantra* ; quoted from *KPKL*, vol. 1.

PNTB=H. Bechert and H. Braun, *The Pāli Nīti Texts of Burma*, London (in the press).

Prś=*Pratyayaśataka*, to be edited by H. Bechert in Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Goettingen 1980 (in the press).

Rat=*Ratnāvali* of Śrī Harṣa, ed. C. Sankara Rama Sastri, Madras 1935.

Rn=*Rājaniti* (*pāli*) ; in *PNTB*.

Sama=*Samayocitapadyamālikā* by Gaṅgādhara Kṛṣṇa Draviḍa, Bombay 1957.

ŚP=*The Paddhati of Śārṅgadhara*, ed. P. Peterson, Bombay 1888.

Śṛṅg=*Śṛṅgāratilaka* ascribed to Kālidāsa as edited in : *Kālidāsa, The Seasons etc.* by L. C. van Geyzel and H. Peiris, Colombo 1961, pp. 152-182.

VC (Sternb)=*Vikramacarita* ; quoted from *KPKL*, vol. 2.

Vet (Sternb)=*Vetālapañcaviṃśatikā* ; quoted from *KPKL*, vol. 3.

Vyās=*Vyāsasubhāṣitasaṃgraha*, ed. L. Sternbach, Varanasi 1969.

Vyās(C)=*Vyāsakāra*; in H. Bechert, *Sanskrittexte aus Ceylon*, vol. I, München 1962, pp. 29-40.

9. ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THE STANZAS :

1. *aṇimā laghimā prāptiḥ*... *Vmkt* 62. Cf. *Vet* (Sternb) 31 (stanza 15), *ŚP* 4542, *MSS* 481, *Amarapadapārijāta* ad *AK* 1.1.36 (edition, p. 27; also in other commentaries of *AK*).

2. *atyalpam api sādhūnāṃ*. . *Juṇh* 31 (only first two *pāda*-s quoted ; printed as prose). *Vyās* (*C*) 13, *Vyās* 17 ; cf. with vv.ll. *Cr* 385, *IS* 75:4.

3. *anekasaṃśayocchedi*... *KSg* 152. *H* (Sternb) 76, *Cr* 1152, *MSS* 1547, *IS* 332.

4. *alaṃkārapriyo Viṣṇur*. . *JanV* 8 (stanza 28). *MSS* 3085, *Sama* 36 (N 1).

5. *asthivad dadhivac caiva*...*KSg* 13 (attributed to Kālidāsa). *MSS* 3890, *Sama* 6? (Ś 7).

6. *ācchidya priyataḥ kadambakusumaṃ yasyāridārair navam*...*SasSn* 25. *Kāvyān* 10 etc., *MSS* 4468.

7. *ādau rūpavināśinī kṛśakarī kāmasya vidhvaṃsinī*... *JanV* 55 (stanza 136). *Prś* 94; with vv. ll. *MK* (Sternb) 177 (stanza 242), *MSS* 4769.

8. *āyuktakebhyaś corebhyaḥ*...*Dūt* 10. *KN* 5.82, *MSS* 5138, *IS* 994.

9. *āvartaḥ saṃśritānām avinayabhavanam pattanaṃ sāhasānām*...*Dhmpdp* 154 (stanza 199). *Prś* 95, *P* (Sternb) 114, *Vet* (Sternb) 81 and 97, *VC* (Sternb) 271, *BhŚ* 94, *MSS* 5371, *IS* 1038.

10. *indur lipta ivāñjanena jaḍitā dṛṣṭir mṛgiṇām iva*...*SasSn* 12 (quoted from *Bālarāmāyaṇa*). *MSS* 6004 (from *Bālarāmāyaṇa*).

11. *uttānocchūnamaṇḍūka*—...*Dhmpdp* 153 (stanza 197). *ŚP* 4144.

12. *kiyato mārayiṣyāmi*...*Dhmpdp* 172 (stanza 256). *Prś* 79, *Bodhic* 5.12.

13. *gajaturagasahasraṃ gokulaṃ bhūmidānaṃ* ... *JanV* 55 (stanza 137). *Prś* 95; with vv. ll. *IS* 2059.

14. *jambūphalāni pakvāni*...*KSg* 8 (attributed to Kālidāsa. *BhPr* 295.

15. *jhaṭiti praviśa gehaṃ mā bahis tiṣṭha kānte*...*KSg* 6 (attributed to Kālidāsa). *Śṛṅg* 6, *MK* (Sternb) 165 (stanza 169), *IS* 2468.

16. *tāmbūlaṃ kaṭutiktamiśramadhuraṃ kṣāraṃ kaṣāyānvitaṃ* . *KSg* 1263. *H* (Sternb) 193, *Vet* (Sternb) 35 (stanza 16), *Cr* 416, *IS* 2536; for more information see Sternbach's notes on *Cr* 416.

17. *dvipād anyasmād api* ..*Dhmpdp* 300 (stanza 369). *Rat* 6, *ŚP* 441, *IS* 3026.

18. *dhanurvedo hastiśikṣā* .. *JAGp* I 72, *RjRk* 37. For this list of the 18 *śilpa*-s see below no. 31.

19. *paripatati payonidhau pataṅgaḥ* ..*KSg* 11. *BhPr* 161, *ŚP* 3588.

20. *pibanti nadyaḥ svayam eva nāmbhaḥ* ..*BovGp* 14. *IS* 4082; cf. *Dhn* 142, *Ln* 64, *Mhn* 31; for more information see note on *Dhn* 142 in *PNTB*.

21. *punnāmno narakād yasmāt*...*VismSn* (II) 757. *Manu*. 9.138, *IS* 4127; also in *Mahābhārata* (crit. ed.) 1.68.38 etc.

22. *mallikāmālabhāriṇyah*...*SasSn* 63. *KāD* 2.215, *ŚP* 3642.

23. *Māndhātā ca mahīpatiḥ kṛtayuge 'laṅkārabhūto gataḥ* ..*KSg* 12. *Vet*(Sternb) 71 (stanza 10), *BhPr* 38, *Cr* 1789, *ŚP* 4002, *IS* 4831.

24. *yauvanaṃ dhanasampattiḥ* (v. l.) *dravyasampattiḥ*)...*VidgAtt* 7, *VidgAtt* (S) 8 (here v. l). *H*(Sternb) 76, *IS* 5683.

25. *rājan kanakadhārābhis*...*VidgAtt* 29, *VidgAtt* (S) 27. *BhPr* 314.

26. *rājābhiṣeke madavihvalāyā*...*KSg* 9 (attributed to Kālidāsa). *BhPr* 317.

27. *vidvān eva vijānāti* (v. l. *vidvajjano vijānāti*) ... *BovGp* 43, *SiṃhBo* 40, *SṅghC* 8. *BhŚ* 746, *Cr* 940, *IS* 6114.

28. *vyasanina iva vidyā kṣīyate paṅkajaśrīr* ... *KSg* 5 (attributed to Kālidāsa). *BhPr* 77.

29. *śastraprahāraṇaṃ datvā*... *Subdh* 158. *KāD* 2.356, *IS* 6436.

30. *śṛṅgāravīrabībhatsa*— ... *BovGp* 37, *SiṃhBo* 34. Cf. *ŚP* 3073.

31. *śrutiḥ smṛtir vyākaraṇam*...*JAGp* I. 72, *RjRk* 37 (in both texts followed by the stanza above, no, 18). *Dhn* 14, *Ln* 10, *Mil* 3; for details see note on *Dhn* 15 in *PNTB*.

32. *sujano na yāti vairam*...*Dhmpdp* 172 (stanza 254). *BhŚ* 801, *Cr* 2068, *ŚP* 237, *IS* 7099, *CGI* 236.

33. *sulaṃ patantaṃ prasamīkṣya pāvake* ... *KSg* 7 (attributed to Kālidāsa). *BhP* 292.

34. *svāmy amātyaś ca rāṣṭrañ ca* ... *Pjv* 749, *SasSn* 56. On this well-known stanza, cf. L. Sternbach, "On the influence of Sanskrit Dharma—and Artha-śāstras upon the Nīti-Literature of Burma", *Charu Deva Shastri Felicitation Volume*, Delhi 1974, p. 617 f. Cf. *Manu.* 9.294, *ŚP* 1407, *KN* 1.18, 4.1 and 8.4, *H*(Sternb) 199 (with further references), *Rn* 26, *Amarapadapārijāta* ad *AK* 2.8.18 (edition, p. 494).

10. These 34 stanzas represent only 6 per cent of the total number of verse quotation in Sanskrit which I have collected from classical Siṁhala literature. Of the 47 Siṁhala texts evaluated for this purpose, only 17 works contain Sanskrit *subhāṣita*-s, and seven of them yield one *subhāṣita* quotation only (*Dūt*, *Juṇh*, *Pjv*, *SṅghC*, *Subdh*, *VismSn*, *Vmkt*). The *Dharmapradīpikāva*, a work of the 12th century, has five *subhāṣita*-s, and the *Janavaṃśaya*, a 15th century text, contains three such citations. The *Attanagaluvaṃśaya* of Vīdāgama Maitreya with two such quotations dates from the 15th century, while the date of the ancient *sannaya* of Sasadāvata which provides us with three Sanskrit *subhāṣita*-s has not yet been clearly determined. Three *subhāṣita* quotations (no. 20, 27 and 30) appear in the Siṁhala version or in the ancient Siṁhala commentary of the *Bodhivaṃsa*. Quotations no. 18 and 31 represent a Sanskrit version of a list of the 18 *śilpa*-s which is known from Pāli works in a quite similar form. The largest number of *subhāṣita*-s in our list was, however, found in the *Kāvyasaṅgrahava* which seems to have drawn on a version of the *Bhojaprabandha* and other similar material. Five *subhāṣita*-s quoted in Siṁhala texts (2, 7, 9, 12, 13) are also found in one of the two collections of *subhāṣita*-s which form part of the literary tradition of Sri Lanka. viz. *Vyāsakāra* and *Pratyayaśataka*.

11. The Siṁhalese literature handed down to us and evaluated for my study dates from the periods beginning with the 11th and ending with the 18th century so that conclusions from the material are valid only for these centuries. During the 19th century,

many works of the *kathā* literature in Sanskrit were brought over from India to the island and there transliterated into the Siṁhala script. Some of them are found in manuscripts, a few were also printed in Siṁhala script, e. g. *Hitopadeśa* (1878). Surprisingly, the use of Sanskrit *subhāṣitasaṃgraha*-s and of the Sanskrit *kathā* literature must have been of a limited importance only during the period of flourishing Sanskrit studies in Ceylon from the 12th to the 15th centuries, as we can infer from the small number of relevant quotations. This observation is not as strange as it may seem at first glance, because the Siṁhala authors were all Buddhists, and there was a strong feeling of the separate cultural identity of the Buddhist tradition in this particular field. The main tradition of *subhāṣita*-s remained that of the relevant Pāli collections beginning with the *Dhammapada*. Similarly, tales and stories were taken from the Buddhist tradition as handed down in Pāli literature, particularly from the *aṭṭhakathā*-s, and not from the Sanskrit *kathā* tradition of India. On the other hand, the Siṁhalese have always continued their studies of the Sanskrit *kāvya* tradition, and therefore, we meet not only with many quotations from the works of Kālidāsa etc. in classical Siṁhala texts, but also with ancient Siṁhala translations of some of these works. It seems, however, that the Indian *kāvya* literature was studied in mediaeval Ceylon not for its contents, but as the classical material for the exemplification of the rules of *alaṅkāraśāstra* which were to be followed by the Siṁhala authors in their own works.

ON THE OPENING VERSE OF THE MEGHADŪTA

Siddheshwar Chattopadhyaya

Kālidāsa, the prince of ancient Indian poets, to begin his *Meghadūta* chose of all other words a pronoun and that is also an indefinite one,—*kaścit*. Commentators took it to be surprising and were at a loss. They practically failed to explain the beauty of the ambiguity created by the use of the word. Bharata Mallika alone following his predecessors, suggests as many as eight explanations. Mallinātha simply avoids the problem by saying *anirdiṣṭanāmā*. Whether Mallinātha by this word means to say that the Yakṣa, the hero of the poem, had no name at all, or that the poet did not like to mention his name, is not clear. Mallinātha's explanation, however, has been supported by some modern writers. They maintain that the poem is fictitious and as such, the poet did not care to or felt the necessity of giving any name to the hero. This is no explanation. We know that many fictitious characters of Kālidāsa's own creation bear names. Bharata Mallika also, in his own way finds fault with the above explanation. He remarks that the story is famous and not fictitious. He, however, keeps mum regarding the source of the story. By some, definitions of *Khaṇḍakāvya* from the works of later rhetoricians have been quoted in support of the use of *kaścit* without taking any care to realise whether Kālidāsa did follow those definitions, or those were formed centuries after Kālidāsa taking *Meghadūta* as the model.

Dogmatic ideas also played a part. Some interpreters, obsessed with their pedantic knowledge in later *śāstric* injunctions, proclaimed that Kālidāsa did right in not mentioning the name of the cursed Yakṣa who did not obey his master; none should utter the name of such a person. As a result, an interesting story also evolved about how and why the Yakṣa was cursed by Kuvera. Others went so far as to find out a *maṅgalācaraṇa* here from the letter *ka* meaning Prajāpati. Finding no other alternative, some took *kaścit* as the name of the Yakṣa. Most interesting perhaps, is the opinion of those who relied upon the baseless story of Kālidāsa's humiliation from his wife who in her first meeting with her husband asked,—*asti kaścid vāgviśeṣaḥ*. Kālidāsa, then a block-headed

idiot kept mum and was turned out. Then after long penance he acquired poetic genius and to give a suitable reply composed three *kāvya*-s, each beginning with a word of the above question. Any way, all the above explanations are anything but poetic, not to speak of silly or nonsense.

Some modern Bengali writers maintain that the *Meghadūta* heaves the sigh of everlasting separation of the eternal human soul and is not limited to the personal feeling of any person of any age. So, the Yakṣa cannot be given any name. A name is sure to limit the eternal pangs of separation to an individual. This idealistic explanation is undoubtedly poetic, but partial. It derives its inspiration from the superb lyric *Meghadūta* of Rabindranath Tagore. But this poem is certainly neither a commentary on nor an explanation of Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta*. It is the highly poetic expression of the emotion of another poet roused by the same of Kālidāsa; itself it is another poetry demanding appreciation. So far as the universal character of Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* is concerned, the same remark is applicable to Rabindranatha's lucid and extraordinary article on the poem in his *Prācīna-Sāhitya*. It must be remembered in this connection that the *Meghadūta* of Kālidāsa is not a lyric in the strict sense of the term. It is not the expression of a single mood or feeling in a brief compass. On the other hand, it can very well be accepted as a *mahākāvya* and some commentators have actually done so. Here there is a hero who sends message to the heroine and gives a long description of the route in detail along with those of the cities, heroine and her abode which is but a dreamland. It is, however, a fact that there are ample lyrical elements in the *Meghadūta*, but as a whole, it is not a lyric.

About the above interpretation it may further be said that the *Meghadūta* depicts the sorrow of a particular couple and that sorrow or sufferings may be taken as symbolic to the eternal pangs of separation of the human soul. But, this is true in the case of each and every poetic work depicting human sufferings. Certainly in all such works the hero is not nameless. Human experiences undoubtedly form the subject matter of poetic art. But those experiences are almost always depicted as belonging to some definite persons. Poetry is the mode of expression of human feelings, but it is creative par excellence. By its nature, it sublimates personal emotions to universal ones. And here lies the key of the gift-box what we call aesthetic relish. What would have been the harm had the Yakṣa of Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* been named X or Y ? Certainly nothing from this point of view. So, the problem remains unsolved.

To understand the significance of the use of *kaścit* as the first word of the *Meghadūta* we propose to take recourse to a study in Kālidāsa's style of beginning his *kāvya*-s. In doing so, we must bear in mind that poetry as a work of art deviates from the norms in some way or other and this deviation implies some motivation of the poet. In our day-

to-day life while reporting some incidents, we never create any ambiguity by not mentioning the name of the central figure as done in the *Meghadūta*. Kālidāsa certainly had some motivation behind the beginning of the *Meghadūta* with an indefinite pronoun. Our task is to guess it.

The *Kumārasambhava* begins with a long description of the mountain Himālaya and this mountain is transformed into a mythical deity so to say.[1] Once this is done, the story begins. The style here is descriptive and seems to be a bit hesitant at least where the mountain is suddenly transformed into a venerable person. This descriptive style of creating a suitable situation for the introduction of story predominates mainly in later Sanskrit prose *kāvya*-s.

The *Raghuvaṃśa*, on the other hand, begins with an invocation. Then follow the humble submission of the poet, some eulogistic verses on the venerable family of the Raghus and in conclusion, a request to the respected persons to listen to. After all the preliminaries are over, the story begins with Manu but jumps to Dilīpa, the founder of the dynasty, as Kālidāsa depicts it. There is no hesitancy of the *Kumārasambhava* here. The prologue is performed with confidence. This is the style of a *Purāṇa*-reciter known as *Kathaka-Ṭhākura* in Bengal. Here Kālidāsa appears in the role of a perfect traditional *Sūta*-poet reciting with regard and veneration the tales of legendary heroes. This is quite fit for the *mahākāvya* on the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa* mainly.

The style of the beginning of the *Meghadūta* is quite different from those of his other two *kāvya*-s, as discussed above. Certainly the theme of the *Meghadūta* would have given ample scope for a long description of the Rāmagiri, if the poet so desired. But here the story begins abruptly with an indefinite pronoun. This may be said to be an ambiguity and gives a free scope to the imagination of the reader and produces a dramatic suspense. This is the style of the beginning of a folkore or a fairy tale. The theme of the *Meghadūta* is not a borrowed one as those of other two *mahākāvya*-s of Kālidāsa. It is purely an invented romantic folk tale. We are not to trace here the impetus that pushed the poet to this dreamland of imagination. This is, however, certain that the poet could have easily invented a name of two long syllables for the Yakṣa to fit in well with the metrical scheme. But he purposely deviated from the traditional epic norm of telling a story and started with an indefinite pronoun leaving the Yakṣa nameless. If a name of the Yakṣa is substituted, the romantic flavour of the whole poem and the dramatic suspense of the beginning will evaporate.

Next comes the word *kāntā*. Here the commentators are unanimous and they

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1. *Kumārasambhava* I.17,

maintain that the word signifies the charming beauty of the heroine (*kāntiyogāt*) and as such, separation from her is unbearable to the passionate Yakṣa. But, is it all to explain the beauty of the word ? Yakṣa-women are naturally very beautiful and it goes without saying, as the ancient Indian sculpture beginning from the Śuṅga period shows. Here we are to point out that sound and meaning are two inseparable elements of words and a word acquires new dimensions of meaning in different contexts. To make the point clear, we propose the substitution of a bisyllabic synonym of *kāntā*, as *bhāryā* or *patnī* having both the syllables long. The difference is wide enough to unvail the charm of the word *kāntā* here. From the standpoint of meaning only, we admit that *bhāryā* does not carry a good sense here, as its derivation (*bharaṇāt*) shows. But the word *patnī* has got a religious sanctity (*yajñasaṃyogāt*). Why *patnī* cannot be admitted here ? The only answer is—its sound does not fit in well here. In the third quarter of the verse *tasyāstīre racita-śikharaḥ* etc.[1], we get the reading—*madgehinyāḥ priya iti* etc. The same quarter of the verse *tatrāgāraṃ dhanapati etc.*[2], reads—*yasyodyāne kṛtakatanayaḥ kāntayā vardhito me*. Let us now transpose the words *gehinī* and *kāntā* in these two cases without causing any disturbance to the metre and read—*matkāntāyaḥ priya iti*...and *gehinīvardhito me*.... Will these readings be acceptable to the lovers of the *Meghadūta* ? The answer is certainly—no. But why ? So far as the meaning is concerned the transposition seems to give a better one. The tender *mandāra* tree is expected to be reared up by the *gehinī* who is to look after the beautification of the house with motherly care. The *Krīḍāśaila* is a favourite spot of the couple. So, it is better to be associated with *kāntā*, the exquisite beautiful spouse of the Yakṣa. But none, we are sure, will accept this transposition. It is then apparent that beyond meaning there is something more that comes to the aid of enhancing the charm of words in poetry and of the poetry itself. Let us try to find out that element here. In the expression-*kṛtakatanayaḥ kāntayā vardhito me*, the parallelism of the soft sounds *ka* and *ta* is to be noted. It is the element that makes the structurally equivalent units of the expression charming. Here *gehinī* is sure to drive this element away and to produce a jerking sound. In the expression—*madgehinyāḥ priya* also, the sounds *da* and *ga* are equivalents. Moreover, *kāntā* used in the verse *tatrāgāram* etc.[3], is repeated in the third quarter of the verse—*tanmadhye ca* etc.[4] Its use is avoided in the verse—*tasyāstire* etc.[5] This is another reason behind the use of *gehinī* there. Similarly, a word like *patnī* in place

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1. *Meghadūta* V. 74 (Sahitya Akademi edn.)
2. *Ibid.* V. 72.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.* V. 76.
5. *Ibid.* V. 74.

of *kāntā* in the opening verse is sure to mar the beauty of parallelism and soft sound.

Now, we like to draw the attention of the readers to the syntactical beauty of the opening verse of the *Meghadūta*. The composition of the first quarter beginning with an indefinite pronoun (*kaścit*) which is related to the adjective *svādhikārapramattaḥ*, but intervened by *kāntā-viraha-guruṇā* having no relation with any of the two, rouses our curiosity to the extreme and produces a dramatic suspense. Who is this *kaścit svādhikāra-pramattaḥ* ? The answer yakṣa is in the third quarter. It is interesting to note that the first word of the first half of the verse refers to the word occupying the same position in the second half. To some, it may appear as a *Dūrānvaya-doṣa*. But this strained syntax is purposive here, as is going to be shown. Where is the noun of the adjective—*kāntā-viraha-guruṇā* ? It is (*śāpena*) at the very beginning of the second quarter and is separated from its adjective—*varṣa-bhogyena* by its own effect *astaṃ-gamita-mahimā*. Wherefrom came the *śāpa* ? The answer *bhartuḥ* is the last word of the same quarter. What did the Yakṣa do ? The answer *vasatim* is found in the next quarter and the places of this *vasati* with all adjectives are put near about. *Vasatim cakre* here signifies wandering about of the Yakṣa with a disturbed mind due to the pangs of separation and this is made clear by the plural number in *āśrameṣu*. It is apparent that the progression of the first half of the verse is very slow due to the suspense produced by the unrelated word-units marked by the pause (*yati*). In the second half, the same is comparatively fast and here the suspense is broken and we get all the answers expected. The first half of the verse is composed of sound images of big billows one after another and in the second half, we get the same of ripples in quick succession. This is known as vocal imagery in modern criticism.

Now, if we read the second quarter of the verse first and then the first one, the syntax will be comparatively normal. The answers to the questions, as put above, will be found nearer than the original. But the above beauty in progression and imagery of rhythm of the verse will vanish. The order of the words and quarters of a good verse controls the order in which the poet likes to communicate the impressions. A change in it is sure to create a disturbance in that order. So, no word of the verse concerned can be replaced by another, of course, if we like to maintain the attitude of the poet reflected in it. We know that the poet's choice of words implies choice of his attitude. This unchangeability of any word in poetry has also been highly praised by Indian critics. Similarly, any change in the order of lineation in the verse is not possible without giving a shock to the lover of good poetry.

From what has been said above, it should not be concluded that we are not in

favour, or we dislike the idea of finding out significance or overtones of the words and those of the verse itself. Our point will be clear by an analogy. Good poetry is like a beautiful damsel. We are to relish her beauty first as she appears before us nude or well-dressed, i. e., the total image of the poetry. Then we are to observe and scrutinise her limbs, dress, ornaments and make-ups, and at last we are to dive into her heart to find out her self. This should be the process of a critic in his appreciation of poetry which has very often been neglected by our ancient commentators.

SUR QUELQUES DÉSIGNATIONS DE TEXTES SANSKRITS

Jean Filliozat

Avant de connaître l'Inde l'Europe la savait patrie des contes. Dès qu'elle a connu quelque chose de sa littérature, ce fut par des sentences bien exprimées. En effet les premiers extraits de textes indiens publiés en langues européennes ont été ceux qu'a donnés au XVIIe siècle Abraham Roger. L'auteur hollandais traduisait en effet quelques stances sanskrites de Bhartṛhari et quelques uns des *Vĕmanapadyalu* telugu.

Il était juste qu'on pût ainsi prendre conscience directement de la sagesse indienne que l'Antiquité gréco-romaine avait vantée et qui, désormais, pouvait s'offrir dans sa teneur originale à la compréhension de tous les peuples. Mais elle s'offrait en une telle abondance et une telle variété qu'il a fallu quelque trois siècles pour en faire les inventaires, les publications, les traductions et les études de détail qui ont préparé le labeur immense par lequel Ludwik Sternbach, aujourd'hui, nous en donne la somme elle-même, avec encore celle des formes sous lesquelles l'ont empruntée les peuples de l'Asie que la culture indienne a touchés.

Car c'est bien une caractéristique de la culture indienne, de toutes les cultures indiennes depuis la sanskrite, d'aimer les pensées bien dites, qu'elles soient morales ou poétiques, religieuses ou profanes, qu' elles soient isolées ou rassemblées en anthologies ou qu'elles émaillent, illustrent et concluent les longs discours en vers ou en prose, et cela même dans des ouvrages techniques.

Dans l'enseignement oral des écoles sanskrites, c'est à dire donné en une langue vénérée et aimée pour elle-même, pour ses structures admirées, pour ses finesses qui donnent la fierté à ceux qui les manient, la recherche du bien-dire était naturelle et, pour la mémorisation, elle était efficace. D'où la place que tienent non seulement dans le goût des lettrés mais encore, bien souvent, dans l'esprit des illetrés qui les entendent on en entendent la transposition en leurs langues, les belles expressions, concises et frappantes ou langues mais riches.

Certaines compositions ont pu n'être que des exercices pédants, mais l'immense majorité des autres est le témoignage de l'art et de l'esprit d'un peuple, d'un des peuples les plus nombreux de la Terre et les plus spirituellment influents sur les amis qu'ils se sont gagnés dans le monde.

La psychologie d'un peuple dépend de ses lois, de ses conceptions normatives, mais aussi de tout ce qui atteint et retient couramment sa pensée. La société indienne a ses *dharmaśāstra* pour règles et ses *subhāṣita* pour pensées. Elle ne peut être pleinement comprise des spécialistes des uns ou des autres, s'ils sont exclusifs et ne savent pas voir ensemble les deux éléments complémentaires qui la constituent psycologiquement et qui commandent ses réactions aux événements de l'économie et de l'histoire. Ludwik Sternbach, lui, a oeuvré pour nous tout ensemble sur ces deux parts fondamentales de l'indianité entière, en nous donnant et ses études de droit et toute la masse des *subhāṣita*.

Quand je l'ai vu pour la première fois lors d'une conférence qu'il a donnée en Inde dans un congrès, l'affluence de ses autres admirateurs ne m'a pas permis de l'aborder moi-même. J'ai dû attendre qu'il vînt à Paris et de l'avoir dès lors comme le collègue dont l'érudition, la puissance de travail et la fécondité de ce travail n'ont jamais cessé d'étonner, et souvent de confondre, toux ceux qui ont eu le privilège de travailler près de lui. J'ai pu en outre, dans toutes ces dernières années, voir dans cet ami, non seulement le savant promoteur et l'agent personnel de la production scientifique dans son domaine de prédilection, mais aussi l'indianiste attaché à tout l'oeuvre scientifique internationale vouée au sanskrit et à sa littérature et, dans cette fonction de dévouement, l'administrateur attentif, prompt et ferme de nos travaux.

On peut dono lui livrer quelques réflexions portant à la fois sur l'objet des siens propres et sur quelques formes de textes que d'autres étudient.

On doit tout d'abord constater que bien avant que deviennent populaires les *subhāṣita*, les hymnes Védiques étaient appelés des *sūkta* et que les deux mots apparaissent à premiére vue comme synonymes pour désigner un énoncé bien exprimé.

Il n'est pas moins évident qu'ils ne s'emploient pas l'un pour l'autre. Les *sūkta* sont des hymnes Védiques qu'on n'appelle jamais *subhāṣita* et on ne voit pas non plus qualifier proprement de *sūkta* les *subhāṣita*. Les deux termes sont spécialisés dans leurs emplois respectifs et ne sont pas alors exactement synonymes. Les racines *VAC* et *BHĀṢ* les mots *vāc* et *bhāṣā* ne le sont pas, car *vāc* est la Parole, le Verbe, et *bhāṣā* n'est que le langage.

Il est vrai qu'un propos bien tourné, une parole appréciée peuvent être qualifiés de *subhāṣita* ou de *sūkta*, mais, dans cet usage banal, il s'agit d'un propos occasionnel dans une conversation particulière. C'est le cas dans les passages indiqués par Böhtlingk-Roth sous le mot *sūkta* traité comme équivalent de *subhāṣita*. Ainsi, par exemple, dans *Rājataraṅgiṇī* III. 186, où la glose (éd. A. Stein) rend *sūktena* par *svastikayā* tandis que

Stein le traduit par "felicitous word". En tant que genre littéraire le *sūkta* est essentiellement l'hymne Védique et le *subhāṣita* la sentence indépendant qui vaut pour elle-même, formant une unité significative en soi, détachée de tout contexte circonstanciel.

Quoi qu'il en soit, les deux noms expriment directement la forme excellente des énoncés, tandis que d'autres noms de textes se rapportent à leur structure ou à leur étendue ou encore à leur nature. Tels sont les noms de *sūtra*, de *Tantra* et *d'āgama* dont nous voulons faire ici l'objet de quelques remarques.

Une étymologie inventée jadis par des indianistes européens a été que *sūtra* ayant pour sens propre et originel "fil", ce mot aurait pu passer au sens de "texte" parce que les manuscrits sur feuilles de palmier, voire bien des manuscrits sur papier, étaient percés d'un trou où passait un cordon liant leurs feuilles ensemble et s'enroulant autour de la liasse, souvent serrée, grâce a ce cordon, entre deux planchettes de garde également perforées.

De son côté la tradition grammaticale indienne montre que Pāṇini fait plusieurs fois allusion aux *sūtra* comme textes mais connaît aussi bien le *sūtra* comme cordon. En effet, 8.3.90 (*sūtram pratiṣṇāṭam*) veut dire que, s'appliquant à un cordon, le mot *pratisnāta*, "baigné" prend la forme *pratiṣṇāta*. C'est en tout cas le sens de "fil" ou "cordon" qui est le sens propre car le mot se rattache à la racine SIV "coudre" (cf. latin *suere*). C'est sans doute pourquoi Śaṅkara voit dans les textes dits *sūtra* le fil de liaison entre les fleurs des sentences des Vedānta[1].

Quoiqu'il en soit, les deux significations de *sūtra* : "fil" et "texte" ou "propos" ne sont pas fortuitement associées et étrangères l'une à l'autre. Elles répondent à un parallélisme naturel de concepts.

C'est un traité médiéval tamoul de grammaire, le *Naṉṉūl* de *Pavaṇanti*, qui l'exprime clairement :

pañcitaṉ collāp paṉuval iḻaiyākac
ceñcoṟ pulavaṉē ceyiḻaiyā-veñcāta
kaiyē vā yākak katirē matiyāka
maiyilā nūṉmuṭiyu māṟu.

"Quand, tandis que le coton consiste en ses mots, le discours est un fil,
le poète aux jolis mots la (fileuse) à bijoux, l'infaillible main la bouche,
le fuseau l'intelligence,
on a le moyen de parachever un propos (ou fil) sans défaut".

Le mot *nūl*, en tamoul, correspond au sanskrit *sūtra* avec le même double sens et le texte ou le propos est formé de mots comme le fil l'est de fibres de conton. Et l'auteur

1. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, I.12.

a joué dans sa stance sur d'autres doubles sens encore. *Paṉuval* est aussi "discours" et "fil" et il évoque immédiatement l'image que nous employons nous mêmes en français de "fil d'un discours". *Iḻai* veut dire à la fois "fil" et "bijou". *Ceñ-* "joli" et "rouge" assonne avec *cēy* "rouge", *cēyiḻai* "celle aux bijoux rouges" ou "au fil rouge" est la belle fileuse. *Katir* est le "fuseau" et le "rayon", *mati* "l'intelligence" et la "Lune". Quant à *ceñcol* (sous la forme *ceñcor* par euphonie) qui qualifie le poète aux "jolis mots", il équivaut à *subhāṣita* du sanskrit et c'est bien un pendant tamoul des *subhāṣita* qu'est la stance tout entière de ce *Naṉṉūl*, à la fois le "Bon texte" et la "Bonne enfilade" de stances ou propos continus donnant les règles du langage et de l'art littéraire.

Puisque ce qui caractérise le *sūtra* ou le *nūl* c'est l'enchaînement continu de ses éléments successifs, qu'il forme un fil de coton ou un fil de discours, il faut nous demander, lorsque le mot désigne une oeuvre de langage, si on retrouve bien ce caractère dans les textes que les Indiens ont désigné de ces noms.

Pour le tamoul nous venons de voir que Pavaṇanti avait lui-même désigné son livre un *nūl*, à la fois traité et enfilade de règles. En sanskrit les *sūtra* sont en prose et ce sont, dans la littérature brahmanique, des morceaux très concis qui s'enchaînent les uns aux autres. Dans les littératures bouddhique et jain, ils sont des discours souvent très longs du Buddha ou du Jina et la littérature bouddhique contient même des *vaipulyasūtra*, des "sūtra à extension". Mais tous conservent, une unité de déroulement qui paraît bien justifier généralement le sens de "fil" que comporte leur nom.

Si les noms de *sūtra*, moyen-indien *sutta*, tamoul, *nūl*, pour désigner des textes sont empruntés à la nomenclature du filage, celui de *Tantra* est inspiré de celle du tissage.

Quel que soit le sens qu'on rencontre dans le plus anciennes attestations védiques du mot *Tantra*, il se rattache à la racine *TAN* "étendre". Il s'apparente à *tanti*, "corde", et à *tantri*, aussi "corde", mais également "descendance, extension familiale".

Quand *Tantra* s'applique à des textes il s'oppose à *veda* comme *āgama* à *nigama*. Le Veda est *nigama* parce qu'il est "institué" de toute éternité et a été vu par les *ṛṣi*, le *Tantra* est *āgama* parce qu'il est la "Tradition", "ce qui est parvenu" aux hommes par l'enseignement de Śiva d'abord donné à Pārvatī ou à Viṣṇu. Or ce que contiennent les *Tantra* ou *Āgama* (les deux désignations sont d'ordinaire employées indifférement chez les sivaîtes) ce sont les eseignements divins ainsi parvenus aux croyants et qui portent sur tout ce qu'il faut savoir et pratiquer en matière de religion. Leur ensemble ou les exposés particuliers des divers textes quand ils sont complets, comportent quatre parties : *vidyā* la science, *kriyā*, le rituel, *caryā*, la conduite et *Yoga*, la maîtrise psycho-somatique.

Les mêmes divisions se retrouvent dans les *Tantra* bouddhiques et dans leurs équivalents jain, aussi bien que dans les *saṃhitā* vishnouites, car, quelle que soit la religion suivie, elle requiert que ses traités techniques portent sur ces mêmes sujets. Aussi le caractère commun de ces textes est d'être des exposés étendus qui développement des enseignements

techniques détaillés et la dénomination de *tantra* s'applique aussi bien au traitement de matières étrangères aux religions : *uttaratantra* est le "texte final" de la *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, traitant particulièrement des spécialités en médecine (ophtalmologie, oto-rhino-laryngologie etc...), la *Carakasaṃhitā* s'appelle aussi *Agniveśatantra*, "Texte d'Agniveśa" et un *viṣatantra* est un "texte sur les poisons".

La définition Śivaîte du *Tantra* insiste bien sur l'extension et le développement des matières qu'il enseigne, tout en ajoutant qu'il est salvifique et cela, par une analyse du mot évidemment abusive mais d'un type courant. Cette définition se présente en effet ainsi, par exemple dans l' *Ajitāgama* 1. 115 :

> *tanoti vipulān arthāṃs tattvamantrasamāśritān* |
> *trāṇaṃ ca kurute puṃsāṃ tena tantram iti smṛtam* ||
> "Il étend (*tan*) les sujets développés, relatifs aux réalités et aux formules et il fait le salut (*tra*) des hommes, c'est pourquoi il est connu comme *tantra*".

Ainsi défini, il apparaît par rapport au *sūtra*, et même au *vaipulya-sūtra* du bouddhisme qu'évoquent lesmots *vipulān arthān*, comme un tissu par rapport au fil et nous pouvons comparer son nom au *textum* latin et à notre "texte" dont il a en fin de compte couramment la simple signification.

Il est vrai que *Tantra*, s'applique spécialement à des textes étendus et techniques, ne peut pas désigner un texte quelconque, par exemple celui d'un *sūtra*. Sa signification est donc plus restreinte mais elle ne répond pas nécessairement, comme on s'est habitué à le croire souvent, á un mouvement réformiste magico-religieux, hostile à l'orthodoxie brahmanique, prenant délibérément le contre-pied du Veda et de la morale et parfois animé par les résurgences d'un substrat aborigène ou d'un chamanisme supposé au centre de l'Asie en une préhistorire inconnue.

Cette construction repose sur une ancienne conviction, formée au siècle dernier, du caractère immoral et provocateur des *Tantra*. Elle repose aussi, sur l'ignorance prolongée des éléments majeurs des littératures tantriques, à commencer par la masse des *Āgama* Śivaîteset de leurs pendants vishouîtes qui, avec leurs *pūjā* et tous leurs autres rites, y compris ceux de la construction des temples et de la fabrication des immages, sont les sources réelles de la pratique religieuse dans tout l'hindouisme vivant de l'Inde, jadis propagé au Sud-Est asiatique.

Les *Tantra* bouddhiques qui, tout en reposant sur les doctrines de la *svabhāvaśūnyatā* et du *vijñāptimātra*, s'insurgent contre la morale du *Tripiṭaka* et prescrivent d'en violer systématiquement les défenses, ne représentent pas une tendance générale, même s'ils ont quelques prallèles dans des traditions sectaires, du Bengale surtout, voisin de leurs terres d'élection. Ces *Tantra* évoquent les attitudes analogues des gnostiques licencieux de l'Antiquité qui ne pèsent guère dans la formation des pratiques chrétiennes.

L'immense majorité des *Tantra*, qui sont aussi les *Āgama*, loin d'être une révolte contre le brahmanisme et spécialement conre le Veda ne rejette nullement ce Veda. Il en utilise des textes, tels que la *gāyatri*, tels que d'autres qu'il emploie dans le culte des planètes, y compris, des planètes ignorées du Veda. Mais son rituel et même son esprit qui sont en réalité la contrepartie technique de la religion des Epopées et des *Purāṇa*, visent à dépasser le Veda par la dévotion (*bhakti*) et pour la délivrance (*mukti*) que le Veda ne connaissait pas. Les *Tantra* çivaîtes enseignent la validité du Veda pour la *bhukti*, la jouissance des biens de ce monde, mais soulignent qu'eux-mêmes valent à la fois pour la *bhukti* et la *mukti*.

C'est le fait que jusqu'aux dernières décennies les *Tantra* que sont les *Śaivāgama*, perdus ou oubliés dans l'ensemble de l'Inde sont restés inconnus de l'indologie classique, qui a laissé s'accréditer la légende des *Tantra* comme livres de sectes protestataires. Mais ils se sont conservés dans les deux régions de l'Inde les plus éloignées l'une de l'autre et qui ont en commun d'avoir subi plus tard que les autres et moins profondément la pression de l'Islam : le Tamilnad et le Kāśmīr. Ils ont été la trame de la pratique religieuse et savante, comme les *sūtra* ont été les fils des discours d'instruction, tandis que les *sūkta* et les *subhāṣita* étaient les fleurs de la sagesse ot de son expression. Et tous ensemble sont la Parole de la civilisation indienne.

QUOTATIONS OF RATNĀVALĪ IN ABHINAVABHĀRATĪ

Pierre Filliozat

Ratnāvali has been one of the most appreciated plays in medieval India, as is shown by the numerous mentions of it in old treatises of dramaturgy and by the remarkable description of it which Dāmodaragupta, who attended the court of Jayāpīḍa in Kaśmīr in the second half of eighth century, has given in his *Kuṭṭanimata*[1]. It is the most-often quoted play in Abhinavagupta's commentary on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the *Abhinavabhārati*.

A first point of interest in these quotations is that they offer many readings not found in the current printed editions[2], especially in the Prakrit passages. For example Bharata in I.57[3] qualifies the *nāndi* as *aṣṭāṅgapadasaṃyuktā*. Abinavagupta explains that it refers to the number of words or of intermediary clauses of the whole sentence of the *nāndi*. As he will show later, the number can be four, eight, etc. Then he quotes the verse 1.4 in *Ratnāvali* as being a four-*pada nāndi*, i.e. a verse made of four clauses. His reading of the verse is :

जितमुडुपतिना नमः सुरेभ्यो द्विजवृषभा निरुपद्रवा भवन्तु ।
अवतु च पृथिवीं समृद्धसस्यां प्रतिपच्चन्द्रवपुर्नरेन्द्रचन्द्रः ॥

"Triumphant is the Lord of Stars; salutation to the Gods; may the excellent brahmins be free of misfortunes; may the earth having plentiful crops be protected by the Moon-like King who has a new-Moon-like body".

This verse has in this reading four propositions, whereas in current printed editions, the second half-verse being cut into two :

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1. *Kuṭṭanīmata* (éd. Tanasukhram Tripathi, Bombay, 1924) v. 830-928; see Ajaya Mitra Shastri, *India as seen in the Kuṭṭanīma'a oj Dāmodaragupta*, Delhi, 1975, p. 6-8.
2. Our references are to the edition of M. Lehot, accompanied by a French translation, Paris, 1933. This edition is based on C. Capeller's edition published in Sanskrit Chrestomathie by O. Böhtlingk (1909).
3. Edition by Ramakrishna Kavi, vol. I to IV, Baroda, 1956, 1934, 1954, 1964.

भवतु च पृथिवी समृद्धसस्या प्रतपतु चन्द्रवपुर्नरेन्द्रचन्द्रः ॥

"May the earth have plentiful crops; may the Moon-like King . . . shine".

On the basis of his reading Abhinavagupta says :

एषापि भारतीयत्वेन प्रसिद्धा कोहलप्रदर्शिता नान्द्युपपन्ना भवति ।

"Even this verse is a possible *nāndi* . . . as shown by Kohala". Another point of interest is that the ascription to Kohala of the interpretation of this verse as a *nāndi* implies that the verse was not accepted as such by others. Abhinavagupta says it is "well-known as *bhāratiya*". This may mean that the verse was commonly taken as a *bharatavākya*, a benedictory verse placed in the mouth of an actor at the end of a play. As a matter of fact the verse "*jitam uḍupatinā*" is modelled on the most common types of *bharatavākya*. Abhinavagupta's remarks show that even in his time there was hesitation as to the function and place of the verse in the play.

Most of the quotations of *Ratnāvali* in *Abhinavabhārati* are found in Abhinavagupta's commentary on the nineteenth chapter which deals with the structure of the plot of a drama. Abhinavagupta has selected almost exclusively this play for the purpose of illustrating the *sandhyaṅgas* or components of the plot. Thus, we get, if not a regular commentary, an almost complete analysis of *Ratnāvali's* plot from the mind of Abhinavagupta. This is a rare privilege, as Abhinavagupta is one of the most intelligent and sensible literary critics of India[1].

The plot of *Ratnāvali* is well-known as the work of the astute minister, Yaugandharāyaṇa. This faithful servant of his Lord has heard a prophecy that the King who will marry *Ratnāvali*, daughter of the King of Siṁhala, will become a *cakravartin*. Therefore, he has resolved to arrange the marriage of his master Udayana, King of Vatsas, with this princess. He has already overcome several obstacles. He has obtained the acceptance of the King of Siṁhala. And fate has helped him, by allowing the princess to be saved from a shipwreck and to be brought to Kauśāmbī by a merchant. Moreover, the chamberlain, Bābhravya, and the minister, Vasubhūti, of the King of Siṁhala, have escaped also from the shipwreck, and have joined by chance Rumaṇvat who is a general of Udayana at that moment busy with a campaign. These two are needed in the plot as being able to recognize, at the end, Ratnāvalī even under a disguise.

The last obstacle which Yaugandharāyaṇa has to face, is the difficulty to introduce the princess in the harem of the King, and to make the marriage agreeable to the Queen,

1. See Abhinavagupta's commentary on *Ghaṭakarpara*, in *La Ghaṭakarparavivṛti* d'Abhinavagupta, text and French translation by B. Parlier, Paris, 1975.

Vāsavadattā, whose temper is hard to cope with. Yaugandharāyaṇa can create events. But he cannot create feelings, shape the psychology of his masters. Therefore, in order not to expose the princess to be blankly rejected by Vāsavadattā, he introduces her in the Court of the Queen under the disguise of a maid of honour, with the name Sāgarikā; then he goes behind the scene and let the characters act by themselves. Śrīharṣa's play starts at this moment. The subject of the play is the psychological story of the three characters thus brought together, the rise of love in Udayana and Sāgarikā, the jealousy, anger and then forgivance and acceptance in Vāsavadattā. The general frame of the story is common to several ancient plays of India. And Śrīharṣa has not invented many new events. His originality is in the framing of a story of emotions, a story which is not the design of a minister, but the natural life of the hearts of three well-born, refined and sympathetic characters.

The plot is divided into five *sandhis*. Abhinavagupta does not illustrate the first, *mukha* "opening", with *Ratnāvali*, but refers to it incidentally. This *sandhi* is based on the *bija* "seed of the plot, i.e. an event which is to develop consequences and to produce the final aim. In the case of *Ratnāvali* the seed is the decision of Yaugandharāyaṇa to make the princess act as Sāgarikā. When the play starts Sāgarikā has entered the place and it is the time of the festival of Spring. This mere circumstance does not show outwardly how the final result will be obtained. It is the "seed", a small event which is to lead to the final result, small "as it is feared", says Abhinavagupta, "to be without efficacy, because of absence of knowledge at that time of the deep purpose to be realised by introducing Sāgarikā into the harem at the time of Spring festival"[1].

Abhinavagupta states that a *sandhi* such as *mukhasandhi* is that portion of a play which "expresses as much of fact as there exist to help the undertaking, and which appear with different flavours according to the succession of events; for example in *Ratnāvali* the *mukhasandhi* is the first act; there is the *vira rasa* in the minister, the *śṛṅgāra* and *adbhuta* of the King of Vatsas (when he watches and admires the celebration of Spring festival among the people), and then *śṛṅgāra* (as depicted at the time of worship of Kāma); all this group of facts helps the realisation of the undertaking of the minister, namely to make Sāgarikā seeing the King"[2]. The minister has placed Sāgarikā in the

1. *Abhinavabhārati* ad *Nāṭyaśāstra* XIX.22 :
यद्वस्तु सागरिकान्तःपुरनिवासेन (वसन्तोत्सव)समये गम्भीरप्रयोजनसंवेदनाभावात् स्वल्पमात्र-मकिंचित्करप्रायं शङ्क्यते···

2. *Abhinavabhārati* adXIX.39 :
प्रारम्भोपयोगी यावानर्थराशिः प्रसक्तानुप्रसक्त्या विचित्रास्वाद आपतितः तावान् मुखसन्धिः, तदभिधायी च रूपकैकदेशः। यथा रत्नावल्यां प्रथमोऽङ्कः, तथा हि अमात्यस्य वीरो वत्सराजस्य शृङ्गाराद्भुतौ ततः शृङ्गार इति इयानयं सागरिकाया राजदर्शनेऽमात्यप्रारम्भविषयीकृतेऽर्थराशिरुपयोगीति मुखसन्धिः।

harem as a maid of honour to give her an opportunity to see the King and to be seen by him. An obstacle arises. Vāsavadattā suspects that Sāgarikā's beauty may attract the heart of the King. And she takes special care to put her maid out of the sight of her husband. But there comes the festival of Kāma. Sāgarikā, though discarded, is curious to see the mode of worship, and watches it from a hiding place. After honouring Kāma the Queen honours the King. Seeing only the last part of the ritual, Sāgarikā mistakes the King as a visible apparition of Kāmadeva. Nothing is more favourable to the rise of love in her heart. Then the chant of a bard reveals to her the true identity of the King.

Pratimukhasandhi is the appearance of the seed which had been as if suppressed as soon as seen. Ratnāvalī's acting as Sāgarikā has been decided by the minister, as a means to unite her to the King. But the celebration of Kāma festival conducted by the Queen has led to the discarding of Sāgarikā from the way of the King. "The acting as Sāgarikā", says Abhinavagupta, "is placed in the opening *sandhi* by the minister, as a seed is placed in the opening *sandhi* by the minister, as a seed is placed in the earth. Then it is hidden by the worship of Kāma at the time of Spring festival, being thus as if suppressed; the festival, etc. like the earth, covers the acting as Sāgarikā which is like the seed"[1]. The *pratimkhasandhi* makes a germ to break forth from the seed. In *Ratnāvalī* it is the portion going from Sāgarikā's words when she identifies the King, "my body though degraded by its state of servant, becomes now more esteemable, as it allows me to see him"[2] upto the meeting with the King arranged by Susaṅgatā[3].

The next *sandhi* called *garbha* is defined by an *udbheda* "sprouting" of the seed, i.e. "an inclination to generate the fruit". This "sprouting" is itself described as chance of realisation of the aim, followed by risk of non-realisation and quest, going on and on. In *Ratnāvalī* there is chance of realisation, when, at the first meeting arranged by Susaṅgatā, the King holds Sāgarikā's hand. It is followed by risk of non-realisation when the Queen enters (p. 38) and finds a painting made by Sāgarikā of Udayana and herself. There is quest when the King waits for Vasantaka and for news of Sāgarikā in the beginning of the

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1. *Abhinavabhāratī* ad XIX.40 :
मुखे न्यस्तं भूमाविव बीजं, अमात्येन सागरिकाचेष्टितं वसन्तोत्सवकामदेवपूजादिना तिरोहितं नष्टमिव । सागरिकाचेष्टितस्य हि बीजस्येव तदाच्छादकमप्युत्सवादिरूपं भूमिरिव ।
2. Act I, p. 17 (p. 27 in Kale's edition, Bombay, 1925). Note the better reading in *Abhinavabhāratī* ad XIX.40 :
परप्पेसत्तणदूसिदं वि मे सरीरं एदस्स दंसणेण अज्ज में बहुमदं संपण्णम् (परप्रेष्यत्वदूषितमपि मे शरीरमेतस्य दर्शनेनाद्य मे बहुमतं संपन्नम्) ।
3. Act II p. 35 (Kale p. 52).

third act (p. 45, 1.5). There is again chance of realisation, when the *vidūṣaka* arrives with the words "there will be for my friend, when he hears my agreeable words, a pleasure he did not experience before, even when ascending the throne of Kauśāmbī..." (p. 45, 1.8). Vasantaka has arranged the meeting of Sāgarikā and Udayana. The heroine is to come, having put on the dress of Vāsavadattā, in order not to be recognized accidentally. Unfortunately the Queen has heard about this arrangement. She comes on the scene. Udayana mistakes her for Sāgarikā with Vāsavadattā's dress and expresses his love, " . . . ambrosia is here only on your *bimba*-like lip" (v. 57, p. 52, 1.1). This is chance of realisation. It is followed again by risk of non-realisation when Vāsavadattā makes herself known (p. 52). There is quest when Sāgarikā comes to the tryst (p. 54). In the meantime the Queen has left the place. There is again risk of non-realisation, when Sāgarikā decides to hang herself and prepares a cord with a creeper. She is frightened at the idea that the Queen may discover her meeting with the King and instead of taking the risk to face the anger and domination of the Queen, she prefers to end her life (p. 54). Abhinavagupta stops here the series of chances of realisation and non-realisation which constitutes the *garbhasandhi*. This is a period of suspense. We do not know what will be the conseqence of Vāsavadattā's anger and what may save Sāgarikā from her desperate action. The state (*avasthā*) corresponding to the *garbhasandhi* is *prāptyāśā* or *prāptisambhava* "hope or possibility of realisation". It implies a doubt on the realisation. That is why such alternative chances of realisation and non-realisation are presented. Abhinavagupta says : "the portion of risk of non-realisation is necessary here; otherwise how could there be the state of possibility of realisation, which consists in only possibility, it would be a state of determination. Then the difference with the *avamarśa* or next *sandhi* is that in *avamarśa* the risk of non-realisation is predominant, and chance of realisation is less"[1].

The fourth *sandhi* is called *vimarśa* or *avamarśa*. One view on this part of the plot is that it is *vimarśa* meaning "doubt". In the previous *sandhi* there has been a deliberation whether the fruit will be realised or not. We expect a decisive solution to come out of the balance of events. But, before this conclusion, there comes a stronger stage of doubt about the realisation of the final aim. In *Ratnāvalī* we see first the King discovering in time that Sāgarikā is to attempt at her life, and preventing her desperate action, secondly the Queen coming back on the scene with the intention to grant a generous pardon to her unfaithful husband. In this favourable situation, it happens that Vāsavadattā arrives on the spot and finds Udayana expressing his love to Sāgarikā. Her anger is heightened. In

1. *Abhinavabhāratī* ad XIX.41 :
अप्राप्त्यंशश्चात्रावश्यंभावी, अन्यथा हि सम्भावनात्मा प्राप्तिसम्भवः कथं निश्चय एव हि स्यात् । अव-मर्शे त्वप्राप्तेरेव प्रधानता प्राप्त्यंशस्य च न्यूनतेति विशेषः ।

the very presence of the King she orders Sāgarikā and the *vidūṣaka* to be imprisoned. Abhinavagupta adds that the greater state of doubt will bring a greater determination. The *avasthā* corresponding to *vimarśasandhi* is *niyatāpti* "determined realisation". He explains how the state of determination accompanies the state of doubt :" "Seeing that the best things meet with more obstacles, I must remove this one, decides (the minister) and with confidence he makes stronger (lit. multiplies by thousand) the thread of his effort. In fact the advent of the magician (see below) caused by the great minister, in spite of the imprisonment of Sāgarikā, is very skilfully brought out"[1].

Another view is that the fourth *sandhi* is *avamarśa* meaning "obstacle". It amounts to a destruction of the seed which had grown in the *garbha-sandhi*. And it is caused by anger, greed, or a misfortune, such as a curse, etc. In *Ratnāvali* the cause of the obstacle is Vāsavadattā's anger. From the moment of imprisonment other causes of obstacles appear; or everything represents the failure. Udayana expresses very elegantly this situation of his in a verse about Sāgarikā's necklace, which has come in his hands through the *vidūṣaka* : "After having embraced her neck, he is separated from her; he is like a friend in the same state as me, and trying to console me"[2].

The last *sandhi* is called *nirvahaṇa* "consummation". In *Ratnāvali* it starts with the entrance of the magician in the fourth act (p. 67). This magician is sent to the Court and is made agreeable to the Queen as hailing from Ujjayinī which is her birth-place. He satisfies everybody by his art. Then after a victory of Rumaṇvat, Bābhravya and Vasubhūti reach the place of Udayana. Vasubhūti speaks about his mission to bring *Ratnāvali*. Vāsavadattā is a bit surprised to learn the arrangement of this marriage which she so far had ignored. But her heart is moved with compassion, when she is told that the princess, who happens to be her cousin, may have lost her life in a shipwreck. Then the news comes of a fire breaking out in the harem. Sāgarikā who is imprisoned there cannot escape. The Queen is then completely drawn out by compassion towards her. She regrets to have been too harsh for her. Sāgarikā is saved by the extinction of the fire which was a mere illusion created by the magician skilfully introduced in the Court by Yaugandharāyaṇa, who was conducting all these events behind the scene. When Sāgarikā is recognized as Ratnāvalī by Vasubhūti, the aim of the minister is accomplished

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1. *Abhinavabhāratī* ad XIX.42 :
श्रेयांसि बहुविघ्नानीति पश्यता तदत्र मया बिघ्नापसारणं कर्तव्यमिति साभिमानः स्वमुद्योगसूत्रं सहस्रगुणीकुरुते, तथा सागरिकाबन्धनेऽपि महामात्यप्रयुक्तमैन्द्रजालिकवृत्तं सुनिपुणमुपनिबद्धं तावत् ।

2. Act IV p. 64 :

कण्ठाश्लेषं समासाद्य तस्याः प्रभ्रष्टयानया ।
तुल्यावस्था सखीवेयं तनुराश्वास्यते मम ॥

and there is no more opposition from Vāsavadattā. Her anger and hard temper have gradually given place to compassion, remorse for harsh treatment and favourableness.

These are the main lines of the plot. We have seen a succession, sometimes slow, as in the first act, sometimes quick, as in the *garbha-sandhi*, of small events which are ordered in a quite logical sequence. The logic here is a very natural and lively psychology of the rising love of two heroes versus the jealousy of a third character. What is remarkable in the story of this conflict is that the calming down of anger in Vāsavadattā is not imposed upon her, but is brought gradually, so that it appears in her naturally and spontaneously. Vāsavadattā is not m a d e amenable to the new marriage of her husband, she b e c o m e s so from her own psychology, when she regrets to have been carried too far by her anger and to have treated Sāgarikā with excessive punishment.

We have summarised in this paper Abhinavagupta's interpretation of the division of the plot of *Ratnāvali* in five *sandhi*-s in order to illustrate his intelligence in literary analysis. It will be of equal interest to study his application of the *sandhyaṅga*-s to the same play. He has illustrated all the *aṅga*-s, with the exception of those of *mukhasandhi*, with excerpts of *Ratnāvalī*. In many cases the passages he has selected as illustrations are different from those selected for the same *aṅga*-s in *Daśarūpāvaloka* which is approximately contemporary of *Abhinavabhāratī*. We would like to stress the sensitivity and delicacy of his interpretation, as revealed by his choice. The *sandhyaṅga*-s appear thus to be the most appropriate and valid means of analysing the literary conventional psychology of Sanskrit theatre, as they are apt to shed light on many significant details of the plot, subtle feelings and emotions, shades of meaning which reveal the talent of a dramatist.

CONTENTS OF KĀVYA CONTRADICTED BY EPIGRAPHS

(Mrs.) Vasundhara Filliozat

Many modern historians consider that literature is also one of the sources for re-writing the past history. Though, it may not be wrong to treat the literary works as one of the sources, it is dangerous to rely upon the facts recounted in them. At the same time, these *kāvya*-s contribute considerably for picturising contemporary the social and religious life. They are but bad historiographs. It is a well-known fact that the epigraphy is the best and the most reliable source of information to recount the past. Unfortunately, for re-writing the ancient history of India, the evidence of epigraphs is so scant that search for refuge in literature is inevitable. Fortunately, in the case of Vijayanagar history, we are amply served by the inscriptions. Nearly four to five thousand inscriptions have been noticed and the resumé of the same is published regularly in *Government Epigraphical Report* (1880-1967) by Epigraphical Survey of India. In the beginning of this century, for the first time, when Sewell and Longhurst wrote about Vijayanagar, they were obliged to make use of literary works due to the non-availability of texts of epigraphs. At present, the text of nearly a thousand of these inscriptions have been brought to light by the Central and State Governments in the Series of South Indian Inscriptions, *Epigraphia Carnatica* and *Epigraphia Indica* etc. In this article, we shall try to show how the contents recounted in the *kāvya*-s are discredited by the inscriptions.

It is well known that the modern village Hampi, which is also its ancient name, was raised to the peak of its importance when it served as the main capital and the residence of the kings of Vijayanagar. Both the kingdom and the capital were called by one and the same name, Vijayanagar. The kings of Vijayanagar protected the entire south India except Kerala for a period of two centuries (1345-1565) against the Muslims and other odds. Hampi alias Vijayanagar is situated on the southern bank of Tuṅgabhadrā, Hospet tālūk, Bellary district, Karnātak state and not far from the borders of Andhrapradesha where Telugu is spoken. As a result both Kannaḍa and Telugu are heard simultaneously at Hampi right from the hey days of Vijayanagar. Now Hampi is in ruins

and most of its historical monuments are raised to the ground. Yet, however, the remaining ruins provide unexhausting matter for work.

Virūpākṣavasantotsavacampū, by the poet Ahobala : Virūpakṣa is the name of the local deity, who resides on Hemakūṭa, one of the hillocks of Hampi. The temple which houses the God Virūpākṣa is an ancient temple. Its antiquity goes back to fifth-sixth century. In the time of Vijayanagar, Virūpākṣa became the titular god of the royal family. *Campū kāvya* by Ahobila deals with "*Vasantotsava*" celebrations of the spring festival of the god Virūpākṣa.

The *Campū* was for the first time brought to the notice of the erudite historians and the Sanskritists by late lamented Dr. V. Raghavan.[1] Then copies of the manuscript were handed over to Shri Vidyaratna R. S. Pancamukhi, who later published it through Kannaḍa Research Institute, Dharwar in 1953 after having published a small article on the same *Campū* in "*Progress* of *Kannada Research in Bombay Province*" from 1941 to 1946". According to both the scholars, Vidyaratna and late Dr. V. Raghavan the Ms. is incomplete. In the latter part of the *Kāvya*, the name of the author is mentioned, but nothing more. Neither his ancestry nor his other works are known to us.

Campū is divided in two parts : first part deals with the car-festival of the god and the latter part with hunt–festival and other relevant ceremonies and ends with "*avabhṛtha*", final ablution. Some leaves of the *Campū* are missing in the first part. In the first part the poet mentions Vidyānagara, another name for Vijayanagar which was constructed or created by the king on the advice of the sage Vidyāraṇya.[2] There is also a mention made about the presence of the sage Vidyāraṇya at the time of car-festival that is the temple chariots. These chariots were to be dragged by the devotees starting from the "*mahāgopura*" or "*mahādvāra*" the main eastern entrance of the temple. In the same context, there is also a reference to the second or inner *gopura* of the same temple[3] and a big *aṅgaṇa* or court yard.

There are more than one legends which relate the foundation of Vijayanagar by Vidyāraṇya by giving vivid colours to his achievements. That is in A. D. 1336, on the advice of the sage Vidyāraṇya. Harihara I founded the empire and as a mark of gratitude for the service rendered by the sage Harihara named the capital Vidyānagara which later became Vijayanagar.[4]

To make the facts clearer, it is necessary to go through the history of the period. First and foremost fact is that there was no sage by the name of Vidyāraṇya at the time

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1. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, XIV, p. 17-40.
2. *Virupākṣavasantotsava cumpū*. p. 14.
3. *Ibid*. p. 32-35.
4. Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*. 1924, p. 19.

of so-called event of the foundation of the Vijayanagar empire in 1336. In 1345, when Harihara I, the first king of Vijayanagar shouldered the responsibility of protecting the "*Hindu dharma*" and assumed the powers, he was counselled by two brāhmin brothers named Mādhava and Sāyaṇa. They were the sons of Māyaṇa and Śrīmatī of Bhāradvāja-gotra and *Yajuśśākhā*. On the banks of Tunga at Śṛṅgēri is one of the *maṭha*-s, according to the legends founded by Śankarācārya. Mādhava and Sāyaṇa were studying Veda and Vedānta in this school under the pontificate of Śrī Vidyātīrthamuni. In 1375, for the first time an inscription refers to Vidyāraṇya[1] by which time Harihara I had passed away and his brother Bukka I was on the throne of Vijayanagar. From the two works i. e. the commentary on *Parāśarasaṁhitā* and the *Jīvanmuktivivekaḥ*, it is clear that both have been produced by the same pen. The commentator of *Parāśarasaṁhitā* was Vidyāraṇya who set to work on *Jīvanmuktiviveka* and was also pontiff of Śṛṅgēri *maṭha* from 1375-1385. When he became "*paripūrṇa*"[2] in 1385, at that time Harihara II made an *agrahāra* in pontiff's name. "*Paripūrṇa*" is to be taken in the sense that Vidyāraṇya left his body to unite with *Paramātman*.

"*Śivatattvacintāmaṇi*" is a *kāvya* in Kannaḍa by Lakkaṇṇadaṇḍēśa who was the minister and a good friend of the king Dēvarāya II. In this *kāvya* Lakkaṇṇa, while describing the capital, credits the king with having built four walls with four *gopura*-s around the temple of Virūpākṣa (251 of 38th *sandhi*). According to two inscriptions in the temple of Virūpākṣa, it is learnt that Kṛṣṇadēvarāya, in 1510 to commemorate his annointment to the throne of Vijayanagar, had the first *gopura* renovated and added an inner *prākāra* with a small *gopura*[3].

Dr. V. Raghavan, unfortunately misled by the fact that the poet witnessed the festival and mentioned Vidyāraṇyayati in the procession, had ascribed the *Campū* to the period of Harihara I (1336-1356) relying upon the existing legends and the *kāvya*-s which associate Vidyāraṇya with the foundation of the empire. Sri Vidyaratna Pancamukhi in the introduction *Virūpākṣavasantotsava campū* opines that the work must have been produced in the time of Harihara II, in the latter half of the XIV century, however contradicting his own statement that the reference to the front *gopura* cast a doubt to this suggestion[4].

The reference to the two *gopura*-s and the description of a big courtyard go beyond doubt to affirm that the *Campū* belongs to the early fifteenth century and not to the fourteenth as opined by the two scholars. The poet has seen the car-festival but imagined as if the events happened in the time of Vidyāraṇya. Thus, the *Campū* belongs to the cate-

1. *Annual Report on S. I. Epigraphy*. 460 of 1928.
2. *Annual Report of the Mysore Archaeological Department* 1933, pp. 138 ff.
3. *S. I. I.* IV, no 259 and *E. I. I.* vol. I p. 367 ff.
4. *Progress of Kannada Research in Bombay Province*, 1941-1946, p. 79.

gory of fiction and not to the source of history. However, we would like to draw the attention of the readers on the descriptions of two deities namely Virupākṣa and his consort Pampā[1]. The descriptions given about the goddess in the *Campū* do not co-ordinate with the actual image in the shrine. Perhaps, the present statue is not the original.

Madhurāvijaya by Gaṅgādēvī : Another *kāvya* which was produced in the middle of the fifteenth century. Gaṅgādēvī was the beloved wife of Kampaṇṇa II. The latter was the son of Bukka I. In the history of Vijayanagar Kampaṇṇa II is known for his heroic deed of cutting off the head of the Sultan who was established in Madhurai (Madurai), the ancient capital of Pāṇḍyas. After the invasion of Malik Kafur in 1310 and in 1323 at *the time of Tughalaks there was a complete chaos in the south. Most of the big temples* in the south were closed and their properties were mismanaged. Certain other temples were converted into mosques. In 1335, Kampaṇṇa II set up on campaigns in the south and Gaṅgādēvī accompanied him. What she saw has come out in the form of the *kāvya*—*Madhurāvijaya.*

Kampaṇṇa II, having Muḷbāgila (Kolar district, Karnatak) as his capital went to each and every sacred place in Tamilnadu, then known as Nikarili Coḷamaṇḍala and settled the matters. On one such occasion he had to attack and fight with the chieftain of Rajagambhīramalai. In the fourth canto the poetess describes at length her husband's invasion over the territory of Śambuvarāya. He met him at Rājagambhiramalai and a severe battle was fought. She says that Kampaṇṇa II with his sword despatched Camparāya (Śambuvarāya) as a guest to Indra.[2]

At Maḍam, Wandiwasi tāluk, N. Arcot dist. an inscription records that the *gopura* called "*Gaṇḍaragūli māranāyakkan tirugopura*" in the second *prākāra* of the temple of Tiruvāgnīśvaramuḍaiya Mahādēva was the gift of Gaṇḍaragūḷi Mārayanāyakkan, son of Somayadaṇṇayakar on the occasion of the capture by him of Venrumakoṇḍa Śambuvarāyar and Rājagambhīramalai.[3]

Another epigraph[4] engraved on the west wall of Senganmalisvara temple at Senganmale near Taiyūr records that an order regarding the grant (specified) was issued by Somayadaṇṇāyaka in accordance with the written order of Rājanārayana Śambuvarāyar. Both the inscriptions date back to 1363-1363 A. D. Thiruvenkatacari, the editor of *Madhurāvijaya* thinks that Rājanārāyaṇa's reign ended in 1359[5] and his son Venrumako-

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1. *V. V. Campū*, p. 60.
2. *Madhurāvijaya*, canto IV.
3. *A. R.* on *S. I. Epigraphy*, 267 of 1919.
4. *Ibid.*, 226 of 1916.
5. *Madhurāvijaya*, introduction, p. 24.

ndān lost his life in the battle against Kampaṇṇa II. Above quoted inscriptions do not tally with the conclusion of Thiruvenkatachari.

With regard to the liberation on Madhurai, Gaṅgā credits her husband with having taken off the head of the Sultan in the duel. She is contradicted by the author of "*Rāmābhyudaya*"[1] written a century later than *Madhurāvijaya* in which the poet says that the Sultan met his death in the duel with Sāḷuva Maṅgu, one of the generals of Kampaṇṇa II. Unfortunately, no inscription is at our disposal to verify the truth.

In spite of contradictions the *Kāvya* is one of the best examples of literary piece of its epoch.

Nārāyaṇivilāsa by the prince Virūpākṣa : In the history of Vijayanagara, at least not less than four princes were called by the name Virūpākṣa or Virupaṇṇa. Virupaṇṇa[2] the governor of Penugoṇḍe was the son of Bukka I and the queen Jommādēvī. Udayagiri[3] Virupaṇṇa was the son of Bukka I and the queen Padumalādēvī. Virupaṇṇa or Virūpākṣa[4] was the son of Harihara II, grandson of Bukka I. *Nārayaṇivilāsa* is a drama written by the prince Virūpākṣa. The problem as to which Virūpākṣa should it be attributed is raised due to an erroneous verse which occurs in the beginning of the play.

Putro bukkanarendrasya dauhitro rāmabhūpateḥ |
Vidyate hi virūpākṣo rājā hariharātmajaḥ ||

On this erroneous verse the two great scholars, late B. A. Saletore and N. Venkataramhnayya have drawn farfetched conclusions by quoting other copper-plate records which are spurious.

They have identified Virūpākṣa as the son of Harihara II, the grandson of Bukka I. Mallāmbikā, the wife of Harihara II was the daughter of Rāmadēva. According to N. V. Dēvagiri Rāmacandra was the father of Mallāmbikā whereas according to B. A. S. it was somebody else.

According to a record from Tīrthahaḷḷi tālūk 16 of *Epigraphia Carnatica* VIII, Vāsukāra Rāmadēva was the father of Padumalādēvī. She was the mother of Udayagiri Virupaṇṇa. In spurious copper plate record of Virūpākṣa it is mentioned that he was the son of Harihara II and Mallāmbikā, the latter being the daughter of Rāmadēva. If we set aside the spurious document, the verse can be read as follows :

Putro bukkanarendrasya dauhitro rāmabhūpateḥ |
Vidyate hi Virūpākṣo rājā hariharātmajaḥ ||

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1. S. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, *Sources of Vijayanagra History*, p. 32-33.
2. *South Indian Inscriptions* VII, no 566; V. Filliozat, *L'Epigraphie de Vijayanagar*, no. 36-37.
3. *Epigraphia Carnatica*, VIII, Tirthahalli 16, V. F. *ibid.*, no. 139.
4. *Epigraphia Indica*, III, p. 225.

Thus, Virupaṇṇa the son of Bukka I and Padumala, the elder brother of Harihara II becomes the author of *Nārāyaṇīvilāsa*. But, to our hypothesis *Unmattarāghava*, another play by the same author raises objection because of the verse :

Pautro bukkanarendrasya dauhitro rāmabhūpateḥ |
Vidyate hi virupākṣo rājā hariharātmajaḥ ||

and also an undated inscription from Śrīraṅgaṃ temple repeats the same *śloka*. As a result until an authentic record throws light on Rāmadēva and his grandson the problem remains unsolved. Perhaps, re-reading of Śrīraṅgaṃ inscription is also worth it.

Sāluvābhyudaya and *Acyutābhyudaya* : by Rājanātha.

Rājanātha belonged to the family of Diṃḍima poets residing at Muḷḷāndrum. They were the court poets and also the best friends of the kings. Celebrated poets who were born in this family were : Aruṇagirinātha, Rājanātha I and Rājanātha II. We will take up only the last two poets thus leaving the former, the author of *Tiruppugal*.

Rājanātha I is the author of *Sāluvābhyudaya* and his grandson Rājanātha II, of *Acyutābhyudaya*.

In *Sāluvābhyudaya* the poet, while describing the marvellous achievements of his master Sāḷuva Narasiṃha, also provides an interesting information about the hero's ancestors.

In the first canto is mentioned Sāluva Maṅgu, one of the ancestors of the family. Sāluva Maṅgu was one of the generals of Kampaṇṇa II who took active part in his master's southern campaigns. The poet credits him with having conquered the Sāṃbuvarāya chieftain and goes to the extent of entitling him "Śāmbuvarāya sthāpanācārya", while enumerating the unhistorical elements in *Madhurāvijaya*, achievements of Mārayanāyaka have already been narrated.[1]

Rājanātha I, however, exaggerates the historical facts. He is nearer to the truth than many other poets. For example, he writes that Sāḷuva Narasiṃha was nominated to the throne at Candragiri. Till the death of the last king of the Saṃgama dynasty i. e. in 1485 Sāḷuvānarasiṃha was his Chief-minister. After the death of his master, though Narasiṃha took all the powers in his hands he never entitled himself as the king of Vijayanagar. In a number of inscriptions his main epithet is *mahāmaṇḍaleśvara* followed by other titles. Most of the modern historians accuse Sāḷuva Narasiṃha of having usurped the throne. There is absolutely no evidence to prove it except stray remarks made by Nuniz, the Portuguese horse-merchant, who was in the capital in the time of Acyutarāya (1535) that is fifty years after the development of the events.

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1. Supra.

Acyutābhyudaya of *Rājanātha* II, relates the events pertaining to the reign of Acyutarāya, the son of Tuḷuva Narasiṃha. In the first Canto, the poet recounts the exploits of Tuḷuva Narasiṃha, the father of the hero. A series of events which the poet has enumerated here are : Narasiṃha conquered a muslim ruler of Mānavadurga ; had a bridge built over swollen Kāvērī near Śrīraṅgapaṭṭaṇam and brought the region under his sway ; etc.

Even in *Sāḷuvābhyudaya* in canto VI there is a reference to the conquest of Muslims by Sāluva Narasiṃha at Pṛthugiri. Pṛthugiri of *Sāluvābhyudaya* is identified with Penugoṇḍe whereas Mānavadurga of *Acyutābhyudaya* is identified with the fort of Mānvi in Raicūr district (not far from Hampi) by the modern historians.

Nuniz, the horse merchant, writes in his chronicles that Kṛṣṇadevarāya wanted to capture Rachol (Raicūr) which was one of the strongholds of Yadalcao.[1] Accordingly, he conquered it in 1521 along with other forts. The inscription which records this historical event, while enumerating the forts conquered by Kṛṣṇadevarāya, mentions also the fort of Mānvi or Mānuve durga.[2] Tuḷuva Narasiṃha died in 1503. Between the lapse of about seventeen years whether the fort of Mānvi was lost to Vijaynagar is not known.

Tuluva Narasiṃha's conquest of Śrīraṅgapaṭṭaṇa is a fantasy of the poet. Exactly the identical events are recorded with regard to the achievements of Saṃgama[3], father of the founders of the Empire. A record on copper plates of the time of Harihara II recounts that "Saṃgama quickly damming up swollen Kāvērī conquered the king of Śrīraṃgapaṭṭaṇa". Since this copper plate record possesses all the elements of an authentic record, the genuineness of the plates is not subject to question. Rājanātha has written the *kāvya* about hundred and fifty years after the reign of Harihara II, no wonder if he had copied the achievements of Saṃgama and attributed them to Narasiṃha, his patron's father. It is surprising to note that a great poet like Rājanātha had copied the facts related in the copper-plate. About the historicity of these events is another problem which will not be treated here.

Varadāṃbikāpariṇaya of Tirumalamba : Acyutarāya is the hero and the *kāvya* recounts his marriage with Varadāṃbā, Kāvērī. This is the most unhistorical *kāvya*. According to the poetess Acyuta succeeds his father Narasa whereas in history of Vijayanagar Narasa was succeeded by his son Bhujabala Narasiṃha and then his half brother Kṛṣṇadēvarāya the great. In *Acyutābhyudaya*[4] Rājanātha says that it was the desire of Narasa that "his three sons should succeed to the throne one after another." This state-

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1. V. F. *Vijayanagara Empire*, National Book Trust, 1977, p. 103.
2. *Annual Report on I. Epigraphy*, 552 of 1960-1961.
3. *Journal of Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, XII, Fleet, Dambal plates, p. 505.
4. *Acyutābhyudaya*, Canto III.15-16, S. K. A. Sources . . . p. 158 and 161.

ment corresponds well with the historical records. The queen Tirumalāṃbā alias Oduva Tirumalāṃbā had rendered history into fiction. The only useful event she mentions in her *Kāvya* is that Narasa married Obāṃbā, the future mother of Acyuta after his pilgrimage to Rāmēśvaram. In 1497, Narasa went on pilgrimage to Rāmēśvaram as recorded in the epigraphs. If what the poetess relates is true, then Acyuta was born between 1498 and 1503 and was in his thirties when he occupied the throne. The authoress has already published[1] an article on "Varadāṃbika ......" in which she has not only questioned the historicity of the facts enumerated by the poetess but has also proved that Oduva Tirumalāṃbā was none other than the poetess Tirumalāṃbā, the queen of the king Acyutarāya.

On the whole these *kāvyā*-s should be read more as literary pieces of their epochs than as authentic historical documents. To glorify their patrons or heroes of their works, the poets did not lag behind the muslim chroniclers in exaggeration of facts, but at the same time, as has been already said they depict a good picture of social and religious life of their times.

In "*Virūpākṣavasantotsava*" there is an interesting pen-picture of the car festival of the god Virūpākṣa and rituals and various other ceremonies that were performed on that occasion. *Sāḷuvābhyudaya* and *Acyutābhyudaya* relate at length the conditions of an expecting lady and the different ceremonies that were celebrated during the period of the pregnancy.

Tirumalāṃbā exhibits all the qualities of an excellent poetess in "*Varadāmbikāpariṇaya*". She excels all her contemporary laureates not only in recounting unhistorical facts but also in displaying her talents as an authoress inferior to none. Nobody can overcome her in the field of imagination and her work is as rich as the exuberant art and architecture of her own period.

IMPORTANT KINGS OF VIJAYANAGAR :

Bukka and Saṃgama (ancestors)

Saṃgama : Harihara I & Bukka I (beginning to 1357 & 1377)
Harihara II, 1377-1404.
Dēvarāya I, 1406-1422.
Dēvarāya II, 1424-1446.
Mallikārjuna & Virūpākṣa, upto 1485.

Sāḷuva : Narasiṃha I, last known date 1493.
Narasiṃha II, 1493-1506.

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1. *Quarterly Journal of Mythic Society*, LXVIII, No. 2. April-June 1977. pp. 40ff.

Tuḷuva : Narasiṃha, last known date 1503.
Bhujabaḷa Narasiṃha, 1503, last date unknown.
Kṛṣṇadēvarāya, 1509-1529.
Acyutarāya, 1529-1542.
Sadāśivarāya, 1542-1570 & even later.

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कालिदास काव्य में वसन्त-सुषमा

धर्मेन्द्र कुमार गुप्त

वसन्त ऋतु को कुसुमाकर, पुष्पसममय, सुरभि तथा मधु भी कहा गया है। ये सभी नाम अन्वर्थ हैं। अपनी प्राकृतिक सुषमा के कारण यह ऋतु सभी ऋतुओं में महत्त्वपूर्ण है। इसीलिए इसे ऋतुराज की उपाधि दी गई है। भगवान् कृष्ण ने भगवद्गीता में अपनी विभूति के माहात्म्यकथन के प्रसङ्ग में स्वयं को 'ऋतूनां कुसुमाकरः' कहकर इस ऋतु की महिमा गाई है।[1] मधु (चैत्र) और माधव (वैशाख) मासों के इस वसन्त में सूर्यदेवता, दक्षिण-यात्रा से मन्द हुए अपने तेज को मानो पुनः प्रतिष्ठित करने के लिए, उत्तरायण में प्रवेश करते हैं। सर्दी दूर करके प्रातःकाल का पाला हटाकर प्रभात को और अधिक चमकाते हुए वह मलयपर्वत से विदा होते हैं।[2]

यह ऋतु चेतन मनुष्य को ही नहीं अपितु जड प्रकृति को भी नये हर्ष और उल्लास से भर देती है। चेतन मानव की कोमल भावनाओं को स्वर देने वाले कवि के हृदय पर तो इसका विशेष प्रभाव पड़ना स्वाभाविक ही है। कविकुलगुरु कालिदास के कवि-हृदय को इस ऋतु ने, स्वभावतः, अत्यधिक प्रभावित किया है। उसकी रचनाओं में इस ऋतु का सर्वाङ्ग-सम्पन्न रूप उभरा है। उनमें हमें इसके रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श तथा सङ्गीत का हृदयावर्जक वर्णन प्राप्त होता है। ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि उसकी लेखनी इस सुभग ऋतु का वर्णन करते नहीं अघाती। ऋतु-संहार, रघुवंश तथा कुमारसम्भव में वसन्त के अनेक मनोहारी चित्र अङ्कित हैं। ये चित्र यथार्थ पर आश्रित कवि की बिम्बग्राहिणी कल्पनाशक्ति का सुन्दर निदर्शन हैं। ये चित्र इन काव्यों में क्रमशः अधिक स्पष्ट, विशद, मधुर तथा भावपूर्ण होते गये हैं।

ऋतुसंहार में कवि ने यौवन और प्रणय की पृष्ठभूमि में वसन्त के प्राकृतिक वैभव का भव्य चित्रण किया है। प्रकृति इन चित्रों में विशद तथा आकर्षक रूप में आती है, यद्यपि इनमें उसका सजीव

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१. भगवद्गीता (गीता प्रेस गोरखपुर, १९७६), १०. ३५.

२. रघुवंश (=रघु०; निर्णयसागर प्रेस, बम्बई, १९१६), ९. २५; तु० दण्डी : अवन्तिसुन्दरीकथा (सं० के० एस० महादेव शास्त्री, त्रिवेन्द्रम, १९५४) पृ० २४.

रूप नहीं उभर पाया है जो इसके बाद के उसके वसन्त-वर्णनों में प्राप्त होता है। इन चित्रों में सूक्ष्मता और भावप्रवणता की अपेक्षा स्थलता और इतिवृत्तात्मकता अधिक है।

रघुवंश में राजा दशरथ के मृगयाविहार के प्रसङ्ग में वसन्त का वर्णन हुआ है। यह वर्णन भावों की तीव्रता, ध्वन्यात्मकता और परिपक्वता की दृष्टि से ऋतुसंहार के वसन्त-वर्णन से बहुत आगे है। यहाँ कल्पना में नवीनता तथा प्रौढता है, तथा कला भी परिष्कृत है। कुमारसम्भव में तारक के वध के हेतु कुमार की उत्पत्ति के लिए समाधिस्थ शिव को पार्वती के प्रति आकृष्ट करने के देवताओं के प्रयत्न के रूप में, स्थाणु (शिव) के तपोवन में वसन्त के पदार्पण का वर्णन है। यह कल्पना अपने आप में बहुत सुन्दर है, जिसे कवि ने अपनी काव्यमयी भाषा में और अधिक हृदयहारी बना दिया है। कवि की कल्पनाशक्ति का यह एक उत्कृष्ठ उदाहरण है। भावों की सूक्ष्मता, अभिव्यक्ति की प्रौढता तथा कल्पना की सुकुमारता यहां दर्शनीय है। प्रकृति इस वर्णन में सजीव तथा सुकुमार मानवी के रूप में आई है; वह वसन्तपुष्पाभरण धारण किए हुए पार्वती के समान सञ्चारिणी पल्लविनी लता के रूप में[1] प्रकट हुई है। यहां दोनों बातें हैं—प्रकृति का मानवीकरण भी और मानव का प्रकृतीकरण भी[2]। कवि के वसन्त-वर्णन के प्रसङ्गों में यह सर्वश्रेष्ठ है।

इन काव्यों के अतिरिक्त, अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तल तथा मालविकाग्निमित्र में भी वसन्त का आनुषङ्गिक चित्रण मिलता है। जहां पहले नाटक में कवि ने दुष्यन्त के हृदय में उसके द्वारा प्रत्याख्यात शकुन्तला के प्रति प्रणयोत्कण्ठा जगाने के लिए वसन्त ऋतु को चुना है, वहां दूसरे में उसने मालविका और अग्निमित्र का प्रणय-मिलन सम्पन्न करने के लिए, अशोक के दोहद की पूर्ति के बहाने, वसन्त का मनोहारी प्रसङ्ग प्रस्तुत किया है। यदि एक में यह श्रृङ्गार रस के वियोग-पक्ष के उद्दीपन के रूप में आया है, तो दूसरे में उसके संयोग-पक्ष के पोषक तत्व के रूप में। इनके अतिरिक्त, अन्यत्र भी उनके काव्यों तथा नाटकों में वसन्त का प्रासङ्गिक उल्लेख हुआ है।

वसन्त–वर्णन के इन प्रसङ्गों में कवि ने छन्दो के चुनाव में भी कवीय अभिरुचि का परिचय दिया है। कवि का प्रिय छन्द उपजाति है जो कुमारसम्भव तथा अंशतः ऋतुसंहार के वसन्त-चित्रों के आलेखन में अपनाया गया है। रघुवंश के वसन्त-श्रृङ्गार में यमक से अलङ्कृत द्रुतविलम्बित छन्द की द्रुत–विलम्बित गति देखते ही बनती है।

कालिदास सौन्दर्योपासक कवि है। उसकी सौन्दर्य-दृष्टि सूक्ष्म तथा मौलिक है। सामान्यतः वह नारी-सौन्दर्य पर मुग्ध है, परन्तु कई स्थानों पर वह प्रकृति की मोहकता को रमणी की कमनीयता से भी अधिक मानता है।[3] उसकी दृष्टि में वसन्तश्री एक सुन्दरी से भी अधिक आकर्षक है, क्योंकि कोकिल की

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१. कुमारसम्भव (=कुमा०; चौखम्बा संस्कृत सीरीज़, वाराणसी, १९६३), ३.५३–४.

२. वही, क्रमशः ३.३९ तथा ३.५४.

३. इस दृष्टि से कालिदास की तुलना अंग्रेजी के शेली तथा हिन्दी के सुमित्रानन्दन पन्त से की जा सकती है।

कुहू-कुहू में स्त्री की वाणी से भी अधिक मिठास है; कुन्द के खिले फूलों की चमक रमणी की हासोज्ज्वल दन्तच्छवि को मात करती है तथा मूंगे जैसी लाल-लाल कोंपलों की लालिमा सुन्दरी की कोमल लाल हथेलियों की लाली से भी अधिक आकर्षक है—

परभृतकलगीतैर्ह्लादिभिः सद्वचांसि
स्मितदशनमयूखान् कुन्दपुष्पप्रभाभिः ।
करकिसलयकान्ति पल्लवैर्विद्रुमाभै-
रुपहसति वसन्तः कामिनीनामिदानीम् ॥[1]

निसर्ग-सौन्दर्य में ही नहीं, अपितु शृङ्गार-प्रसाधन की कला में भी वासन्ती शोभा स्त्रियों से कहीं आगे है। कवि कहता है कि वसन्त-लक्ष्मी ने रक्ताशोक की लाली से रमणियों के होठों की आलते की ललाई को लजा दिया है, रंगबिरंगे कुरबक के फूलों से सुवदना के वदन पर चित्रित चित्रकारी को फीका कर दिया है तथा काले भौंरों से लिपटे हुए तिलक के फूलों से सुन्दरी के माथे की बिन्दी को नीचा दिखा यदि है—

रक्ताशोकरुचा विशेषितगुणो बिम्बाधरालक्तकः
प्रत्याख्यातविशेषकं कुरबकं श्यामावदातारुणम् ।
आक्रान्ता तिलकक्रिया च तिलकैर्लग्नद्विरेफाञ्जनैः
सावज्ञेव मुखप्रसाधनविधौ श्रीर्माधवी योषिताम् ॥[2]

अन्यत्र कवि कहता है कि यह मधुश्री भौंरे रूपी आँजन से अपनी आंखें आँजती है, अपने माथे पर तिलक के फुल की बिन्दी सजाती है और प्रभात के सूर्य की अरुणाभा से चमकने वाली आम की कोंपलों से अपने होंठ रंगती है—

लग्नद्विरेफाञ्जनभक्तिचित्रं मुखे मधुश्रीस्तिलकं प्रकाश्य ।
रागेण बालारुणकोमलेन चूतप्रवालौष्टमलञ्चकार ॥[3]

कालिदास की वसन्त ऋतु सौन्दर्य, सरसता, सौरभ, सुकुमारता तथा सङ्गति की समवेत छवि है। इसका प्रत्येक क्षण सुख और समृद्धि का सन्देश देता है। इस ऋतु में प्रत्येक पदार्थ एक नूतन आभा से भर जाता है, तरु-लताएं फूलों से लद जाती हैं, सरोवरों में कमल खिल जाते हैं, स्त्रियों के हृदय में कोमल भावनाओं का उदय हो जाता है, हवा में महक फैल जाती है, शाम सुहावनी हो जाती है तथा दिन अच्छा लगने लगता है—

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१. ऋतुसंहार (ऋतु०; सं० डॉ० प्रभुदयालु अग्निहोत्री, भोपाल, १९६४), पृ० ८४.
२. मालविकाग्निमित्र (माल०; सं० चारुदेव शास्त्री, लाहौर, १९३३) ३. ५.
३. कुमा० ३. ३०.

द्रुमाः सपुष्पाः सलिलं सपद्मं स्त्रियः सकामाः पवनः सुगन्धिः ।
सुखाः प्रदोषा दिवसाश्च रम्याः सर्वं प्रिये चारुतरं वसन्ते ॥[१]

इस ऋतु में उषाकाल सुहावना होता है, सर्दी घट जाती है, पाला हट जाता है तथा सूरज की चमक बढ़ जाती है ।[२] कोयल की कुहू-ध्वनि को चारों ओर फैलाने वाले और बौरे हुए आम की डालों को हिलाने वाले[३] तथा उनकी मञ्जरियों की महक को चहुंदिश बिखेरने वाले[४] वसन्ती पवन के झोंके मन को प्रफुल्लित कर देते हैं । कवि के शब्दों में—

आकम्पयन् कुसुमिताः सहकारशाखा
विस्तारयन् परभृतस्य वचांसि दिक्षु ।
वायुर्विवाति हृदयानि हरन्नराणां
नीहारपातविगमात् सुभगो वसन्ते ॥[५]

दक्षिण की अथवा मलयपर्वत की यह बयार मानों सूर्य के उत्तरायण हो जाने पर उसकी प्रियतम दक्षिणदिशा की दुःख-भरी उसासें हैं—

कुबेरगुप्तां दिशमुष्णरश्मौ गन्तुं प्रवृत्ते समयं विलङ्घ्य ।
दिग्दक्षिणा गन्धवहं मुखेन व्यलीकनिःश्वासमिवोत्ससर्ज ॥[६]

फूलों के पराग में बसी हुई और खुलती कोपलों से जल--कणों को उड़ा ले जाने वाली यह बयार बिना कारण ही, हृदय को उत्कण्ठित कर देती है[७] । इसका सुखद झोंका ऐसा प्रतीत होता है मानों वसन्त अपने स्निग्ध--शीतल स्पर्श से अङ्गों को सहला रहा हो[८] । इसके द्वारा उड़ाए पुष्प-पराग की रेखा मानों धनुर्धारी कामदेव की पताका है; यह पुष्प-धूलि मानों वसन्तश्री के मुख पर लगाने का शृङ्गार-चूर्ण है ।[९]

इस ऋतु में दिन सुखद और सुहावने हो जाते हैं[१०] । धूप में मामूली गर्मी आ जाती है और लोग

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१. ऋतु० ६. २.
२. रघु० ९.२५; ३२.
३. ऋतु० ६. २२; रघु० ९. ३३.
४. ऋतु० पृ० ८२; माल० ३.४.
५. ऋतु० ६. २२.
६. कुमा० ३. २५; तु० अवन्तिसुन्दरीकथा, पृ० २४ (भावसाम्य द्रष्टव्य है) ।
७. माल० ३. ९.
८. वही, ३. ४.
९. रघु० ९. ४५.
१०. ऋतु० ६. २

वृक्षों की शीतल छाया में रहना पसन्द करते हैं।[१] मोटे वस्त्र उतर जाते हैं और उनके स्थान पर महीन कपड़े निकल आते हैं।[२] बावड़ी का पानी कुछ कोसा हो जाने के कारण मन को भाने लगता है।[३] कोमल होठों और सुन्दर गोरे वदनों वाली किन्नरियों तथा सुन्दरियों के मुख पर चीती हुई चित्रकारी भी बूंदों से फैलने लगती है।[४]

सायंकाल भी बड़ा सुहावना लगता है।[५] रातें छोटी हो जाती हैं[६] और उनकी शोभा बढ़ जाती है, क्योंकि चन्द्रमा की चांदनी में, इस ऋतु में, निखार आ जाता है।[७] कोहरा हट जाने से तारे भी स्पष्ट खिल जाते हैं।[८] लोग सोने के लिए सुखद शीतल छतों पर पहुंच जाते हैं।[९] रात के समय थोड़ी-थोड़ी ठण्ड हो जाती है तथा मामूली ओस भी पड़ने लगती है।[१०]

इन दिनों वनप्रदेशों तथा उपवनों की शोभा भी देखने योग्य होती है।[११] राजभवनों के प्रमदवनों का तो कहना ही क्या ? वे तो मानो राजा को लुभाने के लिए युवतियों के भी साज-सिंगार को लजाने वाले वसन्त के फूलों का शृङ्गार धारण कर लेते हैं।[१२] उपवन में अनेक रंगों के फूलों से कुरबक के पेड़ ऐसे जान पड़ते हैं मानो वसन्त ने वनश्री के शरीर पर बेल-बूटे चीतकर उसका शृङ्गार कर दिया हो।[१३]

वृक्ष तथा लताएं, इस ऋतु में, रमणी के होठों के समान अथवा मूँगों के समान लाल-कोंपलों से[१४] और रंगबिरंगे महकते फूलों से लद जाती हैं।[१५] पहले फूलों की डोडियां लगती हैं, फिर उनकी पंखुड़ियां फूटती हैं और तदनन्तर वसन्त धीरे-धीरे समस्त वनस्थली पर छा जाता है।[१६] उपवन की लताएं

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१. वही, पृ० ८२.
२. वही, ६. १३.
३. वही, ६. ३.
४. कुमा० ३. ३३; ऋतु० ६. ७.
५. वही, ६. २.
६. रघु० ९. ३८.
७. ऋतु० ६. ३; माल० २. ७.
८. वही, ५. ७.
९. ऋतु० पृ० ८२.
१०. वही पृ० ८२.
११. वही, ६. २३.
१२. माल० ३. ४, गद्य
१३. रघु० ९. २९.
१४. (क) कुमा० ३. ३०; ३९; तु० अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तल (= अभि०; सं० एम० आर० काले०, दिल्ली १९६९), १. १९; (ख) ऋतु० पृ० ८४; कुमा० ३. ३०; ३९,
१५. ऋतु० ६. २; कुमा० ३. ३९; तु० अभि० ७.२५, गद्य।
१६. रघु० ९. २६.

नाचती-गाती तथा हंसी बिखेरती अल्हड़ स्त्रियों-सी प्रतीत होती हैं : श्रुतिसुखद भौंरों की गुंजार उनके गीत होते हैं और खिले हुए कोमल फूल उनकी स्मित-जन्य दन्तच्छवि हैं, और वायु से हिलती हुई कोंपलों वाले हाथों से वे मानों अनेक प्रकार के हाव-भाव दिखाती हैं—

श्रुतिसुखभ्रमरस्वनगीतयः कुसुमकोमलदन्तरुचो बभुः ।
उपवनान्तलताः पवनाहतैः किसलयैः सलयैरिव पाणिभिः ॥[१]

आम के पेड़ बौरा जाते हैं और बड़े सुन्दर लगने लगते हैं।[२] लाल-लाल कोंपलों के गुच्छों से ये झुक जाते हैं, और सुन्दर सुनहरी मञ्जरियों से लदी हुई इनकी शाखाएं पवन के झोंकों में इस प्रकार हिलती हैं[३] मानो ये नृत्य का अभिनय सीख रही हों।[४] इन बौरों की भीनी सुगन्ध हवा में बस जाती है। कुछ लाल-हरे-पीले रंग वाले ये बौर[५], कोकिल के स्वर में, वसन्त को आने का निमन्त्रण देते हैं[६] तथा लोगों को वसन्त के आगमन की सूचना देते हैं; इसीलिए इनका 'वसन्तदूत' नाम सार्थक है। ये बौर ही इस ऋतु के सर्वस्व हैं।[७] आम के बौर के आस्वाद से कषायित कण्ठ वाले कोकिल मीठे स्वर से कूकते हैं : मानो कामदेव का सन्देश सुनाते हैं।[८] दूसरी ओर, कोकिलाओं का आलाप भोली बधुओं की बातचीत से कम आकर्षक नहीं होता है।[९]

इन आम्र-मञ्जरियों पर मदमस्त भौंरे मंडराते हैं तथा गीत-सा गुनगुनाते हैं।[१०] आम की मञ्जरियों से इन्हें विशेष लगाव है, चाहे अन्यान्य फूलों से भी ये रसपान करते हैं।[११] इन बौरों पर झूम रहे ये काले भौंरे ऐसे लगते हैं मानो कामदेव के बाणों पर लिखे हुए उसके नाम के अक्षर हों।[१२] फूलों पर इधर-उधर झूमते हुए इन भौंरों की पङ्क्ति वसन्तश्री की आंखों में लगे अञ्जन के समान प्रतीत होती है।[१३]

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१. वही, ९. ३५.
२. ऋतु० ६. ३
३. वही, ६. १५; २२; पृ० ८२.
४. रघु० ९. ३३. तु० कादम्बरी (सं० पी० एल० वैद्य, पूना, १९३५), अनु० ३४३; दशकुमारचरित (सं० एम० आर० काले, पुनर्मुद्रण, दिल्ली, १९६६), पृ० १७७.
५. अभि० ६. २.
६. कुमा० ६. २
७. माल० ३. १३, गद्य; अभि० ६.२.
८. कुमा० ३. ३२
९. रघु० ९. ३४
१०. ऋतु० ६. १४. तु० ६. २१; २४ भी।
११. कुमा० १. २७. (अभि० ५. १) कमल के फूलों के लिए इनके विशेष आदर का वर्णन किया गया है।
१२. कुमा० ३. २७.
१३. रघु० ९. ४१; कुमा० ३. ३०; माल० ३.५. (= मेघ०)

इधर अशोक के वृक्षों में नई कोपलें फूट निकलती हैं, और साथ ही सुन्दरी के, आलते से रंगे, नूपुर से झङ्कृत कोमल चरणों के प्रहार से–जो कविसमय के अनुसार अशोक का दोहद है[1]–इनमें नीचे से ऊपर तक लाल-लाल फल खिल आते हैं।[2] इन फूलों का रंग सुन्दरी के अमृत--भरे अधरों के समान[3] अथवा पद्मराग या मूंगे के समान[4] है।

कुरबक (कटसरैया) के फूल भी इस ऋतु में खिल जाते हैं जो रमणियों के वदन के समान सुन्दर लगते हैं।[5] इसके काले, उजले और लाल रंग के फूल स्त्रियों के मुखों पर चीती हुई चित्रकारी की छवि को भी मात करते हैं।[6] हवा में इनकी मादक गन्ध बस जाती है।[7] इन फूलों से इतना मधु बहता है कि भौंरे मस्त होकर इन्हीं पर गुनगुनाते रहते हैं।[8]

बकुल (मौलसिरी) के वृक्ष भी इस ऋतु में फूल उटते हैं और मधु के लोभी भौंरे उनपर मंडराने लगते हैं।[9] सुन्दरियों की मुख–मदिरा के छींटों से—जो कवि-परम्परा में इनका दोहद है—ये खिल पड़ते हैं।[10] सम्भवतः इसीलिए इसके फलों की सुगन्ध में मदिरा की मादकता होती है।[11] कवि के अनुसार इनको जितना मसला जाता है उतना ही ये अधिक गन्ध देते हैं[12]—स्वयं कालिदास की वाणी के समान जिसे श्रीकृष्ण कवि ने 'विमर्दहृद्या' कहा है।[13]

इस ऋतु में खिलने वाले तिलक के फूल वसन्तश्री के माथे पर तिलक की बिन्दी के समान प्रतीत होते हैं।[14] काले भौंरों से लिपटे हुए ये फूल स्त्रियों की काली लटों से घिरे माथे पर के तिलक की छवि

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१. वही, ३.८, गद्य; १२; १७; ५. ५. मेघदूत (= मेघ०; सं० सुशीलकुमार दे, साहित्य अकादमी, नई दिल्ली, १९७०), ७५; कुमा० ३.२६
२. ऋतु० ६. १६; कुमा० ३. २६.
३. ऋतु० पु० ८०; माल० ३. ५.
४. कुमा० ३. ५३; ऋतु० ६. १६,
५. वही, ६. १८.
६. माल० ३.५
७. वही, ३.९.
८. कुमा० ३. २९
९. रघु० ९.३०
१०. मेघ० ७५; रघु० ९. ३०
११. वही, ९. ३६
१२. माल० ३. १३, गद्य।
१३. अस्पृष्टदोषा नलिनीव रम्या हारावलीव ग्रथिता गुणौघैः।
प्रियाङ्कपालीव विमर्दहृद्या न कालिदासादपरस्य वाणी ॥—भरतचरित्र, प्रस्तावनाश्लोक।
१४. कुमा० ३. ३०; रघु० ९.४१,

को नीचा दिखाते हैं।[1] पराग-कणों से भरे इनके फूलों की पङ्क्ति, उन पर मंडराते हुए भौंरों के झुण्ड के कारण, ऐसी हृदयहारी लगती है जैसे स्त्रियों के सिर पर मोतियों की माला—

उपचितावयवा शुचिभिः कणैरलिकदम्बकयोगमुपेयुषी ।
सदृशकान्तिरलक्ष्यत मञ्जरी तिलकजालकजालकमौक्तिकैः ॥[2]

कर्णिकार (कनेर) के फूल भी वसन्त की शोभा में चार चांद लगाते हैं।[3] इनकी सुन्दरता देखते ही बनती है, और यह सोने की चमक को भी पीछे छोड़ देती है।[4] हवन की अग्नि के समान चमकते हुए ये फूल वनश्री के कानों के कर्णफूल जैसे लगते हैं।[5] काश, इन दृष्टिसुभग फूलों में सुगन्ध भी होती ! कवि को दुःख है कि विधाता की ऐसी प्रवृत्ति बन गई है कि वह किसी भी वस्तु में पूरे गुण नहीं भरता—

वर्णप्रकर्षे सति कर्णिकारं दुनोति निर्गन्धतया स्म चेतः ।
प्रायेण सामग्र्यविधौ गुणानां पराङ्मुखी विश्वसृजः प्रवृत्तिः ॥[6]

बेचारे पलाश के फूलों के साथ भी विधाता ने यही अन्याय किया है। नहीं तो, सुग्गे की चोंच के समान लाल रंग के इसके फूल[7] मन को और अधिक भाते। वनभूमि में फैले हुए, दूज के चांद के समान टेढ़े टेसू के अधखिले फूल ऐसे लगते हैं मानो वसन्त ने वनश्री के साथ विहार करते हुए उसपर अपने नखों के नये चिह्न बना दिए हों,[8] अथवा काम के आवेश में लाज छोड़कर किसी कामिनी ने ही अपने प्रियतम के शरीर पर अनेक नखक्षत कर डाले हों।[9] पवन के झोंकों से हिलते हुए, दीप्त अग्नि के समान दिखाई पड़ने वाले टेसू के फूलों से सर्वतः ढंकी हुई वनभूमि ऐसी लगती है मानों लाल दुपट्टे में लिपटी हुई कोई नई-नवेली दुलहिन हो—

आदीप्तवह्निसदृशैर्मरुतावधूतैः सर्वत्र किंशुकवनैः कुसुमावनम्रैः ।
सद्यो वसन्तसमयेन समाचितेयं रक्तांशुका नवबधूरिव भाति भूमिः ॥[10]

मोतियों की माला के समान सफ़ेद सिन्दुवार (सेनुआर) के फूल भी इस ऋतु की शोभा बढ़ाते

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१. माल० ३. ५.
२. रघु० ९. ४४.
३. ऋतु० ६.५; २०; २७.
४. कुमा० ३.५३.
५. रघु० ९.४०.
६. कुमा० ३.२८.
७. ऋतु० ६.१९
८. कुमा० ३.२९.
९. रघु० ९.३१.
१०. ऋतु० ६.१९.

हैं।[1] इधर कुन्द के उजले फल कामिनी की शुभ्र मादक हंसी के समान खिल जाते हैं।[2] इनकी चमक स्त्रियों की मुस्कान पर चमक उठने वाले दांतों की दमक की हंसी–सी उड़ाती है।[3]

माधवी लता अथवा वासन्ती के फूलों को मतवाले भौंरे चूमने लगते हैं; इनके नये कोमल पत्ते मन्द-मन्द पवन में झूमने लगते हैं, जिन्हें देखकर सहृदय के हृदय में अनुराग की उत्कण्ठा जाग जाती है।[4] माधवी के समान नवमल्लिका (बेल मोतिया) भी वृक्षों की सुन्दरी नायिका है[5], जो अपनी मधु-मदिरा की सुगन्ध से, लाल-लाल पत्तों के होंठो पर फलों की मुस्कान लेकर, देखने वालों को पागल बना देती है—

अमदयन्मधुगन्धसनाथया किसलयाधरसङ्गतया मनः ।
कुसुमसम्भृतया नवमल्लिका स्मितरुचा तरुचारुविलासिनी ॥[6]

उपवनों के समान सरोवरों की शोभा भी दर्शनीय है। यहां कमल खिले हैं।[7] सम्पन्न लोगों के घरों के भीतर बनी हुई बावड़ियों में भी कमल खिल गए है; वे ऐसे लगते हैं मानों स्नान कर रही सुन्दरियों के, पानी से बाहर झांक रहे, मुस्कराते वदन हों; साथ ही इनमें चहचहाते जलपक्षियों का कलरव ऐसा प्रतीत होता है मानो उन सुवदनाओं की करधनियां बज रही हों—

शुशुभिरे स्मितचारुतराननाः स्त्रिय इव श्लथशिञ्जितमेखलाः ।
विकचतामरसा गृहदीर्घिका मदकलोदकलोलविहङ्गमाः ॥[8]

वसन्त की शोभा से परिव्याप्त ताल की कमलिनी के पास भौंरे और हंस मंडरा रहे हैं।[9] चकवा-चकवी भी जल-क्रीडा में निरत हैं।[10]

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१. कुमा० ३. ५६.
२. ऋतु० ६.२३.
३. वही, पृ० ८४; तु० पृ० ८० भी। अन्यत्र (माल० ३.८) कवि ने वैशाख मास में इसके पत्तों के पक जाने तथा इने-गिने फूल बच रहने का उल्लेख किया है।
४. ऋतु० ६.१७. मेघ० (७५) में अलका नगरी में यक्ष के भवन के पास क्रीडापर्वत पर कुरबक के वृक्षों के घिरे माधवीमण्डप का सुन्दर उल्लेख है। अभि० (३.१०, गद्य) में आम्रवृक्ष से लिपटी नये पत्तों वाली माधवी लता का उल्लेख भी महत्वपूर्ण है। इसी कृति में अन्यत्र (३.८) विरह में कृश शकुन्तला को वायु के स्पर्श से मुरझाई हुई पत्तियों वाली माधवी लता के सदृश कहा गया है।
५. अभि० ४.१३
६. रघु० ९.४२.
७. ऋतु० ६.२.
८. रघु० ९.३७.
९. वही, ९. २७.
१०. कुमा० ३.३७.

वनभूमि और पर्वतप्रदेशों की छटा भी दर्शनीय है। चट्टानों से घिरी पहाड़ियों की चोटियों के ओर-छोर पर सुन्दर फूलों के पेड़ों के ऊपर कोयलों की कूक छा रही है।[१] प्रियाल (चिरौंजी) के फूलों की धूल के उड़-उड़कर आँखों में पड़ने से भली भांति न देख पा रहे मतवाले हिरण शिशिर में झड़े सूखे पत्तों की मर्मर-ध्वनि वाली धरती पर इधर-उधर दौड़ते फिर रहे हैं।[२]

वसन्त की इस निसर्ग-सुषमा का मानव-हृदय पर—या कहिए प्राणिमात्र के हृदय पर—मादक प्रभाव पड़ना स्वाभाविक है। कवि ने इस प्रभाव का मनोवैज्ञानिक वर्णन किया है। उसने तो जड प्रकृति पर भी इसके मोहक प्रभाव की झाँकी प्रस्तुत की है। वसन्त मानव-हृदय को प्रेम-विभोर कर देता है; वह उसे काम-विह्वल बना देता है। यही वसन्त और कामदेव की अनन्य मित्रता अथवा बन्धुता का रहस्य है।[३] यह रूपक-कल्पना बड़ी सजीव तथा सटीक है। कविकुलगुरु कालिदास ने इन दोनों के बन्धुत्व के इस रूपक का भली भांति उपयोग किया है। वस्तुतः उसने अपनी रचनाओं में शृङ्गार रस के उद्दीपन के रूप में ही, प्रमुखतः, वसन्त का वर्णन किया है। ऋतुसंहार में भी, जहां उसको आलम्बन के रूप में ग्रहण किया गया है, उसका उद्दीपन रूप ही मुख्यतः मुखरित है। इसके प्रायः प्रत्येक पद्य में वासन्ती सुषमा का वर्णन प्रेम-भावना के सन्दर्भ में ही किया गया है। कवि के अनुसार, इस ऋतु में वसन्त नहीं अपितु महाराज कामदेव ही आम्रमञ्जरी के बाणों का तरकस हाथ में संभाले[४], वसन्त को सेनापति के रूप में साथ लेकर, मलयानिल रूपी मदमस्त हाथी पर सवार होकर, टेसू के धनुष् पर भौंरों की डोरी कसे, आम की बौरों के बाणों से प्रेमियों का हृदय-बेधन करने के लिए पदार्पण करते हैं; इसके साथ चारणों के रूप में कोकिल होते हैं तथा चन्द्रमा अपना श्वेत छत्र इस विजयी राजा के सिर के ऊपर धारता है।[५]

कवि ने इस ऋतु में स्त्रियों के सौन्दर्य में निखार,[६] उनके हृदयों में अनुराग के प्रस्फुटन और पल्लवन[७] तथा वासन्तिक फूलों के आभूषणों से सजने की उनकी चाह[८] का विशेष रूप से वर्णन किया है। लाल-लाल कोंपलों के गुच्छों से झुके हुए और सुन्दर मञ्जरियों से लदी हूई शाखाओं वाले आम के पेड़ जब पवन के झोंकों से हिलने लगते है तो उन्हें देख-देखकर नायिकाओं का मन प्रेमोत्सुक हो जाता है।[९] अशोक

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१. ऋतु० ६.२५
२. कुमा० ३.३१
३. तु० ऋतु० ६.१; ११; २८; कुमा० २.६४; ३.२१; ४.२४; २९. तु० दशकुमारचरित, पृ० ९८.
४. तु० कुमा० २.६४; ३.२७. कामदेव को आम्राङ्कुर विशेष प्रिय है (तु० कुमा० ४.३८)।
५. ऋतु० ६.२८
६. वही, ६.३; ९–११.
७. वही ६.२; ८; १५; तु० दशकुमारचरित, पृ० १७७; अवन्तिसुन्दरीकथा, पृ० २५; कादम्बरी, अनु० ३४४.
८. ऋतु० ६.५
९. वही, ६.१५

और माधवी आदि तरुओं तथा लताओं को उनके पूरे यौवन में देखकर तथा कोकिल और भ्रमरों का मधुर सङ्गीत सुनकर उनके मन की अस्थिरता बढ़ जाती है।[१] कोयल की कूक में तो मानो उन्हें कामदेव का यह सन्देश मिलता है : "तुम रूठना छोड़ दो, लड़ाई-झगड़ा छोड़ो। यह चतुर यौवन फिर वापस नहीं आयेगा–[२]" "त्यजत मानमलं बत विग्रहैर्न पुनरेति गतं चतुरं वयः"। स्वभावतः नायिकाएं कामदेव की इस सलाह को मान लेती हैं – "स्मरमते रमते स्म वधूजनः[३]।" इसीलिए वसन्त को 'शृङ्गारदीक्षागुरु' कहा गया है[४]।

इस काल में सुन्दरियां मुख्यतः वासन्तिक फूलों के आभरणों से ही अपने आपको सजाती हैं। वे कुसुम्भ के लाल रंग से[५] अथवा महावर से रंगे तथा अगर-धूप से सुवासित महीन कपड़े धारण करती हैं।[६] अपनी काली-घुंघराली लटों में वे अशोक के फूल[७] और बेल मोतिया की खिली हुई कलियाँ[८] या कुन्द के उजले फूल[९] सजाती हैं। जूड़ों में कुरबक का ताजा फल[१०] अथवा चम्पे की कलियां[११] खोंसती हैं। प्रियतम के हाथों से बालों में खोंसे गए, सुन्दर पंखुड़ी और पराग वाले कनेर के फल तो प्रेयसी के केशपाश की अपूर्व शोभा बढ़ाते हैं।[१२]

कानों में स्त्रियां अशोक की कोमल कोंपलें,[१३] कनेर का सुनहरा फल,[१४] अथवा जवारा (यवांकुर)[१५] खोंसती हैं। मुख पर बेल-बूटे (पत्रलेखा) चीतती हैं[१६]। गले में वे सुन्दर फूलों का हार धारण करती हैं[१७]।

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१. वही, ६.१६–८; २१; २७; कुमा० ३.३२.
२. रघु० ९.४७; तु० कुमा० ३.३२.
३. रघु० ९.४७; ऋतु० पृ० ८०.
४. ऋतु० पृ० ८०.
५. वही, ६.४,
६. वही, ६.१३; रघु० ९.४३.
७. ऋतु० ६.५; कुमा० ३.५३.
८. ऋतु० ६.५.
९. मेघ० ६५.
१०. ऋतु० पृ० ७८; मेघ० ६५.
११. ऋतु० पृ० ८२.
१२. रघु० ९.४०; कुमा० (३.६२) में कवि ने पार्वती के केशपाश के बीच में गुंथे कर्णिकार के फूल का वर्णन किया है।
१३. रघु० ९.२८; माल० ३.१६.
१४. ऋतु० ६.५; कुमा० ३.५३.
१५. रघु० ९.४३.
१६. ऋतु० ६.७; कुमा० ३.३३,३८.
१७. ऋतु० ६.६.

वे मोतियों का हार भी, उसे धौले चन्दन-जल में भिगोकर, पहनती हैं ।[१] अपने गौरवर्ण उरोजों पर वे प्रियङ्गु, कालीयक और कुङ्कुम के रस में कस्तूरी तथा चन्दन मिलाकर उसके घोल से लेप करती हैं[२] । बाहों में वे (सम्भवतः फूलों के) वलय और बाजूबन्द पहनती हैं[३] तथा हाथ में लीलारविन्द धारण करती हैं[४] । नितम्बप्रदेश पर वे करधनी बांधती है[५] जो सोने या मणियों की अथवा केसर के फूलों की होती हैं[६] ।

युवक नागर-जनों पर भी वसन्त के मादक प्रभाव का वर्णन कवि ने अनेकत्र किया है[७] । प्रवासी विरहियों की दयनीय स्थिति का तो विशेष रूप से उल्लेख है[८] । मतवाले भौंरे जब माधवी के फूलों का अधर-मधुपान करते हैं[९] अथवा जब नायिका के वदन के समान उज्ज्वल कुरबक की मञ्जरियां खिल पड़ती हैं तब कवि कहता है, किस सहृदय का मन कामोत्सुक नहीं हो जाता[१०] ? सुन्दरी की विभ्रम-पूर्ण हंसी के समान उजले कुन्द-पुष्पों को देखकर मुनियों का मन भी डोल जाता है[११] । वसन्त के पुष्पाभरणों से सजी हुई स्त्रियां अपनी मतवाली चञ्चल चितवन से तपस्वियों का मन भी डिगा देती हैं[१२] । कुरबक के पराग से सुरभित तथा किसलयों के खुलने से उनके अन्दर स्थित जल की बूंदों को उड़ा ले जाने वाला मलयानिल अकारण ही मन में उत्कण्ठा भर देता है—

वोढा कुरबकरजसा किसलयपुटभेदशीकरानुगतः ।
अनिमित्तोत्कण्ठामपि जनयति मनसो मलयवातः ॥[१३]

यही कारण है कि जब शिव के आश्रम-वन में सहसा वसन्त का आगमन होता है तब वहां के तपस्वी बड़ी कठिनता से अपने मन को विकृत होने से रोक पाते हैं ।[१४] कुमारसम्भव के अनुसार, कामदेव ने

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१. वही, ६.७; पृ० ७८.
२. वही, ६.१२.
३. वही, ९.६.
४. कुमा० ३.५६; ६.८४; मेघ० ६५.
५. ऋतु० ६.६; रघु० ९.३७
६. (क) ऋतु० ६.२४; (ख) वही, ६.३; (ग) कुमा० ३.५५.
७. ऋतु० ६.१८; २०; २३; २४.
८. वही, ६२.६; पृ० ८२ ; तु० दशकुमारचरित, पृ० ४२; १७६; अवन्तिसुन्दरीकथा, पृ० २५; कादम्बरी, अनु० ३४३; काव्यादर्श (सं० धर्मेन्द्रकुमार गुप्त, दिल्ली, १९७३), २.३३८; ३५३.
९. ऋतु० ६.१७
१०. वही, ६.१३.
११. वही, ६.२३; तु० रघु० ९.३३.
१२. ऋतु पृ० ७८; ६.२३; २४; तु० रघु० ९.४३.
१३. माल० ३.९.
१४. कुमा० ३.३४

इसी वसन्त की सहायता के बल पर समाधिस्थ शिव को डिगाने का बीड़ा उठाया था। इन्द्र के प्रति उसके शब्द हैं—

तव प्रसादात् कुसुमायुधोऽपि सहायमेकं मधुमेव लब्ध्वा।
कुर्यां हरस्यापि पिनाकपाणेर्धैर्यच्युतिं के मम धन्विनोऽन्ये[1]॥

शिव के इस तपोवन में, कामदेव के नेतृत्व में वसन्त के आगमन का चेतन और जड पदार्थों पर जो मादक प्रभाव पड़ा उसका वर्णन कवि के शब्दों में ही देखना उचित होगा। उस तपोवन में ऋतु–राज के पदार्पण करते ही जड–चेतन में एक अपूर्व उत्कण्ठा जाग उठी—

मधु द्विरेफः कुसुमैकपात्रे पपौ प्रियां स्वामनुवर्तमानः।
शृङ्गेण च स्पर्शनिमीलिताक्षीं मृगीमकण्डूयत कृष्णसारः॥
ददौ रसात् पङ्कजरेणुगन्धि गजाय गण्डूषजलं करेणुः।
अर्धोपभुक्तेन बिसेन जायां सम्भावयामास रथाङ्गनामा॥
गीतान्तरेषु श्रमवारिलेशैः किञ्चित्समुच्छ्वासितपत्रलेखम्।
पुष्पासवाघूर्णितनेत्रशोभि प्रियामुखं किम्पुरुषश्चुचुम्ब॥
पर्याप्तपुष्पस्तबकस्तनाभ्यः स्फुरत्प्रवालौष्ठमनोहराभ्यः।
लतावधूभ्यस्तरवोऽप्यवापुर्विनम्रशाखाभुजबन्धनानि॥[2]

अर्थात् उस समय भौंरा अपनी प्रिया के पीछे-पीछे घूमता हुआ पुष्प–रस से भरे एक ही फूल-कटोरे में मधुपान करने लगा[3]। काला हिरण, अपने सींग से, स्पर्श–सुख से आखें मूंदे बैठी हिरणी की आंख खुजाने लगा[4]। हथिनी बड़े प्रेम से, अपनी सूंड से कमल के पराग में बसा हुआ सुगन्धित जल निकाल कर हाथी को पिलाने लगी और चकवा भी आधी कुतरी कमल–नाल लेकर चकवी को भेंट करने लगा। किम्पुरुष गीतों के बीच में ही, थकावट के कारण आये पसीने की बूंदों से कुछ–कुछ पुंछ गई चित्रकारी वाले, अपनी प्रियाओं के वदनों का चुम्बन करने लगे। और तो और, वृक्ष भी बड़े–बड़े फूलों के गुच्छों रूपी उरोजों वाली तथा चमक रही लाल कोंपलों रूपी सुन्दर होठों वाली लता सुन्दरियों का, उनकी झुकी हुई शाखा रूपी बांहों से, आलिङ्गन प्राप्त करने लगे।

वसन्त के इस मादक प्रभाव से अभी तक शिव अछूते बचे थे, परन्तु जब इस मोहक वातावरण में पार्वती उनके समक्ष उपस्थित हुई तब उनका धैर्य भी एक बार डोल गया,[5] क्योंकि वसन्त–पुष्पों का आभरण धारण किये यह पार्वती स्वयं वासन्तिक लता बनकर उनके सामने आई थी—

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१. वही, ३.१०.
२. वही, ३.३६–३९.
३. तु० ऋतु० ६.१४ भी।
४. तु० अभि० ६.१७. यहां हिरण की आंख खुजाती हिरणी का वर्णन किया गया है।
५. कुमा० ३.६७

आवर्जिता किञ्चिदिव स्तनाभ्यां वासो वसाना तरुणार्करागम् ।
पर्याप्तपुष्पस्तबकावनम्रा सञ्चारिणी पल्लविनी लतेव ॥[1]

इस प्रकार कालिदास की कृतियों में ऋतुराज वसन्त का सर्वाङ्गपूर्ण चित्र उभरा है। वह आलम्बन बनकर भी आया है और उद्दीपन के रूप में भी, यद्यपि उसका उद्दीपन रूप ही प्रमुख तथा मुखर है। उपमान के रूप में भी वसन्त के विभिन्न तरु–लता–पुष्पों का उल्लेख है। इनको कहीं–कहीं उपमेय के रूप में भी प्रस्तुत किया गया है; इस स्थिति में सुन्दरी के लावण्य–पर्ण अङ्गों को उपमान के रूप में रखा गया है।

कवि की रचनाओं में वसन्त की शोभा के चित्र जिस किसी भी रूप में आये हैं, उन चित्रों में वसन्त के ही पुष्पों के विविध रंग हैं, उन्हीं के पुष्पों का मधुर मधु है, उन्हीं की मादक सुगन्ध है तथा उन्हीं के समान है स्पर्श–रमणीय कोमलता । इसके साथ ही इन चित्रों में कोकिल और भ्रमरों का मधुर सङ्गीत भी व्याप्त है। इस प्रकार रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श तथा शब्द का अपूर्व समवाय जो वासन्तिक फूलों की विशेषता है वह इन चित्रों की भी विशेषता है। इन चित्रों में ऋतुराज वसन्त साकार हुआ है और कविराज कालिदास अमर। सम्भवतः इसी कारण जर्मन के महाकवि गेटे (Goethe) ने कालिदास की कृति अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तल में सर्वप्रथम झांकी वासन्तिक फूलों की पाई थी।[2]

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१. वही०, ३.५४

2. Wouldst thou the young year's blossoms and the
fruits of its decline

……………………

I name thee, O Shakuntala, and all at once is said.

PAÑCATANTRA IN JAVA BALI

C. Hooykaas

INTRODUCTION

There are two good reasons to write about the *Pañcatantra* in this Felicitation Volume. Professor Sternbach more than once occupied himself with *Hitopadeśa* and *Pañcatantra*. The present author, half a century ago, wrote his Leiden Ph.D. thesis[1] on *Tantri*, part of the caption of this paper. To his delight Prof. A. Venkatasubbiah has made that work accessible in English. He, too, stresses the relationship with South-India[2]. That thesis and the ensuing text publication of the *Tantri Kāmandaka* were based upon the Balinese materials collected (1876-94) by Dr. N. N. van der Tuuk[3], the author of the four-volume *Kawi-Balineesch-Nederlandsch Woordenboek*[4]. *Nandaka-prakaraṇa* came to light and was published[5], but of *Maṇḍūka-Pakṣi* and *Piśāca-prakaraṇa* only the captions were known.

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* This paper could not have been written without the help received from I Gusti Ngurah Ktut Sangka of Puri Gdé Krambitan (Tabanan) in acquiring the MSS involved and Ida Bagus Gdé Gria of Gria Pidada, Sidĕmĕn (Karang Asĕm) in their interpretation. The author thanks them warmly for their assistance.

1. *Tantri, de Middel-Javaansche Pañcatantra-bewerking*, Leiden, 1929.
2. *Some Sanskrit Stanzas in the Javanese Tantri Kāmandaka*. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut for idem, 121.3, 1965, 350-59.
   A Tamil version of the Pañcatantra, *Adyar Library Bulletin* 29, 1966, 74-143.
   A Javanese version of the Pañcatantra, *A. B. O. R. I.* 47, 1967, 59-100.
3. Dr. H. H. Juynboll, Supplement op den Catalogus van de Javaansche en Madoereesche Handschriften der Leidsche Universiteits-bibliotheek, I, 1907; II, 1911, Brill, Leiden.
   Same author, Supplement op den Calatogus van de Sundaneesche Handschriften en Catalogus van de Balineesche en Sasaksche Handschriften der Leidsche Universiteits-bibliotheek, Brill, Leiden. 1912.
4. Landsdrukkerij, Batavia, 1897-1912.
5. C. Hooykaas, *Tantri Kāmandaka*, Bibliotheca Javanica 2, 1931, Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, Nix, Bandoeng.

The situation regarding palm-leaf MSS was improved when in 1928 the Dutch Government, afraid that valuable MSS might be sold to tourists, founded a library, called Kirtya-Foundation, for the palm-leaf writings of Bali and Lombok, which was opened by the then Governor-General. In the thirties a *Maṇḍūka-prakaraṇa* came to light. It was copied (the original remained with its owner) and added to the Kirtya collection[1] as K 1082, with the note that the alternative title was *Rāga-winā́śa*. A *Pakṣi-wicāra* was copied and given the number K 625 ; no vestige of *Piśāca-prakaraṇa* was found.

During the fifties and sixties it appeared to me that no satisfactory philological publication on Balinese religion and ritual could be made, based merely upon the materials accessible in Leiden and Singaraja. It was constantly necessary to have access to supplementary texts. In 1972 the author found copyists in Bali who were prepared to make typewritten copies of MSS in private hands. Due to this third stage of collecting made possible, thanks to the (University Libraries of Berlin, Leiden, London, New York and Sydney[2]), MSS of *Maṇḍūka-prakaraṇa/Rāga-winā́śa* were located, copied, numbered Z 7, 673, 1954, 2406 and 2417 and distributed to the above mentioned libraries and the Kirtya. The short *Pakṣi-wicāra* was given the number Z 1804. The considerably longer *Piśāca-*[*praka*]*raṇa*, Z 1940 and Z 2554, came to light only quite recently.

Thus the moment seems to have arrived to ask for attention for this subject, space was offered here to the author, so *kāla-deśa* is presented for this short preliminary effort. Full texts with their translations, a linking up with South and Southeast Asian texts and the drawing into the discussion of Javano-Balinese reliefs[3] belong to a complete study of this subject, to which the author encourages his younger colleagues.

1. Latest list of Kirtya stock and sources of the preceding lists in Indonesische Handschriften, door R. M. Ng. Dr. Poerbatjaraka, Dr. P. Voorhoeve en Dr. C. Hooykaas, Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia "Koninklijk Bataviaansch Genootschap" Nix, Bandung, 1950, pp. pp. 184-88.
2. C. Hooykaas, *La conservation des manuscripts et de la parole parlée en Indonésie*, in Archipel 6, 1973, 33-41.
Same, *Puisi Lama*, in 'Spectrum, essays presented to Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana on his seventieth birthday', edited by S. Udin, Dian Rakyat, Jakarta, 1978, 209-214.
3. Cf. N. J. Krom, *Inleiding tot de Hindoe-Javaansch Kunst* I-II, 2nd. imp., Nijhoff, The Hague, Index s. v. *Tantri*.

SOME REMARKS ON THE NACIKETAS-LEGEND

S. G. Kantawala

Purāṇa-s are "rooted in Vedic literature"[1] and are said to be the soul of the *Veda*-s[2], suggesting thereby that they expound the quintessence of the *Veda*-s[3]. Mammaṭa observes that *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* teach in the manner of a friend[4]. One of the functions of *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*-s, as the *Mahābhārata* enunciates, is the *Vedopabṛṃhaṇa*[5] i.e. "one should strengthen the *Veda* by (the study and application of) *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*"[6]. In connection with the *upabṛṃhaṇa* Rāmānuja quotes the same stanza from the *Mahābhārata* and explains the *upabṛṃhaṇa* by remarking that it is the clarification of the meaning of the sentences of the *Veda* by the words of those who have known the real essence of the entire *Veda*, by the power of their *Yoga*. It, *i. e. upabṛṃhaṇa*, is necessary because it is difficult to decide the meaning by a partial listening of the *Veda*[8].

Vedic stanzas, themes and legends have migrated to the *Purāṇa*-s which try to expound them and during this process metamorphosis therein takes place also several times[9].

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1. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, p. 518.
2. Cf. *ātmā purāṇam vedānām, Skandapurāṇa, Revākhaṇḍa*, 1.22.
3. Cf. The *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* is called "*nigamakalpataror galitam phalam*/ I.1.3.
4. *Suhṛtsammitārthatātparyavat purāṇāditihāsebhyaśca* / Gloss on *Kāvyaprakāśa* 1.2., p. 7. Cf. *dvitīyas tvarthatāparyavān siddhārtharūpaḥ purāṇetihāsādiḥ* / *sa hi suhṛd iva "evaṃ kṛte idam iṣṭaṃ bhavati, evaṃ ca kṛte idam aniṣṭam" ity etāvanmātram bodhayati na tv ājñāpayati* (*Pradīpa*, thereon, *ibid*, p. 8) (*Kāvyaprakāśa, Ullāsas*, I, II and III, edited by S. S. Sukthankar, 1933).
5. *itihāsapurāṇābhyāṃ vedaṃ samupabṛṃhayet* /
   bibhety alpaśrutād vedo māmayam prahariṣyati // *Mbh.*
   Cr. Ed. 1.1.204. The said stanza occurs in other works also; vide Kane, P. V., *History of Dharmaśāstra* (=*HDS*), Vol. V, Part II, p. 914, fn. 1449.
6. Kane, P.V., *HDS.*, Vol. V, Part II, p. 914.
7. I.1.204.
8. *Śrībhāṣya* I.1.1. p. 69 (edited by Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, 1915, Poona).
9. For a discussion of some Vedic legends vide Kantawala, S. G., Purūravas-Urvaśī Episode: A

The legend of Naciketas is told in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (=*TB*)[1] *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (=*KU*), *Mahābhārata Anuśāsanaparvan*[2] (*cr. ed.*), the *Varāhapurāṇa* (=*VarP*)[3] and in the *Nāciketopākhyāna*[4]. The legend is traceable to *Ṛgveda*[5], but the reference is not unimpeachable.

P. V. Kane[6] and Janaki Nath Sharma[7] refer to this legend in the *VarP.* in the context of the *upabṛṃhaṇa*—function. Baladeva Upadhyaya has discussed the *Nāciketopākhyāna*, while tracing its origin and development from the Vedic times[8]. In this paper it is proposed to discuss the charming legend of Naciketas especially from the *upabṛṃhaṇa* point of view and its consequent metamorphosis in the *Mbh.* and the *VarP.*

In the *Dharmasaṃhitā* (*i.e.* Section III) of the *VarP* the *Sūta* is the reporter, while

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Study in Vedico-Purāṇic Correlates, *ABORI*, Vol. LVII, Parts I-IV (1976), pp. 49-58; Some Observations on the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* : A Study in Vedico-Purāṇic Correlates, *JMSU*, Vol. XXIV (1975), No. 1, pp. 41-48; Paṇi-Saramā Legend: A Study in Vedico-Purāṇic Coorrelates, *Indica*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March, 1979, (*Fr. Adolph Esteller, S. J. Eightieth Birthday Felicitation Number*), pp. 111.119.

1. 3.11.8.
2. Chapter 70.
3. In this paper the references to the *VarP* are to the edition published by Shri Venkateshwar Steam Press, Bombay, Saṁvat 1959.
   The extant *VarP* is a late *Purāṇa* and it is diffiult to assign a date to it; but it can be assigned to a period earlier than the tenth century A. D. (Kane, P. V., *HDS.*, Vol. V, Part II, p. 904) i.e. 9th to 10th century A. D. (Upadhyaya, Baladeva, *Purāṇa-Vimarśa*, p. 559). It consists of four distinct sections :—(i) chapters 1-112; (ii) chapters 113-192; (iii) chapters 193-212 and (iv) chapters 213 to the end i. e. 217. These four sections differ from each other in general character and in regard to interlocutors. They "are most probably the works of different hands hailing from different ages". [Hazra, R. C., *Studies in the Purāṇic Records on the Hindu Rites and Customs*, (second edition, 1975), p. 97]. The section III, i.e. the *Dharmasaṃhitā*, is a distinct unit and "does not seem to be connected with the chapters of the first or the second section". (Hazra, R. C., *op. cit.*, p. 100). "It is highly probable that these chapters were taken from other source in which the story of Naciketas was narrated". (Hazra, R. C., *op. cit.*, p. 100). The third section i.e. chapters 193-212 may be placed between 900 A. D. and 1100 A. D. according to R. C. Hazra (*op. cit.*, p. 106), who opines that "the first three sections of the present *Varāhapurāṇa* were composed in Northern India". (*Op. cit.*, p. 107).
4. There is the *Nāsiketopākhyāna* in Sanskrit as well as in Hindi. For details vide Upadhyaya, Baladeva, The *Nāciketopākhyāna* and its development in the Veda, Itihāsa and Purāṇas, *Purāṇa*, Vol. VI, No. 2, July 1964, pp. 361 ff.
5. 10.135.
6. Kane, P. V., *HDS.*, Vol. V, Part II, p. 915.
7. Varāha-Purāṇa-Eka Saṃkṣipta Paricaya, Saṃkṣipta-Varāha-Purāṇa-Aṅka, *Kalyāṇa*, (Hindi) Vol. 51, No. 1, January, 1977, p. 397.
8. Upadhyaya, Baladeva, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-410; *Purāṇavimarśa*, pp. 262-272.

the king Janamejaya and Vaiśampāyana are the interlocutors in this legend-tract. After the twelve-year sacrifice Janamejaya atones for the Brahmanicide and approaches Vaiśampāyaṇa to know about the *karmavipāka* (rewards of actions committed) and Yama's demesne. And it is in this context that the legend of Naciketas is narrated by Vaiśampāyana in this *Purāṇa*. The purpose of the legend herein is, therefore, the topic of retribution and metempsychosis[1].

The legend has a nebulous reference in the *Ṛgveda*[2], the *ṛṣi* of which is Kumāra Yāmāyana and the deity is Yama. According to Sāyaṇa on *ṚV* 10.135.1 there is a reference to *Kumāra* Naciketas, by name, the son of Vājaśravasa. In his alternative explanation Sāyaṇa, observes that there is a reference to a sage named *Kumāra* other than Naciketas. Apropos of this remark of Sāyaṇa Baladeva Upadhyaya[3] observes that there is neither a reference nor a contextual corroboration to this hymn. According to Geldner Sāyaṇa's recognising the legend of Naciketas in this Ṛgvedic hymn is an anachronism[4]. H. D. Velankar holds that "the story of Naciketas as presented in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* has a clear resemblance with the story which forms the basis of the Ṛgvedic hymn X.135"[5]. As noted above, Sāyaṇa offers a double interpretation of the hymn, *i.e.* one with reference to Naciketas as the son of Vājaśravasa and another as referring to *Kumāra* who is a *ṛṣi* other than Naciketas. But would it be that Sāyaṇa's explanation with reference to Naciketas has no basis or tradition behind it? It is quite true that there is no direct reference to this legend or to Naciketas, the hero of the legend in this hymn; but the hymn has a reference to *Kumāra* and Yama. It is tempting to note that the vocable *Kumāra* occurs in the vocative in *ṛc*-s 3 and 4 of the said hymn and this indicates that the *Kumāra* is addressed by some one. In *ṛc* 5 it occurs in the accusative. The *TB*[6] and the *KU*[7] describe Naciketas as *Kumāra*[8]. It may also be observed that the phrase *taṃ ha kumāraṃ santam* is common to the *TB*[9] and the *KU*[10].

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1. On the *karma*, transmigration, rebirth and torments in hell, vide Kane, P. V., *HDS*, Vol. IV, pp. 38ff.
2. 10.135.
3. Upadhyaya. Baladeva, *Purāṇavimarśa*, p. 262.
4. Geldner, K. F., *Der Rigveda*, Dritter Teil (*HOS*, Vol. 35), pp. 367-368. I am thankful to Dr. (Mrs.) Dorothea Dave for translating the relevant portion from Geldner's *Der Rigvida*.
5. Velankar, H. D., The Ṛgvedic Origin of the story of Naciketas (*ṚV*. X.135), *Mélanges D'Indianisme, A la mémoire de Louis Renou* (Publications de l'institut de civilisation Indienne), p. 763.
6. 3.11.8.1.
7. 1.1.2.
8. Sāyaṇa explains the vocable *kumāra* as *upanayanayogyavayaskaḥ* and Śaṅkara *prathamavayasam* ..., *aprāptajananaśaktiṃ bālam* on the *TB* and *KU* respectively.
9. 3.11.8.1.
10. 1.1.2.

The *ṚV* is silent about Naciketas' parentage, but the *TB*[1] refers to him as the son of Vājaśravas and Sāyaṇa thereon observes that he (*i.e.* Vājaśravas) is some sage born in the Gautamagotra and his son is Vājaśravasa also known as Uddālaka. The *KU*[2] also states Vājaśrvasa as Naciketas' father and here Śaṅkara explains the vocable *Vājaśravasa* as derivable by *rūḍhi* or as an *apatyavācaka* from the vocable *Vājaśravas*[3]. Sāyaṇa on *TB*[4] observes that Naciketas is the son of Uddālaka. In the *Mahābhārata* he is Uddālaka's son[5]. According to the *VarP*[6] also he is Uddālaka's son. The vocable *Uddālaka* finds a variant as Auddālaka in the *VarP*[7]. The *KU*[8] refers to him as Auddālaki Āruṇi, *i.e.* "Auddālaki, the son of Aruṇa"[9] and Śaṅkara explains the vocable *Auddālaki* as *Uddālaka eva Auddālakiḥ* and the vocable *Āruṇi* as *Aruṇasya apatyam Āruṇiḥ*. The *KU*[10] mentions Gautama as Naciketas' father and Saṅkara has nothing to contradict it. It may also be noted that in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*[11] Śvetaketu is called Āruṇ ya which vocable is explained by Śaṅkara as *Aruṇasya pautraḥ i.e.* Śvetaketu is the son of Āruṇi who is in turn the son of Aruṇa[12]. On this commixture of the parental attribution A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith observe that this is "due only to a desire to give Naciketas a connexion with the famous Āruṇi"[13]. Charpentier identifies Naciketas with Auddālaki Āruṇi[14] and Hillebrandt also holds the same view[15]. Śaṅkara tides over this problem by observing that he is *dvyāmuṣyāyaṇa i.e.* he belongs to two *gotra*-s. The *Mahābhārata* and the *VarP* follow the *KU*. The *Matsyapurāṇa*[16] uses the term *dvyāmuṣyāyaṇa*-

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1. 3.11.8.1.
2. 1.1.1.
3. *Ibid.*
4. 3.11.7.2.
5. *Anuśāsanaparvan* 70.2.
6. 193.12-13.
7. 198.21.
8. 1.1.11.
9. Radhakrishnan, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 599.
10. 1.1.10.
11. 6.1.1.
12. S. Radhakrishnan's (*op. cit.*, p. 599) observation : "The father of Śvetaketu is called Aruṇi (*CU* VI.1.1)": is difficult to endorse in the light of Śaṅkara's explanation. It is interesting to note that S. Radhakrishnan notes this explanation by Śaṅkara given above on p. 446 of the said book. Śaṅkara on the *CU* 6.1.1 (i.e. *Śvetaketur hāruṇeyaḥ*) explains the vocable *Āruṇeyaḥ* as *Aruṇasya pautraḥ*.
13. Macdonell, A. A. and Keith, A. B., *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, Vol. I (1958), p. 432.
14. Referred to by S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 599.
15. Referred to by S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 600; vide also *Indian Antiquary*, 1928, pp. 205, 223.
16. 49.33.

kaulina with reference to Bhāradvajas and Bharatas who were the descendents Vitatha Bharadvāja[1].

It will not be out of place to refer here to the etymological explanation of the vocable *Naciketas*. It has a semantic counterpart in *na-vedas* which means "cognizant, observing" according to Grassmann[2]. Discussing the semantic aspect of the vocable *Naciketas* in the context of the *KU*, Y. K. Wadhwani observes that Naciketas "is no stranger to knowledge ; all the same he is aware of the fact that there still remains much more to be learnt... . Naciketas thus symbolises the 'quest for knowledge' by one who has the prerequisites of knowledge like faith and detachment"[3].

This Upaniṣadic personality is beutifully summarised by the *VarP*[4] which describes Naciketas as *sarvavedāṅgatattvavit*, *buddhimān*, resorting to *yoga*, *tattvajña* and ever-steeped in contemplation ; thus he possesses the knowledge of Brahman, whom he has realised ; what more he has to know is the life after death and rewards of *karmavipāka*. This appears paradoxical ; but it may be remarked that he is cognizant *i.e.* aware of the life after death, but he visits the Yamaloka and gets the first hand knowledge and later on, when asked about it, he describes it as he had seen it whith his own eyes. It will be interesting to note that in the *Nāsiketopākhyāna*, the vocable *Nāsiketa* is derivatively connected with the *nāsa i.e.* one who is born from the nostrils[5]. This derivation appears to be a case of transference of the derivation of the vocable *Nāsatya* which stands for the dual gods Aśvinā/Aśvinau, because, for example, the *Matsyapurāṇa*[6] while deriving the vocable *Nāsatya*, states that they are so-called *i.e.* "nose-born", because they were born from the nostrils[7], when Saṁjñā in the form of a mare ejaculated the semen poured by the Sun in the form of a horse[8]. This Purāṇic derivation is indebted to the *Nirukta*[9]

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1. Kantawala, S. G., *Cultural History from the Matsyapurāṇa*, p. 28.
2. Wadhwani, Y. K., Implication of the Vedic term Naciketas, *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal*, Vol. XI (1973), p. 3.
3. Wadhwani Y. K., *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5; for other derivations vide Belvalkar, S. K. and Ranade, R. D., *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (Creative Period), p. 475. S. Radhakrishnan explains the vocable *Naciketas* as "one who does not know and therefore seeks knowledge". (*ibid.*, p. 595) and quotes *ṚV* 10.79.5 in support of his explanation. [*nahám devásya mártyaś ciketa*/ *ṚV* 10.79.4. i.e. "No knowledge of the god have I, a mortal". (*Ibid.*, p. 595)].
4. 193.13-15.
5. *Nāsāgreṇa tu samutpanna ṛṣir nāma tavākarot* /
   Nāsiketa iti jñātvā mama proktaṃ mahātmanā //
   As quoted by Baladeva Upadhyaya, *ibid*, p. 394; *Purāṇavimarśa*, *p.* 271.
6. 11.35-37.
7. Cf. *sañjātau Nāsatyau nāsikāgrataḥ* // *Matsya-Purāṇa* 11.37.
8. *Matsyapurāṇa* 11.34-37.
9. 6.13.

which also notes the derivation: *Nāsikāprabhavau babhūvatuḥ i.e. nāsa,* nose+*ja,* born[1], and this represents the *Aitihāsikapakṣa* according to Durga[2].

The *VarP*[3] categorically states that the purpose of this *ākhyāna* is to narrate what men have to suffer and experience after death in the kingdom of Yama i.e. to say it deals with the eschatological problem especially dealing with the post-mortal life. The eschatological problem is mooted in the *KU*[4] *i.e.* Naciketas wished to know what happened to his ancestors and what would happen to his contemporaries. The doctrine of rebirth is assumed here[5], observes S. Radhakrishnan. The doctrine of rebirth assumes the doctrine of transmigration and *karmavipāka* which is taken up in the *VarP.* The *KU* deals with the metaphysical problem and Yama appears herein as a competent exponent to expound the metaphysical teaching whereas in the *VarP* it is Yama who appears again as the competent and right authority for the administration of the *karmavipāka.*

One of the ingredients of this legend is the theme of the gift of a cow. In the *ṚV* the terrestrial cow has already acquired a certain sanctity and her inviolability (*cf. aghnyā*) is also declared. In the *AV* the worship of the cow as a sacred animal is also recognized[6]. During the course of time the high merit came to be associated with the *godāna* (gift of a cow), "Donors, sometimes, passed old and weak cows on donees", observes P. V. Kane[7] and this is echoed in the *KU*[8]. The *godāna* is highly eulogised in the *Mahābhārata*[9], thus the epic elaborates the *godāna.* It may be noted that in later times, as P. V. Kane puts, "in imitation of the gift of the cow, gifts of certain articles were made and they are also described as *dhenus*"[10]. During the course of the *Viśokadvādaśivrata* the *Matsyapurāṇa*[11] describes the *guḍadhenuvidhāna* and herein[12] it mentions ten *dhenu*-s *viz.*, (1) *guḍa* (jaggary), (2) *ghṛta* (ghee), (3) *tila* (sesame) (4) *jala*

1. Sköld, Hannes, *The Nirukta,* p. 272. This etymology is obscure. (Varma, Siddheshwar, *The Etymologies of Yāska,* p. 137).
2. *Nirukta* with Durga's commentary, Venkateshvar Press Edition, p. 475.
3. 193.6 ff.
4. Belvalkar, S. K. and Ranade, R. D., *op. cit.,* pp. 260-261.
5. Radhakrishnan, S., *op. cit.,* p. 597.
6. Vide Macdonell, A. A., *The Vedic Mythology,* 1971, p. 151.
7. Kane, P. V., *HDS,* Vol. II, Part II (1974), p. 881.
8. Vide, Kane P. V., *HDS,* Vol. II, Part II (1974), p. 881. Baladeva Upadhyaya sees the occasion of the *godāna* in the *TB*-version which is silent about it.
9. *Anuśāsanaparvan.* Ch. 70 (Critical Ed.)
10. Kane, P. V., *HDS,* Vol. II, Part II, p. 880. *Mbh. Anuśāsanaparvan* 70. 38ff (Cr. Ed.) mentions some of the *dhenu*-s mentioned in the *Matsyapurāṇa* 82.17-22.
11. Ch. 82.
12. 82.17-22.

(water), (5) *kṣīra* (milk), (6) *madhu* (honey), (7) *śarkarā* (sugar), (8) *dadhi* (curds), (9) *rasa* (other liquid) and (10) *dhenuḥsvarūpataḥ* (*i.e.* cow itself).

It is also interesting to note from the *upabṛṃhaṇa*-point of view that *KU*[1] is elaborated in *Anuśāsanaparvan*[2] thus :—

pītodakā jagdhatṛṇā dugdhadohā nirindriyāḥ /
anandā nāma te lokās tān sa gacchati tā dadat //[3]

Cf. *pītodakāṃ jagdhatṛṇāṃ naṣṭadugdhāṃ nirindriyam /*
jarogrām upayuktārthaṃ jīrṇāṃ kūpam ivājalām //
dattvā tamaḥ praviśati dvijaṃ kleśena yojayet //[4]

En passant it may be noted that the vacable *nirindriyā* is explained by Śaṅkara as *prajananāsamarthā jīrṇā niṣphalā*. This reminds the vocable *jīrṇā* in the Epic version. The vocable *anandā* is rendered as *tamaḥ* by the Epic. Śaṅkara explains it as *anānandāḥ* and *asukhāḥ*.

Another theme current in all these versions is the father's wrath and consequent committing of Naciketas to Yama. In the *TB*[5] when Naciketas' father gave away everything as *dakṣiṇā*, he asked his father as to whom he was given away, because the *śraddhā*[6] had developed in him. When the said question was repeated a third time, as it was unheeded to by his father earlier, the latter irately told the former that he was given away to Yama[6]. The *KU*[8] inherits the same situation. In the *Mahābhārata* Naciketas' failure to get the requisite sacrificial material for his father results into the latter's wrath culminating into a curse to his being committed to Yama[9]. The *VarP*[10] also refers to his being committed to Yama[11]. The Vedic decision-bearing phrase: "*mṛtyave dadāmi*" is paraphrased in the Epic and the *VarP* as the peremptory statement: "*Yamaṃ paśya*". It may also be noted that the Epic and the *VarP* explain the vocable *mṛtyu* as Yama[12]. It is

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1. 1.1.3.
2. 76.5-6.
3. *KU* 1.1.3.
4. *Anuśāsanaparvan*, Cr. Ed. 76.5.6.
5. 3.11.8.
6. Sāyaṇa explains the vocable *śraddhā* as *yathāśāstraṃ dakṣiṇā dātavyēty eṣā buddhiḥ śraddhātiśayaḥ* on *TB* 3.11.8.1. *ṚV* 10.151 is in honour of *Śraddhā*.
7. Cf. *mṛtyave tvā dadamīti* / *TB* 3.11.8.1=*KU*. 1.1.4*d*.
8. 1.1.4.
9. 70.6; Cf. *Yamaṃ paśya* / *Anuśāsanaparvan*, Cr. Ed. 70.6.
10. 193.14.
11. Cf. *gaccha śīghram Yamaṃ paśya* / *VarP*. 193.14.
12. Sāyaṇa and Śaṅkara render the vocable *mṛtyu* as Yama (vide on *TB* 3.11.8.2) and as *Vaivasvata* (vide on *KU* 1.1.4) respectively.

significant to note that the *Mbh*[1] points out that "*Yamaṃ paśya*"[2] is equivalent to *na mṛto'si*[3], as pointed out by Yama to Naciketas and hence Naciketas is not dead. The *VarP*[4] says that Naciketas was warmly received by Yama and he returned to this world alive. In the *VarP*[4] Naciketas himself says to his father that he would go to Yama's abode and return. This declaration was made after he had resorted to *yoga* for a few minutes. This tends to enhance the character of Naciketas in the *VarP* in comparison with his in the *TB.*

The theme of the three boons consequent upon Naciketas' waiting for three nights at Yama's abode in the *TB* and the *KU* is not exactly inherited in the Epic and the *VarP* as the ecology of the legend differs in the Epic and the *VarP*. In the Epic Yama asks Naciketas to choose his desired objects and he chooses to visit the rich regions of the *puṇyakṛts*[6] and he is taken round these regions in a chariot. In the *VarP* Naciketas visits the terrible and hellish regions and beholds the frightening and unbearable tortures and punishments inflicted on the sinner after death. The *VarP*[7] retains the theme of Yama's granting the boon and Naciketas' desire to see his (*i.e.* Yama's) region as well as the regions of doers of the meritorious acts and perpetrators of sinister acts. There are some stanzas in the *VarP*[8] glorifying the principle of *satya*. *Satya* is a means to cross over the ocean of transmigratory existence; it is a ladder to heaven. It is to be followed and faith therein is to be cultivated. It is because of it that the sun shines and emits light and heat; it is due to it that the wind blows and the fire burns and the earth is supported. It is because of it that the ocean does not violate its bounds. Because of it the *mantra* works beneficently and the sacrifices sanctified by the *mantra* remain effective and powerful[9]. With it everything can be obtained. Everything resides in it. Heaven and *dharma* are its forms. And *satya* is Brahman. Nothing is higher than it. Thus *satya* has a cosmic-ethical connotation. The principle of *satya* has its Vedic predecessor in the principle of *ṛta*[10].

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1. *Anuśāsanaparvan* 70.18.
2. *Ibid.* 70.6.
3. *Ibid.* 70.17.
4. 194.1ff.
5. 193.17-18.
6. *Anuśāsanaparvan* 10.19.
7. 198.22ff.
8. 193.38ff.
9. *En passant* it may be noted that the concept that *mantra*-s have power is as old as the *ṚV*, because in the latter it is said "May *mantra*-s recited by the seers bring you (*i.e.* Yama) hither". Cf. *ā́ tvā mántrāḥ kaviśastā́ vahantu* *ṚV*. 10.14.4c.
10. On *ṛta* vide Kane, P.V., *HDS*, Vol. IV, p. 5 and pp. 2*ff*; Dandekar, R. N., A Vedic God and

In the *VarP*[1] there is a tract on the importance of a son. The *Nāsiketopākhyāna* also refers to this theme[2]. In the *VarP* Naciketas' father, while dwelling on the importance of son, observes that a house without a son is a great void and is useless. Vasiṣṭha, the renowned Vedic seer, observes that a condition of sonlessness is one of the misfortunes and requests Agni not to expose his worshippers to this condition[3].

In the *Nāsiketopākhyāna* it is said that Uddālaka, after his return from Prajāpati, who had prognosticated to him that he would have a son first and then a wife, had a semenal discharge, when he was engrossed in contemplating over the said topic. He collected the discharged semen in the lotus flower and let it loose in the Ganges[4]. The theme of the discharged semen being collected in the lotus is traceable to the *ṚV*. In the context of the birth-story of Vasiṣṭha it is said that while the potent fluid discharged by Mitrā-Varuṇa at the glimpse of Urvaśī was collected in a jar, a drop of it fell out and was held fast in a lotus by the Viśvedevas[5]. It may also be noted that the lotus symbolises fertility[6].

This legend is an *ākhyāna* according to the *VarP*[7] whereas it is an *upākhyāna* according to the *KU*[8]. According to the *VarP* this legend is accredited to be sanctifying and an annihilator of all sins, a promoter of *dharma* as well as an increaser of glory[9]. It is also said to augment *bhakti*[10]. Thus the legend has an ethical value also.

From the afore-going discussion it is seen that the Epic and Purāṇic versions have undergone changes and modifications as per the context. Moreover, the Purāṇic version has tried to incorporate some fundamental ethical concepts and expound them. The

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A Vedic Seer, *Panjab University Research Bulletin* (Arts), Vol. VI, No. 2 (October, 1975), pp. 109ff; Velankar, H. D., *Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala* VII, Introduction, pp. IVff.

1. 193.27ff.
2. Vide Upadhyaya, Baladeva, *ibid.*, p. 270.
3. Velankar, H. D., *ibid.*, Introduction, p. xxv; Cf. *ṚV.* 7.1.19.
4. Upadhyaya, Baladeva, *ibid.*, p. 270.
5. Vide *ṚV.* 7.33.11; on the birth of Vasiṣṭha vide Dandekar ,R. N., The Two Births of Vasiṣṭha : A Fresh Study of *ṚV.* VII.33.9-14, *H. Güntert Commemoration Volume* (*Gedenschrift für Herman Güntert*) p. 227 and pp. 223-231.
6. Vide Gonda, J., *Epithets in the Ṛgveda*, p. 130.
7. 212.20.
8. 1.3.16.
9. 193.10-11.
10. 212.20-21.

Purāṇa has also dilated on the problem of metempsychosis and retribution which is not treated in the *KU*. In this context of *KU*[1] S. Radhakrishnan observes that "possibly Naciketās wished to know what happened to his ancestors and what will happen to his contemporaries after death"[2]. It may be said that V*arP* is a sequel to this question.

1. 1.1.6.
2. Radhakrishnan, S., *op. cit.*, p. 597.

UDBHAṬA'S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO SANSKRIT LITERARY THEORY

K. Krishnamoorthy

Generally, historians of Sanskrit poetics have done less than justice to Udbhaṭa's original contribution to Sanskrit literary theory. This is partly due to the fact that only his short compendium on figures of speech viz., *Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha* modelled mechanically on that of Bhāmaha's section on *alaṅkāra*-s is extant; and even the few recovered broken fragments of his *Bhāmahavivaraṇa* are virtually undecipherable. Typical of the general trend of historical judgement of Udbhaṭa is the following by the latest writer on the subject, viz. Professor Edwin Gerow :—

> "Udbhaṭa, on the basis of his extant work, which is nothing but definitions and illustrations of Bhāmaha's *alaṅkāra*-s, appears to have been the most uncompromising *ālaṅkārika* and at the same time the least theoretical; for him there is no subject of study other than the figures in their concrete differentiability."

But such a view ignores completely the scattered testimonia in the works of later theorists and scholiasts who revere Udbhaṭa as the father of several major views relating to literary concepts other than specific *alaṅkāra*-s. An attempt is made here to indicate a few of them.

I

Rasa : It is well known that Bhāmaha's idea of the figure *rasavad* is notoriously imprecise and his example extremely vague and almost meaningless. All that he says is summed up in the verse—

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1. Edwin Gerow, *Indian Poetics*, (*A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. V) Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977, p. 235.

rasavad-darśitaspaṣṭa-śṛṅgārādirasaṁ yathā|
devī samāgamaddharmamaskariṇyatirohitā||[1]

No interpreter, ancient or modern, has been able to give a satisfactory explanation of this crucial verse. We do not know what exactly Udbhaṭa said on this verse, because his *Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa* on this passage is not extant. But we do know that Abhinavagupta who refers to this very passage in his *Locana*[2] cleverly avoids the explanation of the illustration contained in the passage. Since it is difficult to believe that a single line stating the culmination of a *devī* (queen or goddess) in love with the union of her beloved (man or god) can be taken as illustrating the erotic sentiment rising to a climax, one might hazard the conclusion that the allusion is probably to a well-known *prakaraṇa* or episode in a poetic work, which is not easy for us now to locate precisely.

Leaving aside this incidental question of interpretation, if we turn to the central problem at issue, viz. the theory of *rasa* envisaged therein, we get the following testimonia regarding Udbhaṭa's stand from the recently published anonymous *Kalpalatāviveka*[3] :

rasasya vākyārthībhāve ye rasavadalaṅkāraṁ udbhaṭādayaḥ pratipannāḥ, tān prati dhvaniguṇībhūtavyaṅgyavādinā ācāryeṇa "bhinno rasādyalaṅkārāt" iti "ete ca rasavadādyalaṅkārā iti" ca vadatā svābhiprāyapratipādanaṁ yadvihitaṁ, tadupajīvya parasyeyamuktiḥ-"upalakṣaṇībhūtaṁ" iti, vākyārthībhāvamanāpannamaṅgabhūtamapradhānamiti yāvat; tena mukhyavṛttyaiva udāttame'at, na rasavadalaṅkārāpavādatvena ityarthaḥ; anyatra tu rasavad iti; Etatparyantā Bhaṭṭodbhaṭādīnāmuktiḥ.

This is a very important testimony which clears many misunderstandings current so long among writers on *Alaṅkāraśāstra* including Prof. M. Hiriyanna who concludes his paper, entitled : '*The Problem of the Rasavadalaṅkāra*'[4] with these words—

> "In this distinction which Udbhaṭa makes between the *Rasavadalaṅkāra* and the *udāttālaṅkāra*, we may say, lies implicit an important aspect of the theory of *rasa*, as propounded later, viz. that where the *rasa* element is predominant, we have the variety of *kāvya* designated *dhvani* and where it is subordinate, we have the *Rasavadalaṅkāra*. But he had not the necessary aesthetic outlook for rightly interpreting it, and therefore, spoke of them both as *alaṅkāra*-s."

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1. *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, III.6.
2. *Dhvanyāloka-locana*, NSP Edn. Bombay, Chap. II.5f.
3. *Op. cit.*, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1968 p. 280.
4. *Proceedings and Transactions of the All India Oriental Conference*, XV Session, Bombay, 1949, p. 270.

This conclusion is inevitable when Udbhaṭa's position is not correctly understood and then reviewed from the later angle of the *dhvani* theorists. But here the correct position, as rightly pointed out in the extract from the *Kalpalatāviveka* cited above, is that *udātta* is not an exception to *rasavadalaṅkāra* according to Udbhaṭa but an independent figure in its own right. If this were not the case, Mammaṭa need not have included *udātta* as an *alaṅkāra* in his tenth chapter, since it would also come under the category of *rasavadādi* figures—*preyas*, *rasavat*, *ūrjasvin* and *samāhita*—already explained by him under the head of '*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*' in the fifth chapter of his *Kāvyaprakāśa*. The anonymous author of the *Kalpalatāviveka* is drawing our attention to the fact that the stand of Udbhaṭa and his followers is clearly :—

1. When *rasa* is *vākyārtha* or primarily important in a given context, it should be regarded as *rasavadalaṅkāra*.

2. When *rasa* is not *vākyārtha*, that is to say, when it serves as a subsidiary element in a given passage, it should be regarded, not as *rasa* miscarried and hence less beautiful, but as really another aesthetic figure, *udātta* (of the second kind), as beautiful as *rasavad* itself.

To a *dhvani*-theorist who swears by the dictum that what is *pradhāna* or *vācyārtha* is aesthetically also superior, and that *rasa*, when *apradhāna*, should be *ipso facto* aesthetically inferior—indeed this is the sheet anchor of the distinction between two orders of poetic beauty, namely, *dhvani* and *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*—Udbhaṭa's stand might appear unsustainable. But one should not forget that there is scope for another aesthetic theory equally strong, that there cannot be different orders in 'beauty' of art, though there might be endless variations in its manifestation. Such is the view actually held by Kuntaka in his *Vakroktijīvita* who gives the name '*sāhitya*' to the total beauty in a poetic work which is vast enough to include a hundred different varieties of *vakrokti* relating to artistic use of form and content (*śabda* and *artha*). But both Ānandavardhana and Kuntaka agree on the basic issue that *Rasa* is only 'what is ornamented' (*alaṅkārya*) and is never an ornament (*alaṅkāra*) or means of embellishment.

But as noted even by Kuntaka himself, and by Vāmana much earlier in his very first *sūtra* or aphorism—'*Saundaryaṁ alaṅkāraḥ*'—the word '*alaṅkāra*' can be used in the etymological sense of 'beauty resulting from ornaments' (though *bhāva-vyutpatti*) as much as 'means of ornamentation' (through *Karaṇa-vyutpatti*). Anyway, Udbhaṭa did not have several aesthetic concepts like later theorists. Under the single concept or category of '*alaṅkāra*' (Artistic Beauty) he brought all instances of aesthetic beauty, whether *alaṅkāra* (in the sense of ornament, *alaṅkriyate iti*) *guṇa* or *rasa*. He never says '*rasa*' itself is *alaṅkāra*; on the other hand he states that '*rasavat*' (possessor of *rasa*) is *alaṅkāra*—a distinction which is very much intended by Udbhaṭa but ignored by modern scholars; a

distinction which is noticed even in the naming of his other figure pertaining to (*bhāva*-s) as *preyasvat* instead of just *'preyas'*[1]. The poetic content can be *rasavat* or *preyasvat* when it will be regarded as aesthetically beautiful (*alaṅkāra*) even in the absence of other *alaṅkāra*-s like metaphor.

Hence it is that a follower of Udbhaṭa can cogently argue that *dvitiya 'udātta'* (defined as *'mahatāṁ ca upalakṣaṇaṁ'*) is not an exception to the rule that, in *rasavadalaṅkāra*, *rasa*-s should be prominently delineated; but a supplement to it. On the other hand, the subscribers to the later *dhvani*-thought have no go but to take it as an exception to their new role that wherever *rasa*-s are secondary to something else, they should be deemed as *rasavad-alaṅkāra*. In fact, commentators of Mammaṭa like Rucaka, Someśvara and Māṇikyacandra say in so many words that this Udātta should be deemed as an exception to the general rule about *rasavat* :—

(i) *na cāsyāṅgatve'pi rasavadalaṅkāratvaṁ asyodāttasya tadapavādatvāt.*[2]

(ii) *angatve'pi na rasavadalaṁkāro' syodāttasya tadapavādatvāt.*[3]

(iii) *tadapavādatvākalpane nirviṣayamudāttaṁ*[4]

Equally interesting is the further view ascribed to Udbhaṭa that wherever sentient behaviour is primarily delineated in a work, it should be regarded as *rasavadalaṅkāra*, a view controverted at length by Ānandavardhana[5] as well as Kuntaka.[6] That this was the view of Udbhaṭa authenticated by Śrīdhara in his commentary on *Kāvyaprakāśa*[7] in these words :—

evaṁ udbhaṭenāpi yatra cetanānāṁ vākyārthībhāvaḥ sa rasavadādyalaṅkārasya viṣaya iti yaduktam . . . .

What is more, we are given to understand by Pratīharendurāja that Udbhaṭa had observed the avenues of *rasa* as five-fold; and of *bhāva* as four-fold.[8] The five avenues of the former are :—

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1. *Udbhaṭamate hi bhāvālaṅkāra eva preya ityuktaḥ, Locana*, Benares, 1940, p. 192.
2. Rucaka's Commentary on *Kāvyaprakāśa*, X.29. He also explains *'upalakṣaṇaṁ'* as *'aṅgabhāva'*. Ed. S. S. Sukthankar, Bombay, 1941.
3. Someśvara's Commentary on the same, Jodhpur, 1959, p. 311.
4. Māṇikyacandra's Commentary on the same, Poona, 1922, p. 266.
5. See Ed. K. Krishnamoorthy, *Dhvanyāloka*, Dharwar, 1974, p. 46.
6. See Ed. K. Krishnamoorthy, *Vakroktijīvita*, Dharwar 1977, p. 144ff.
7. Ed. S. P. Bhattacharya, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1961, p. 141. As suggested by the editor, the reference is obviously to *Bhāmahavivaraṇa*.
8. Cf. *Yaduktam Bhaṭṭodbhaṭena—pañcarūpā rasā iti* and *catūrūpā bhāvā iti, Op. cit*, NSP Edn., Bombay, 1915, pp. 48-49.

(i) *svaśabda* (ii) *sthāyibhāva* (iii) *sañcāribhāva* (iv) *vibhāva* and (v) *anubhāva*.

The four avenues of the latter are : —

(i) *svaśabda* (ii) *sañcāribhāva*, (iii) *vibhāva*, and (iv) *anubhāva*.

Ānandavardhana criticises the idea of interpreting it to mean that each is an independent avenue and showing how *svaśabda* or naming of any *rasa* or *bhāva* cannot evoke that sentiment or mood.[1] But obviously, Udbhaṭa could have meant only a combination of all the avenues if read in the light of Bharata's famous *rasa-sūtra*.

Pratihārendurāja also explains Udbhaṭa's conception of *rasavad* as referring to *sthāyibhāva*-s which are to be delineated by the poet, both on account of their didactic and aesthetic values :—

yatra ca rasāstātparyeṇavuagamyante tatra teṣāṁ vākyaviśrāntisthānatvena caturvarga-taditara-prāpti-parihāropāyabhūta-sthāyibhāva-paripoṣātmanāsvādyamānatvādrasavadalaṅkāro bhavati.[2]

The same idea is more fully brought out in the verses anonymously quoted by him under *bhāvika* :—

rasollāsī kaverātmā svacche śabdārthadarpaṇe |
mādhuryaujoyutapraudhe prativindya prakāśate ||
sampītasvacchaśabdārthadrāvitābhyantarastataḥ |
śrotā tatsāmyataḥ puṣṭiṁ caturvarge parāṁ vrajet ||[3]

This leads us on to the final position of Udbhaṭa that *rasa* is the soul of poetry, as it supplies the very life-essence to poetic expression :—

rasādyadhiṣṭhitaṁ kāvyaṁ jivadrūpatayā yataḥ |
Kathyate tadrasādīnāṁ kāvyātmatvaṁ vyavasthitaṁ ||[4]

Lala Ramayadupala Siṃha rightly holds that these verses are from the pen of Udbhaṭa himself.[5] There is no other writer in the history of Sanskrit poetics anterior to Ānandavardhana who could have stated these views. As we have seen already, the view of *rasa* as *pradhāna-vākyārtha* with a dual aim, and as we will see hereafter, Udbhaṭa's views of three *guṇa*-s (instead of ten) grounded in the *saṅghaṭanā* of *śabdārtha*-s on the one hand and in *śabdārtha*-s themselves on the other, cannot fit the view of any other older theorist. Thus Udbhaṭa's contribution to the most important aesthetic concept of *rasa* is certainly

1. See *Dhvanyāloka*, Dharwar Edn., p. 10 and notes pp. 354-360.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 54.
3. *Op. cit.*, p. 74.
4. *Op. cit.*, p. 77.
5. Udbhaṭa and Rasavāda, *ABORI*, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1 and 2, (1958), pp. 118-26.

entitled to be regarded as a major one. In fact our hypothesis is also substantiated by Ruyyaka who almost summarises the second of the above verses when he states in his *Vyaktiviveka-vyākhyāna* :—

...śāstretihāsavailakṣaṇyaṁ kāvyasya śabdārthavaiśiṣṭyādeva nābhidhāvaiśiṣṭyāditi Bhaṭṭodbhaṭādīnāṁ siddhāntaḥ.[1]

We need not dwell at length here on the well known original contributions of Udbhaṭa to the *rasa*-theory like his first ever mention of *śānta* as a ninth *rasa*, of *rasābhāsa*-s as aesthetic themes of poetry, of *Kāvyavṛtti*-s and so forth, as they can be easily gathered from his available work.

II

Guṇa : Ānandavardhana alludes at the outset of his *Dhvanyāloka* to the fact that his worthy predecessors have already theorised about *guṇa-s grounded in saṅghaṭanā*;[2] and he later discusses elaborately the question whether *guṇa*-s are grounded in *saṅghaṭanā* or *vice versa* in the III chapter (*kārikā*-s 5f). As far as we know, there is no other writer who uses the expression *saṅghaṭanā* in the sense of the familiar words *rīti*, *racanā* or *bandha*. Again, Ruyyaka assures us that this is the view of Udbhaṭa himself :—

Udbhaṭādibhistu guṇālaṅkārāṇāṁ prāyaśaḥ sāmyameva sūcitam, viṣayamātreṇa bhedapratipādanāt, saṅghaṭanā-dharmatvena śābdārthadharmatvena ceṣṭeḥ[3].

It deserves to be noticed here that *guṇa*-s too are associated only with poetic expression (*śabda*) and content (*artha*) like *alaṅkāra*-s; and hence they are on a par with them in this respect. He sharply reacted against the jejune distinction commonly made, viz., that the relation of *alaṅkāra*-s to *śabdārtha*-s was one of external appendage (*saṁyoga*) while that of *guṇa*-s to *śabdārtha*-s was that of an intrinsic inherence (*samavāya*). This logical distinction, according to Udbhaṭa, was inapplicable to poetics, and betrayed only an unthinking or blind conformity to a wrong tradition. Hemacandra commenting on his own *Kāvyānuśāsana* (I. 13) makes this clear :—

iha tu ubhayeṣāṁ samavāyena sthitirityabhidhāya tasmād gaḍḍarikāpravāheṇa guṇālaṅkārabheda iti Bhāmahavivaraṇe yad Bhaṭṭodbhaṭo' bhyadhāt tannirastam.[4]

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1. *Loc. cit.*, Benares, 1936, p. 18.
2. *Saṅghaṭanādharmāśca ye mādhuryādayaḥ te'pi pratīyante—Dhvanyāloka*, Dharwar Edn., p. 2.
3. *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, Trivandrum, 1926, p. 7.
4. *Loc. cit.*, Ed. V. M. Kulkarni, Bombay, 1964, p. 34; Cf. also commentaries on *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Ch. VIII.1, *vṛtti* where this point is so explained.

We can reconstruct the exact reasoning adopted by Udbhaṭa with the help of Abhinavagupta's *Locana* on the nature of *guṇa*-s and *alaṅkāra*-s according to 'ancient theorists' (i. e. the school of Udbhaṭa) :

dvividhaṁ cārutvaṁ-svarūpamātraniṣṭhaṁ, saṅghaṭanāśritaṁ ca. Tatra śabdānāṁ svarūpamātrakṛtaṁ cārutvaṁ śabdālaṅkārebhyaḥ; saṅghaṭanāśritaṁ tu śabdaguṇebhyaḥ. Evamarthānāṁ cārutvaṁ svarūpamātraniṣṭhaṁ upamādibhyaḥ, saṅghaṭanāparyavasitaṁ tvarthaguṇebhyaḥ iti.[1]

"Beauty in Poetry is twofold : (1) grounded in the very nature of the material and (2) located in the patterning (*saṅghaṭanā*) of the material. That which relates to the nature of expression (*śabda*) is *śabdālaṅkāra*, and that which relates to the patterning of *śabda* is *śabdaguṇa*. Similarly, that which is naturally present in content (*artha*) is *arthālaṅkāra* and that which relates to the patterning of *artha* is *arthaguṇa*." This is indeed a more precise and insightful explanation of poetic categories than the simplistic and apparently logical explanation of Vāmana and others that *alaṅkāra*-s are external appendages of the body of poety, while *guṇa*-s are its intrinsic properties.

III

Alaṅkāra : The doyen of old Poetics in India is admittedly Udbhaṭa and his position was that '*Alaṅkāra*' is the irreducible minimum characteristic of all poetry as such. This is stated in so many words by Bhaṭṭa Gopala in his commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* :

sarvam kāvyaṁ sālaṅkāramiti cirantanodbhaṭādyālaṅkārikapakṣakaṭākṣeṇa . . . . .[2]

But as noticed all along, it should not be divorced from his compact theory of *guṇa* and *rasa* as often done by *dhvani*-theorists in the past, and modern scholars in the present, who talk of an '*alaṅkāra*-school' in opposition to *guṇa*-cum-*rasa* schools of poetics.

In the field of *alaṅkāra*-s again, it was Udbhaṭa who, for the first time, brought some order into the incohate thinking on 'mixed figures'. All his predecessors were content in treating the beauty mixed figures under the single blanket term *saṁsṛṣṭi*. This could not explain the minute variations so common in poetic usage of different *alaṅkāra*-s. So Udbhaṭa scientifically restricted the use of the term '*saṁsṛṣṭi*' only to separable figures and coined the term *saṅkara* to denote inseparable ones. Again, under the latter (i. e. *saṅkara*), he set forth four categories :—

(i) *sandeha-saṅkara* (involving doubt)

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1. *Locana*, KSRI Edn., Madras, 1944, pp. 40-41
2. *Loc. cit.*, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Vol. II, Trivandrum, 1930, p. 327.

(ii) *ekavākyānupraveśa-saṅkara* (involving common application in the sentence as a whole)

(iii) *ekavākyāṁśānupraveśa-saṅkara* (involving common application in sentence-part)

(iv) *anugrāhyānugrāhaka-saṅkara* (involving a relation of the governor and the governed).

This treatment was so scientific that it came to be adopted freely even by rival theorists like Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.[1]

Another major innovation introduced by Udbhaṭa regarding the underlying principle or decisive element in naming figures involving a play upon words (*śleṣa*) deserves notice here. While all theorists were underestimating paranomasia as an artificial exercise which could at the most beautify other figures like metaphor, Udbhaṭa made bold to assert that *śleṣa* was a spontaneous result of poetic genius and hence deserved recognition always as a major figure of content (*arthālaṅkāra*) coloured by other poetic shades and not dismissed as a mere word-play. This shows his originality and insight into basic poetic facts.

IV

PRACTICAL CRITICISM :

A general criticism of Udbhaṭa is that he ignored the appreciation of the best examples of Sanskrit poetry, and contented himself with illustrating his precepts by his own ready-made verses. This is very unfair to Udbhaṭa because even the unreadable fragments recovered by Prof. Gnoli show that he has quoted passages from Kālidāsa, Harṣa, Bāṇa, Bhāravi, Māgha and so forth and commented at length upon them. We are singularly lucky that his remarks are partially preserved on at least one verse of Bāṇa in *Kalpalatāviveka*. The verse in question is from the *Harṣacarita*, at the head of chapter II :

rāgiṇi naliṇi lakṣmīṁ
divaso nidadhāti dinakaraprabhavāṁ /
anapekṣitaguṇadoṣaḥ
paropakāraḥ satāṁ vyasanaṁ //[2]

This verse is cited as an example of the figure *arthāntaranyāsa* by Udbhaṭa while commenting upon Bhāmaha II. 71. The context of the verse is that Bāṇa came to be a recipient of honour and fame from Harṣa through the spontaneous good-nature of Kṛṣṇa (Harṣa's

1. Cf. *Udbhaṭa*, V. 20, 22 and 25 with *Locana*, p. 121f. KSRI Edn.
2. Cf. R. Gnoli, *Udbhaṭa's Commentary Fragments*, Rome, 1962, p. 33 and *Kalpalatāviveka*, p. 274.

half-brother). Instead of directly mentioning this specific fact (*viśeṣa*), Bāṇa only gives as a general observation (*sāmānya*) about the benificent good nature of great souls, illustrating it with the natural activity of sunlight which makes the loving lotus bloom day after day. Udbhaṭa's observations as cited in the *Kalpalatāviveka* are as under :—

rāgiṇi iti : atra Bāṇaviṣaya-Kṛṣṇavyāpāre viśeṣe prastute' prastuta-samarthaka-viśeṣarūpa-nalinaviṣaya-divasavyāpāra-samarthitā satāṁ paropakāra-vyasanitā sāmānyābhūtopavarṇitā. Tataśca kaṇṭhopātta-sāmarthya-samarthakāpekṣayā arthāntaranyāsaḥ, pratīyamānaprastutaparatvena cāprastutapraśaṁseti. Yadāha iti Udbhaṭaḥ.

The passage also shows how Udbhaṭa was equally alive to the beauty of the *vācyālaṅkāra*, namely, *arthāntaranyāsa* as well as to the beauty of the *vyṅgyālaṅkāra*, namely, *aprastutapraśaṁsā*. This shows how he had a clear perception of the suggested beauty in poetry as much as Ānandavardhana himself, though his orthodoxy prevented him from proclaiming a new theory like *dhvani*.

The considerations noted above are enough to support our contention that Udbhaṭa was a major thinker in the field of literary theory and his original contribution is neither meagre nor minor as usually made out.

THE SAHṚDAYA

J. Moussaieff Masson

Like many semi-technical words in Sanskrit literature, *sahṛdaya* (roughly, sensitive reader, imaginative reader, a person sensitive to literature) is often used without quite knowing what it means : it is generally left untranslated, and precision is not what one looks for when searching for an appropriate translation. The word, in Sanskrit, has a certain elusive charm, and I will argue that the limits of its use were never clearly delineated by early writers on *alaṅkāra*. This ambiguity is the result of a richness of connotation whose origin I will attempt to locate. But first the problem : If I say in Sanskrit : *ayaṃ kaviḥ mahān sahṛdayaḥ*, (this poet is a great *Sahṛdaya*), I doubt that anybody who knows Sanskrit would ask me what I meant by the sentence. But I could cause confusion if I then went on to say ; of somebody else : *yady api mahān sahṛdayaḥ, tathāpi ekam api ślokṃ racayitum aśaktaḥ*. (Though a great *Sahṛdaya*, he is incapable of composing a single verse). In the former sentence, I am using the word in its broadest meaning, to refer to a person who is moved by literature. In the latter sentence, I am using the word more technically to refer to a critic of literature, but not a writer. But even though I would be understood, I do not believe that the distinction I made is one justified by the tradition. The writer and critic were of course thought of as separate categories within Sanskrit literary criticism, just as they are today. We have novelists and critics, and it is a rare and usually lamentable occasion when the two are combined. I believe that a certain theory of creativity is implicit in early Sanskrit uses of the term. Throughout the *Dhvanyāloka* (9th cen.) there is a certain rich confusion as to whether the author is addressing would-be poets, or simply those who enjoy literature but do not themselves create it. It is as if such a distinction was only a convenience, not a reality. Abhinavagupta, in the *Abhinavabhārati*[1], says that literature is meant, at some deeper level, for the *inspired* reader,

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1. P. 279, GOS Ed., Vol. I.

one who is gifted with a translucent poetic imagination : *adhikāri cātra vimalapratibhānaśāli-hṛdayaḥ*. *Pratibhā*, which refers to a flash of intuitive genius on the part of either the poet or reader, is closely associated with *sahṛdaya*. The most famous definition of the *sahṛdaya* is found in the *Dhvanyālokalocana* (11th cen.) of Abhinavagupta, and reads as : *yeṣām kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadibhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayibhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabhājaḥ sahṛdayāḥ*[1], which I translate as : "Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts—those (people) are known as sensitive readers." Those familiar with the theory of *rasa* in Sanskrit literature, will recognise many of the ingredients in this brief definition. Around *rasa*, which I consider to be the greatest gift of Indian literary criticism to the world, we find constellating the same densely meaningful terms : *pratibhā*, *sahṛdaya*, *tanmayibhavana*, *hṛdayasaṃvāda*. These associations, compelling to me, were obviously present to Abhinava as well, for he goes on to quote, clearly by association, an interesting, but difficult verse from the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (3-4 cen. A. D. ?) :

Yo'rtho hṛdayasaṃvādi tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ/
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭham ivāgninā[2]//

The translation I hesitatingly offer is :

"The externalisation (*bhāva*) of that emotion (*artha*) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source (*udbhava*) of *rasa*. The body is suffused by it, as dry wood is suffused by fire." (This brings to mind Abhinava's use of this simile in the *Locana* on p. 212, adding the analogy, to explain the reader who is totally receptive, of a pure white cloth, which dipped in pure water, absorbs it all).

It seems clear that the association in Abhinava's mind was the capacity for deep identification on the part of the reader : he is overwhelmed, consumed, even, by the work he reads. It is this notion, valid both for reader and for writer, rather than the idea of a cultivated reader, which seems to me most important, most crucial, in the concept of a *sahṛdaya*. The person most responsive to literature, is the one who is most completely absorbed. This is how I read the profound myth of the origin of *śloka* (verse) from *śoka* (sorrow) in the *Rāmāyaṇa* : Vālmīki sees two birds making love, shot by a hunter. He is overwhelmed with *śoka*, sorrow, pity, compassion, and unable to contain his feelings, recites the famous verse :

1. Banaras ed., 1940, p. 38.
2. *NS* VII.7, G.O.S. Vol. I, p. 348

mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhāṃ tvam agamaḥ śāśvatiḥ samāḥ|
Yat krauñcamithunād ekam avadhīḥ kāmamohitam||

whereby his *śoka*, sorrow, is transformed into *śloka*, poetry.
Thus we read in the *Nāṭyaśāstra.*[1]

Yas tuṣṭe tuṣṭim āyāti śoke śokam upaiti ca|
dainye dīnatvam abhyeti sa nāṭye prekṣakaḥ smṛtaḥ||

"He who is happy when others are happy, and sad when others are sad and even deeply depressed when others are so, he is the real spectator in a drama."

In the *Abhinavabhārati*, Abhinava asks how it is that somebody who is absorbed in his own personal sorrows and happiness can possibly bring his attention to bear on matters that do not concern him personally[2] and the answer he gives is this : there is a process whereby one becomes, from an *ahṛdaya*, one without a heart, a *sahṛdaya*, one with a heart. The operative word here is *alaukika*, another ambiguous, highly connotative technical term that crops up wherever *rasa* is to be found. It is the business of the theatre to take us out of the real world. To this end Abhinava tells us, there is music, and paintings, and dances and bright flowers and actresses of exquisite beauty. The voluptuous assault on the senses encouraged in the theatre convinces us that we have left our ordinary world behind and we enter a world of perfection. This is what Abhinava means by his famous theory of the *vighna*-s : whatever opposes the gradual absorption into an unreal world of gossamer beauty, must be broken down (the Tantric rituals, so dear to Abhinava, are a possible source for these charming ideas).

Thus Abhinava says at the beginning of the *Abhinavabhārati* :

nāṭye tu pāramārthikaṃ kiñcid adya me kṛtyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyevaṃbhūtābhisandhisaṃskārābhāvāt[3] :

"Today I do not have to do anything, I am going to the theatre".

This then is my first point. The second concerns the origin of the dual nature of the action implicit in the concept of the *sahṛdaya*, namely actively creating and passively enjoying. This, to my mind, stems from a creative, indeed imaginative fusion of literature and philosophy. Is it possible that the ideas we have been looking at come from philosophic view about the similarity of the world to a dream, or to a display of magic (after all, what does '*māyāmayam idam sarvam*' mean originally, if not that we are witnessing a magic show), or indeed, to a drama. It is the old Vedāntic notion of the person

1. Ch. 27, v. 55.
2. *Nijasukhādivivaśībhūtaśca kathaṃ vastvantare saṃvidaṃ viśrāmayet*, p. 282.
3. P. 36.

as witness, or spectator, the *sākṣin*, who watches, in some sense fascinated, in some sense, totally uninvolved :

dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā
samānam vṛkṣam pariṣasvajāte |
tayor anyaḥ pippalam svādv atti
anaśnan anyo 'bhicākaśīti ||[1]

"Two birds, very close, friends, perch on the same tree.
One eats the sweet fruit. The other, without eating, watches."

This is the stance required by the poet, or by the *rasika*, the synonym of *sahṛdaya*, he who enjoys the *rasa* of any situation. And so a verse that so enchanted Śaṃkara :

mithilāyāṃ pradīptāyāṃ na me dahyate kiñcana|

"My city burns, but I loose nothing", spoken by Janaka from the top of a hill where he witnesses, like a spectator, the destruction of his life. Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinava's great prdecessor, at the very beginning of his lost commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, in a difficult but important passage preserved in Abhinavagupta's work[2], likens Rāma's life story to a dream, which nonetheless grips the imagination (*hṛdayagraha*) and appears wondrous (*adbhutam*) thus allowing us insight into the ultimate truth (*lokottaraparamapuruṣārtha*), namely that *viśvam idam asatyam* (all is unreal).

I realise that to deny *vyutpatti* (learning) its legitimate role in the formation of the critic (or poet) is fraught with dangers. But there comes a moment when deeper springs are tapped, and there is something unique about the Sanskrit poem where profound philosophical scepticism is linked with an equally profound imaginative delight in the world : I am thinking of that most curious of all poems, the *Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇam*. There is a kind of untutored vitality to this work, an imaginative freedom coupled with a richly associative mind, that makes it unique in Sanskrit literature. In it is the impossible combination of detachment (asceticism) and involvement (sensuality).

In summary, then, I have attempted to show (1)that the concept of the *sahṛdaya* involves a theory of creativity, where the ability to loose oneself in a profound and sympathetic experience, often sensual, is paramount (thus the frequent use of the word *sahṛdaya* in works on *rasa*), and (2) that this concept may well have been influenced by philosophic solipsism (e. g. *Advaitavedānta* and Kashmir Śaivism) where detachment is stressed, by linking this idea to the equally pervasive views of creativity and action implicit in literature and literary criticism. This helps to explain the paradoxical combination of sensuality and detachment so often remarked upon as typical of Indian literature.

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1. *ṚV*. 1.164.20.
2. P. 5.

TEXT-CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON VĀLMĪKI-RĀMĀYAṆA

S. Pollock

In deciding how most appropriately to pay tribute to a scholar who has done so much to enlarge our knowledge of the textual history of Sanskrit poetry, a particularly fitting contribution seemed to me some observations on the text of the *ādikāvyam*, gathered during my preliminary work on *Ayodhyākāṇḍa* for the annotated translation of the critical edition of the poem undertaken by the Rāmāyaṇa Translation Project.[1]

A close re-examination of the materials exploited for the critical edition of the *Rāmāyaṇa* abundantly confirms the soundness of the basic principles upon which the work is predicated. The manuscripts fall unmistakably into two main recensions, from the continual concordance of which we can indubitably postulate a common, archetypal source. Consequently the procedures[2] for constituting the text *en gros*— i.e., for determining interpolations—seem powerfully cogent, and it is rather rarely the case that I find myself in disagreement with editorial judgments at this "maximal" level.[3]

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1. Under the general editorship of R. P. Goldman, University of California, Berkeley.
2. *Rāmāyaṇa*, crit. ed., Vol. I., p. xxxiv.
3. Some examples with regard to Book II. (I leave out of consideration those places where the critical edition constitutes a passage in a way exhibited by no MS. at all, e.g., 50.15, 52.14, etc.) After 31.25, 816+ should be read: it has precisely the same MS. authority as, say, 30.24, and is contextually essential. 53.24 as constituted (with switch to direct address of Kausalyā) without 1297+, makes little MS. or contextual sense. Ch. 92 appears to be an interpolation. The chapter is missing $D_{4,5,7}$ and there are strong narrative reasons telling against its authenticity. Carefully examining the southern and northern recensions we find: between *pāda*-s d and e of 18.32 either 474+ or 475+ is necessary; after 49.4 either 1164+ or 1165+ (cf. v. 13 of the *sarga*); after 67.14 1735+, 5-7 or 1732+. 9-11; comparing 526+ and 527+, we conclude the archetype must have contained a verse or two in which Kausalyā protests that she will be burnt by a fire whipped up by the wind of separation, stoked by grief, etc.; comparing 716+.7-12, 717+.11-19, 718+.1-4, 13-15, especially lines 11, 16 and 13 respectively of the three passages, we conclude the

At the "minimal" level, however,—the level of the single *śloka,* of the phrase, of the individual reading—the implications of these sound critical principles, of the large text-critical credo, seem not always to have been fully appreciated or systematically pursued. Agreements on individual readings among isolated southern and northern MSS do not appear to have been consistently accorded the same hearing, and allowed as impartial a judgment, as their testimony with regard to larger portions of the text (perhaps an inescapable consequence of the sheer volume of material). Nowhere are we provided with a clear explanation of the editorial procedures at this level, and indeed they often appear very eclectic.

What does it signify, we must ask ourselves, when a good variant (that is, not a natural facilior substitute) is found, say, in G_1, M_2, Ś, V and Ñ ? or Ś, B, D_{4-6} and T ? or Ñ and M ? Must there not be some critical degree of inter-recension consensus that certifies a reading more conclusively than the unanimous testimony of either recension singly ? I have not been able to ascertain this degree—the concordances seem quite random, the chance for stemmatic arrangement of the MSS remote ; but I am nonetheless convinced that the primary textual principles must be applied here, too. In lieu of the determination of the critical threshold, all cases of such agreement, however exiguous, will have to be carefully reasoned through, for in the absence of a sure genealogy of MSS none of them can lay claim to any greater sincerity than another. Moreover, the consideration of variants should (in practice as well as in theory) consist in weighing them, not simply counting up MSS ; one-sided support, however loud, should not be the criterion for awarding the prize. And additionally, given the special interests of the northern recension, which I shall enlarge on, "agreement" need not always be verbatim to convince.

I should like to examine a few cases (restricting myself exclusively to Vol. II) where a reconsideration of the rich materials stored in the critical apparatus of the Baroda *Rāmāyaṇa* may help us to constitute a text of greater precision and of greater fidelity to our manuscript sources and their common descent. Besides simple cases of variants to be preferred on the grounds of varying degrees of inter-recension I want to investigate some instances where the northern recension can give us to perceive its retention of correct readings which have been virtually lost from the southern ; and finally to isolate certain features of the northern recension which can serve as an interpretative tool of the critically constituted text. The examples I offer are not always meant to be significant per se, but I

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archetype must have contained some lines in which Lakṣmaṇa addresses Rāma, telling him that he wishes to accompany him to the wilderness, and that indeed Rāma had already given him permission to do so.

notice them in the hope that they are illustrative of procedures by means of which, analogically, other text problems may be addressed.[1]

43. (13–) 14.

(kadāhaṃ punar āgamya ...mṛgayāṃ paryaṭiṣyāmi ... ||
nātyartham abhikāṅkṣāmi mṛgayāṃ sarayūvane ||
ratir hy eṣātulā loke . . . ||

G_2, M_1, Ñ, V, B, $D_{1-3, 5}$: *atyartham.* All commentators agree on the text of the critical edition; it has the unmistakable look of a pious falsification.

12.6.

saritāṃ tu patiḥ svalpāṃ maryādām satyam anvitaḥ |
satyānurodhāt samaye velāṃ svāṃ nātivartate ||

M_1, G_2 : *samayam*; Ñ, V, B : *samayaṃ* (*pālayan velām*; similarly $D_{1, 2}$; the NR otherwise omits); so too C_K. The ocean's compact is its shoreline, as its truth is its limit (cf. also the following verse, 7. : *samayaṃ ca mamāryemaṃ yadi tvaṃ na kariṣyasi*... .).

111.5

ete cāpy abhiṣekārdrā munayaḥ phalaśodhanāḥ |

All commentators, G_2 : *kalaśodyatāḥ*; Ś, Ñ, $D_{2, 4-6}$: *kalaśapaṇayaḥ* (probably a simplification of the somewhat unusual *paranipāta* of *udyata*—). *kalaśa*— thus corroborated as the true reading (cf. eg., III.15.3) in place of the absurd *phala*—, though the *uttarapada* must remain uncertain.

63.15

evam etan mayā dṛṣṭam imām rātriṃ bhayāvahām |

T_3, $G_{1, 2}$, M_{1-3} : *bhayāvaham*; NR 1607+ : *evam eṣa mayā svapno dṛṣṭaḥ pāpo bhayāvahaḥ.* It is the dream, not the night, which is terrifying.

78.8

yadā tuṣṭas tu bharato rāmasyeha bhaviṣyati |
seyaṃ svastimatī senā gaṅgām adya tariṣyati ||

$T_{1, 2}$, $M_{1, 2}$, $G_{2, 3}$, $C_{V, R, M}$: (a) *duṣṭas*; while the NR 1922+ offers, *yadi yāsyati sanduṣṭo* .. (*neyam*....). Cf. 79.7, *kaccin na duṣṭo vrajasi rāmasya* .... Read thus : *yadāduṣṭas.*

77.19

nirīkṣyānugatāṃ senāṃ tāṃ ca gaṅgāṃ śivodakām |
(niveśayata me sainyam .. *(iti bharato 'bravīd* ·) ||

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1. The abbreviations used are those of the critical edition; additionally, NR=northern recension; SR=southern; C_{RA}=the commentary called *Rāmāyaṇaśiromaṇi*, C_S the commentary of Satyatīrtha. [ā has been substituted by A for technical reasons—Editor]

$T_{1,2}$, G_3, D_T, D_D : ***anutthitām*** (C_{RA} : *gaṅgātīre saṃsthitām*; C_T : *gamane anudyogām* [*gaṅgayā nirodhāt*]) ; Ś, $Ñ_1$, V, B : (ca) *sthitām*; $Ñ_2$: *stambhitām*. The verse presents a slight hysteron proteron (not at all uncommon in the epics), which perhaps occasioned the weak variant *anugatam* : "He saw the Gaṅgā with its kindly waters and the army halted (at it)". $Ñ_2$ has brought out the full intention of the word with its "gloss". Read thus : *anutthitām*.

19.9

anvag evāham icchāmi vanam gantum itaḥ punaḥ /

M_1, G_2 ; Ś, Ñ, V, B, $D_{1,6}$ (ad 489+. 10) : *itaḥ purāt*. The corroborant testimony of the N MSS, hidden in a parallel version of the passage, was neglected. Similarly in 19.19,

kaścid daivena saumitre yoddhum utsahate pumān /

T, G_1, $M_{2,3}$, $C_{K,T}$; Ś, Ñ, D_6 (ad 489+. 35 *v. l.*) : *kaś ca* (text of the parallel passage in the NR incorrectly established).

90.25

śarāṇāṃ dhanuṣaś cāham anṛṇo 'smi mahāvane /

$T_{1,2}$, $G_{1,3}$, M_2 : *mahāmṛdhe*; $Ñ_2$, B, D_3, M_3 : *mahāhave* (which is probably the correct reading, though to account for the variant ***mahāvane*** one might conjecture ***mahāraṇe***, cf. 16.21).

58.48

yadi māṃ saṃspṛśed rāmaḥ sakṛd adyālabheta vā /

The commentators are quite at a loss on the second *pāda* : C_G reads ***labheta***, glossing : *cakṣurviṣayātām prāpnuyāt* (though Daśaratha will say in the next verse that he is blind) ; C_K interpolates a line to supply a direct object with *labheta*; $C_{T,RA}$ read ***anvārabheta*** (C_T, *kiñciddvārā vā spṛśet*; C_{RA}, *paścādgamanārambhaṃ kuryāt*). On the other hand, G_2, $M_{1,2}$: ***apy ālapeta***. This reading, recommended by sense, receives confirmation from the "gloss" of the NR, which unanimously offers, *sambhāṣetāpi* (*cāgataḥ*). Both readings, however, may be facilior for D_D, D_M ***anvālabheta***, which is attested in *Mbh.* (crit. ed. V.35.10), glossed by Devabodha ad loc. as "*vade*".

There are instances where the correct reading appears to have been lost throughout the SR, and can only be recovered by inferring from the NR.

30.10

adya nūnaṃ daśarathaḥ sattvam āviśya bhāṣate /

As the line stands it is quite meaningless. The NR presents :

nūnaṃ daśaratho 'nyena sattvenāviṣṭacetanḥ / (785+)

The correct reading of the critical text should be : ***daśaratham*** (suggested also in C_K ed, note ad loc.).

21.11

tathety uvāca suprītā (kausalyā)

In the NR we find : *tathety uvāca duḥkhārtā.* Obviously the reading required is : (a) ***suprita,*** for the following verse is :

... *(rāmaḥ) abravīd vākyam mātaram bhṛśaduḥkhitām* /

60.2

kausalyā vividham śokakarṣitā /

Read *dvividham*; cf. NR (1518+) : *dvividhenāpi duḥkhena kausalyā bhṛśaduḥkhitā*, and verse 4 of the same *sarga* : *vihāya mām gato rāmo bhartā ca svargato mama* /

68.2

(rājyād bhraṃśasva kaikeyi................ /
parityaktā ca dharmeṇa mā mṛtaṃ rudati bhava //

The commentators take *mā* either as negative (but Kaikeyī has not in any case been weeping for Daśaratha), or=*mām* (which is contextually meaningless— "abandoned by *dharma* beweep me who am, will be, dead"?—and solecistic : a *pāda* may not, and in Vālmīki never does, commence with an enclitic. The NR (1741+.6) gives, *mām ṛte (sukhini bhava)*, suggesting we so read in the critical edition and understand, "*dharma* has abandoned you, and I shall too, and may you cry your eyes out without me". *ṛte* with the accusative is, admittedly, rare (attested so far as I can tell in epic and puranic literature only in *Bhg.* 11.32 and *MatsyaP.* 106.24); but it is precisely this rarity coupled with the fact that Vālmīki should employ the construction elsewhere—VI.23.31—that adds conclusive support to the NR *pāṭha.*

63.4

vādayanti tathā śāntiṃ lāsayanty api cāpare /
(nāṭakāny apare prāhur....)

śāntim is the reading of the entire SR, and its relation with ***vādayanti*** confuses the commentators (CGMTBA all must add *uddiśya*, "in order to pacify [him]"; PW s. v. *śānti* understands "to wish one well", which simply does not fit here, while the parallel it cites [V.69.28 vulg.] is removed in the critical edition [V.66.29]). The critical apparatus notes, "$D_{4, 5, 7}$ *gānti* (sic)". The NR as a whole offers,

avādayañ jaguś cānye nanṛtur... (1594+)

The three D MSS have preserved the correct reading (in fact the difficilior, as is ***vādaya***—absolute), which the NR has glossed. The form of the verb, mistaken as a corruption by the editor, is authenticated by *Mbh.* V.107.9 (crit. ed.).

Occasionally the want of conclusive MS evidence requires that we approach the border of conjecture, which, though rightly eschewed by the editors of the critical edition,

we must be allowed judiciously and circumspectly to utilize when otherwise nonsense will remain.[1]

101.22

bhūmiḥ kīrtir yaśo lakṣmīḥ puruṣaṃ prārthayanti hi /
svargasthaṃ cānubadhnanti satyam eva bhajeta tat //

All MSS, according to the apparatus, agree on *svargastham*, save D_T, D_D, D_M, which offer *satyaṃ samanuvartante.* Land and wealth do not attend the dead : you cannot take it with you even in Sanskrit poetry. A comparison with 99.19 (*narendram satyastham... carāma*), and the evidence of the three D MSS, strongly suggest : *satyastham.*

20.5

asthāne sambhramo yasya jāto vai sumahān ayam /

None of the MSS which preserve this line convincingly clarifies the syntax of *yasya*, which has no referrent (the commentators " '*yasya*' *te prasiddhasya*" is desperate). Conjecture : *sumahānayaḥ* ["This consternation is out of place, from which this great impolicy has come" (i.e., Rāma's decision to abandon the kingship and retire to the forest)]. cf. 8.14, *sumahān anayaḥ* (*anaya* appears to be a Schlagwort of Vālmīki's : II.72.4, V.19.10, 20.29, etc.).

I have had occasion more than once to use the term "gloss" for variants found in the NR. It is a peculiar, perhaps unique feature of this recension that it does not (unlike, say, either of the *Mahābhārata* recensions) only or merely transmit the archetype of the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*; it adapts it as well. In countless cases where the received text was evidently regarded as too obscure or difficult the NR simplifies—sometimes only with respect to a single lexical item, sometimes with respect to the syntactical organization, while sometimes it recasts the whole thought of a *śloka* into a more perspicuous form. (One might even hazard the suggestion that what we have here is the commencement of that process of "popularization" that issues ultimately in the great medieval vernacular translations.) The NR, as I hope to have shown, continues to corroborate the SR continues even sometimes to preserve or confirm the lectio difficilior—its evidence for constituting the text is in no way impugned by this additional objective, which elsewhere and frequently allows it to function as what could be regarded as our oldest commentary on the *Rāmāyaṇa.* But of course like any other commentary its judgment must be scrutinized before being accepted.

Glosses :

17.7 *kṛtamaṅgalā* = *maṅgalavādinī* (409+.1)

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1. One must, however, never be so bold as to over-rule the unanimous testimony of the MSS, as for example Vaidya has done ad II.23.30,

83.11 *svastikavijñeyāḥ (nāvaḥ)* = *svastil acihnāṅkāḥ* (contra the commentators, "(boats) called '*svastikas*'")

21.11 *śubhadarśanā* = *dharmadarśini*

94.49 *vyāsane kaccid ādhyasya durgatasya ca...* = *kaccid vivadato 'rtheṣu balino durbalasya ca* (2161+; *vyāsena* appears to be hapax in the sense of "at law")

cf. above ad 77.19, 54.48. 63.4.

Syntactical reconstructions and periphrases :

19.22 *buddhiḥ praṇītā yeneyaṃ manaś ca susamāhitam |*
tat tu nārhāmi saṃkleṣṭuṃ pravrajiṣyāmi mā ciram ||

yena tat—"since...then", *saṃkleṣṭum* used absolutely (contra all commentators), as appears from NR 489+.21-22 :

evam me niścitā buddhir manaś caiva samāhitam |
na vilambitum icchāmi....

47.26 *adharmabhayabhītaś ca paralokasya cānagha |*
(tena lakṣmaṇa nādyāham ātmānam abhiṣecaye ||

C~G, K, T~ : "(afraid) of the loss of the world to come"; C~S~ suggests *paraloka-parakīyajana,* which finds corroboration in NR 1122+,

adharmaprāptibhīto 'haṃ lokavādabhayena ca

(cf. 20.6, crit. ed. : *lokasyānatiśaṅkayā*, where C~G~' s understanding "from worry about the people's respect [*ānati*, against all other commentators, who divide *anatiśaṅkayā*], finds support in the NR, *lokavādabhayena*).

24.7 *prāsādāgrair vimānair vā vaihāyasagatena vā |*
sarvāvasthāgatā bhartuḥ pādacchāyā viśiṣyate ||

viśiṣyate to be construed exceptionally with the instrumental (for ablative), as per C~V~, contra C~K,T,Ra~, for cf. NR 618+ :

harmyaprāsādabhavanavimānebhyo 'pi me prabho |
tava pādāśrayaḥ śreyān....

51.12 *kiṃ samarthan janasyāsya kiṃ priyaṃ kiṃ sukhāvaham |*
iti rāmeṇa nagaraṃ pitṛvat paripālitam ||

C~M, K, T, RA~ : "The city (once) guarded by Rāma became worried thinking, 'What will be good... (sc., from now on, since Rāma has left)'." The NR adequately clarifies the construction intended :

...iti cintayatā tena jano 'yaṃ paripālitaḥ ||[1]

1. With the help of the NR we can, I think, fairly and certainly explain the old crux in the *Sundarakāṇḍa*, over which all commentators have been so exercised :

10.8 (*santi me kuśalā vaidyā*) *adhituṣṭāś ca sarvaśaḥ* /
NR composite : *suvibhaktāś ca vṛttibhiḥ*

56.10 *naiṣā hi sā strī bhavati ślāghanīyena dhīmatā* /
ubhayor lokayor vīra patyā yā saṃprasādyate //

C_M, K, T, RA construe together *pāda*-s b and c, incorrectly; cf. NR 1359.+ (3—) 4

(*devabhūtena bhartrā yā yāceta na prasīdati* /
kṛtāñjalibhṛśārtena) *hatā seha paratra ca* //

27.26 *tava sarvam abhiprāyam avijñāya śubhānane* /
(*vāsaṃ na rocaye 'raṇye. . . .*)

The implication—"I did not approve your dwelling in the wilderness just to see how you would react"—has been surmised also by the NR; cf. 702+ :

tathā tava ca jijñāsur niścayaṃ śubhaniścaye /
(*uktavān na nayiṣye 'ham. . . .*)

The greater and far more difficult task of assembling the vast mass of manuscript materials has been excellently performed by the editors of the critical edition of the *Rāmāyaṇa*; but this raw stuff of textual criticism must continue to be processed by new readers, for what is written above the line must, to some extent, be considered provisional only.

V. 7.68.
babhūva buddhis tu harīśvarasya yadīdṛśī rāghavadharmapatnī /
imā yathā rākṣasarājabhāryāḥ sujātam asyeti hi sādhubuddheḥ //
(69). *punaś ca so' cintayad ārtarūpo dhruvaṃ viśiṣṭā guṇato hi sītā* /
athāyam asyāṃ kṛtavān mahātmā laṅkeśvaraḥ kaṣṭham anāryakarm //)
NR v. 1 ad 68d, *asyā iti*, which is intended to remove the old and difficult double *sandhi* of the archetype: The thought crossed Hanumān's mind—his thoughts were reasonable: if Sītā had been like these other women, it would have been far better *for her*. (For Sītā, he saw on further reflection, and to his bitter sorrow, excelled them all, and this it was which drove Rāvaṇa to do the ignoble thing he did).

ON PRAHELIKĀ

Marie-Claude Porcher

We have to thank Professor Sternbach for his important contribution, the study of enigmas in Sanskrit literature[1]. He provides a detailed history of these complex word-games, he has collected a large number of them from widely diverse and hard-to-find sources. Our purpose here is not to study them in depth : these "riddles" are extremely dissimilar (remember there is only a very tenuous connection between the theological riddles of the Vedas and the charades found in the *Subhāṣita-saṅgraha*). Moreover, the Indian criteria of classification are highly desperate. Only one poetician has taken an interest in the purely linguistic aspects of these riddles : Daṇḍin (Sternbach, chapter II, p. 38-52). The following pages are devoted to the sixteen categories of *prahelikā* he mentions.

Daṇḍin discusses the *prahelikā* in third *pariccheda* of the *Kāvyādarśa*. After giving a detailed definition, illustrated by many examples, of the *yamaka* and of the different types of the *citra*, he sets forth the sixteen categories of *prahelikā* which constitute the latter part of the chapter on *śabdālṅkāra*. Are these included merely among the figures of the *signifiant*[2], as their position would suggest, coming as they do after the *yamaka* and the *citra* ? The examples given by Daṇḍin are remarkably heterogeneous. One would have expected him to make regular use of *sabhaṅgaśleṣa* or even polysemy. Both of these processes are evident, but we also find others which are unexpected : for instance, a metaphor can become a riddle. We have no intention of making an exhaustive study of the wide-ranging catalogue provided by Daṇḍin, nor of imposing a further categorisation of our own.

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1. *Indian riddles*, Hoshiarpur, 1975.
2. We refer here to F. De Saussure's distinction between *significant* and *signifié* (*Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris 1960, 5th. edition). The relation between these two terms corresponds, to some extent, to the Indian conception of the *śabda-artha* relation.

We will only try to elucidate the different processes he emphasizes and examine their relation to the poetics[1].

The study of the fifteen *prahelikā*-s mentioned by Daṇḍin (the sixteenth being defined as a combination of the preceding fifteen) shows that these plays on words can contain double meanings or single ones: the presence or absence of ambiguity as the main-spring of the riddle allows us to establish the first major division within the *prahelikā*.

I. The use of ambiguity is not surprising. It is a well established tradition in India whose first examples can be traced to the Vedic period. The *prahelikā*, therefore, is often characterized by double meanings in which each meaning is of equal importance (expressed by the *abhidhā*). This hesitation between two meanings, both of them possible, at first tends to throw the hearer off. But secondary factors allow him to choose between the two and, in case of multiple meanings, to determine a hierarchy. Before going in more detail, we should notice that this use of double meanings is also a literary device, and that there is no break between the word-games and the specifically poetic language.

The first two examples of *prahelikā*[2] *samāgatā* and *vañcitā* reflect the traditional distinction between *sabhaṅga śleṣa* (the same phonemic shape, differently split up, yields two different meanings) and *abhaṅgaśleṣa* (the pun depends on the duplicity of meaning assignable to the word). In the first case, we can understand the same phonemic span either as *na mayā go-rasa-abhijñam* or as *na mayā āgo-rasa-abhijñam*...[3] In the second case, the interpretation rests upon the duplicity of the word *kubjām*[4] which means "a hunchbacked woman" (first sense) or "a woman from the city of Kanyakubja" (hidden sense). In both cases of double meaning, (that is to say with a different word-division or with the same word-division) the understanding of the first sense results in a confusion or in incoherence. So it is necessary to find a new interpretation in order to discover the hidden meaning.

A large number of the *prahelikā* contains a *śleṣa*, usually ambiguity assignable to one or several words. But they also make use of other devices which allow us to propose a more detailed categorisation of the riddles of the first type.

For instance, *prakalpitā*[5] juxtaposes *śleṣa* and syntactical ambiguity: *pada* a and b can be understood either as an instrumental qualifying the word "old woman" (*vṛddhe* being the vocative case of *vṛddhā*–, f.) or a complement of *tiṣṭhantam mām* (in that

1. In this study of Daṇḍin's *prahelikā*, we will not repeat a comprehensive translation of the riddles, but will refer the reader to chapter II of *Indian riddles*.
2. 3.108-109.
3. 3.108.
4. 3.109.
5. 3.115.

case, *vṛddhe* is the vocative of *vṛddhi*–, f., "goddess of wealth"). It is the context which reveals the ordering of the meanings (as suggested in the commentaries). The first interpretation, the one that comes first to mind, turns out to be incoherent and obliges to reread the text.

To the main lexical duplicity (*śleṣa*) can be added homonymy or synonymy, sometimes both devices simultaneously. In *nāmāntaritā*[1], the intended meaning of the riddle contains the noun *rājātana*– which designates a kind of tree (the Piyal). But the first meaning, (superficial) presents several words which, when assembled, form an homonym (*rājā...atanaḥ*), making use of a process similar to that of western charades. In *samānaśabdā*[2], the use of several synonyms (for instance *abhūmi*– *adhara*–, literally the "non-earth", but, at the second level, the "lip", in the compound *abhūmi-sāhvayaḥ*) makes the text difficult to understand at first sight. The two devices are combined in *ekacchannā*[3] : *amanuṣya*– is a synonym of *gandharva*–; *gandharva-hasta*, designates a kind of tree (the Eraṇḍa) : homonymy. These word-games become even more complicated when the different parts of a single word are dispersed and scattered throughout the verse.

The *śleṣa*, therefore, is occasionally coupled with a referential ambiguity : in *niblṛtā*[4], the stanza can be applied either to a human being (robbed by a courtesan) or to the ocean [represented as the husband (=*naram*) of the rivers]. It is the negative statement ("these are not courtesans") which excludes the first meaning (the one which comes first to mind) and introduces the hidden meaning suggested by the commentaries: "these are mountainous rivers".

In concluding the study of the first category of the *prahelikā*, it should be mentioned that lexical ambiguity can extend throughout the whole verse, as it does in *paruṣā*[5]. In this example, the second level of meaning obtained by applying complicated grammatical rules : thus, *surāḥ* : "gods" (well-known conventional sense) takes on the meaning of "vendors or drinkers of spirits". This second sense is obtained in an artificial and forced manner by referring to Pāṇini[6]. Contrary to what we notice in the preceding riddles, the first meaning, here, remains perfectly clear and self-contained. The second meaning is superimposed on the first to demonstrate the poet's grammatical prowess. This verse, the only example of its kind in this list, bears witness to the Indian fondness for sophisticated word-games.

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1. 3.116.
2. 3.118.
3. 3.121.
4. 3.117.
5. 3.113.
6. III.1.21 and III.1.134.

The *prehelikā* which we have just examined thus makes use of ambiguity. In general, the first meaning, obscure or incoherent, necessitates a reinterpretation and gives way to the second meaning, hidden but coherent. To this first type, characterized by the presence of two directly expressed meanings ("conjoined" : *śleṣa*), we can oppose a second category, in which the two meanings bear a different relation to each other: the first meaning is directly expressed, but not the second one, the intended meaning, which is not conveyed by the ***significant.***

II. The *prahelikā samānarūpā*[1] gives an example of this second category:

I saw in this garden a creeper with five twigs and, on each of the twigs, a red cluster of blossoms.

There is no *śleṣa* here. First of all, we understand that the riddle is about a creeper with clusters of red flowers. But we quickly become aware that, at the secondary level, the creeper means, metaphorically, the woman. The twigs mean the arms, the red flowers and the painted nails. We know that the *lakṣaṇā* (second function of the word) determines the relation of the first and second meanings: this is a relation of similarity. The classification of the metaphorical process within the *prahelikā* should not overshadow the fact that this same process gives rise to the figure of speech *atiśayokti* : the examples of *atiśayokti* mentioned by Mammaṭa[2] are comparable in all points to this riddle. Thus the *prahelikā* does not differ—linguistically—from the figure of speech *atiśayokti*, which belongs to the *arthālaṅkāra*. The disappearance of one term of the comparison (the subject) casts a doubt in the mind of the reader and results in an enigma: thus the process itself has been classified as a part of the *prahelikā*.

In this second category of *prahelikā*, which is made up only of this prolific metaphorical process, the two different senses are not directly expressed: the first one is directly expressed, the other is indirectly indicated by the first meaning. There is no longer ambiguity, but rather symbolism (the creeper symbolizes the woman, because this second sense is not expressed by *abhidhā* but indirectly indicated by *lakṣaṇā*).

III. Neither the ambiguity nor the symbolic process constitutes the entirety of the *prahelikā* mentioned by Daṇḍin. A certain number of riddles, on the contrary, are only open to one interpretation. Various devices can be used to obfuscate the single meaning and thus to distract or delay the final understanding of the enigma.

The difficulty may be purely lexical. Rather than using common vocabulary, the *prahelikā* incorporates rare words which are not always found in the lexicons. We have to refer to the commentaries to understand *pramuṣitā*[3] in which the noise of the ankle

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1. 3.112.
2. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, X.449,
3. 3.111.

bracelets of a young woman is evoked. The author has proceeded by accumulating rare words which render the meaning incomprehensible without a commentary.

Proper nouns can be replaced by a periphrase which recalls the qualities or the deeds of a particular god or hero. In *parihārikā*[1] "the father of the enemy of the son of the conqueror of the bird" designates, in succession, Sūrya, Karṇa, Arjuna and Indra. The obscurity increases in function of the accumulation.

The problems of interpretation may, on the other hand, be merely syntactical. Thus, in the *vyutkrāntā*[2], splitting the phrases, scattering the nouns and qualifiers, creates a major syntactical disorder which misleads the reader (according to Daṇḍin's definition: *mohakāriṇī*). The strange example furnished in *sammūḍhā*[3] arises also from a syntactical confusion: the stanza, which would appear clear, remains nonetheless impossible to understand if the absolutive *parāvṛttya*, expressed in the first half, is not repeated in the second.

The examples of *prahelikā* belonging to this third category no longer demand a double interpretation on the hearer's part. But the production and the understanding of the text requires a high degree of erudition, a thorough knowledge of the Sanskrit language and of the cultural background (particularly mythological) characterizing the scholarly milieu from which these sophisticated riddles spring.

IV. Two *prahelikā*-s of Daṇḍin, more specifically "enigmatic" in form, remain to be examined. They ask a question or give a definition. The answer or the object described can be guessed from the statement itself. Thus *saṃkhyātā*[4] assures us of the existence of a city which contains a nasal surrounded by four phonemes in which dwells a king whose name consists of eight phonemes: these are Kāñcī and the king Puṇḍraka. *Ubhayacchannā*[5] asks a riddle: "what is it that is joined to what in all circumstances etc." Answer: the head and the hair. In fact, the answer is contained in the question, since the two interrogatives (*kaḥ* and *kena*) possess a double meaning: *kaḥ* is a synonym of *kaśaḥ*, *kena* of *mastakena*. As we can see, these *prahelikā*-s make use of the linguistic processes aforementioned: ambiguity (in 3.122 a second interpretation reveals the meaning hidden by the first and, itself, constitutes the answer) and periphrase in place of the proper noun. Such word-games have gained great popularity in the Sanskrit tradition, as we can see from the examples collected by Professor Sternbach in chapter three of his book. Thus the *bahirālāpa* riddles possess many points in common with 3.122.

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1. 3.120.
2. 3.110.
3. 3.119.
4. 3.114.
5. 3.122.

From Daṇḍin's examples, we can draw several conclusions. We have singled out a certain number of stylistic devices by which the creators of *prahelikā* manage to obscure the meaning, to focus the hearer's interest and curiosity, and to mislead his interpretation : rare words, unexpected syntax, ellipsis and, above all, ambiguity depending on polysemy, homonymy and synonymy. These devices are not essentially different from those employed in poetry in general. We should notice the importance of the *śleṣa* in the *prahelikā* as well as in poetry : there is no break in continuity between the two.

Therefore, it is in no way astonishing that a poetician such as Daṇḍin should have taken a special interest in these riddles. The study of riddles is closely tied to the study of poetics as such. Because they tend to illustrate the most obvious stylistic devices, these games, though widely scattered throughout the Sanskrit literature are often disregarded. In Indian as in Western tradition, they were early relegated to a minor genre. This explains why Daṇḍin consigns them to the category of *śabdālaṅkāra*, in spite of the fact that they do not play on the *significant* alone.

SUBHĀSIT AND CPĀP' IN KHMER LITERATURE

Saveros Pou

Didactic literature, whether oral or written, is common to all cultures in the world due to the universal tendency of man to draw lessons from his life experience, and to pass them on as sayings, proverbs, maxims and the like, from generation to generation. It is not unusual to find striking similarity between proverbs or maxims of different countries, not only in the contents but also in the expression of the thought.

In the case of Cambodia, it is common knowledge that it ranges among the countries most deeply influenced by the Indian civilization since the earliest times of the Christian era. Consequently, people expect to find Indian cultural patterns reflected in Khmer culture, as for instance in didactic literature. On the other hand, since the earliest Khmer literary documents stemmed from the 15th c.[1], one also meets with (a) very confused statements on Khmer literature prior to that time, and (b) the widespread assumption that Khmer culture as known to us after the fall of Angkor is simply a by-product of a combined Sino-Thai cultural complex.

I have committed myself to sort out the constituents of Khmer literature by means of linguistic investigation. After identifying the *Rāmakerti*, or Khmer *Rāmāyaṇa*[2], a similar study is called for regarding didactic literature. A few separate studies of texts

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1. Three stages are reckoned in the history of Khmer language and literature :
   (a) Old Khmer : 6th-14th c.
   (b) Middle Khmer (High- and Low-) : 15th—Mid. 19th c.
   (c) Modern Khmer Mid. : 19th c. onward.
2. *Publications de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême—Orient* :
   Vol. CX, 1977, *Rāmakerti (XVIè–XVIIè siècles)*.
   Vol. CXI, 1977, *Etudes sur le Rāmakerti* (XVIè-XVIIè siècles).
   Vol. CXVII, 1979, *Rāmakerti (XVIè-XVIIè siècles)*. Khmer Text.

have already been carried out in a joint project[1]; it now appears that an attempt should be made on the whole topic.

The present paper has also profited from various references on Indian literature, and particularly from direct information kindly provided by Dr. Ludwik Sternbach to whom I wish to express my sincere gratitude.

I. CULTURAL BACKGROUND

Old Khmer documents consist of epigraphs, evidently of limited length, and dealing with factual subjects; there are no "Belles-Lettres" to speak of prior to the 15th c. In other words, judging from the date of available documents, Khmer literature began with the Middle Period. But the same documents far from showing any sign of a newly born literature, bear witness to a centuries-long experience forming the background of all the works. Theravāda Buddhism, for instance, has never been more productive in arts than in the Middle Period. And all genres (epigraphs, epics, didactic and narrative texts) concur in bringing evidence to the open and resilient Khmer mind which has welcomed different thoughts and concepts and eventually processed them into a rich and fertile field.

1.1. Regarding the Old Khmer Period, we can safely say that the lack of documents (cf. supra) does not mean lack of literary interest and production. The epigraphs themselves bear witness to a refined civilization, a high degree of culture and knowledge at the Khmer court which fostered scholars and poets, both male and female. This small circle appears highly hinduized, in the classical sense. The Khmers were very conversant with the main Sanskrit sources, whether religious[2], or epic (*Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*), or scientific (*Mānavadharmaśāstra, Dharma°, Artha°* and *Nīti°*). Thus, since the dawn of Cambodia's epigraphy, the Indian culture had played an important part in the making of Khmer intellectual heritage.

Admittedly, all that information does not concern the whole population of Cambodia. We do not know specifically how closely the mass of commoners stood to the aristocratic upper class. But we would not be wrong to assume that they stood in the sphere of influence of the court, therefore, received a good degree of education and even took an active part in the literary production.

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1. Under the generic title of "Les *Cpāp*' ou 'Codes de conduit' Khmers", in *BEFEO* :
LXII, 1975, p. 369-394.
LXIII, 1976, p. 313-350
LXIV, 1977, p. 167-215.
LV, 1978, p. 361-402.
2. See for instance K. Bhattacharya, *Les religions brahmaniques dans l'ancien Cambodge*", *EFEO*, Vol. XLIL, 1961.

1.2. I would like to add a personal view in this connection. While the upper class appeared to have fostered Brahmanic religions in Ancient Cambodia, the people might have been attracted to Buddhism, mainly Mahāyāna as mentioned in the epigraphy. This is the only sensible hypothesis which could account for the smooth and effective take-over by Theravāda Buddhism circ. 13th c.

2. The oldest Khmer literary texts date back from the 15th-16th c. The various genres share in common two striking features:

(a) Buddhistic philosophical background.

(b) A strong propensity to didactics which has been continuously kept in favour up to the present time.

2.1. In addition, we are more informed on the nature of education and its role in the Middle Period society. To the credit of Theravāda Buddhism, we ought to point out the spreading of primary education over the whole community. The main agents, as a matter of course, were the monks in the monasteries, called ***grū*** or ***grū-pādhyāy***[1]. They taught the three basics, writing, reading and counting, crowned by *braḥ dharm*, or "the Law of the Lord (Buddha)". In this task, they had to supply reading materials, sometimes by composing the texts themselves (cf. infra). In so doing, they helped to fix the oral tradition (***camṇām***, or ***damniem***, or ***prabaiṇi***); they also trained the youngsters in the art of writing and engraving which certainly contributed to perpetuate the above mentioned tradition.

2.2. Besides the supreme authority of *braḥ dharm*, the monks also stressed the role of the "Ancestors", called *cās'* or *purāṇ*, not just any old people of the past, but only those endowed with "knowledge" (*tamṇiṅ*, or *camṇeḥ*) and "wisdom" (*prajñā*), who had been the guardians of the spiritual treasure of the "nation" (*jāti*).

The monks, *grū*, acted as voluntarily self-effacing agents of the transmission of that tradition. But it must be understood that they, too, belonged to the group of "wise men", called *lok*[2], scholars in *dharma*. They had opened up the "(right) path" (*ganlaṅ*, or *tamrāy*) for all people of good will in order to lead them towards "progress" (*banrāy*) and a further threefold goal : (a) *gāp'*, or "social success", (b) *parjñā*, or "wisdom", and (c) *pārami*, or "spiritual perfection leading itself to Deliverance"[3]. Consequently, the *lok* were praised and revered by all "good people" (*anak jā*) for generations.

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1. Cf. *Skt. guru* and *upādhyāya*. In Khmer *grū* means basically "dispenser of knowledge", i.e. any teacher, while *pādhyāy* is "a senior monk in charge of the training of a novice, and responsible for his spiritual and intellectual education". See S. Pou, *Etudes sur le Rāmakerti* (XVIè-XVIIè siècles), p. 24-31.
2. Skt. *loka*>Khm. *lok* /lo̤ok/, "world, good people, wise men".
3. Cf. *Cpāp' Kram*, st. 8 and 9.

2.3. In the curriculum the oral teaching consisted mainly of narrative texts or "tales" (*rīoeṅ breṅ*), containing a moral lesson of some kind, and a mass of what we temporarily call "wise sayings and proverbs". It can be assumed that the tales had been partly written up through the practice of calligraphy (cf. 2.1.) But this was not the case of sayings and proverbs; it never occurred to Khmer people of old to write them down into some sort of anthology. They were learnt "by heart" (*dandeñ*, or *svādhyāya*) either from the *grū's* mouth or from quotations included in various literary works. They were committed to memory by all educated people to be used in conversation and in literary composition,and enhance their flavour : they are called *bhāsit* or *subhāsit.*

2.4. To serve the dual purpose of their teaching (academic and ethical) the *grū* had sometimes to compose the texts themselves[1]. These, as a rule, were comparatively short versified texts which dealt with various problems of life and offered behaviour-patterns accordingly. Called *cpāp'*, they typified the gnomic didactic literature in Cambodia. Their success was so tremendous in the monastery schools and throughout the country that they have survived until modern times in a way which is remarkable by Khmer standards. They have been followed by many other *cpāp'* over the centuries, so that they all form a typical "genre" in Khmer literature, unique in the whole of S. E. Asia.

II. SUBHĀSIT

We have previously suggested calling "sayings and proverbs" either *bhāsit* or *subhāsit.* In fact, there are synonymous phrases which refer to the thing. It would be most interesting to examine the "significants" before analysing the "signifié"[2].

1.1. *Bhāsit*, < Skt. *bhāṣita*, must be understood strictly "sayings of the Elder". They are *ipso facto* "good sayings". However, they are sometimes more explicitly called *subhāsit*, i.e. "good-sayings". In which sense should one understand the word "good"?

Unlike in Skt. *subhāṣita*, the *su-* prefix in Khmer *subhāsit* has no literary connotation[3]. The *subhāsit* have no aesthetical literary motivation, nor are they meant for artistic purpose. The main connotation is of an ethical nature. Let us remember the unquestionable wisdom of the *cās'* or *purāṇ*, i.e. people of old, elders as well as senior members in the community. Let us also make clear that all their wise counsel forms the tenets of child-rearing and education. *Subhāsit*, then, stand for "sayings for good

1. So did my grand-father, Nau, a traditional scholar who devoted his retirement time to the study of Scriptures and the education of country children.
2. Or : referring lexemes as opposed to referred thing, according to Saussure's theory.
3. Cf. Ludwik Sternbach, *Subhāṣita, Gnomic and Didactic Literature*, 1974, p. 1.

upbringing". As *bhāsit* refers to the same object, *su-* prefix of *subhāsit* is practically redundant, even from the ethical point of view.

1 2. Colloquial speech makes use of the more popular phrases of *bāky cās'* or *bāky purāṇ*, literally "Elders' sayings"[1]. There is no noticeable semantic difference between them and the more literary terms of *bhāsit* and *subhāsit*[2].

2.1. *Subhāsit*, or whatever the synonym is, covers a wide range of gnomic phrases memorized by the Khmers and expressing practical wisdom. They could be sayings, proverbs, maxims or aphorisms. They describe a fact culled from everyday life, not in its own right, but in connection with human behaviour. In view of a better understanding of life and a better standard of living, they express numerous "counsels or advices" which could sometimes take a very stern form of prohibitions[3].

2.2. As occurs in other cultures, the authorship of Khmer *subhāsit* is beyond investigation. Most sayings go back to times immemorial. Others were coined in historical times, not necessarily by prominent writers, by "wise people" (cf. *lok*, supra, I, 2.2.) for "all good people" (*mahājan*). No one was ever concerned about the identity of the authors, and no one was interested in noting down the sayings until this century. The first attempt towards their collection was made by foreign scholars[4]. Only in the last few decades have Khmer scholars made serious efforts to publish "Collections" of *subhāsit*[5]. In any case, one cannot but marvel at the good preservation of loose *bhāsit* in the people's memory.

3.1. Memorability, then, is one important feature of *subhāsit*. By Khmer standards, they must (a) be short, and (b) involve rhyme.

Far from being a shortcoming, shortness is an achievement as it entails alertness, conciseness and colour. It requires an excellent knowledge of the language to the extent of performing *tours de force*. This can be translated mainly by the use of the occasional ellipsis of any sentence-constiuents, mostly grammatical terms. For instance:

(a) *cāy dhaṃ* "to spend—large"
khñum ge "slave—people"
i.e.: "(If one) squanders, (one is likely to become) a slave (of other) people".

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1. Khm. *bāky /piək/* stems from Skt. *vākya*, and Khm. *cās' /cah/*=Skt. *purāṇa*.
2. Another synonymous phrase is the rarer and quaint *bāky slok*, made from Skt. *vākya* and *śloka*.
3. Dr. Sternbach suggested to me, directly, the following equivalence: Khm. *subhāsit*=Skt. *lokokti*.
4. See L. Finot, "Proverbes cambodgiens" in *Revue Indochinoise*, 1904, p. 71-73; A. Pannetier, "Sentences et proverbs cambodgiens", recueillis par.., in *BEFEO*, XV, 3, p. 47-71.
5. This concerns another main project of mine to be carried out in the near future.

(b) ***brĕṅ min brăt'*** "occuring in the past—not separated" i.e. "People bound to meet because of their deeds in previous life will never be separated".

Thus, *subhāsit* could appear unsophisticated, even laconic or cryptic, but they do not contain the slightest dull linguistic note (cf. infra).

3.2. The second prerequisite of good Khmer *subhāsit* is a combination of rhyme and rhythm. Most of them are in verse and very few in prose. Whatever their form is, they are articulated bodies instead of long monotonous sentences. Thus, in the above quoted *bhāsit*: (a) distich contains the rhyme *dhaṃ~khñuṃ*, /ɔm~om/, and (b) common phrase contains the consonnantic rhyme, or alliteration, *br-*, /pr-/. In both, the cadence is marked by the caesura, viz. after *dhaṃ* and *brĕṅ*.

Here is a longer prose sentence :

ghoeñ khlā ṭek thā khlā slāp'

"Seeing the tiger asleep, one assumes that he is dead".

The meaning is quite clear : the sentence describes a rash, inconsiderate assumption, by means of a colourful and vivid metaphor. In addition, its structure shows a remarkable symmetry based an the word *khlā* "tiger".

3.3. Another important aspect of *subhāsit* is their extensibility which involves a potential productivity. Any short idiomatic phrase could become a nucleus from which may be derived a few more phrases or sentences by grammatical alteration. This is mostly the case of similes. For instance :

(a) Nucleus : *dik kanlaḥ k-am*

"Water filling only half the pitcher"

(*K-am* is a pitcher carried on the hip by a woman. If it is only half filled and the woman walks very briskly, the water is bound to gurgle quite noisily).

(b) Simile : *ṭūc dik kanlaḥ k-am*

"Like unto the water filling only half the pitcher".

(Referring to woman gushing out and giggling loudly).

(c) Prohibition : *kuṃ ṭūc dik kanlaḥ k-am*

"Do not behave like water filling only half the pitcher".

The derivation could also be mentally motivated. The satiric mind of Khmer people combined with their luscious wit has turned some *subhāsit* into colourful and ironical sayings, such as :

(a) Nucleus : *cit l-a min kra yūr*

(When) one is kind-hearted, one does not remain poor for ever".

This good counsel is sometimes turned cynically into :

(b1) Derivative : *cit l-a kra khluon*

"(When) one is kind-hearted, one will be stripped off",

3.4. Unlike Indian *subhāṣita*, Khmer *subhāsit* are not "beautifully turned out" in literary sense; they could not be called literary gems. Being of popular origin, they were made for the common people in an agricultural society where there was little room for romantic speculations and no room at all for erotic outpourings or vagaries[1]. This is reflected in the language. It is straight, unsophisticated, without precluding wit and humour; sometimes, it could be crude by the use of indecent or obscene words. For instance :

phom knuṅ dik mtec gaṅ' s-uy

"(Even) farting in water does not prevent the stench".

Or :

chkae niṅ āc'
stec niṅ rājy

"(Any) dog is attracted by ordure (as any) prince by a kingdom".
(The comparison of both subjects and objects increases greatly the crudeness of the indecent word *āc'* "excrement, ordure").

4.1. As for the contents of *subhāsit*, they reflect the practical, realistic mind of the people. They are only concerned with the everyday life which involves many problems calling for sensible answers. The field of *subhāsit* is like a vast stage where the story of life is acted by all creatures : humans as well as animals and plants, and the whole of nature. Thus :

(a) *mān praḷāy doep dik hūr*
"There must be a furrow to allow water to run".

(b) *bhūt niṅ hor*
cor niṅ jāṅ

"An astrologer is bound to lie
(a) a workman is bound to swindle".

(c) *svā bāk' ṃakuṭ*

"A crowned monkey (is not to be compared with a good man)" (i.e. it is pointless to give a monkey a crown, and cf. the English proverb : "Do not cast your pearls before swine").

(d) *sramoc niṅ skar*
"The ants with sugar"
(Money entrusted to a scoundrel, a girl left to a man, etc., are like sugar left to the ants).

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1. In this respect, Theravāda Buddhism has very well fitted into Khmer society.

4.2. We must bear in mind that all aspects of life are represented there, except politics and agricultural activities proper. Paradoxically enough, Khmer *subhaāsit* do not include almanac such as the tremendous one in French lore, although they belong to a genuine rural community. Likewise politics has never found room in the expression of popular wisdom. This explains why attempts made by modern politicians to compose pompous *subhāsit* and whip up patriotic sentiment have all failed. The short-lived sentences were washed away with the popularity of their authors.

III. CPĀP'

1.1. The structure of this word is most informative. A derivative of verb *cpāp'* /*cap*/, it has had a remakable semantic development. *Cāp'* means : "to take, seize, begin ; to begin a work, to compose a work".

At this juncture, i.e. the dawn of Middle Period, appeared the derivative *cpāp'* /cbap/, hence "literary work" on a definite subject. Therefore, it could be at first called "treatise" (cf. Skt. *śāstra*). Very soon, historic and cultural circumstances developed one particular aspect of it : the *cpāp'* became a work, didactic by nature and ethical in purpose (cf. supras I, 2). Since *epāp'* were composed for young boys attending monastery classes, and unsophisticated adults, they were also given a particular form : gnomic verse.

They vary considerably in length, from thirty-odd strophes to a few hundreds. Given their continuity and coherence in Khmer literature, they form a "genre littéraire" different from others in Khmer[1], and having no counterpart in literatures of neighbouring countries.

1.2. It can then be inferred that *cpāp'* deal with popular wisdom, a subject obviously shared with *subhāsit*. But in Khmer vocabulary up to the middle of our century, the two words were not interchangeable. *Subhāsit* were loose verses or sentences in prose, having no age or signature—most of which are nowadays put together into "Collections or Anthologies" (*pramūl*, or *prajuṃ*)—whereas *cpāp'* were personal compositions. No single *subhāsit* could be called *cpāp'*, while *cpāp'* were a part of the Khmer treasure of *subhāsit*.

2. The oldest *cpāp'* known to us is the *Kerti kāl* which goes back to the 16th c. (i.e. High-Middle Khmer)[2]. The "genre" might have existed long before, and borne a

1. See *Etudes*..., p. 22-31.

2. For further details on this estimation, see Philip N, Jenner, "The Relative Dating of Some Khmer *CPĀ'PA*", in *Austroasiatic Studies*, The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, Part II, p. 693.710; and S. Pou, *Etudes*..., p. 23-24.

different name, but we have no concrete evidence to speak of that. Therefore, from the strict literary point of view, we shall start with the Middle Period.

2.1. On the whole, *cpāp'*—texts have been well preserved not only through the painstaking labour of handcopying carried out by students in the past to learn calligraphy. Numerous manuscripts of palm-leaves called *satrā*[1], collected from various places in Cambodia, and nowadays kept in various places in the world, show for each *cpāp'* strikingly similar recensions. We can, therefore, rely on the authenticity of the prime Khmer text.

2.2. Each *cpāp'* bears a title which sounds rather like a nickname[2] : ***Kerti kāl, Bāky cās', Prus, Sri*** ..Be this as it may, the titles fall into three grous :

(a) *pratika*-titles using the opening word(s) of the texts,

(b) titles drawn from the subject-matter,

(c) titles given to texts after the authors.

2.3. The question of authorship, however, worthy of investigation, would not receive a full answer. Most of *cpāp'* bear no signature at all. In the late Middle Period, three of them included the name of their authors, viz. ***Cpāp' Prus*** and ***Cpāp' Sri*** were composed by Paṇḍit Mai, and ***Cpāp' Ariyasatthā*** by Ariyasatthā. From then on, the situation reversed, as most authors spelt out their name either in the preamble or in the colophon.

As far as anonyms are concerned, their texts could sometimes give the clue to their status, through the style or the subject-matter. It could then be said for instance that the ***Kram*** (dealing with primary education in monastery) was composed by a monk, whereas the ***Rājaneti*** was probably a royal composition.

2.4. On the other hand, the question of subject-matter can be dealt with easily. However, present time and space are too short to exhaust the matter which I shall outline as follows.

Like *subhāsit*, there is no scientific and technical subject (such as art and arts, medicine, erotics) involved in the themes of *cpāp'*; but unlike *subhāsit*, some authors of *cpāp'* devoted their thinking to what we may call "politics" (cf. infra, 4). ***Cpāp'*** are essentially didactic ethical texts. In the context of Middle-Period Cambodia, ethics consisted of all rules of conduct as modelled by ***braḥ dharm***, or "the Law of the Lord". The gist of *cpāp'*—lessons is represented by a profound humanism. Students—in a very broad sense—were trained :

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1. **Skt *śāstra*>Khm. doublets :**
   (a) *–sāstr* /saah/, used as suffix in Indo-aryan loans "treatise, section of knowledge", and
   (b) *satrā* /sətraa/, "palm-leaf manuscripts; their contents (story, legend, code)"
2. **Cf. European musical compositions.**

(a) to become *gāp'*, or "socially fit",
(b) to *banrāy*, or "progress and prosper", both in this world and the world beyond.

It must be pointed out in this connection that the structure of the community is necessarily based on a dichotomy : one group consists of "good people" (*anak jā*), endowed with *prajñā*, i.e. apt and willing to learn, while the other includes "common people" (*anak sāmāny*)[1] who cannot be taught because of their thick and arrogant mind. In this particular sense they are called *khlau*[2], a crucial word in Middle Khmer. Out of tolerance, the *grū* never attempted to force his teaching on the mass of "common people", but nevertheless he left the door open for them to join the "good" congregation.

2.5. Then the wordly wisdom of *cpāp'* encompasses all aspects (social, intellectual and moral) of the problems that a human had to face in his life-time. We shall, therefore, find lessons on upbringing, education, home economics, mangement, family and community life. Sometimes, one marvels at how minutely the lessons could be illustrated, and how much common sense lurked behind casual observation and advice. Some subjects, deemed essential to human value, gave rise to truly fascinating little essays which shone amidst the texts like rare gems. This unfortunately cannot be illustrated here with brief quotations. Therefore, I shall append some extracts which will also give the readers a glimpse of the literary and poetical value of *cpāp'*.

3. After this quick survey of the genre, it behoves us to present a categorization of the *cpāp'* as they are known to us.

3.1. Let us take first the traditional categorization, evidently not based on any scholarly investigation and research. All Khmer people know about *Cpāp' cās'* as clearly distinct from *Cpāp' thmī*.

Cpāp' cās', or "Old *cpāp'* ", consist of a few short texts, the most popular of which are :

—*Keri kāl*, on how to keep up the "family legacy",
—*Kūn cau*, on how to bring up "children", and
—*Kram*, a set of advice to novices in a monastery class.

Cpāp' thmī, or "New, Late *cpāp'* ", is the name applied to the majority of *cpāp'* following the "Old" ones (cf. infra).

This traditional categorization, purely chronological, however lacking in concrete evidence, proves astonishingly accurate. The chronology has been worked out and memorized by the sheer process of uninterrupted oral transmission. It agrees with the

1. From Skt. *sāmānya*.
2. Cf. Skt. *mūrkha*.

result of investigations that we, modern scholars, have carried out so far[1]. This means "Old *cpāp'* " belong to the High-Middle Khmer Period, while "Late *cpāp'* " range from the 18th c. onward, until the first decades of the 20th c.

"Late *cpāp'* " outnumber the older ones, as a matter of fact, because they have not undergone natural selection to the same extent. In keeping up the traditional lines, they often tackle the same topics, the ageless lessons of virtuous behaviour. Consequently, they may appear as plagiarisms to an unobservant eye. In fact, they are produced by known dedicated thinkers and talented poets representing a community whose cultural Brahmanic connection was nearly superseded by Buddhistic teaching. Also, the literary achievements of the Low-Middle Period writers showed a strong Thai influence (cf. infra, 4.2).

3.2. Modern scholars have made a further step in analysing the language of *cpāp'* (cf. supra). Besides the main linguistic investigation (on phonology, vocabulary, grammar, style and versification), we were interested in analysing the actual topics of the texts. As a result of both, I would propose a typological categorization of *cpāp'* which might prove useful for future literary research.

As a rule, *cpāp'* deal with "wordly wisdom", whatever field of action they choose to elaborate. But some show a definite connection with what we have called "politics", which is in fact the "Rex regis". I have proposed to call these texts *Cpāp' neti*[2]—as opposed to "common" *cpāp'*—and I shall now outline them in the light of our pioneering research[3].

4. A brief analysis of the word *neti* itself will give the clue to the rest. *Neti* is the Middle Khmer derivative of Skt. *nīti*[4] "policy", which was to be understood as "the policy of the king" in the past, whether in India or in Cambodia.

4.1. *Neti* has never occurred in Khmer as a lexical item. In Middle Khmer, it appeared as a compound-constituent in the title of two *cpāp'*, viz. :

—*Rājaneti*, or "the king's *neti*", and

—*Trineti*, or "the threefold *neti*".

The natural phonetic development *niti*>*neti* (cf. note 4 below) suggests a concurrent semantic development of the word, too. In other words, Khmer writers of the early Middle Period have not lost touch with the Sanskrit *nīti*-tradition as known to their ancestors in Ancient Cambodia. Another *cpāp' neti*, although not explicitly so named, is *Cpāp' Vidhurapaṇḍit*. Undoubtedly, all three concur with other *cpāp'* in the sense that

1. See for instance Philip N. Jenner, "The Relative Dating. . .", *loc. cit.*
2. See *BEFEO*, LXV, 1978, p. 364-366.
3. In the sense that it is quite recent, therefore, subject to amendments and improvements.
4. This illustrates the vocalic shift by opening occurring in Middle Khmer concurrently with the split of register, thus: /i/>/e/, and /e/>/ɛ/, etc. A more famous instance is to be found in the name *Rāmakerti*, <*Rāma*+*kīrti*, or "The Glory of Rām".

they survey man's behaviour and conduct in his community. But they, undoubtedly too, mean to instruct would-be leaders of the country, as it is explicitly put in *Cpāp' Trīneti* and *Cpāp' Vidhurapaṇḍit* since they are addressed to "Great Prince!" (*mahārāj* and *mahākṣatr*).


4.2. There seemed to be a gap in the production of *cpāp' neti*, concurrently with the decline of Middle Khmer values. Then followed a period of recovery when there appeared a few didactic compositions called *Lokanay*, or *Lokaneyy*, which could belong to the Low-Middle Period.

The most famous was a long *cpāp'* composed in 1794 A. D. by a no less famous poet-scholar : Naṅ. This work has been published and edited under slightly different titles :

—*Lokanay Dhanañjay*
—*Lokaneyy bāky kāby*
—*Lokanayapakar(ṇ)*, even
—*Lokanay Jātak*

-*Nay*~-*neyy* is only a variant of *neti* (both stemming from Skt. *NĪ*), but it is now appended to *loka*– "world". Naṅ being closely connected with Khmer royalty at the turn of the 18th c., therefore, with Bangkok culture, it is not surprising to see him name his poem after what was called *Lokanīti* in Siam, the origin of which could be traced back to Burma[1]. But it is much more important to note that despite the loaned title, Naṅ's *Lokanay* was conceived as a *cpāp'*, an original composition on a definite topic. It has the form of a Jātaka in which the Bodhisatva was a young wise man called Dhanañjay, patronized by the king, his namesake Dhanañjay Korab. The story says that Dhanañjay was frequently called upon by the king to meet the challenge of scholars and answer various questions and riddles. Needless to say, Dhanañjay did it easily and brilliantly and his learned discourses were strung up into a Code of conduct for any ruler.

At this stage, it would be unwise to venture further in the field of *Lokanay*. I shall close the subject by only suggesting three converging sources of it :



1. See mainly Ludwik Sternbach, "General Appeal of Subhāṣita Literature in Sanskrit", in *Cultural Forum*, XV, 2, 1973, p. 6-21.

4.3. The trend set by ***Lokanay*** texts was short-lived. While the genre had survived throughout, the lexical elements ***-neti*** ou *-nay* faded out in the 20th c. Therefore, scholors had to coin a new name, this time merely reproducing Skt. ***nīti***. Hence ***Subhāsit Rājaniti***, or *Subhāsit Rājanitisātth* by Nau (1955) which can be described as a Code of conduct for a king.

To sum up, *Cpāp' neti* show no difference from other *cpāp'* because they deal with worldly wisdom. But they are set off by their royal connection. Whether composed by royalty or commoners, they could be viewed as Treatise for the education of princes or future rulers of the kingdom.

4.4. We would then include in this group a sub-type called ***Cpāp'°*** or ***Satrā suosti***. These texts contain sets of instructions for young men who chose the career of officers or "royal servants".

× × ×

This rough survey of *subhāsit* and ***cpāp'*** is the first step into the area of Khmer didactic literature. It has been made possible by linguistic investigation. It is my hope that scholars of literature will take it over and give us a wider and better defined study before long.

APPENDIX

EXCERPTS FROM *CPĀP'* AS PUBLISHED IN *BEFEO*

1. *KETI KĀL* (*BEFEO* LXII, 1975) :

(a) "Si vous êtes trop généreux, vos biens en souffriront;
si vous êtes mesquin, vos facultés en souffriront;
si la femme est douée de qualités, le mari en souffrira;
si vous êtes prolixe et mensoger, votre personnalité en souffrira;

s'il y a trop de fruits à un arbre, les feuilles en souffriront.
Trop de poissons randront l'eau trouble;
trop de biens seront difficiles à garder;
trop peu de biens vous donnera des soucis".

(st, 21-22)

(b) "Ne sous-estimez pas les affaires difficiles,
ne vous excitez pas pour les choses ordinaires.
Allez document sans vous emporter,
de peur de manquer le but visé.

Refléchissez, observez tout avec vigilance.
Cultivez les rizières des deux saisons.
Posez des clôtures à vos rizières,
et faites-en également à vos champs secs.

N'abandonnez pas le chemin sinueux,
ne suivez pas le chemin direct.
Marchez suivant les voies
et les sentes des anciens sages".

(st. 26-28)

2. *KŪN CAU* (*BEFEO* LXIV, 1977)

(a) "Le sage déclare que le feu est brillant
certainement, que, cependant,
il n'égale point le soleil.
Le sage déclare que la lumière du soleil
qui brille de tout son éclat dans le firmament
n'égale, cependant point
le saint *dharm* de notre Seigneur le Buddha.

Le feu brille de tout son coeur,
mais arrivé à terme, il disparaît,
s'évanouit et s'éteint.
Le soleil, en brillant,
resplendit, assurément,
mais il diminue d'intensité au coucher,
et on ne distingue plus son éclat.

Quant au saint *dharm* précieux,
une fois brillant, il brille le plus
dans ce monde-ci
jusqu'au lointain au-delà;
sa Perfection brille très loin,

et son éclat grandiose
ne s'évanouira jamais".
(st. 9-11)

(b) "Le sage dit que les métaux,
qui passent pour être très durs,
on peut les chauffer, les marteler,
les travailler à la lime ou la râpe,
comme on l'estime,
sans qu'il leur arrive
jamais de protester.

Les éléphants de la forêt,
féroces, terriblement agressifs,
qui foncent et chargent de toute leur force,
une fois qu'on les a capturés,
on peut les adoucir, les dompter en bonnes montures,
sans qu'il leur arrive
de refuser d'avancer.

Mais le stupide, rebelle,
qui se dresse contre vous, et s'obstine,
ne se laisse pas dompter par les conseils,
car il est plus dur que les métaux
et les éléphants, à cause
de sa stupide ignorance,
et de l'intensité de son égarement.

Le sage dit, en effet, du corbeau :
comment peut-on songer à prendre des gemmes, des joyaux,
et du cristal pour les lui offrir?
Un animal de la nature du cerf,
comment le coiffer d'un diadème ?
Un animal de la nature du singe,
comment peut-il porter un *saṃbat'*?

Alors, comment peut-on utiliser la Loi du Seigneur,
profonde, claire, pourvue de sens,
noble et immaculée,

pour éduquer un être stupide,
oisif et vil ?
Comment peut-on prendre une tiare
pour coiffer un singe?"
(st. 54-58)

3. *RĀJANETI* (*BEFEO* LXV, 1978) :

(a) "N'ayez pas confiance dans les étrangers,
n'ayez pas confiance dans les ascètes,
n'ayez pas confiance dans les beaux parleurs.
Restez digne en toute circonstance,
réfléchissez bien profondément,
et écoutez les discours
et les recommendations de vos parents.

Ne vous laissez pas assommer par le vent,
ne fléchissez pas sous les paroles du sot,
ne vous faites pas du souci à cause des femmes,
ne touchez pas à un poison mortel,
ne soyez pas familiers avec les femmes.
Les ascètes et les gens vénérables,
ne vous disputez point avec eux.
(st. 3-4)

(b) "Prenez le cas d'un aveugle se protégeant la vue avec une peau,
ou encore celui d'un chauve
qui dérire avoir de l'huile pour ses cheveux,
celui d'un sourd qui écoute les chansons
en frappant la cadence avec enthousiasme,
celui d'un paralytique, se déplaçant péniblement,
qui remonte le *saṃbat'* en langouti pour courir !

Il y a trois sortes de comportement perfide.
Le permier est celui de l'éléphant
excessivement féroce,
qu'on arrive à domestiquer.
Sous la pression du croc,
il s'élancera à la poursuite d'un chef de troupeau
haut de six coudées !

Le deuxième est celui de l'homme malveillant,
rempli d'avidité et de prétention,
qui ne suit pas la bonne voie,
ni les paroles de son supérieur,
qui mélange les formes dans son discours,
sans penser aux périls,
et s'expose à une destruction prochaine.

Le troisième est celui de la courtisane
qui pratique la continence,
en vous tenant de beaux discours !
Ces trois phénomènes
sont des exemples de dangereuse perfidie.
Vous tous, bonnes gens,
évitez de vous y conforme.''.
(st. 21-24)

(c) ''En cultivant la rizière, surveillez les herbes ;
en étudiant la lignée de quelqu'un, on examine ses collatéraux ;
en jugeant les serviteurs, on examine leur comportement ;
en voyant une bonne conduite,
on ne rejette pas la possibilité d'une ruse ;
en remarquant un coeur pur,
on ne néglige pas l'examen du comportament.

Pour juger une reine, il faut examiner ces observances ;
pour connaître un roi, il faut examiner sa puissance ;
pour connaître un soldat, il faut examiner ses exploits ;
pour connaître un artisan, il faut examiner les ouvrages
produits par ses mains ;
si vous prenez une femme,
il faut bien examiner sa demeure.

Il y a trois sortes de choses décevantes
selon les recommandations de nos parents,
et les conseils des anciens :
le riz cru, d'une pure blancheur,
dont vous ratez la cuisson ;
une personne de bonne mine qui est stupide ;
et un sage dépourvu de morale !

De même, un religieux sans vertus ;
une personne âgée sans bonne conduite ;
un pauvre qui regarde les choses avec mépris ;
une épouse prodigue
qui dépense hors de mesure ;
des soldats bien sots
qui sont difficiles à entraîner".
(st. 36-39)

LE BDELLIUM DANS LA MATIÈRE MÉDICALE ĀYURVÉDIQUE

Alix Raison

Le bdellium est une gomme-résine bien connue depuis l'antiquité aussi bien en Europe qu'en Inde. Il est déjà mentionné sous le nom de *guggulu* dans l'*Atharvavéda* où un hymne lui est consacré (XIX. 38). Il est désigné là comme ayant deux formes dites *saindhavá* et *samudriya*, c'est-à-dire indiquant sas provenances, l'une du Sindh et l'autre de la mer. Cette dernière indication est interprétée depuis longtemps comme désignant ūne espèce apportée par mer. En effet l'arbre qui produit principalement le bdellium, le Balsamodendron mukul Hook, ainsi que les espèces voisines telles que Balsamodendron kataf et berryi poussent effectivement dans les régions arides du Sindh, du Balouchistn, de l'Arabie et de l'Afrique orientale. Il est clair que le *saindhavá* était la forme proprement indienne du bdellium et que les autres étaient apportées par le commerce maritime. Nous savons que ce commerce a été largement assuré par les Arabes ainsi que l'indique Hérodote à propos du Cinnamomum.[1]

En grec, il est déjà mentionné par Dioscoride et, en Inde, il n'a cessé d'être un produit utilisé d'une part comme médicament et d'autre part comme une substance fournissant une sorte d'encens moins précieux que la myrrhe produite par le Balsamodendron myrrha Nees.

Dans les grands textes de matière médicale en Sanskrit sont énumérés ses noms, ses caractères et ses propriétés et celles des variétés voisines. Ces textes peuvent aujourd'hui compléter les renseignements fournis par les ouvrages en langues européennes de botanique et de matière médicale. Les principaux qui sont des dictionnaires sont le *Dhvantarinighaṇṭu* le *Rājanighṇṭu* et le *Bhāvaprakāśa* qui s'étagent chronologiquement dans cet ordre et qui donnent de plus en plus d'informations sur lui. Toutefois, c'est le *Rājanighaṇṭu* qui fournit le plus grand nombre de noms.

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1. Cf. Filliozat (Jean) *Les relations extérieures de l'Inde.* Pondichéry, 1956. Publications de l'Institut français d'indologie n° 2, p. 7.

En voici la traduction.

III *Dhanavantarinighaṇṭu candanādi*

127 *guggulu, kālaniryāsa, jaṭāyu, kauśika, pura, naktaṃcara, śiva, durga, mahiṣākṣa* sont *kalaṃkaṣā* les différents noms.

128 Le bdellium est dit poissant piquant, amer, astringent. Colorant, bon pour la voix, léger, subtil, âpre, il vainc le vent et la pituite.

129 Il y a un autre [vers] : le bdellium est connu comme, onctueux, laxatif et chaud. Il vainc [les maux de] vessie, la graisse et les blessures dus au phlegme et au vent, les altérations d'urine, les enflures et les perturbations dues aux démons.

130 Le bdellium purest cuisant, astringent, gluant, piquant. Colorant, bon pour la voix, léger, laxatif, onctueux, destructeur du vent et du phlegme.
Frais. il favorise la croissance et est invigorant. Vieux, il est très irritant.

L'édition donne en note deux recelttes de purification que nous reproduisons : Après avoir jeté le bdellium dans un électuaire chaud de dix racines,[1] après l'avoir délayé, purifié à travers un linge et séché au soleil, imprégné de *ghī* après en avoir fait une boule, le bdellium est purifié. Autre [recette] : cuit dans un système de sachet dans du lait ou une décoction des trois myrobalans, après l'avoir fondu avec de la graises, le bdellium est à prendre pour toutes opérations.

Rājanighaṇṭu XII *candanādi*

103 *guggulu, vavanadviṣṭa, bhavābhiṣṭa, niśāṭaka, jaṭāla, kālanirvāsa, pūra, bhūtahara, śiva,*

104 *kauśika, śambhava, durgā, yātughna, mahiṣākṣaka, deveṣṭa, marudeśya, rakṣohā, rūkṣagandhaka, divya, mahiṣākṣa* sont les vingt noms.

105 Le bdellium est piquant, amer et chaud. Il vainc le phlegme, le vent et la toux.
Il détruit les parasites, le vent, l'ascite, la splénomégalie, les enflures, les hémorroïdes. C'est un élixir vivifiant.

1. Cf. Raison (Alix). *La Hārītasaṃhitā*. Pondichéry 1974. Publications I. F. I. n° 62 p. 305.

106 Il y a [aussi] *gandharāja*, *svarṇakuṇa*, *suvarṇa*, *kaṇaguggulu*, *kanaka*, *vaṃśapota*, *surasa*, *palaṅkaṣa*.

107 Le *kaṇaguggulu* piquant et chaud, odoriférant, chasse le vent. Il détruit les douleurs aigües, les tumeurs, les gonflements de l'abdomen et le phlegme. C'est un élixir vivifiant.

108 Il existe un troisième bdellium : *bhūmija*, *daityamedaja*, *durgāhlāda*, *iḍājāta*, *āśādiripusaṃbhava*, *majjāja*, *medaja*, *mahiṣāsurasaṃbhava*.

109 Le bdellium *bhūmija*, piquant et chaud, vainc le phlegme et le vent. Cher à Umā, il détruit les démons, favorise l'intelligence et donne bonne odeur constamment.

Bhāvaprakāśa

Voilà le bdellium, [l'auteur] dit ses noms

karpūrādivarga

32 Il y a *guggulu*, *devadhūpa*, *jaṭāyu*, *kauśika*, *pura*, *kumhholūkhalaka* (au neutre) *mahiṣākṣa* et *palaṅkaṣa*.

33 *Mahiṣākṣa*, *mahānīla*, *kumuda* et aussi *padma*, *hiraṇya*, connu comme le cinquième sont les cinq espèces de bdellium.

34 On sait que le *mahiṣākṣa* est de la même couleur que l'abeille noire et le collyre noir.
Le *mahānīla* doit être connu avec la caractéristique propre à son nom (très noir).

35 Le *kumuda* a la couleur du *kumuda* (rose), le *padma* ressemble au rubis. Celui qui est appelé or a l'aspect de l'or : [ainsi] est dite la caractéristique des cinq.

36 Le *mahiṣākṣa* et le *mahānīla* tous deux sont salutaires aux éléphants. Le *kumuda* et le *padma* sont excellents, faisant le bien-être et la santé des chevaux.

37 Le *kanaka* (celui couleur d'or) est réputé spécialement pour les hommes. Parfois le *mahiṣākṣa* est aussi estimé par certains pour les hommes.

38 Le bdellium pur est amer, de vertu chaude, cholagogue, laxatif, astringent, piquant. A la cuisson il est piquant, il devient âcre et très léger.

39 Faisant la jonction de ce qui est brisé, invigorant, subtil, bon pour la voix, favorable au chyle, favorisant la diges-

tion, gluant, fortifiant, il peut détruire le phlegme, le vent, les plaies et les adénopathies.

40 la graisse, l'altération des urines, la gravelle et le vent, les maladies de peau suintantes, la dénutrition et le vent. Il peut vaincre les pustules, les élevures, les enflures, les hémorroïdes, les adénopathies cervicales et les vers.

41 Du fait de sa douceur, il peut apaiser le vent et du fait de son astringence, il enlève la bile. Par suite de son amertume, il vainc le phlegme. C'est pourquoi le bdellium enlève tous les *doṣa*.

42 Frais, il assure la bonne croissance, il est invigorant. Vieux, il est très irritant.

43 Onctueux, ressemblant à de l'or, pareil au fruit mûr de l'Eugenia jambolana, le bdellium frais est dit de bonne odeur, lui qui est gluant.

44 Desséché, il a mauvaise odeur et il a perdu sa couleur naturelle. Vieux, on doit savoir que le bdellium est dépourvu de vertu.

45 Celui qui recherchant ses qualités cxactement l'emploie à l'avance doit éviter l'acide, le cuisant, l'indigeste, l'aphrodisiaque, a la fatigue, le coup de soleil, l'ivresse, la colère.

Au grand nombre de noms qui se trouvent dans ces trois textes, on doit ajouter ceux qui se présentent dans l'*Amarakośa* : *kumbha*, *ulūkhalaka*, *kauśika*, *pura*. D'autre part nous constatons queces noms sont présentés en désordre dans tous ces textes mais qu'ils peuvent être classés selon qu'ils désignent le bdellium d'après sa nature et sesaspects ou d'après les usages qui en sont faits, la signification de quelques uns de ses noms restant incertaine et obscure.

On peut les classer en plusieurs catégories :

Noms dérivés des caractères et effets du produit.

kālaniryāsa	résine noire
mahānīla	très noir
kumuda	[couleur de] lotus rose
padma	[couleur de] lotus rouge
hiraṇya, *kanaka*	[couleur d'or]
rūkṣagandhaka	à odeur âpre

palaṃkaṣa °*ṣā*	usant la chair
uddīpa	enflammant

Nom dérivé de l'habitat de la plante productrice.

marudeśya	de région désertique, variante *marudiṣṭa*, "assigné au désert."

Noms dérivés de l'utilisation cultuelle.

divya	divin
deveṣṭa	aimé des dieux
devadhūpa	encens des dieux
bhavābhiṣṭa	très aimé de Bhava (Siva)
yavanadviṣṭa	détesté des Musulmans (probalement en tant qu'utilisé par les Hindous et ici les Yavana ne sont pas les Grecs de l'antiquité qui précisément se servaient du bdellium, D'ailleurs à date tardive *yavana* désigne seulement les Musulmans).
Śiva	
Durgā	cf. Durgāhlāda ci-dessous
Sāmbhava	de Śambhu (Śiva)

Noms dérivés d'une utilisation fréquente pour chasser les démons.

bhūtahara	destructeur de démons
yātughna	tueur de sorciers
rakṣohan	tueur de rakṣas
niśāṭaka	s'occupant des rôdeurs de nuit

Noms dérivés de la présentation en récipients (?)

pura	réceptacle
kumbha	pot
ulūkhalaka	mortier
kauśika	enveloppant
puṭa	coupe

Noms inexpliqués

mahiṣākṣa, °*ka*	oeil de buffle, une des appellations courantes

jaṭāyus	nom de l'oiseau tué par Rāvaṇa enlevant Sitā
ja āla	crêté ?

Noms des variétés.

gandharāja	roi des parfums
svarṇakaṇa	petit doré
suvarṇa, kanaka	or
kaṇaguggulu	petit bdellium
vaṃśapota	"enfant de bambou" (confondu avec la manne de bambou)
surasā	de bon suc
palaṅkaṣa	usant la chair
bhūmija	né sur le sol (formes arbustives basses)
majjāja	né de la moëlle
medaja	né de la graisse
daityamedaja	né de la graisse du démon-buffle, *mahiṣāsurasaṃbhava*, cf. *mahiṣākṣa*
āśādiripusaṃbhava	né des ennemis de l'espoir etc... (=des démons)
durgāhlāda	délice de Durgā
iḍājāta	né pour les libations

En outre les indications données par les *nighaṇṭu* nous permettent d'associer plus spécialement certains des noms avec les variétés d'espèces botaniques qui fournissent les divers bdellium du commerce.

Le Balsamodendron mukul Hook donne un bdellium couleur d'or quand il est frais (selon la Materia Medica de Nadkarni), c'est donc celui qui est spécialement indiqué pour l'homme d'apres *Bhāv.* P. 37 qui est surtout recommandé frais (*Bhāv.* P. 42) et qui dans le *Rāj. N.* (XII. 106-107) est l'objet d'un traitement à part, recevant outre les noms de l'or (*suvarṇa* et *kanaka*) d'autres désignations qui le qualifient comme roi des parfums (*gandharāja*) et aussi de petit (*kaṇa*) ce qui se rapporte à la taille de l'arbre, un épineux dont les branches partent très bas sur le tronc. Comme il était apparemment impossible de se procurer le produit frais s'il venait d'au-delà des mer, ce bdellium a dû être celui du Sindh u moins pour les régions voisines.

Dans le Sud de l'Inde, notamment au pays tamoul où ne pousse pas le Balsamodendron mukul Hook, il est connu que le bdellium y est remplacé par la résine dite *kuṅkiliyam*

qui provient d'une autre plante, Boswellia glabra. Le *kuṅkiliyam* est d'ailleurs aussi remplacé par d'autres résines[1].

Le bdellium africain, plus foncé ou noir, correspond au *kālairyāsa* (*Rāj. N.* XII. 103) et, semble-t-il au *mahiṣākṣaka* (*Rāj. N.* XII. 103, *Bhāv.* P. 33) et *mahiṣāsurasaṃbhava Rāj. N.* XII. 108). C'est lui, rapproché du *mahānila*, qui est employé en médecine vétérinaire pour les éléphants (*Bhāv. P.* 33, 34) et qui, selon George Watt[2] serait donné aux bufflesses alaitant. C'est alors le Balsamodendron kataf Kunth qui produit ce bdellium.

Les qualités *kumuda* et *padma*, utilisées pour les chevaux (*Bhāv.* P. 36) sont brun-rouge plus ou moins intense et peuvent correspondre à du bdellium de B. mukul à des états intermédiaires entre la fraîcheur où il est jaune d'or et l'ancienneté où il devient de plus en plus sombre[3].

Quant aux propriétés proprement médicales elles paraissent être en définitive de deux sortes. En fumigation, le bdellium est favorable aux coryza et rhino-pharyngites (quand il est frais et de bonne odeur). A l'intérieur, il passe pour résolutif et employé dans tous les genres de réduction d'oedèmes et d'hypertrophies, en même temps que comme invigorant.

Malgré sa réputation ancienne, il est aujourd'hui peu employé en médecine indienne. Mais il l'a été en médecine européenne dans la préparation du diachylon et de l'emplâtre de Vigo, utilisant sans doute la propriété qui lui est attribuée par l'Āyurveda dans le traitement des plaies (*Bhāv.* P. 39).

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1. Cf. Sambasivam Pillai (T. V.) *Tamil-English Cyclopaedic Dictionary of medicine, Chemistry, Botany and allied sciences based on Indian Medical Science.* Tome II, Madras, 1931, p. 1481.
2. *Dictionary of the Economic Products of India,* 1889. Tome I, p. 426.
3. Sambasivam Pillai (T. V.) p. 1479-80 (sous *guggulu*).

SOCIAL ATTITUDE IN BHĀSA'S WORKS

K. Kunjunni Raja

Though much has been written about Bhāsa and his works, all that we can say definitely is that Bhāsa was an ancient dramatist praised by Kālidāsa as *prathitayaśas*, and that among the plays written by him one was called *Svapnavāsavadattam*; it is also certain that among the 13 plays published from Trivandrum by T. Ganapati Śastri, the *Svapnavāsavadattam* is a version, perhaps the Kerala stage version, of the original play by Bhāsa. All the other 12 plays have also been considered as Bhāsa's works by many scholars and are referred to as Bhāsa plays; but as Prof. Winternitz pointed out in his paper published in the *Woolner Commemoration Volume*, the claim of each has to be examined independently in the light of further material. Hence my paper on the social attitude in Bhāsa's plays will be mainly based on the *Svapnavāsavadattam*.

Since literature deals with life and human problems have necessarily to be portrayed against the social background, we may find various social problems reflected in Sanskrit literature also. But we do not generally find the conscious response of the artist to the social reality or of his commitment to social relevance in the classical works. The theory of *Karma* and *Saṁsāra*, together with the *varṇāśramadharma* is generally accepted by all writers. Whenever misfortunes or calamities occur in life they are usually attributed to the effect of fate or destiny, and not to the social condition which is in need of radical change. Though bound by the effects of his past actions man is theoritically the master of his own destiny, since he can direct his future by concentrated effort. Sanskrit literature accepts without question the social order as found in India. The caste system had established itself on the basis of the difference in profession and inclination and man's duties were fixed on the basis of his caste. Transgression of the social order was considered a sin. *Varṇāśramadharma*, the duty pertaining to one's own position in society and stage of his life was to be done properly.

From the few references available in the *Svapnavāsavadattam* we can have a general

idea of the social condition prevailing at that time and the playwright's attitude towards some of the problems, though not fully and clearly. In the beginning of the play itself we find the contrast between life in the villages and cities on the one hand, and life in the penance grovc on the other. The calm and quiet life in the penance grove is also active in its own way, ritual worship, kindling of fire; peace and contentment reigned supreme there. There was no violence even to animals or trees. The *Tapovana* is everybody's home.

तपोवनानि नामातिथिजनस्य स्वगेहम् ।

Yaugandharāyaṇa is surprised at the command for clearing the way for the princess even in the penance grove, as in the case of the villages.

कथम् इहाप्युत्सार्यते ?
कोऽयं भो निभृतं तपोवनमिदं ग्रामीकरोत्याज्ञया ।[1]

There is a subtle protest here against the custom of *utsāraṇā* or clearing the way for royalty even in the villages and cities, which is an insult (नगरपरिभव).

We hear not only about sages or *Tāpasa*-s doing penance, but also of *Tāpasī*-s. It is quite possible that there were some people who took to the *Kāṣāya* robe as a means for their livelihood. Yaugandharāyaṇa says that he has not taken the role of a wandering mendicant (*parivrājaka*) for livelihood.

नाहं काषायं वृत्तिहेतोर्वहामि ।[2]

The different orders of social life like Brahmins and Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras were in existence. Brahmins were held in great respect, and were generally educated and virtuous, though the Vidūṣaka is an uneducated fool interested in food, but good at heart; gate-keepers and nurses were employed in palaces.

Polygamy was prevalent among the royal classes of whom Aṅgāravatī was the chief. King Mahāsena had sixteen queens. Some of the marriages were arranged by the ministers for political alliance; some were due to romantic love. Udayana's marriage with Vāsavadattā was partly *Gāndharva* and partly *Rākṣasa* type, for, the couple eloped from the palace without the knowledge or consent of the girl's parents. Later the parents performed the ritual marriage for the portraits of the eloped couple. The tying of the nuptial thread, *Kautuka*, on the wrist of the bride and bridegroom formed part of the preliminary ritual of marriage, child-marriage does not seem to have been prevalent especially among the princes.

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1. *SvapnaV* 1.3.
2. *Ibid.* 1.9.

For women chastity (*cāritra*) had to be scrupulously maintaind. A woman whose husband was away on a journey, ***proṣitabhartṛkā*** was forbidden to wear ornaments and fine clothes; she was to have long, loose tresses of hair not properly braided, she was also forbidden to apply collyrium to her eyes. She had to put on a veil and avoid seeing other men.

प्रोषितभर्तृका परपुरुषदर्शनं परिहरति ।[1]

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* and also the *Pratimānāṭaka* it is said that a woman can be seen freely by men at the time of her marriage, in a sacrifice, in times of calamity or in the forest.

निर्दोषदृश्या हि भवन्ति नार्यो यज्ञे विवाहे व्यसने वने च ।[2]

Men were not expected to look at the face of a married woman in normal circumstances. But these rules did not apply to the working class people : their women did not use veils.

During the early days of his married life with Vāsavadattā, Udayana seems to have made some overtures to a charming maidservant named Viracikā, not seriously, but out of his romantic nature and youthful enthusiasm. Vāsavadattā had taken it very seriously, and in protest abandoned her ornaments and showed her anger through silence. Udayana is reminded of this incident when he sees Vāsavadattā in his dream.

Prostitution was prevalent in cities like Ujjain and prostitutes held a high position in society. So also gambling. From the *Mṛcchakaṭika* we learn that men of status who resorted to the houses of prostitutes were ashamed of confessing it in the open court यौवनमेवात्रापराध्यति । Some bold men seem to have preferred stealing to penuary and slavery. There is no direct reference to these in the *Svapnavāsavadattam*.

That life is a mixture of happiness and misery coming one after the other like the rungs in a wheel, and that there is nothing to worry about it, since it is the play of fate as has been clearly stated by Bhāsa :

कालक्रमेण जगतः परिवर्तमाना
चक्रारपङ्क्तिरिव गच्छति भाग्यपङ्क्तिः ।[3]

Bhāsa says अनतिक्रमणीया हि विधिः

i. e. one cannot escape the working of destiny.

Vasavadattā feels that even gods are unsympathetic

अकरुणाः खल्वीश्वराः ।

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1. *Ibid.* VI.
2. *Pratimānāṭakam* I. 29.
3. *Svapnav.* I.4.

Nobody can escape death :

क: कं शक्तो रक्षितुं मृत्युकाले
रज्जुच्छेदे के घटं धारयन्ति[1] ॥

The people believed in astrologers and the seers who could read the destiny. Yaugandharāyaṇa says that even destiny cannot go against the predictions of seers.

न हि सिद्धवाक्यान्युत्क्रम्य गच्छति विधि: सुपरीक्षितानि ॥[2]

The *Svapnavāsavadattam* is a psychological drama and not a social drama; there is little scope for the playwright to indicate his views on social problems or even to portray them. Still the discerning critic can find much interesting information about the social attitude of the poet reflected in this play.

1. *Ibid.* VI.10.
2. *Ibid,* I.11.

ABOUT ANCIENT INDIAN RIDDLES[1]

Walter Ruben

A riddle circumscribes an object withouth mentioning it, for the purpose of exciting the reader or listener to find it out.[2] One can begin with *Ṛ.V.* I. 164[3] and connect it's questions, sung by a single *hotṛ*, with the *brahmodya*, a riddle-contest, spoken by two brahmins, a questioning and an answering one. It was similar to a theological quiz, but it was prearranged,[4] fixed by tradition, it was no examination of the two priests. It had to show the world the knowledge (Veda) of the two priests. Without that (the Āryans believed) the ritual would not have its magic result.[5] Side by side with this

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1. This paper is inspired by the last book of L. Sternbach : Indian riddles, a forgotten chapter in the *History of Sanskrit Literature*, Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur 1975. This book is a treasure of ancient Indian riddles and it stimulates discussions. Sternbach is mainly interested in the differentiation of the categories of the Indian riddles, following the ancient Indian tradition of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and other authorities on the different kinds of literature (Sternbach § 26sq. and 126-30). I am interested in describing the role of riddles in the cultural history of ancient India. One can distinguish with Sternbach riddles of the Vedic, epic and *kāvya*-literature.
2. *Conversations lexikon* in 15 Bänden, F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 9th edition, vol. XI, 1846, 688 s. v. Räthsel. Sternbach § 28 defines the riddle in a very similar way : "... riddles or puzzles which are generally understood to be 'something proposed for conjecture or that to be solved by conjecture' (Webster)". The riddle is regarded by one of the great folklorists as a test of cleverness, and the riddles in folk-literature have been collected by him and registered in a catalogue according to their nature, as far as they occur in tales, myths, ballads or the like of as much peoples of the world as possible (Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, vol. 3, Helsinki 1923, 275 : H 530-899). The ancient Indian riddles should be analysed once according to this method.
3. Sternbach § 6-7.
4. Sternbach § 3-5.
5. But Sternbach § 3 following Bloomfield: "These theological riddles were employed to enliven 'the mechanical and technical progress of the sacrifice by impressive intellectual pyrotechnics' ".

fictive quiz there were real contests of knowledge.[1]

Furtheron one has observed that the "riddle of numbers" of the feet of four beings in *Ṛ.V.* (X. 117. 8) reminds us of the riddle of the Sphinx,[2] but only the second and the third of the four being correspond to each other.[3]

The riddle of the Sphinx is nearly identical with one of the Uraons[4] and similar to that in Jātaka 546[5] where the number of the feet is not mentioned; the boy Mahosadha finds the answer. This boy later on judged about two women who were fighting for the same baby, as king Salomon did.[6] The Uraons, a Dravidian tribe, once came to India from the west;[7] did they carry this literary material with them ? Tales also wandered,[8] why not riddles ? The myth of the four *yuga*-s has wandered from the Near East to India and Greece; about 700 B.C. it is found in Hesiodos and Aruṇa (*ChUp* III. 1. 11),[9]

Cf. Sternbach § 9.1: "The religious riddles. . . were a favourite recreation of the priests. . . That can be seen from Manu. . . : whatever may please the Brāhmaṇas, let him (the sacrificer) give without grudging it; let him give riddles from the Vedas for that is agreeable to the manes" (! not to the priests or listeners !). Sternbach has taken the translation and the note about the favourite recreation from Bühler (*SBE* XXV, Oxford 1886, 118: *Manu*. III.231) and he repeats a mistake of Bühler: the first "let him give" is right (*dadyāt*), but the second one is wrong: Manu says: let him arrange (*kuryāt*) *brahmodya*-s.

1. Once the Aśvins criticised the ritual of the gods as headless, a term which the gods did not understand, till the Aśvins showed them that they knew more about the ritual than the gods (*ŚBr.* IV.1.5.15 sqq.; cf. Ruben, W., *Beginn der Philosophie in Indien*, Berlin 1955, 39 sq.)
2. Gonda, J., *Vedic Literature* (Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas), *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. I, 1, Wiesbaden 1975 (the same year as Sternbach's book), 133 note 6 below.
3. Gonda l. c. : *Ṛ.V.* X.117.8 : The one-footed has walked farther than the two-footed; the two-footed has overaken the three-footed from behind; the four-footed comes to (obey) the call of the two-footed, attending and having his eyes upon the herds: the sun, a man, an old man leaning on a stick, a dog.—The Sphinx: What...walks on four legs in the morning, two at noon, and three in the evening? the baby, the man, the old man.—Cf. Graves, R., *The Greek Myths*, Penguin Books 1955, II, 10; Stith Thompson *loc. cit.* motif H 761.
4. Ruben, W., *Uber die Literatur der vorarischen Stämme Indiens*, Berlin 1952, 115: Four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, three legs at night. Archer, W. G., *The Blue Grove*, London 1940, 192, riddle 196.
5. Cf. Sternbach § 20.3 about this Jātaka.
6. Sternbach l. c. note 49.
7. Ruben, W., *Kulturgeschichte Indiens*, Berlin 1978, 37; *Die Entwicklung der Gangesgesellschaft* (Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung Indiens VI) Berlin 1973, 17.
8. The ancient Indian tale of the lion, the jackal and the ass (*Pañc.* IV. 2) is nearly identical with an ancient Greek one; cf. its version of Babrios, in : Hausrath, A., and Marx, A., Griechische Märchen, Jena 1932, 38 sqq.—Cf. Benfey, Th., *Pantschatantra*, Leipzig 1859, I, 430 sqq.; Wesselski, A., Versuch einer Theorie des Märchens, Reichenberg 1931, 167 sq.
9. Ruben 1978 (cf. above n. 7) 105.

and some motifs in the biographies of Kṛṣṇa, Paris and other heroes did the same.[1] The Egyptian tale of the fighting of the members of the human body for supremacy is found in some old *Upaniṣad*-s and among the Uraons.[2] Kṛṣṇa is mentioned in *ChU* (III. 7. 6), Paris in Homeros; both texts belong to the same time of 700 B. C.

According to ancient Greek tradition the Sphinx herself had come from Ethiopia to Thebes.[3] Does that hold true for the tale and the riddle of the Sphinx also ? The Indian and Greek versions of her riddle may be derived even from Indo-European tradition, because they are so similar to each other, just as riddle-contests may have begun among Indo-Europeans[4] although there are not very convincing arguments for such a theory.

On the other hand the Uraons ask : Where are seven holes in a single thing ? Answer : in the head (two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and the mouth).[5] This reminds us of an ancient Indian *śloka* which found its various form in *AV* (X. 9. 8) etc.[6] But this *śloka* is used by the brahmins only as a simile. They interpreted the seven forces in these holes sometimes as seven *ṛṣi*-s or *prāṇa*-s[7] or "fires in all men".[8] Who borrowed this conception from whom in the period when the Gangā-society, a class-society began ?

At that time conquering Āryan tribes suppressed pre-Āryan tribes as non-Āryans (śūdras, cāṇḍālas etc.). In the period of the old *Upaniṣad*-s[9] the Āryans had settled down; their kings resided in towns. Kings like Janaka were—certainly under pressure from below—interested in the development of Upaniṣadic thinking, e. g. in that of *karman*.[10] Pre-Āryans believed in rebirth in their own clan. But Yājñavalkya taught at the court of Janaka the doctrine of *karman* (*BU* III. 2. 13), in which every Hindu believes up to to-day. Yājñavalkya combined the pre-Āryan conception of rebirth with morals, and this was basic for the beginning of Hinduism.

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1. Ruben, W., Kṛṣṇa, Paris and seven similar heroes, *Ann. Bhand. Or. Res.* Inst. Poona 1977-78, 291 sqq.
2. Ruben 1952 (cf. n. 4 on p. 362) 115; *Die Philotophen der Upansihaden*, Bern 1947, 61 sq.
3. Graves (cf. above n. 3 on p. 362) II, 10.
4. Schrader, O., *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde*, ed. Nehring, A., Berlin-Leipzig 1920, II, 210 sq.; cf. Sternbach § 4,2.
5. Archer (cf. n. 4 on p. 362) 193, riddle 211.
6. Ruben 1947 (cf. n. 2 above) 120; 1952 (cf. n. 4 on p. 362) 115, n. 1 on 362; 1955 (cf. n. 1 on p. 362), 150; Horsch, P., *Die vedische Gāthā-und Śloka-Literature*, Berlin 1966, 154 no. 126. Cf. Sternbach § 131: Sanskrit riddles had to be composed in verse. Of course only literary riddles.
7. Ruben 1955 (cf. n. 1 on p. 362) 150 sq.
8. *Ibid.* 105 sqq.
9. Not yet in the Brāhmaṇa-period. Only now I separate these two periods of the Brāhmaṇas and old Upaniṣads from each other.
10. Ruben 1978 (cf. n. 7 on p. 362) 97.

Already in the *Ṛgveda* a competition of the religions of Indra and Varuṇa had begun, which lead to doubting,[1] e. g. in cosmogonies. Slowly some primitive kind of medicine-physiology began[2] together with Vedic and Hinduistic theology. Thus science and philosophy began about 700 B. C. in the old *Upaniṣads*. In this complicated development, of which nobody then was conscious, polemics began. Instead of asking who knows more, as was done in riddle-contests like *brahmodya*-s, some brahmins began to ask who knows better.[3]

Important is also the fact that Uraons and Birhors ask riddles for pleasure only in some evenings, but they have also some kind of ceremonial riddle-contest during their marriages.[4] This holds true for the Hindus also (Sternbach § 137), it is a pre-Āryan element in Hinduism.[5]

Later on in the *Mahābhārata* riddles played "an enormous role".[6] Sternbach deals with an episode of the Pāṇḍavas during their twelfth years of exile, of wandering through several forests. In the last year they had to answer questions of a Yakṣa before he allowed them to drink from his lake.[7] This text is the first collection of Sanskrit-riddles (Sternbach § 15.2). Some of them I can not understand; Sternbach deals only with eleven of them.[8] There are cosmological ones[9] which remind us of the *brahmodya*-s. In one the *trayī*, Vedic religion is praised,[10] but it is Hinduism where some deal with ignorance which envelops the world.[11] The last four riddles represent an outlook on life, sceptical against reasoning, theology, saints and traditional morals, and ending in

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1. *Ibid.* 71 sq.
2. *Ibid.* 75, 102.
3. *Ibid.* 76, 82.
4. Ruben 1952 (cf. n. 4 on p. 362) 114.
5. Ruben 1978 (cf. n. 7 on p. 362), 36 sqq., 84 sqq., etc. about such elements. *Cf.* Sontheimer, G. D., *Birobā, Mhaskobā und Khandobā, Ursprung und Umwelt von pastoralen Gottheiten in Mahārāṣṭra*, Wiesbaden 1976.
6. Sternbach § 13. But the riddles of Vyāsa and Gaṇeśa (Sternbach § 14) are an interpolation (*Mbh.* ed. crit. vol. I ed. V. S. Sukthankar, Poona 1933, Appendix 1, v. 1. after line 39).
7. *Mbh.* III, 296 sq.; cf. Chaitanya, K., *A New History of Sanskrit Literature*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay etc., 1962, 209 sq.
8. Sternbach 15.2.1=*Mbh.* III.297.26; 2=28; 3=36 sq.; 4=40 sq.; 5=44 sq.; 6=50 sq.; 7=54 sq.; 8=1383; 9=Appendix I.32, line 9-12; 10=*ibid.* line 13-16; 11 (Sternbach 15.3, 1-2)=*ibid.* line 59.
9. What is fleeter than the wind? The mind. Sternbach 15.2.4; cf. Stith Thompson's motif H 661: What is swifter than a bird, the wind or lightning; The eye.
10. Sternbach § 15.2.7.
11. *Ibid.* 15.2.8 and 10.

fatalism.[1] Sternbach calls this text a Hindu catechism (§ 15.4) ; in fact the *Mahābhārata* is a *Dharmasaṁhitā*.[2] This *adhyāya* has grown a lot.

Among its interpolations some lines deal with the problem whether a man becomes a brahmin by birth, behaviour, learning (*svādhyāya*) or hearing (*śruta*). Yudhiṣṭhira answers in favour of behaviour.[3] This was also his standpoint when he had to answer the question of a snake (cf. below).[4] It has been regarded as "a revolt against the caste-system".[5] One of the progressive men of this 'revolt' was Yudhiṣṭhira, *dharma* incarnate ; and at the end the Yakṣa said, that he himself was *dharma*, Yudhiṣṭhira's father. This revolt began with Yājñavalkya (*BUp* III. 5), with Hinduism. Was this "revolutionary" standpoint of Yudhiṣṭhira connected with his radical-sceptical one ?

Yudhiṣṭhira's dispute with the snake,[6] with an other kind of an ogre,[7] happened in an other forest ; the snake wanted to become free from a curse[8] as a reward for his knowing more than Yudhiṣṭhira. The snake captured Bhīma and Yudhiṣṭhira had to liberate him. First the snake asked and Yudhiṣṭhira answered from his "revolutionary" standpoint to which the snake agreed and declared that he will not devour Bhīma. Then Yudhiṣṭhira asked, first about the other world, then about some epistemological questions with terms of *Sāṁkhya*[9] and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*.[10] Such a type of discussion is not dealt with in *Nyāya* ;[11] both speakers know more than their opponent in certain fields, as it seems. It is not a *brahmodya*, not a ritual riddle-contest, it is a theological examination about morals of two equals who are not brahmins.

In the *Vanaparvan* there is a third discussion between Aṣṭāvakra and the bard (*Vandin*) of king Janaka.[12] This *Vandin* had once drawn Kahoḍa, Aṣṭāvakra's father,

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1. *Ibid.* 15.3. This is no materialism, but radical and in some way pious agnosticism of a small householder, not indebted. This is the ideal of Yudhiṣṭhira, the just king.
2. Bühler, G. (cf. n. 5 on p. 361) LXXIV sq.
3. *Mbh.* III Appendix I. 32, line 41-48 (50 ?).
4. *Ibid.* III.177.15 sqq. ; *vṛtti* or *vṛttam ibid.* 21, 25, 30 sq.
5. Kane, P. V., *History of Dharmaśāstra* II. 1, Poona 1941, 101.
6. *Mbh.* III.177 sq.
7. This snake was Nahuṣa, the fifth king of the lunar line and thus ancestor of Yudhiṣṭhira (*Mbh.* III.177.6); cf. Kirfel, W., *Das Purāṇa Pañcalakṣaṇa*, Bonn 1927, 384, 6; 369, 2; 406 sq.; 571.
8. He had once behaved proudly against some great brahmins (Ruben, W., *Krishna*, Istanbul 1943, 22 sq. : Some analogies from non-Indian myths) and was cursed by Agastya.
9. *Kṣetrajña* : III.178.23; cf. *bhūtātmā kṣetranihsṛtas*: *ibid.* 20.
10. The *manas* helps that the different senses do not work at the same time: *ibid.* 17 and 21.
11. It is neither *vāda* nor *jalpa* etc.: NS I. 2.
12. *Mbh.* III. 133 sq.

after his victory over him in a previous discussion. Aṣṭāvakra, planning vengeance, wanted to participate in the dispute (*brahmodya*)[1] with the brahmins during a great sacrifice of king Janaka. Janaka asked him three riddle-questions in order to test his capacity in discussions, first about that which has 360 spokes, six wheel-naves etc. (the year). Aṣṭāvakra pretended to know this eternally moving (year), but he repeated only the enigmatic words of the king without mentioning the year; he added only "eternally moving";[2] was this sufficient to make the listener understand that he meant the year? This riddle reminds us of that of *Ṛ.V.* I. 164. 2 (Sternbach § 7.2) and of the various "metaphorical riddles" of the year, collected from non-Indian literatures.[3]

In this riddle-contest the *Vandin* starts with a stanza enumerating four items, of which there exists no second one (there is only one fire, sun, Indra, Yama). Aṣṭāvakra answers with a stanza about four items of which there are two (Indra-Agni, Nārada-Parvata, the Aśvins, man and wife). In this way both go on till the *Vandin* knows only two items of which there are thirteen things,[4] and Aṣṭāvakra adds two more of this kind, filling up this stanza. The *Vandin* is vanquished in this way and he says that he is a son of Varuṇa to whom he now starts going; his drowned victims come back from Varuṇa, among them Kahoḍa. This *Vandin*, thus, is similar to an ogre, like the snake and the Yakṣa.

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* riddles do not play any particular role.[5] In the *Harivaṁśa* Kṛṣṇa sends, what one might call a riddle-message[6] to Kālayavana: a black snake (black meaning Kṛṣṇa), and Kālayavana sends it back with a lot of ants (his great army).[7] The riddle-message may be interpreted as a "test of cleverness",[8] or as a "discussion by symbols".[9]

A peculiar problem are the "riddles" of the *Vetālapañcaviṁśati*. Sternbach,

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1. *Ibid.* 133, 18; did the author of this episode know what a thousand years ago a *brahmodya* had been? Was it still practised?
2. *Ibid.* 21 sq.
3. Stith Thompson (cf. n. 2 on p. 361) motif H 721; Riddle of the year. Cf. Nehring (cf. n. 4 on p. 363) 211 mentions a Russian riddle of the year.
4. Cf. Stith Thompson l. c. H 602.
5. Sternbach 16, 1-3 quotes only a riddle which is "based on the *Rāmāyaṇa*" without mentioning its source.
6. *Harivaṁśa* II.57.32 sqq: cf. Ruben 1943 (cf. n. 8 on p. 365), 142 sq. with some analogies in Indian, Arabian, Italian and other folk-tales. *Ibid.* page XV: Cf. Stith Thompson l. c. motif H 607: Discussion by symbols (cf. n. 9 below).
7. Cf. *ibid* motif J 1625: Armies like seeds and peppercorns.
8. *Ibid.* motif H 500 sqq.
9. *Ibid.* motif 607, cf. n. 6 above.

following Jambhaladatta's text, calls it a collection of "riddle-stories" (24.3.3) without going into any details of the text. I have once (1944) connected this mediaeval text with the very old type of theological contest : who knows more[1] (cf. above) ; but I have changed my mind now.

In 1944 I added to the second story of this text an analogy from Hemavijaya's *Kathāratnākara*.[2] This story has been registered by Stith Thompson under the type of folktale No. 945. This folktale ends with a question about a queer moral topic; this question of a prince makes a princess who does not like to speak, answer and she becomes his wife. The tale has an "enigmatic ending", but this is no proper riddle-question. This folktale is at the same time registered by the same authority under folktale-motif H 621, as the only example of the motif H 620 : "The unsolved problem : enigmatic ending of tale". This motif H 621 is registered as one case of the numerous "riddles" which are an undergroup of the "tests of cleverness". Stith Thompson, if he would have interpreted the tales of the Vetāla, accordingly, would have regarded them perhaps as tales with an enigmatic ending. In reality they are not ending in a riddle-question, but in a moral question on which the king who does not want to speak, has to answer.

The tales of the Vetāla do not belong either to those which contain some riddle-questioning and answering e. g. the tale of Turandot or the folktale Grimm No. 22. A princess can not solve the riddle of a prince and she must, therefore, become his wife.[3] But in the tales of the Vetāla there are no riddles in the sense of our definition of the riddle (cf. above). Every tale of the Vetāla ends with a question about its moral problem which the king as a moral judge has to answer. Vikrama was regarded by the Hindus as an utopian, exceptionally good despot, who acknowledged the rules of *dharma*.[4] He has not to prove his knowledge more than the Vetāla, but to demonstrate his capacity of analysing moral problems.

He can not answer the last question, but the Vetāla can not either. Vikrama is not beaten by the Vetāla. He is different from Aṣṭāvakra, but also from king Šalomon who answered all the riddle-questions of the queen of Saba.[5] The Vetāla asks the king

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1. Ruben, W., *Ozean der Märchenströme*, Teil I : Die 25 Erzählungen des Dämons, *FF Communications* No. 133, Helsinki 1944, 12.
2. *Ibid.* 27 sqq.
3. The type of the folktale No. 851.
4. Ruben, W., Utopische Gesellschaftskonzeptionen der Volksmassen in der altindischen Gangesgesellschaft in : *Das Altertum* XIII, 1977, 4.219 sqq.
5. *Old Testament*, I. Kings 10, 1-3.

at the end of each story provokingly because he wants to make the king speak because, when the king does so, Vikrama can not carry the corpse to the Yogi, as he has promised him to do.

These tales were very much liked by the well to do towns-people.[1] The authors of different versions of this text wrote them probably in the interest of the kings in order to propagate such an utopian ideal of a despot as Vikrama was, among some groups of relatively educated towns-people. This text helped the despot, the towns-people, the whole system of ancient Indian society to continue for more than 2000 years, in contrast to the European development from antiquity via feudalism to capitalism. The last version of the text, that of the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*, belongs to the 18th century.[2]

In the 15th century the Jaina Ratnacūḍa wrote his *Jñānasāgara* in which he told a tale form of the story of the wise little boy of Jātaka 546 (cf. above) : Rohaka[3] answers the questions of his king who wants to test his cleverness, and satisfied, appoints him as his Prime Minister. Among other topics we find in this text a variant of the "paradoxical task" : Rohaka shall approach his king, but he shall do this neither by day nor at night.[4] Already in *TBr.* I. 7. 1. 7 the demon Namuci and Indra, the king of the gods, made a contract that Indra should kill Namuci neither by day nor at night etc. ; Indra killed him at dawn, while Rohaka approached his king at dusk.

In Europe as well as in India riddles are liked today by a lot of people in the different forms of quiz-examinations, cross-puzzles etc. ; in this way they convince themselves as well as others that they know a lot. But the history of the riddle in Europe needs especial research. In Europe we have no more a tribe which corresponds to the Indian pre-Āryans with their riddles, nor are there remnants of *brahmodya*-s in the remnants of the Āryan Vedic religion. The important development from knowing more to knowing better can not be observed in texts of European antiquity, although one can imagine that it has happened once in Europe, in ancient Greece nearly in the same time as in India. It is a pity that we have no texts of the first Greek philosophers.

In European history one can begin, as it seems, only with the riddle-contest of the two seers Mopsus and Kalchas, the so-called Melampodia, ascribed to Hesiodos,[5] and

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1. Ruben 1944 (cf. n. 1 on p. 367), 193 sqq.; cf. Ruben 1978 (cf. n. 7 on p. 362), 7 about the four ancient Indian cultures, those of the peasants, the townspeople, the warriors and the priests. Cf. Ritschl, E., and Schetelich, M., *Die fünfundzwanzig Erzählungen des Totendämons, Reclam,* Leipzig 1979, 95, 99.
2. Ruben 1944 (cf. n. 1 on p. 367), 3.
3. Hertel, J., *Indische Erzähler*, vol. 7 (Leipzig 1922), 10 sqq.
4. Cf. Stith Thompson Motif H 1057.
5. Nehring (cf. n. 4 on p. 363) 210.

with the Greek riddle of the Sphinx. The Romans, according to some modern historians, were not interested in riddles.

The Greek literary tradition lived in a strange way during European feudalism, first in Byzantium, where Christian philologists preserved the heathen Greek tradition in contrast to the West-Roman empire with its catholic tradition. Later on the young class of late feudal citizens in the renaissance made use of this heathen heritage against the dominating catholic tradition, and in the 19th century classic philology began to care in its own ways for the Greek cultural heritage. Thus there was some continuity of tradition of European riddles, but it had a peculiar character, it was quite different from the continuity of the tradition of ancient Indian riddles till to-day. The *Mahābhārata* for instance with its riddle-contests is still living in the Hinduistic population.

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1. *Ibid.*

MEGHADŪTA : A STUDY OF THE INTERPLAY OF "DARK" AND "BRIGHT" IMAGES

Ranajit Sarkar

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about Kālidāsa and his works. The historians of Sanskrit literature have spent much time and energy in order to place him and his works on a sound historical basis. But history has to deal with documents which in the Indian context are very scanty. And therefore, the results obtained and the energy spent in such historical studies seem to be disproportionate.

When we look at the field of Sanskrit literature we find a dearth of historical documents. However, literary monuments are not lacking. And, René Wellek says, "Literary study differs from historical study in having to deal not with documents but with monuments."[1] While the historians have moved around these monuments trying to discover the missing or non-existent documents, critics and readers have tried to reach and view the monuments themselves. However, most of the critical judgments have been made intuitively from an inherent sense of aesthetic value in the critic's mind, through his insight. These critical judgments and insights have established Kālidāsa as the greatest of classical Sanskrit poets. And any reader with sufficient poetic sensibility and critical and aesthetic discernment will be able to verify for himself the truth of this judgment. We need not reconsider this opinion in any general way.

Moreover, our object will not be a total study either of Kālidāsa's works as a whole or of the *Meghadūta* in all its different aspects. We shall focus our attention only on a particular detail, though an important one, of this literary monument which is ***Meghadūta***. Continuing this image of monument we could also quote what the poet-critic Randall

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1. René Wellek, *Concepts of Criticism*, 8th Printing (New Haven and London 1975) pp. 14-15.

Jarrell says addressing the literary critic : "Remember that you can never be more than the staircase to the monument..."[1]

Meghadūta is recognized as one of the most perfect expressions of Indian poetical mind. "Indian criticism has ranked it highest among Kālidāsa's poems for brevity of expression, richness of content and power to elicit sentiment, and the praise is not undeserved."[2] Not only traditional Indian critics, but modern critics too have bestowed the highest praise on this poem. The admiration of Rabindranath Tagore is well-known, as is vouchsafed by his articles and the long poem in Bengali, ***Meghadūta***, inspired by and a glorious tribute to Kālidāsa.[3]

Like Tagore, Sri Aurobindo too has given unreserved praise to this poem. "Every possible beauty of phrase", he writes about this poem, "every possible beauty of sound, every grace of literary association, every source of imaginative and sensuous beauty has been woven together into a harmony which is without rival and without fault : for amidst all its wealth of colour, delicacy and sweetness, there is not a word too much or too little, no false note, no excessive or defective touch : the colouring is just and subdued in its richness, the verse movement regular in its variety, the diction simple in its suggestiveness, the emotion convincing and fervent behind a certain high restraint, the imagery precise, right and not overdone as in the ***Raghuvaṁśa*** and yet quite as full of beauty and power."[4]

Here is then a wonderful monument of Indian poetry. Our task will be to throw some light on a particular facade of this monument, to discover some harmony of pattern, some justness of vision which has hitherto not been fully revealed. Critics have spoken of the Kālidāsian metaphor, *upamā Kālidāsasya*; the sensuousness of his use of colours, the vividness and intensity of the feeling for the object have been noted; single verses have been quoted and requoted in order to show the complex suggestiveness of the images, the happy blending of sense and sound. Yet we cannot say that the poem has been exhausted; there are still undiscovered regions, the exploration of which will certainly yield new insight into the poem for its fuller understanding and appreciation.

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1. Randall Jarell, *Poetry and the Age* (London 1973) p. 92.
2. A. Berriedale Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (London 1920) p. 86.
3. For a more detailed consideration of the relation between the two poems see, "*Rabīndra-dṛṣṭite Kālidās*", pp. 92-133 in : Prabodh Candra Sen, *Bhārat-pathik Rabīndranāth*. Calcutta 1962; and Bīrendra Kumār Bhaṭṭācārya, "*Meghadūt o Rabīndranāth*" in : *Kabi o Kabitā*, X, 4. pp. 433-453. R. H. Assier de Pompignan in the introduction to his French translation of *Meghadūta* (Paris 1967) erroneously speaks of a Bengali translation by Tagore, p. xxxii. There are several Bengali translations of *Meghadūta*, but none by Tagore.
4. Sri Aurobindo, *On Translating Kālidāsa*, in : Birth Centenary Library, Vol. 27. (Pondicherry 1972) p. 106.

One sueh field is the metaphorical texture of the poem made up of "dark" and "bright" images. We can see the whole poem as a metaphor. To this idea we shall return presently. However, before proceeding further we should try to grasp the structure of the poem and its different psychological movements so as to see the effect, the intensity and the changing significance of the metaphorical texture within the different parts of the poem.

DIVISIONS OF THE POEM

Meghadūta presents a greater unity than the *mahākāvya*-s, firstly because of the pervasivenese of one *rasa*, namely *vipralambha śṛṅgāra*, love in separation : secondly because of the uniform rhythm used throughout the poem. The *mahākāvya* presents more structural variety, as well as a greater scope for the interplay of different emotions. *Meghadūta* has, therefore, been called, by later critics, a *khaṇḍa-kāvya*, a poem which has no all-round complex development, which concentrates on and follows one single object.[1] It has also been called a *saṅghāta*, defined as the expression of one poetic object, *artha*, in one unvarying metre.[2] Indian poetics has spoken of two main literary genres, two forms of *kāvya—dṛśya* and *śravya*, which correspond to the two major kinds of genres, namely tragedy and epic as envisaged by Aristotle and Horace, who were also aware of the third major genre, lyric poetry. "The three major kinds are already, by Plato and Aristotle, distinguished according to 'manner of imitation' (or 'representation') : lyric poetry is the poets's own *persona* : in epic poetry (...) the poet partly speaks in direct discourse (mixed narrative) : in drama, the poet disappears behind his cast of characters."[3]

Seeing the great range and overwhelming complexity of the literary phenomenon, modern criticism has rejected this clear-cut categorisation. In the same way when we approach Indian *kāvya* it will be vain to apply this genre-theory there, for neither Kālidāsa nor any other Indian poet worked according to Horace's prescription "each particular genre should keep the place allotted to it".[4]

1. *Khaṇḍa-kāvyam bhavet kāvyasyaika-deśānusāri ca / Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, 6. 329 (ed. Śālagrāma Śāstrī, Benares 1956).
2. *Yatra kavir ekam arthaṁ vṛttenaikena varṇayati kāvye /*
   saṅghātaḥ sa nigadito Vṛndāvana-Meghadūtādiḥ //
   quoted by Pārvatīcaraṇ Bhaṭṭācārya, *Meghadūt Paricay*, 2nd ed. (Calcutta 1376 A. B.)p. 11.
3. René Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature* (Harmondsworth 1968) pp. 227-8.
4. Vide, Ulrich Weisstein, *Comparative Literature and Literary Theory* (Bloomington—London 1973) p. 123.

Nevertheless, we find that modern historians and critics of Sanskrit literature have brought in quite automatically this terminology of the literary genres in order to define *Meghadūta* as a lyrical poem in contradistinction to the *mahākāvya*-s which are termed as epics.

Indeed, if we try to apply the genre terminology here the lyric will be the nearest description. But to the word lyric we have to give a greater flexbility of meaning : it will not be true to call this poetry "the poet's own *persona*", if by the poet we mean the historical person who composed the poem. But such a narrow definition of personality was discarded long ago, as is evinced by the following remarks of Hudson, "though the essence of lyrical poetry is personality, it must yet be remembered that the majority of the world's great lyrics owe their place in literature very largely to the fact that they embody what is typically human rather than what is merely individual and particular, and that thus every reader finds in them the expression of experiences and feelings in which he himself is fully able to share".[1]

Meghadūta can thus roughly or impressionistically be designated as a lyric. But if we want to understand its development and its structure better and also want to study fruitfully the metaphorical texture we should not rest content with this vague designation. In fact it has been noted that the purity of genre is artificial and unnatural to literature; "that every genuine literary work partakes of all genres, though in different degrees and manners, and that it is this proportionate difference which accounts for the abundance of the historically evolved genres".[2]

From this wider standpoint we shall try to differentiate certain significant part in *Meghadūta*. Some Indian critics and commentators divided the poem into two parts : Mallinātha for example calls them *Pūrva-megha* and *Uttara-megha*.[3] In this division we find that the first part ends with the description of the route that the cloud has to follow. The next part consists of the description of Alakā, description of the Yakṣa's home, description of the Yakṣa's wife and the message the Yakṣa wants to send to his wife. Kālidāsa himself indicates the two movements of the poem[4] :

mārgaṁ tāvat śṛṇu kathayatas tvat-prayāṇānurūpaṁ
sandeśam me tad-anu jalada śroṣyasi śrotrapeyam[5]/ [13]

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1. William Henry Hudson, *An Introduction to the Study of Literature*, 2nd ed. enlarged, (London 1917) p. 127.
2. Quoted Ulrich Weisstein. *op. cit.* p. 113.
3. For other names of the parts see Introduction to the French translation of *Meghadūta* by R. H. Assier de Pompignan (Paris 1967) p. XVI.
4. Vide Pārvatīcaraṇ Bhaṭṭācārya, *op. cit.* p. 70 Intr.
5. The numbers written within square brackets denote the number of the verse according to the

Listen now, as I tell you of the path best suited to your journey : you will then listen, O Cloud, my message most pleasing to the ear.

These lines, however, do not analyse the whole structure of the poem, because in the second part there is not only the message, *vārtā*, but there are also important descriptive passages.

Nevertheless, this shows us two significant parts of the poem. We recognize a description and a message. Now let us begin to read the poem : *kaś cit kāntā-viraha-guruṇā*... There is no doubt that it is neither a speech nor a description. It is a pure narration. Standing in the background the poet narrates certain events and actions which have taken place in the past of the event—this is marked by the use of the perfect, *parokṣe liṭ*, i. e. the perfect is used for the narration of actions and events not witnessed by the speaker. The perfect cannot but be the tense of narration. The use of the perfect in Sanskrit is a sufficient cause for a passage to be narrative, though it is not a necessary one.[1]

Following this criterion we can easily conclude that the first five verses are genuinely narrative, except for the second half of the third verse, and the last quarter of the fifth, where the narrator puts in a comment. This only makes the hearer feel the presence of the speaker who often assumes a didactic role. But these parenthetical remarks do not change the essential character of the narration.

With the fifth verse the poet breaks the flow of pure narrative and introduces a speech with the word *yayāce*, "asked". Here follows the report, real or fictive, of the words spoken by the Yakṣa to the Cloud. The rest of the poem consists of this report; the poet's presence is further dissolved, for we hear not the poet speaking, but the whole speech is attributed to one of the characters of the poem. And even the moral or philosophical reflections embedded in the poem are no longer those of the poet; they are expressions of the Yakṣa's thoughts.

For example :

yāñcā vandhyā varam adhiguṇe nādhame labdha-kāmā| [6]

Better to pray in vain to one who is noble than to be heard by the vulgar.

To all intents and purposes such remarks may coincide with the poet's thought, but formally they belong to the Yakṣa's.

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edition of E. Hultzsch, *Kālidāsa's Meghadūta, edited from Manuscrips with the Commentary of Vallabhadeva* (London 1911).

1. vide, J. S. Spijer, *Sanskrit Syntax* (Leiden 1886) § 330. In the notes the author quotes some examples of perfect denoting actions witnessed by the speaker.

In the Yakṣa's speech we distinguish two main divisions, one which is directly spoken to the Cloud and meant for him alone, another which is a message, *vārtā*, only entrusted to the Cloud but meant for the Yakṣa's wife. The message is emboxed within the whole speech. The speech meant for the Cloud is further composed, except for a few verses of address, of eulogy, request and wish, for the most part, of description, which itself has four subdivisions, as we have already noted earlier : the cloud's route, Alakā, Yakṣa's home, Yakṣa's wife. When we compare the descriptive portion and the message we find a very significant difference. In the first the Yakṣa is almost absent : it is true that he is the speaker but he is never in the limelight except in the passages of address and request. The whole tone is objective; there is no reference to the speaker. But in the message the speaker is in the forefront : the lyrical *persona* of the Yakṣa reveals itself and bursts forth into powerful feelings.

We thus see three steps in the composition of the poem :

1. Kālidāsa, the poet, narrates the events of a certain Yakṣa, who takes the poet's place as the speaker;

2. the Yakṣa, as poet, describes the Cloud's route, the city of Alakā etc. But he himself is absent, he is not an object of the poem ;

3. the Yakṣa, as poet, becomes a part of the poem, a subjective lyric in which the "I" is the *persona* of the poet-Yakṣa, Grammatically, too, the first person singular pervades this section. The verses (101-109) are the lyric of the poet-Yakṣa, a love-lyric direct, natural, and simple, tenderly and magically appealing.

POETRY AS VIKALPA

The direct naming of an emotion is foreign to Sanskrit *kāvya*. Lines such as the following from the Yakṣa's message are rather rare even in Kālidāsa.

> *ittharṁ cetaś caṭula-nayane dūrlabha-prārthanaṁ me*
> *gāḍhoṣmābhiḥ kṛtam aśaraṇam tvad-viyoga-vyathābhiḥ/* [105]

> In this way, O lively-eyed girl, my heart, while it conceives impossible desires, is overcome by the fiercely burning pangs of separation.

This is too evident, too abstract to say. Poetry has to be concrete; its task is not to state but to evoke, to suggest. Therefore Ānandavardhana, the Indian theorist who had the most genuine insight into the psychology of poetic creation, said that naming an emotion was not poetry :

na hi kevala-śṛṅgārādi-śabda-mātra-bhāji vibhāvādi-pratipādanarahite kāvye manāg api rasavattva-pratītir asti (*Dhvanyāloka*)

"In a poem which merely contains words such as 'love' etc., but which is in fact

lacking in those elements that help and create the proper atmosphere for real emotional experiences, there can not be the slightest imaginative experience".[1]

How are emotions suggested ? How is finally *rasa*, the imaginative experience, evoked in the mind of the reader ? Here again we find the insight of Ānandavardhana rewarding. *Rasa* cannot directly be communicated by naming it; it has to be conveyed obliquely. In this process we can recognize several steps in the poetic creation which we may deduce from the following passage :

vastu ca sarvam eva jagad-gatam avaśyam kasya cid rasasya bhāvasya vāṅgatvaṁ pratipādyate antato vibhāvatvena/citta-vṛtti-viśeṣā hi rasādayaḥ/na ca tad asti vastu kiṁ cid na cittavṛtti-viśeṣam upajanayati/

"And all such things in the world will necessarily be the auxiliaries either of a given *rasa* or of a *bhāva*, (even if) finally as a causal factor (*vibhāvatvena*). For *rasa*-s etc. are (only) particular mental states (*cittavṛttiviśeṣa*) and there is nothing, whatever, that cannot give rise to a mental mood".[2]

From the above we see that *rasa* is a particular *citta-vṛtti*, mental state, which can be aroused with the help of *vastu*, an object, a concrete reality which is to function in poetry as a *vibhāva*, a causal factor, a poetical stimulus.

We see, therefore, that *vastu* equated to *vibhāva* is the element with the help of which the poet has to convey *rasa*. A poet, however, does not deal with *vastu*, an object as such; he deals with language, *śabda*. In order to understand the relation more fully we can perhaps turn to Patañjali's *yoga* psychology which is suggested to us by the words *citta-vṛtti* and *vastu*. Patañjali says that the *citta-vṛtti*-s are of five kinds, one of which is called *vikalpa*, defined as follows :

śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ[3]/

"*Vikalpa* is empty of real objects, *vastu*, and is a result of the verbal knowledge".

This means that a mental mood can be activated with language only, even without a direct contact with reality.

This need not signify that objects do not exist. Words may be, and in the human world mostly are, substitutes of *vastu*. Poetry cannot handle *vastu* directly, although the poet receives the knowledge of the object by direct perception, *pratyakṣa*[4] and, therefore, the poet's *cittavṛtti* rising from that *pratyakṣa* is the *rasa* which he has to communicate, but he can only do so through the medium of language, so that the mental

1. Translation by J. L. Masson in "Telling, Not Conveying—*svaśabdavācya*". *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, II, 2. p. 146.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
3. *Yogasūtra* 1.9.
4. *Ibid.* 1.7.

state which arises in the reader is a *vikalpa*, not the *pratyakṣa*. This idea corresponds to the concept of Susanne Langer who says : "The poet's business is to create the appearance of 'experiences', the semblance of events lived and felt, and to organize them as they constitute a purely and completely experienced reality, a piece of *virtual life*"[1]. The expression "*virtual life*" conveys the significance of *vikalpa*.

The poet then uses words, instead of objects perceived, to present an appearance of life, not to give an interpretation of life, nor a criticism. The presentation is, therefore, not the real but an appearance of the real. But the poet does not want to communicate an illusory *rasa* : what he wants to evoke in the reader's mind has to be real. From the above discussion, however, it would seem to be an impossible task. It would indeed be impossible if there were not the subtle go-between which Ānandavardhana calls *dhvani*, suggestion. The poetic power, *śakti*, the creative genius, *pratibhā*, of the poet, can use all the potentialities of language, both of sound and sense, *śabdālaṅkāra*, as well as *arthālaṅkāra* in order to suggest as strongly as possible the reality and the emotion contained in that reality, experienced by him.

Sanskrit poetics has delved deep into the problem of *dhvani* but it has always remained within the boundaries of single verses. In fact not only separate verses, but a poem as a whole—or a passage more or less long—can "suggest" through the interplay of certain sound-patterns or sense-patterns. Here we shall try to study one such complex metaphorical pattern and see how it can suggest to the sympathetic reader the emotion Kālidāsa wishes to convey.

METAPHORICAL TEXTURE : *VARṆANA*

It has been argued by Indian theorists as well as modern Western critics that poetic experience cannot be conveyed by discourse which is analytical conceptual language, which lacks the 'poetic presence' : "The perceptible object", writes Yves Bonnefoy, "is *presence*. It is primarily distinguishable from the conceptual by one act, namely its presence".[2] The poet has to invest language with that presence and shape it into a metaphor of the poetic experience. Along with the faculty of seeing, of perception, *darśana*, the poet has the other dynamic faculty of presentation, of "description", *varṇana*.

Before we proceed further we should try to understand what "description" means. We have already used the word in view of the tripartite division of *Meghadūta*, but there we have not laid any emphasis on the poetic quality : its use is rather vague without any

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1. Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art* (New York 1953) pp. 50-51.
2. "L'object sensible est *présence*. Il se distingue du conceptuel avant tout par un acte, c'est la présence". *L'Improbable* (paris 1959) p. 28,

reference to poetry. Description is a verbal representation of objects and scenes, differing from the narration in that it has no temporal or dramatic development. Narrations, strictly speaking, are "representations of actions and events" and descriptions are "representations of objects and characters",[1] whereas *varṇana*, the power of description which we are at present speaking of, has no inherent psychological relationship with representation. Here "description" is "presentation"[2] that is to say, the poem is a metaphor of the poet's world. Borrowing the expression of Wimsatt we can say there is a "total metaphoric relation between a good poem and (...) reality..."[3] It is the power of *varṇana* which establishes this metaphorical relation. And this is done with the help of both sound and sense, *śabdārthau sahitau*.

In an exhaustive study of any of Kālidāsa's works—or, for that matter, of the work of any poet—the student cannot neglect either the metaphorical elements of sound or of sense. Our object is not such an exhaustive study ; we want to limit ourselves to the visual exploitation of language, and this too, in a very limited field, namely that of colours and words associated with and directly evocative of colours. Kālidāsa, no doubt, knows the magic and the art of sound ; he exploits with great mastery the potentialities of sound, but it is in the creation and presentation of visual images that he is unsurpassed. "In continuous gift" writes Sri Aurobindo, "of seizing an object and creating it to the eye he (Kālidāsa) has no rival in literature".[4]

Kālidāsa presents or "creates to the eye" through the medium of words what he has seized of reality. We have the poem, the "metaphor" or the "presentational symbol". How are we, as readers, going to approach this metaphor ? We may look at it with open eyes so that the impressions enter our mind.

Or else we may approach it more actively, with a discerning and searching mind, trying to understand and interpret consciously. Perhaps for a pure enjoyment and an intuitive experience of the poet's world, this second approach is not essential ; yet, if we, as critics, wish to communicate our enjoyment we have to extract and analyse those elements which, by a certain process of interaction, evoke or convey the aesthetic delight, *rasa*. Ogden and Richards also speak of two kinds of approach to a poem of a picture.

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1. "... des représentations d'actions et d'événements, qui constituent la narration proprement dite, et (...) des représentations d'objets ou de personnages, qui sont le fait de ce que l'on nomme aujourd'hui la *déscription*". Gérard Genette, *Figures II*. (Paris 1969) p. 56.
2. vide, Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art* (New York 1959) p. 89, for the discussion on "presentational symbol".
3. Quoted Marcus B. Hester, *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor* (The Hague, Paris 1967) p. 79.
4. *The Age of Kālidāsa,* in: Birth Centenary Library. Vol. 3. (Pondicherry 1972) p. 223.

We can submit to it as a stimulus, letting its colour-qualities and form-qualities work upon us emotionally. Or with a different attitude we can interpret its forms and colours (its words)"[1]

Our attitude here is mainly the second one, which is not altogether independent of the first one, though. It is because the stimulus has emotionally affected us that we wish to go further and interpret the action of that working. We shall here consider the "colour-qualities" of *Meghadūta*. When we read the poem and submit to the stimulus not only with our senses but also with our intuition and intellect, we find that the emotional experience we undergo is that of love in separation, *vipralambha śṛṅgāra*, of Indian poetics. It mav be true that our experience is not altogether free; that it is directed and modified by our knowledge of the Indian tradition of *rasa*-theory, or by some personal factors of our individual life. The second attitude, we believe, can correct in some ways the possible errors of the first.

Meghadūta is a poem of *viraha*, separation of lovers. Among the various means by which the poet has given form to the pangs of separation, one is the tension and interaction between the images related to darkness and those related to brightness. Images and words have also cultural associations, non-verbal associations which the poet cannot altogether ignore, and which influence the significance of images. In this context we have to remember that "darkness" is not an antithesis of "day".[2] This cultural association of the significance of night and day, or dark and bright, goes back to the very origin of Indian culture, as can be gathered from the Ṛgvedic hymns to Dawn and Night. Night is not the absence of light : night holds light within its apparent darkness. But the word *tamas* has often a negative meaning, it is an antithesis of light. Thus *ṚV* 10.127.2 says that Night,

jyotiṣā bādhate tamaḥ/

"destroys darkness with her light".

Here, *tamas*, darkness, is negative but not night. Likewise, Kṛṣṇa, the divine Lover is portrayed dark. Kālidāsa himself remembers and makes use of this in the poem :

yena śyāmaṁ vapur atitarāṁ kāntim āpatsyate te
varṇeneva sphurita-rucinā gopa-veśasya Viṣṇoḥ/ [15]

...which (rainbow) will make your dark-hued body lovelier still as the resplendent peacock-feather made lovelier the body of Viṣṇu incarnate as the Cowherd (i. e. Kṛṣṇa).

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1. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 10th ed. (London 1966) p. 236.
2. Vide, my article "Night' and 'Day' in *Kumārasambhava*: an investigation into the suggestive meaning". (In press).

Thus, culturally the association of absence, pain or desolation, of emptiness are not strongly associated with darkness. But the word *tamas* has the negative association, as in the Ṛgvedic hymn. About Alakā, the poet writes : (The verse is, however, considerd spurious by Vallabhadeva and Mallinātha)

nitya-jyotsnāḥ pratihata-tamo-vṛtti-ramyāḥ pradoṣāḥ/ [26][1]

...where everlasting moonlight checking the course of darkness makes nights enchanting.

Also in another verse *tamas* has been depicted as an obstruction to love's union, the darkness covers the roads which women have to take to reach their lover's house :

ruddhāloke nara-pati-pathe sūci-bhedyais tamobhiḥ/ [37]

...on the king's highway where dense darkness,—so dense that a needle-point might prick it—veils the sight...

Therefore, "dark" (except *tamas*) cannot suitably function as a symbol for separation, for *viraha*, neither "bright" for union, *milana*. Neither of the two are negative, they are not antithetical. How can these images then present make concrete, the emotional experience ? The poet does not emphasize in the metaphorical texture the opposition between separation and union with the opposition of colour-qualities. In both union and separation two parties are involved : the lover and the beloved, the masculine element and the feminine element. What the "dark" signifies is the masculine element; what "bright" signifies is the feminine element. *Milana* is the meeting of the two elements, *viraha*, their separation. And it is indeed through the interplay of these two elements that Kālidāsa has built up the whole metaphorical texture of the poem.

But one question remains—a question which is not essential to our interpretation or understanding but which will lend support to our assumption. Is this structure intended by the poet ?

A poet does not write with the express intention of using a particular metaphorical structure. The structure suggests itself in the process of composition. The intention of the poet lies in the acceptance or the rejection of the suggested structure. If there were any means of knowing the images that a poet rejects we could find by comparison the intention and the norm behind the acceptance of the expressed images. Such a study is possible with the works of modern poets, from the rough drafts and the corrections of whose works we can get an idea of the rejected images. But for the earlier poets we can only study the work as it has come down to us and see if here is a significant pattern, a coherence in the metaphorical structere. The problem may be made complicated by the

1. This verse is considered spurious by Vallabhadeva and Mallinātha, though the latter comments upon it. Hultzsch gives it in the Appendix [VI].

inclusion of interpolated verses where the later poet has mechanically used some metaphorical elements without having caught the poet's intention. On the other hand the study of the metaphorical structure may help to detect some interpolations.

It is then evident that we have to look for the poet's intention within the poem itself. Modern critics have shown that the poet's intention reveals itself most strongly in style. And metaphors—living, original metaphors, not the dead conventional hackneyed ones—always bear the mark of the poet's will. Therefore, if we find a definite structure of the metaphor, if we can recognize a significant purpose there, we can safely conclude that it was intended.[1]

In Sanskrit literature we find quite a good amount of dead metaphors within the poem. Some of them had, quite early, lost all suggestive value : a face compared to the moon or the lotus does not mean anything more than a "lovely face". Therefore, it is quite difficult to find the mark of the poet's intention in such metaphors. But when we consider the whole poem as a metaphor we have a new ground, and in that the images, descriptions as well as internal metaphors, are the elements which constitute the metaphorical relation. And that relation bears the poet's intention.

But the elements of these metaphorical relations are often determined, at least partially, by some choice that the poet makes as the focal point of his work. This focal point can be the plot, or a character, or an event or a scene or even a mood. Here, as we can easily see, this focal point is the Cloud.[2] And the choice of the cloud as the messenger, as the Yakṣa's spokesman, throws the Yakṣa at the background; he is hardly a part of the poem, he retires, so to say, outside of it into the position of, as we have earlier shown, a second poet, except in the lyrical part when the poet's *persona* reappears.

The choice of the focal point determines and demarcates to a large extent the metaphorical field. The images which then surge up in the poet's mind are not free, they are organically related to the focal point, in this case to the cloud.

In the poem itself Kālidāsa directs our attention to the aspect of the cloud which is most significant in the present context : separation of lovers. The poem ends with the following line :

mā bhud evaṁ kṣaṇam api ca te vidyutā viprayogaḥ| [111]

May you never, even for a moment, be thus separated from the lightning.

This closing benedictory line shows us clearly that the poet establishes consciously a link between the pair Yakṣa--Yakṣa's wife, and the pair Cloud—Lightning.

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1. For the opinions of some modern critics, vide, Marcus B. Hester, *op cit.*, pp. 147-50.
2. In more complex works there may be several such focal points varying in intensity.

The cloud is not just the messenger of the Yakṣa, it is his image, his other self. This is suggested by the qualification *antar-vāṣpaḥ*, used for the Yakṣa.

tasya sthitvā katham api puraḥ. . . .
antar vāspaś ciram anucaro Rāja-rājasya dadhyau/ [3]

Standing with difficulty in front (of the cloud) Kubera's attendant (i. e. the Yakṣa), his heart filled with tears brooded for a long time.

Here the cloud and the Yakṣa are placed face to face. And in this confrontation Kālidāsa uses skilfully the meaning of the word *vāṣpa* : tears, vapour. *Antarvāṣpa* would be a very appropriate description of the cloud but here used for the Yakṣa suggests indirectly the identification of the two. Thus there is no difficulty in accepting the metaphorical transfer from one couple to the other. This association indicates to us as it indicated to the poet himself—the linking of the "dark" of the cloud to the "bright" of the lightning. The poet specially draws our attention to the darkness of the cloud in the very first introduction :

. . . . . .megham āśliṣṭa-sānuṁ
vapra-krīḍā-pariṇata-gaja-prekṣaṇīyaṁ dadarśa // [2]

(the Yakṣa) saw a cloud embracing the peaks, lovely to behold as an elephant when it bends down to strike playfully a river's muddy bank.

This comparison of the cloud with the elephant points on the one hand to the size, on the other hand to the colour. The dark colour is further brought into prominence by showing us the elephant dashing against a mound of carth ; we thus imagine it covered with mud.

We discover a series of images where these two colour-qualities are brought together. But the intensity and the significance of the imagery are not equal in all the parts : the descriptive part, as it is to be expected, developes most fully the metaphorical texture. Also, the images have not always a very implicit relation to the mood of separation, *viraha*, but only act to create a certain atmosphere of beauty, as if to show the interaction of darkness and brightness, to show that union is the most normal thing in nature where we find at every side the intermingling of the dark (male) and the bright (female).

In order to prove our point we shall study the imagery under different sections.

(A) IMAGERY IN THE NARRATIVE-DESCRIPTIVE PASSAGE

(i) in the purely narrative passage,
(ii) in the description of the Cloud's route,
(iii) in the description of Alakā and the Yakṣa's home,
(iv) in the description of the Yakṣa's wife ;
and

(B) IMAGERY IN THE LYRICAL PASSAGE

(A) IMAGERY IN THE NARRATIVE-DESCRIPTIVE PASSAGE

(i) NARRATIVE PASSAGE

This passage, as we have noted, gives only the skeletal frame of the poem. Nevertheless, from the metaphorical standpoint we find a few important indicators. In the opening verse Kālidāsa uses the expression ***astaṁ-gamita-mahimā***, "one whose glory has been made to set or decline", to qualify the Yakṣa. Both ***astaṁ-gam*** "to set, to decline" closely associated to the sun and *mahimā* "glory, greatness" which points to the former exalted status of the Yakṣa, evoke the image of a divine being who has lost his lustre. In the next verse, too, there is a similar suggestion, *dhvani* :

> *abalā-viprayuktaḥ sa kāmi...kanaka-valaya-bhraṁśa-rikta-prakoṣṭaḥ*
>
> "the lover separated from his wife...he whose arms are naked through the falling of the golden bracelets".

Critics have noted the suggestion of this image, namely that it conveys the idea that the Yakṣa has become emaciated due to the pangs of separation, *viraha-duḥkhāt kṛśaḥ* (Mallinātha). But there is also another *dhvani*. The lover, *sa kāmi*, is separated from the beloved wife, *abalā-viprayuktaḥ*; this finds its parallel in the image of the arm separated from the golden bracelet. The suggestion of Mallinātha explains the use of *valaya* bracelet, but not the use of *kanaka*, gold. "Gold" becomes pregnant with meaning when we restitute to it the idea of brightness. The separation from his wife finds metaphorically concrete expression in the falling of brightness that is the golden bracelet.

The brief narrative part fixes with admirable subtlety the symholism of the "dark" and the "bright".

(ii) CLOUD'S ROUTE

Kālidāsa explicitly tells us that this is a very important part of the poem.[1] And in fact it is here that the metaphorical texture finds its fullest expression. This texture is made up of two different kinds of imagery. In one kind the cloud itself represents the dark aspect and the personification of the lover, and as such occupies a central position in the metaphor. Here the images are directly linked to the theme of union and separation. The Yakṣa often creates images of union, *milana*, so as to demonstrate the poignancy of separation, *viraha*. The other kind of images are either independent of the cloud or else the cloud is not personified; it is an object of nature like any other object, like the bird,

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1. "*Mārgaṁ tāvac...*" quoted earlier.

or the mountain; here the Yakṣa evokes pictures of "dark" and "bright" as if to create the suitable background for the elaboration of his emotions, which finds its direct expression in the delicately sensuous lyrical passage.

There are five verses in which, in the present context, we can speak of the personification of the cloud. The cloud is the dark lover: in four of the verses a river assumes the role of the beloved woman;[1] and in one the feminine role is assumed by a mountain [25]. In all these images the darkness of the cloud is emphasized in opposition to the brightness of the river or the mountain. The stamp of the metaphor is most powerful here. The comparisons within the images, the details of the pictures evoke intensely at the same time the idea of eroticism, *śṛṅgāra,* and the idea of separation which here finally ends in lovers' meeting. These images also carry too a burden of sadness which becomes poignant as they remind the Yakṣa, in a very sensually concrete manner, of the moments of his happy love. Let us now consider these images:

veṇi-bhūta-pratanu-salilāṁ tām atītasya sindhuṁ
pāṇḍu-cchāyāṁ taṭa-ruha-taru-bhraṁśibhir jīrṇa-parṇaiḥ/
saubhāgyaṁ te subhaga virahāvasthayā vyañjayantīṁ
kārśyaṁ yena tyajati vidhinā sa tvayaivopapādyaḥ// [29]

When you are away the waters of the River almost run dry so that she looks like a thin braid of hair; her complexion grows pale with the yellow leaves fallen from the trees that stand on her banks : such is her lovelorn condition. All this, O happy lover ! suggests how fortunate you are. It is now left to you to find out what is to be done to make thinness depart from her body.

In the foreground we see the river; the main traits brought forward are the emaciated form and the colour. Both are results of the pangs of separation. As regards the colour-quality which is our concern, we find the word *pāṇḍu,* which denotes a pale shade of yellow. The yellow-quality is emphasized by *jīrṇa-parṇa,* old leaves falling from the trees, which are mostly yellow. The whole colour-scheme evokes the yellowish pallor of one pining with love. The palour, in separation, however, suggests that in union the colour is bright. Palour as is suggested, is only the diminution of brightness. The cloud remains rather in the background. We must always keep in mind that the cloud is dark so as to be able to appreciate and seize the colour-scheme.

In the verse we are going to consider next, the colour-scheme becomes even more prominent. The cloud comes forward into the middle ground :

gambhīrāyāḥ payasi saritaś cetasīva prasanne
chāyātmāpi prakṛti-subhago lapsyate te praveśam/

1. [29, 40, 46, 49].

tasmāt tasyāḥ kumuda-viśadāny arhasi tvaṁ na dhairyān
moghīkartuṁ caṭula-śapharodvartana-prekṣitāni// [40]

In any case, you, lovely by nature ! will find entrance as a reflection in the clear waters of Gambhīrā, as within a loving heart; therefore, you should not, through self-restraint, frustrate her lily-white glances which are like the glittering leaps of restless little carps.

Again the river represents the beloved; the brightness and whiteness are strongly emphasized, first by the word *prasanna*, clear, limpid, bright when related to the water, then the glances of the river which are white like water-lilies; and moreover, these glances are bright because they are nothing but the springing up of the restless silver-scaled *śaphara*, a small carp, the scales of which glisten and reflect the sunlight as it jumps out of the water.

The cloud's colour is made more prominent by the word *chāyā* : the reflection of the cloud on the water is contrasted with the brightness of the water. Here we have the scene of union.

In the third example the cloud too comes to the forefront : the interplay of dark and bright reaches its highest intensity, balance and harmony.

tvayy ādātuṁ jalam avanate śārṅgiṇo varṇa-caure
tasyāḥ sindhoḥ pṛthum api tanuṁ dūra-bhāvāt pravāham/
prekṣiṣyante gagana-gatayo dūram āvarjya dṛṣṭir
ekaṁ muktā-guṇam iva bhuvaḥ sthūla-madhyendranīlam// [46]

As you bend down to take water from the river, gods moving in the sky will cast their glances down below and see the broad watery stream looking narrow from so far, and on that stream you, the ravisher of Kṛṣṇa's complexion : this will appear to them as Earth's string of pearls with an immense sapphire in the middle.

This recalls in some ways the previous two images. They all show a gradual progression from almost a half-image to the complete crystallization—here the preception has reached the imaginative height of exactness in which there is no hesitation; it is a 'fully realized image.'[1]

The joy of union—for the Yakṣa the aesthetic fulfilment of his desire, the embodiment of the delight and beauty of love he remembers and he hopes to find again when his curse will be ended—is here vividly portrayed; the mental state, *cittavṛtti*, is made visible. The cloud by ravishing the colour of the body of the eternal Lover, Kṛṣṇa, has become itself metaphorically the supreme lover. The perfect union of the dark and bright is splendidly pictured by the image of the sapphire in the string of pearls.

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1. H. Coombes, *Literature and Criticism* (Harmoddsworth 1965) p. 55.

These images show a sustained development of an imaginative truth expressed with precision and clear intellectual control. The development which finally reaches the height of concrete perception proves beyond question that the images of "dark" and "bright" are intended and used with conscious artistry.

There is yet another image in which the cloud-river relation is depicted, but with a different psychological goal. It does not move on the aesthetic emotional level but on the ethical.

> *hitvā hālām abhimata-rasāṁ Revati-locanāṅkāṁ*
> *bandhu-prītyā samara-vimukho Lāṅgali yāḥ siṣeve |*
> *kṛtvā teṣam abhigamam apāṁ somya sārasvatīnām*
> *antaḥ-svacchas tvam api bhavitā varṇa-mātreṇa kṛṣṇaḥ ||* [49]

When Balarāma, the Plough-bearer, turned away from battle for love of his kinsfolk, he resorted to the waters of Sarasvatī, giving up his cherished drink, the intoxicating liquor which mirrored Revati's eyes. You too dear friend reaching those waters will become pure in the heart : your colour alone will remain dark.

A new dimension is added to the metaphor. Love is not just an emotional experience, not eroticism alone, but has also a moral significance. Kālidāsa depicts with vivid sensuousness the beauty and the pleasure of love, but always there is a progressive transformation; he is never content only to show love that ends in the culminating beauty of erotic experience alone. There is a gradual purification of love, as we find it very clearly in Umā's *tapas* and more dramatically in Śakuntalā. Speaking about the latter, Rabindranath Tagore writes that Kālidāsa raises love from the realm of natural beauty, *svabhāva-saūndarya*, to the eternal heaven of beauty-in-goodness, *maṅgala-saundarya.*[1] It is this ethical aspect of love that is effectively suggested here.

There is one verse in which the counterpart of the cloud is not a river but the mountain Nicais.

> *Nicair ākhyaṁ girim adhivases tatra viśrāma-hetos—*
> *tvat-samparkāt pulakitam iva prauḍha-puṣpaiḥ kadambaiḥ |*
> *yaḥ paṇya-strī-rati-parimalodgāribhir nāgarāṇām*
> *uddāmāni prathayati śilā-veśmabhir yauvanāni ||* [25]

You should stop to take rest there, on the hill called Nicais whose full-blown *kadamba*-flower will be like the bristling of hair at the thrill of your embrace : this hill proclaims the passionate youth of the townsmen by its rocky caverns exhaling the sensuous perfumes of the courtesans.

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1. Vide, Rabīndranāth Thākur (Tagore) "Śakuntalā" in *Prācīnasāhitya* (Calcutta 1907).

The bright yellow colour of the full-blown *Kadamba* flowers is set against the blackness of the cloud. We should, however, note a different tone : Kālidāsa suggests here another aspect of love which was an important part of the Indian society in classical times : the love of the courtesans. The idea of venal love is expressed firstly by the name of the mountain, *Nicais*, meaning "low" : this is a lower kind of love ; and secondly by the description of the mountain caverns exhaling sensual perfume, *ratiparimala*.[1]

The second category of images in this section are those which develop the setting with the contrast of "dark" and "bright". The cloud may be one of the terms, but it is not personified.[2] The erotic symbolism too is often quite subdued. But because of these images this whole passage gets its unmistakable metaphorical colouring.

The Yakṣa leads the cloud across the splendid landscape over hills and rivers, villages and towns, unfurling a panorama which reveals concretely his mental state. The landscape becomes truly an "inscape."[3] The scenery shows us the beauty and interplay of the encounter between the bright and the dark. The black cloud voyaging through the changing scenes is shown with white birds, creating thus a wonderful contrast, intense and moving. Such scenes are familiar to the Indians and charged with strong emotional associations.[4]

Kālidāsa notes such images with great care and precision. When the favourable wind drives the cloud on, the white cranes in the sky will form themselves into a garland which will shine against the black cloud. A lovely sight !

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1. The mountain Nicais could also be taken as a male friend, it is often thus interpreted, perhaps because of the grammatical gender of "*giri*", mountain, which is masculine. The word "nicais" is indeclinable. But the grammatical gender need not debar us from taking the mountain metaphorically as feminine.
2. In a way, the cloud is personified throughout the poem because of his role as the messenger. What I mean here is that even if we forget this formal personification the images to be considered will not lose anything of their beauty and significance.
3. For the affinities of this concept of Gerard Manley Hopkins and the analysis of *pratibhā* "as the power of clear visualisation of the aesthetic image which is really the seizure of the object in all its fullness and life", see Krishna Chaitanya, *Sanskrit Poetics: A Critical and Comparative Study* (London 1965) pp. 217-8.
4. The impact that this beauty can make on a sensitive person can be understood from an experience that Rāmakṛṣṇa had as a child. "One morning", he recalled in later life, "I took some parched rice in a small basket and was eating while I walked along the narrow ridges of the rice-fields. In one part of the sky, a beautiful black cloud appeared, heavy with rain. I was watching it and eating the rice. Very soon, the cloud covered almost the whole sky. And then a flock of cranes came flying. They were as white as milk against that black cloud. It was so beautiful that I became absorbed in the sight. Then I lost consciousness of everything outward. . ." Christopher Isherwood, *Ramakrishna and his Disciples* (Calcutta 1974) pp. 28-9.

nūnam ābaddha-mālāḥ
seviṣyante nayana-subhagaṁ khe bhavantaṁ balākāḥ // [10]

the flock of white cranes in the sky will, for sure, become a garland to adorn you who are the delight of their eyes.

Again in a different scene the Yakṣa says that the white swans will be the companions of his journey : *rājahaṁsāḥ sahāyāḥ* [12]

Various other scenes with glorious hues against the dark cloud are evoked. The rainbow shines like a mixture of the lights of various gems, *ratna-cchāyā-vyatikara iva,* and invests the cloud with incomparable loveliness [15].

A few verses further follows a description, almost supernatural in its beauty, as the poet himself says, a sight fit for the gods :

channopāntaḥ pariṇata-phala-dyotibhiḥ kānanāmrais—
tvayy ārūḍhe śikharam acalaḥ snigdha-veṇi-savarṇe /
nūnaṁ yāsyaty amara-mithuna-prekṣaṇiyam avasthāṁ
madhye śyāmaḥ stana iva bhuvaḥ śeṣa-vistāra-pāṇḍuḥ // [18]

You have the same hue as the black tresses smeared with oil ; when you have climbed the summit of the mountain covered on all sides with wild mango-trees, shining with ripe fruits, you will look like the Earth's breast, dark in its centre and bright all around : a sight surely for the divine couples to see.

Many other images intensify this metaphorical texture. The lightning in the cloud is like a gold streak on the black touchstone, *kanaka-nikasa-snigdhā* [37]. When the cloud, like an elephant, bends down to drink the crystal-clear water of the Gaṅgā, its dark reflection appears like the dark river Yamunā at its confluence with the bright Gaṅgā[51]. When it rests on the tops of snow-clad mountains the cloud's splendour will be comparable to the mud dug out by Śiva's white bull[1] :

śobhām ramyāṁ tri-nayana-vṛṣotkhāta-paṅkopameyām/ [52]

a splendid loveliness that bears a comparison with the mud that the bull of the three-eyed God digs out.

And finally when the cloud reaches the slopes of the Mount Kailāsa, we find one last picture in which the dark and bright are intricately mingled :

utpaśyāmi tvayi taṭa-gate snigdha-bhinnāñjanābhe
sadyaḥ-kṛtta-dvirada-daśana-ccheda-gaura ya tasya /
līlām adreḥ stimita-nayana-prekṣaṇiyāṁ bhavitrīm
aṁsa-nyaste sati Halabhṛto mecake vāsasiva // [59]

1. One may here note the variant reading : *śobhāṁ śubhra-tri-nayanavṛsotkhāta-paṅkopameyām.*

You have the sheen of Kohl ground in oil; the mountain is as white as a freshly cut piece of ivory. When you reach its slopes, its beauty, I can well imagine, will be worth looking at with unwavering eyes, like that of Balarāma, the Plough-bearer, with a dark cloak flung on his shoulders.

This is a complex image. Firstly, the simple picture of the black cloud resting on the white snowy slopes of Kailāsa. This itself is evocative, but Kālidāsa makes the picture more concrete with a metaphor and a simile : the cloud has the hue of Kohl ground in oil, *snigdha-bhinnāñjanābha*, and the whiteness of the snowy slopes is shining bright like a white piece of ivory[1] which has just been cut. After having strongly made the contrast, the poet puts them together with the help of a simile : the meeting of the two is like a black cloth thrown on the shoulders of Balarāma, who, contrary to his brother Kṛṣṇa, is white. Moreover, this association with Balarāma suggests that blackness is not inauspicious; it is a part of the total universal structure, as has also been pointed out earlier by the image of the Earth's breast.

This texture is seen also in images where the cloud is absent. Rivers, mountains, trees, fruits, flowers, birds, beasts and insects take part in this universal imagination; the world becomes a playground where bright things meet with dark things. We see the mountain Vindhya with its huge dark rocks like black big elephants; the river Revā flowing on the rocks appears like stripes of ashes[2] on the elephants' bodies—*bhūtim ange gajasya* [19]. Elsewhere, the poet paints a wonderful picture of a village where the white *ketaka*-flowers, the rose-apple tree with its dark-blue fruits, the black crows and the white swans are interwoven into a sustained harmony of contrasts.

pāṇdu cchāyopavana-vṛtayaḥ ketakaiḥ sūci-bhinnair
nidārambhair gṛha-bali-bhujām ākula-grāma-caityaḥ /
tvayy āsanne phala-pariṇati-śyāma-jambū-vanāntāḥ
sampatsyante katipaya-dina-sthyāyi-hamsā Daśārṇāḥ // [23]

Garden-hedges whitely gleaming with *ketaka*-flowers bursting open at the pointed tips; sacred village-trees vibrant with life as crows build their nests; rose-apple woods dark-blue with fruits ripening; and swans come to stay for a few days : —such will be the beauty of the land of Daśārṇas at your approach.

In order to appreciate the picture one has to take into consideration not only the colour-qualities but the sound, form and other emotional associative qualities as well.

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1. The ivory which is expressed in Sanskrit by *dvirada-daśana*, elephant's tusk, conveys also the contrast between the colour of the elephant and that of its tusk.

2. *Bhūti* is mostly glossed as "decoration" made on the elephants body with paints". But here the image seems to justify the other meaning of *bhūti*, ashes, which are used to decorate elephants. Mallinātha glosses, *śṛṅgāram iva vā bl smitam iva*.

Nevertheless, even in our limited field of investigation we see the liveliness and sobriety with which the poet has used the colours.

In another passage we are shown the temple-courtesans swaying the white chowries the handles of which are shining with the lustre of gems; to this brightness is contrasted the side-glances of the courtesan's dark eyes, glances which are made concrete by Sanskrit poets (Kālidāsa too utilizes effectively the convention) as a string of black bees—[1] *madhukara-śreṇi-dīrghān kaṭāsān* [35]. The artful play of the black brows sends forth flashes of dark and bright light, *kṛṣṇasāra-prabhā*. The word *kṛṣṇasāra* means "white and black" and also "the spotted deer". Both acceptions are to be kept in mind. Further, these flashes are compared to black bees flying after white jasmine waving in the wind, *kundakṣepānuga-madhukara* [47].

In one verse [44] first the poet speaks of the dark-blue peacock's feather with the bright luminous circles, the eyes of the peacock's tail which are skilfully compared to blue lotuses, *kuvalaya*; then in a few words he shows moonlight falling on the peacock, emphasizing especially the white corners of the peacock's eye : ***dhautāpāṅgaṁ Hara-śaśi-rucā*** . . *mayūram* [44], "the peacock, the corners of whose eyes are washed with the light of Śiva's moon". Here we should remember that a peacock is also called by the descriptive epithet *śuklāpāṅga* "having white eye-corners", an expression which Kālidāsa himself uses [22].

Using the mythological reference of the Gaṅgā falling from Heaven on Śiva's matted hair, the poet again creates a picture in which he mixes concrete and subtle associations of black and white. Gaurī's frown, ***bhṛukuṭi*** is contrasted with Gaṅgā's smile. Now, the smile is the white foam; although no explicit mention of colour is made with respect to the frown, we can easily grasp the poet's intention, and psychologically and conventionally the Indian mind associates "dark" with frown. Gaṅgā's wave-hands caught at the crescent moon seized Śiva's hair [50]. Here too we see the foamy whiteness of the waves made whiter still by the moon against the blackness of Śiva's hair.

Finally in this section we will consider the last verse, in which the Yakṣa introduces Alakā, which is painted bright. But when the rains come, the clouds gathered on the city pouring bright drops of rain, are like the black hair of a lovely woman adorned with strings of pearls [63].

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1. To the non-Indian reader these conventions may seem strange. In this connection we may note what Franklin Edgerton says, "Some standard conventions of Indian poetry, (. . .) seem to us strange; why, for instance, should Hindu poets always think of laughter as white? We can only say that they do. (We associate jealousy and envy with the colour green;)". *The Cloud Messenger* (Ann Arbor Paperbacks 1964) pp. 3-4, Intr.

III. ALAKĀ AND THE YAKṢA'S HOME

There is a marked difference between the description of the cloud's route and that of Alakā, the city lying on the slopes of Kailāsa. Alakā is said to be the beloved bride of the snow-white Kailāsa; she too is bright and lovely, the shining Ganges is her silken garment which slips down revealing her naked beauty *srasta-Gaṅgā-dugūlā* [63]. A definite transition has taken place.

Rabindranath Tagore says that in the first part the strange and varied beauty of the earth is described. When one has journeyed through it, one arrives at the eternal beauty, *nitya saundarya,* of the city of Alakā.[1] Tagore's perception is just. Kālidāsa indeed makes this distinction clearly tangible from the very first mention of Alakā. The Yakṣa tells the cloud :

> *gantavyā te vasatir Alakā nāma yakṣeśvarāṇāṁ*
> *bāhyodyāna-sthita-Hara-śiraś-candrikā-dhauta-ramyā* // [7]

> You will go up to Alakā where the wealthy Yakṣas live; there the city-palaces are whitewashed by the moonlight falling from the head of Śiva seated in the surrounding gardens.

Śiva lives just outside the city; the moon on his head whitewashes the houses with its light. The nearness of Śiva shows at once the unearthly nature of the city and its whiteness and brightness.

We have seen that the Yakṣa fallen from his higher status lost his glory. This has made him lose his lustre, thus preparing the field for the metaphorical texture. On the earth, light and shade, dark and bright, together make up the pattern of beauty. "There is a darkness in terrestrial things"[2] In Alakā there is no real darkness. The Yakṣa too was luminous when he was there before the fall and he will again be luminous when he returns after the expiration of his curse. In one of the verses he compares himself with the sun [77]. In Alakā he does not identify himself with the cloud. When he paints the city and his own house, the description glows with bright colours. There is hardly anything dark, only once [74] does he speak of the hills of *indranila*, sapphire, which has been used earlier to describe the darkness of the cloud [46]. But very astutely Kālidāsa notes that these hills are not natural to Alakā, they are artificial hills, *kriḍā-śaila*; they are only play-things. As also the peacock *nilakantha* [76], the bird with dark-blue neck is a plaything.

The presence of the cloud too is greatly mitigated; even when the Yakṣa speaks of the cloud, it is not on the dark aspect that the stress lies : we feel his presence only as the

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1. *Op. cit.*, p. 392.
2. Sri Aurobindo, *Savitri—A Legend and a Symbol,* in: Birth Centenary Library, Vols. 28-29. p. 17.

messenger of the Yakṣa. Wherever this messenger cloud or other clouds become prominent in an image it is not to incorporate it and give it a central or even a significant positive part, but to show that darkness has no place in Alakā.

In the first verse of this section [64] the cloud is compared with the city palaces; but the poet is careful enough not to mention the cloud's hue. The Yakṣa says that the cloud is comparable in many respects to the palaces; you have your lightning, they have their lovely women; you have the rainbow, they have paintings; . . . the palaces can bear comparison with you on various points—*tais tair viśeṣaiḥ*—. But the colour-quality which was so strong in the previous part is altogether ignored here.

Once again the cloud is mentioned only to show that it has no place in the love-scene of Alakā. The Yakṣa indirectly asks the cloud not to cover the moon, because when the moonlight falls on the magical *candrakānta* stone, drops of water will ooze out from it to soothe the fatigue of women exhausted in the embraces of their lovers. [67].

Other clouds are shown flying out of the windows of the palaces like smoke [68].

The impression we get of Alakā is that of brightness. Here various bright colours are suggested : rich-hued-flowers [65, 75], precious stones, gold, crystals are scattered to make a brilliant, shining picture. A pool is thus described :

vāpi cāsmin marakata-śilā-baddha-sopāna-mārgā
haimaiḥ syūtā kamala-mukulaiḥ snigdha-vaiḍūrya-nāliaḥ/ [73]

And there is a pond with a flight of steps that are of emerald stones, and decked with golden lotus-buds on shining stalks of lapis lazuli.

And this luminous city is the place of happiness where immortal lovers live in the joy of love's union : love which does not need the instigation of Kāma who fears to draw his bow with the string of black bees [71].

In love's union there is no darkness; the terrace on which the lovers meet is made of crystal, *sita-maṇi*, "white gem", on which the light of the stars reflects like bright flowers—*harmya-sthalāni jyotiś-chāyā-kusuma-racanāni* [66]. And the whole love play which is concretely described is not a thing of the dark; the light-giving gems cannot be put out :

nīvi-bandhocchvasana-śithilaṁ yatra yakṣāṅganānām
vāsaḥ kāmād anibhṛta-kareṣu ākṣipatsu priyeṣu /
arcis-tuṅgān abhimu'hom api prāpya ratna-pradīpān
hrī-mūḍhānām bhavati viphala-preraṇaś cūrṇa-muṣṭiḥ // [69]

As their lovers, in passion, pull with naughty hands at the garments of the Yakṣa-women—garments which the girdles hold no longer—they throw, bewildered in

shame, handfuls of powder at the high-flaming jewel-lamps; the powder is thrown in vain even though it hits the mark.

Such is the bright picture that the Yakṣa conjures up before the cloud's eyes. And he remembers the splendours of his home, remembers too that he was himself once bright and by his brightness made his house bright too. But now in his absence it will certainly not be like before :

kṣāma-cchāyaṁ bhavanam adhunā mad-viyogena nūnaṁ
sūryāpāye na khalu kamalaṁ puṣyati svām abhikyām/ [77]

...the house, its lustre now, no doubt, dimmer owing to my absence! When the sun sets the lotus does not cherish its own beauty, does it ?

IV. THE YAKṢA'S WIFE

Like his home which has lost its brightness his wife too, paragon of all perfections, most beautiful [79], most bright, has certainly become pale too. She is not dark : this pallor is only brightness diminished because of separation, because the Yakṣa was for their home, the sun. Her lips which were red like ripe berries, *pakva-bimbādharauṣṭhī* [79] have become discoloured, *bhinna-varṇa* [81]. Her sun is now far away; it does not give any warmth; for her it is winter, the cold of separation has withered her brightnees. The Yakṣa says, "I fear she has changed as a lotus afflicted by winter",

jātāṁ manye śiśira-mathitāṁ padminīṁ vānya-rūpām/ [80]

Her beauty which was luminous, fair as the moon's, has now diminished; the brightness has fallen from her body. The Yakṣa describes her face thus :

hasta-nyastaṁ mukham ..
indor dainyaṁ tvad-upasaraṇa-kliṣṭa-kānter bibharti/ [81]

"face resting on her hand has assumed the miserable appearance of the moon whose loveliness is befogged by your (cloud's) approach".

Or again, using the same image of the moon :

prācimūle tanum iva kalā-mātra-śeṣāṁ himāṁśoḥ/ [87]

She is "like the slender form of the cold-rayed moon left in the Eastern horizon with just one digit left". The image is significant. It shows that she has not lost all her fairness, that death has not robbed her of her beauty but that she is at the point of dying like the pale moon in the East just before disappearing completely.

Another simile suggests very clearly that the light has not completely disappeared from her life or beauty from her body :

sābhre 'hniva sthala-kamalinīṁ na prabuddhāṁ na suptām/ [89]

"She is like a *sthala-kamalini*[1] on a cloudy day, neither awake nor asleep".

Here again we find the metaphorical relation of the Yakṣa with the sun. The simile also suggests appositely the diminution of the brightness both of the Yakṣa who is far away, symbollically associated to the cloud—in this line "the cloudy day" suggests the association—as well as of the Yakṣa's wife who is like a half-faded flower.

The paleness is also indicated by her neglect of ornaments. She does not care about her garments, which are soiled and dull-coloured [83], she has abandoned on the very first day of separation the garland that adorned her hair, *śikhā-dāma* [85]. She no longer wears the string of pearls she usually wore : *muktā-jālaṁ cira-paricitaṁ* [93].

The idea that the palour is not an absence of brightness, but is subdued, diminished brightness, is brought out adequately by contrasting it with light. The Yakṣa asks the cloud not to flash forth his lightning : Don't make it brighter than the pale glow of fireflies, *khadyotālīvilasita-nibha* [78].

In the description of Alakā and of the Yakṣa's wife darkness has practically no descriptive significance. The poet avoids almost all things, dark or black. However, we should mention two exceptions : the hair and the eyes. Though in this section Kālidāsa gives them hardly any prominent or metaphorical value, he mentions them in several places as part of the beauty he is depicting. The hair and the eyes—side-glances, *kaṭākṣa*—are such an integral part of the Indian aesthetic world, part of woman's beauty, that it is hardly possible to avoid mentioning them without doing violence to the poetic description. And hair and eyes, we should not forget, are always dark in India.

B. IMAGERY IN THE LYRICAL PASSAGE

In the Yakṣa's message two parts are to be distinguished, one in indirect speech [98-100], the other in direct speech [101-109]. The tone of the first part is controlled; the Yakṣa is mentioned in the third person. But in the second part the Yakṣa's *persona* comes forward without any go-between.

The dominant thing here is not the image-making; the Yakṣa's emotions, his yearning, the pangs of separation, anxiety, passion, express themselves in an outburst of impressions and memories; but they do not get concrete form. It is not often that we get such an outburst of feelings in Sanskrit poetry which, on the whole, proceeds from image to image. But here we have a rapid flow; sometimes images come, but there is no rest so

1. Lit. "land-lotus", *hibuscus mutabilis*. It opens in the morning with the rise of the sun; and as the sun declines it changes its colour and fades in the evening.

as to elaborate them into perfect pictures. The Yakṣa sees his wife's reflections in the entire Nature:

syāmāsv aṅgaṁ cakita-hariṇi-prekṣite dṛṣṭi-pātaṁ
gaṇḍa-cchāyāṁ śaśini śikhināṁ varha-bhāreṣu keśān /
utpaśyāmi pratanuṣu nadi-vīciṣu bhrū-vilāsān
hantaikasthaṁ kva cid api na te bhiru sādṛśyam asti //

I see your body in the *śyāma* creepers; your glance in the eyes of the startled deer; the colour of your cheeks in the moon; your hair in the thick plumage of the peacocks; the artful play of your brows in the tiny ripples of the rivers. But alas ! O timid girl, there is nowhere to be found, gathered in one place, the image of you.

But they are all passing impressions, he cannot grasp her; not even in imagination—no sooner has he painted her picture, than it is washed away by his own tears [102],—nor even in dream [103].

The metaphorical texture is not significant here; impressions, dreams, memories rise up, then perish immediately, to make room for other impressions, dreams, memories. All the senses seek but none can grasp her.

Such being the general tone of this part, we find no metaphorical texture with significant imagery of dark or bright. We can perhaps speak of one genuine embodiment in concrete form without the use of similes, which becomes concrete only by the strength of the feeling. The second half of the last verse of this lyrical passage is the climax and the concrete form of love :

snehān āhuḥ kim api viraha-hrāsinas te hy abhogād
iṣṭe vastuny upacita-rasāḥ prema-rāśibhavanti / [109]

People say that affection diminishes in absence. Not so; when the cherished object is not enjoyed, affection stores up its essence and grows into love's vastness.

The verb *rāśibhū* gives us the impression of crystallisation. But we cannot really speak of any impression of colour, though after having read the poem one may be tempted to think of this crystallized heap of love as the bright snow-capped peak which are, so to say, the accumulated laughter of Śiva,—*rāśibhūtaḥ*... *tryambakasyāṭṭahāsaḥ* [58]—who burnt to ashes *Kāma,* before accepting to marry Pārvatī who had purified her love by *tapas* of self-purification. Also here Kālidāsa hints at a transformation, at two gradations of love, *sneha* becomes ***preman.***

In this study we have taken only a fragmentary aspect of poetic imagination. If one wants to apprehend and appreciate more fully one must also inquire into the texture of sound, form, touch, smell and rhythmical and metrical devices. Kālidāsa has used,

with wonderful sensibility and vision, various figures of speech; "...the figures", says Edwin Gerow speaking about poetry in general and Sanskrit poetry in particular, "for from being extrinsic, constitute the very form of its expression and are the very means through which poetry is distinguished and becomes *voll Gesinnung*. From the figures of speech derives that particular charm which is the innermost mark of the poetic apprehension".[1]

And Kālidāsa is supremely representative of classical Sanskrit poets. In his works, sound and sense, with all their figures, *śabdālaṅkāra* and *arthālaṅkāra*, have found their highest expression. Therefore, for a full poetic apprehension one must take the various textures; nevertheless, even from the investigation of one partial field, we can acquire a greater insight into Kālidāsa's poetic world. We see that his creative imaginative *pratibhā* does not merely fabricate brilliant scenes, but creates a world which becomes real. Even if, following Susanne Langer, we say that poetry is "virtual life", yet, while reading Kālidāsa, we forget its virtuality and experience life in its sensuous, imaginative beauty and symbolic insight.

1. *A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech*, (The Hague—Paris 1971) p. 15.

ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SAYING KĀVYEṢU NĀṬAKAṀ RAMYAM

Mukunda Madhava Sharma

APPLIED ASPECT OF LITERARY CRITICISM :

Side by side with the theoretical aspect there is also an applied aspect of Indian literary criticism. Definition of *Kāvya,* its classification into ***uttama***, ***madhyama*** and ***adhama*** varieties, its causes (***hetu***-s) and its purposes (***phala***-s) are some of the topics which constitute the theoretical aspect as we have it in the standard ***alaṅkāra*** texts like the ***Kāvya-prakāśa*** and the ***Sāhityadarpaṇa***. Certain authors of ***alaṅkāra*** works give their own compositions as illustrations for various figures and faults, etc. Paṇḍitarāja is such an ***ālaṅkārika***. Others draw their illustrations from the existing literature.[1] Comments given along with the illustrations of the various aspects of poetry tend to present literary criticism in its applied aspect. Ānandavardhana's comments on Amaruka's ***muktaka***-s[2] and the principal sentiments of the ***Rāmāyaṇa***[3] and the ***Mahābhārata***[4], Kṣemendra's remarks on the metres employed by Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti and few others[5], and

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1. Cf. पूर्वशास्त्राणि संहृत्य प्रयोगानुपलक्ष्य च ।
   यथासामर्थ्यमस्माभिः क्रियते काव्यलक्षणम् ।। काव्यादर्शः, १.२
2. Cf. मुक्तकेषु प्रबन्धेष्विव रसबन्धाभिनिवेशिनः कवयो दृश्यन्ते । यथा ह्यमरुकस्य कवेर्मुक्तकाः शृङ्गाररसस्यन्दिनः प्रबन्धायमानाः प्रसिद्धा एव । Under *Dhvanyāloka,* 3.7.
3. Under *Dhvanyāloka*, 4.5.
4. *Loc. cit.*
5. Cf. *Suvṛttatilaka,* 3.29 to 3.35 for comments on the skill of Abhinanda, Vidyādhara, Pāṇini, Bhāravi, Ratnākara, Bhavabhūti, Kālidāsa and Rājaśekhara with such verses like :
   सुवशा कालिदासस्य मन्दाक्रान्ता प्रवल्गति ।
   सदश्वदमकस्येव काम्बोजतुरगाङ्गना ।। 3.34.

Mammaṭa's reference to the Rāghava-Bhārgava episode of the ***Mahāviracarita***[1] as an illustration of the literary blemish called *Akāṇḍe Cheda*, are good examples of this applied aspect of literary criticism.

APPLIED CRITICISM IN LITERARY WORKS :

Certain poets also pass critical remarks on other authors or other works in their own literary works. Such comments also go a long way to serve the purpose of what we understand by the term literary criticism. For example, we have Bāṇabhaṭṭa's verses in praise of ***Bṛhatkathā***, ***Vāsavadattā***, Bhaṭṭāraharíścandra, Sātavāhana, Pravarasena, Bhāsa, Kālidāsa, and Āḍhyarāja,[2] Dhanapāla's comment on Māgha or Bhavabhūti,[3] Trivikramabhaṭṭa's remarks on Guṇāḍhya,[4] Kavirāja's encomium on his predecessors Subandhu and Bāṇabhaṭṭa,[5] or Govardhanācārya's remarks on Bhavabhūti.[6]

It is interesting that critical comments of theoretical nature are also sometimes found in the ***Kāvya*** works of certain poets, e. g., Bāṇa's opinion on the beauty of the ***Kathā*** and ***Ākhyāyikā*** varieties of composition,[7] or Bhavabhūti's suggestion regarding the merits of an ideal ***Prakaraṇa***.[8] Even some brief remarks of the commenntators of ***Kāvya***

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1. Cf. अकाण्डे छेदो यथा—वीरचरिते द्वितीयेऽङ्के राघवभार्गवयोर्धाराधिरूढे वीररसे कङ्कनमोचनाय गच्छामि इति राघवस्योक्तौ । काव्यप्रकाश: — ७
2. Cf. Verses 12 to 19 in *Harṣacarita*, 1.
3. Cf. माघेन विघ्नितोत्साहा नोत्सहन्ते पदक्रमे ।
स्मरन्तो भारवेरेव कवय: कपयो यथा ।। तिलकमञ्जरी
स्पष्टभावरसा चित्रै: पादन्यासै: प्रवर्तिता ।
नाटकेषु नटस्त्रीव भारती भवभूतिना ।। तदेव
4. Cf. धनुषेव गुणाढ्येन नि:शेषो रञ्जितो जन: ।। नलचम्पू:
5. Cf. सुबन्धुर्बाणभट्टश्च कविराज इति त्रय: ।
वक्रोक्तिमार्गनिपुणाश्चतुर्थो विद्यते न वा ।। राघवपाण्डवीयम्
6. Cf. भवभूते: सम्बन्धाद् भूधरभूरिव भारती भाति ।
एतत्कृतकारुण्ये किमन्यथा रोदिति ग्रावा ।। आर्यासप्तशती
7. Cf. *Kādambarī*, I.8 and I.9, *Harṣacarita*, I.22 for comments on *Kathā*, and *Harṣacarita*, I.21 for a comment on *Ākhyāyikā*.
8. Cf. भूम्ना रसानां गहना: प्रयोगा: सौहार्दहृद्यानि विचेष्टितानि ।
औद्धत्यमायोजितकामसूत्रं चित्रा: कथा वाचि विदग्धता च ।।
Mālatīmādhava, I.4

works are found to contain elements of criticism.[1]

LITERARY CRITICISM IN ANONYMOUS STATEMENTS :

There are a number of anonymous statements or verses containing elements of literary criticism either of theoretical nature or of applied nature with some clear references to works or authors. Some such statements are as follows :

(1) उपमा कालिदासस्य भारवेरर्थगौरवम् ।
नैषधे पदलालित्यं माघे सन्ति त्रयो गुणाः ॥[2]

(2) उत्तरे रामचरिते भवभूतिर्विशिष्यते ।[3]

(3) भवभूतेस्तु सर्वस्वमुत्तरं चरितं कवेः ।
तत्रापि च तृतीयाङ्को यत्रच्छाया प्रदर्श्यते ॥

(4) मेघे माघे गतं वयः ।

(5) नैषधं विद्वदौषधम् ।

(6) बाणोच्छिष्टं जगत् सर्वम् ।

(7) काव्येषु नाटकं रम्यं तत्र रम्या शकुन्तला ।
तत्रापि च चतुर्थाङ्कस्तत्र श्लोकचतुष्टयम् ॥[4]

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1. Cf. नारिकेलफलसम्मितं वचो भारवेः सपदि यद् विभज्यते ।
स्वादयन्तु रसगर्भनिर्भरं सारमस्य रसिकाः यथेप्सितम् ॥
Introductory verses of *Ghanṭāpatha* on *Kirātārjunīya*.

2. Ghanaśyāma in his com. on the *Uttaracarita* gives a different reading as :
नैषधे पदलालित्यं भारवेरर्थगौरवम् । उपमा कालिदासस्य माघे सन्ति त्रयो गुणाः ॥
Vide M.M. Kane's edn , 1962, p. 5. For an explanation of this verse see my paper "The Three Qualities of Māgha" in *Prof. Birinchi Kumar Barua Com. Volume*.

3. MM. V. V. Mirashi recognises it as the second half of a *subhāṣita* verse. *Bhavabhūti*, 1974, p. 402. Ghanaśyāma attributes it to one Vikramārka. Ghanaśyāma appears to have rejected the opinion embodied in this statement, as in many others like '*daṇḍinaḥ padalālityam*', etc., as nothing more than a self-eulogy. *Uttaracarita*, MM Kane's edn., 1962, p. 5. There is a metrical flaw in the earlier foot of this half of a *śloka*. In my opinion the actual reading should be '*uttare carite ramye*' or something of the sort.

4. Often we have many variant readings for such verses. The purport of a number of such floating statements has been explained by Ācārya Rāmacandra Jha in his work संस्कृत महा-कवियों के सम्बन्ध में प्रचलित लोकोक्तियाँ–एक विश्लेषण Muzaffarpur, 1962 leaving, however, enough room for further objective analysis.

(8) शाकुन्तलचतुर्थोऽङ्कः सर्वश्रेष्ठ इति प्रथा ।
न सर्वसम्मता यस्मात् पञ्चमोऽस्ति ततोऽधिकः ॥

(9) गद्यं कवीनां निकषं वदन्ति ।[1]

Even parts of the few verses quoted above are often cited as conveying critical opinions of deep significance. How significant these utterances are may be realised from an exposition of the import of the only three words *Kāvyeṣu nāṭakaṁ ramyam* as shown below :

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENT–KĀVYEṢU NĀṬAKAṀ RAMYAM :

The plain meaning of this statement is that of the different varieties of literary composition the dramatic composition is the most beautiful. Here the word *nāṭaka* may be taken to mean not merely the *nāṭaka* variety of the ten *rūpaka*-s but the dramatic composition as a whole as may be supposed to be warranted by a similar statement of Vāmana, which will be quoted by and by. The word *ramyam* also could have been shown to have the force of a technical term like the word *ramaṇīya* in the statement '*ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ Kāvyam*', as explained by Paṇḍitarāja himself. But just as we prefer to understand the word *nāṭaka* in a general sense it is better to take the word *ramyam* merely in the sense of charming. Why should the dramatic composition be reckoned as most charming ? Because of its appeal. This appeal is obviously due to the relish of *rasa* that is derived from it. Though all theoristst may not agree with Viśvanāthakavirāja's definition of *Kāvya*[2], yet in the final analysis it becomes undeniable that *rasa* is the ultimate source of appeal for all varieties of literary composition. The so-called *anitya doṣa*-s owe their very existence to the extent of their effect on the contextual *rasa*. The other sources of appeal like *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* also ultimately owe their origin or degree of excellence to the contextual *rasa*. This has been widely acknowledged by the theorists since the days of Ānandavardhana, who declares in almost unequivocal terms that '*rasa* is the very soul of poetry' ;[3] 'the poet while composing a *Kāvya* should be completely concerned with the delineation of *rasa*' ;[4] and that 'his whole effort was not only for

1. Quoted anonymously for the first time by Vāmana under *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra*, I.3.21. The *Kāmadhenu* commentary also confirms that it is a floating statement by calling it an *ābhāṇaka*. Significance of this statement is discussed by me elsewhere, vide *Paramārthasudhā*, (Varanasi) and *Prof. Gaurinath Sastri Felicitation Volume* (Kurukshetra).

2. वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम् । साहित्यदर्पणम्—१

3. Cf. काव्यस्यात्मा स एवार्थः । ध्वन्यालोकः–१.५ । स एवेति प्रतीयमानमात्रेऽपि प्रक्रान्ते तृतीय एव रसध्वनिरिति मन्तव्यम् इतिहासबलात् प्रक्रान्तवृत्तिग्रन्थार्थबलाच्च । तत्र लोचनम्

4. कविना काव्यमुपनिबध्नता सर्वात्मना रसपरतन्त्रेण भवितव्यम् । ध्वन्यालोकः–३

presenting the concept of *dhvani* but for conveying the idea that it is always desirable to employ the various elements of poetry for the sole purpose of suggesting *rasa*'.[1] But the suggestion of *rasa* depends on the proper depiction of *vibhāva*-s, *anubhāva*-s and *vyabhicāri-bhāva*-s. A more perfect delineation of *vibhāva*-s, etc., leads to a greater relish of *rasa*. From this angle of view, as it appears, Vāmana recognises *nāṭaka* as the best form of *Kāvya*.

VĀMANA'S PREFERENCE FOR DRAMATIC COMPOSITIONS :

In his *Kavyālaṅkārasūtra*, Vāmana opines that a longer composition is preferable to isolated verses[2]. Then he goes on to say that amongst the longer compositions (called *sandarbha*-s or *prabandha*-s) the ten varieties of *rūpaka*, i. e., *nāṭaka* and other verieties of *rūpaka*, are better.[3] This is because the dramatic composition is interesting (or agreeable) on account of presenting the details in their entirety like a canvas of painting.[4]

Vāmana not only holds that the dramatic composition is the best of all longer compositions with the *sūtra*, '*sandarbheṣu daśarūpakaṁ śreyaḥ*', but also opines that the other varieties of literary composition like *Kathā* and *ākhyāyikā* also are conceived only as variations of the dramatic pattern.[5] In fact, the playing of the dramatic pattern itself may be witnessed in all the varieties of literary composition.[6] This mode of thinking of Vāmana definitely warrants the purport of the saying, '*Kāvyeṣu nāṭakaṁ ramyam*'. But the pity is that the otherwise celebrated *Kāmadhenu* commentary is not very helpful for understanding the significance of the concerned passage of the work of Vāmana.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S ELUCIDATION OF VĀMANA'S OPINION :

What we miss in the *Kāmadhenu* commentary is amply compensated by the *Abhinavabhārati* commentary, where Abhinava twice utilises the dictum '*sandarbheṣu daśarvpakaṁ*

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1. रसादिरूपव्यंग्यतात्पर्यम् एवैषां युक्तमिति यत्नोऽस्माभिरारब्धो न ध्वनिप्रतिपादनमात्राभिनिवेशेन। तत्रैव
2. नानिबद्धं चकास्त्येकतेजःपरमाणुवत्। १.३.२९
3. सन्दर्भेषु दशरूपकं श्रेयः (१.६.३०)। सन्दर्भेषु प्रबन्धेषु दशरूपकं नाटकादि श्रेयः।
4. कस्मात्? तदाह—
   तद्धि चित्रं चित्रपटवद् विशेषसाकल्यात् १.३.३१
5. ततोऽन्यभेदक्लृप्तिः १.३.३२
   ततो दशरूपकात् अन्येषां भेदानां क्लृप्तिः कल्पनम्।
6. दशरूपकस्य एव हि इदं सर्वं विलसितं यच्च कथाऽऽख्यायिके महाकाव्यम् इति।

śreyaḥ' of Vāmana with a sufficiently significant elucidation. The said dictum is quoted once (i) while commenting on the *rasasūtra*[1] of Bharata, and again (ii) while giving the justification for calling the *rasa*-s the *nāṭyarasa*-s in the *Kārikā*.[2]

(i) The *rasasūtra* of Bharata desires that all the three elements, viz., *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* should be delineated for *rasaniṣpatti*, i. e., for conveying the relish of *rasa*. While commenting on this aspect of the *sūtra*, Abhinavagupta first shows that in certain passages any one of these different elements may emerge out more prominently and yet lead to the relish of *rasa*. Then he opines that there may be also such passages where any two of the said elements might be delineated more prominently. Finally Abhinavagupta adds that the relish of *rasa* is found to be in its best when all the elements are depicted with equal prominence. This is possible only in the case of a *prabandha* (i. e., a longer composition, which is called *sandarbha* by Vāmana). In fact this desirable full delineation of the different elements is possible only in case of the dramatic composition. In support of this opinion Abhinavagupta quotes the aforesaid *sūtra*-s of Vāmana[3]. He further opines that full delineation of all the elements may be experienced in case of a *prabandha* (i. e., a longer composition other than a dramatic composition) only by superimposing on it the dramatic form and by assuming it to have the propriety (as is found in case of a drama) in respect of language, dress and the *pravṛtti*-s (i. e., the *vṛtti*-s like *bhāratī* and *Kaiśikī*).[4]

(ii) While giving the probable reasons for calling *rasa*-s the *nāṭyarasa*-s in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*,[5] Abhinavagupta offers the alternative explanation that *rasa*-s occur only in the drama. *Rasa* occurs in the *Kāvya* (i. e. in a composition other than a drama) only when it behaves like a drama. It is the opinion of the Upādhyāya[6] that in case of a *Kāvya* the relish of *rasa* occurs only when the meaning thereof[7] occurs to the

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1. तत्र विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः ।
2. भावाभिनयसंबद्धान् स्थायिभावांस्तथा बुधाः ।
   आस्वादयन्ति मनसा तस्मान्नाट्यरसाः स्मृताः ॥ *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI. 33.
3. *Sūtra*-s, I.3.30 f. While in the *sūtra*, I.3.31 of the Jivānanda's edn. of the *Kāvyālaṅkāra* we have the reading तद्धि चित्रं M R. Kavi's edn. of the *Abhinavabhāratī* gives it as तद्विचित्रं. But this does not make much difference to the point under discussion.
4. एवं द्वयप्राधान्ये चोदाहार्यम् । किन्तु समप्राधान्य एव रसास्वादस्योत्कर्षः । तच्च प्रबन्ध एव भवति । वस्तुतस्तु दशरूपक एव । यदाह वामनः—"सन्दर्भेषु दशरूपकं श्रेयः । तद्विचित्रं चित्रपटवद्विशेषसाकल्यात् ।" इति तद्रूपसमर्पणया तु प्रबन्धे भाषावेषप्रवृत्त्यौचित्यादिकल्पनात् ।

   Here तद्रूपसमर्पणया is the alternative reading supplied by the MS म.
5. *Kārikā*, VI. 33.
6. With the term *upādhyāya*, Abhinavagupta refers to his teacher Bhaṭṭatota, the author of *Kāvyakautuka*.
7. i.e., the things and the incidents described therein.

mind's eye like some thing directly witnessed.[1] Abhinava further adds that *Kāvya* (or literary composition) occurs mainly in the form of a dramatic composition......... that is why Vāmana says '*sandarbheṣu daśarūpakaṁ śreyaḥ*'. Hence, all the varieties of literary composition beginning from an epic to a short poem (i. e., *muktaka*) are required to contain the five junctures (i. e., *sandhi*-s) which constitute the vital elements of a drama........[2]

THE DRAMATIC POEM IS PREFERABLE :

From the above elucidations of Abhinavagupta it follows that even in the realm of poetry, the dramatic poem is always preferable as it is capable of giving greater relish like the drama. Hence, a literary composition, which is technically not a drama, but possesses a good deal of the qualities of a drama like the delineation of different characters and their dialogues and the depiction of the junctures or the stages of the development of the story element as in a drama, deserves to be called a dramatic poem, and such a composition is invariably superior to the compositions containing mere narrations. We find the dramatic aspect of poetry, for example, in Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṁśa* through the depiction of the characters like Dilīpa and Vaśiṣṭha and Nandinī in the guise of the lion and their conversations. In an epic like the *Raghuvaṁśa* the conversation part is greater in proportion than the objective description of things and situations. Even where there is the occasion for describing the sea in canto XIII of the *Raghuvaṁśa* the description is given in the form of a speech of Rāma addressed to Sītā. This technique is adopted again in the *Ṛtusaṁhāra*, where it is not the poet, but a character depicted by the poet, i. e., a lover, who presents the description of the seasons to the beloved in a passionate tone. Thus these descriptive poems also assume the form of dramatic poetry and become more appealing. This technique is adopted also in the English literature. Thus, even a highly philosophical content is rendered more appealing by Coleridge in his poem, Dejection : An Ode, where the whole text is addressed to a lady (i. e., Dorothy Wordsworth).[3] In Sanskrit literature again even highly technical concepts of the science

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1. ...नाटच एव च रसा: । काव्येऽपि नाटचायमान एव रसः । काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकल्पसंवेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्याया: ।

   Abhinavabhāratī, Kavi's edn.. 1956, p. 290.

2. वयं तु ब्रूमः—काव्त्रं तावन्मुख्यतो दशरूपकात्मकमेव · तत एवोच्यते सन्दर्भेषु दशरूपकमिति । तेन तदङ्गसन्ध्यादिसङ्घटनमुद्धृत्य सर्गबन्धादि यावन्मुक्तकम् ।

   Idid., p. 291.

3. Cf. O Lady ! in this wan and heartless mood,
   To thoughts by yonder throstle woo'd,....(Section II)

of polity are presented in the form of conversations and is thus rendered more palatable in places like *Bhaṭṭikāvya* XII and *Śiśupālavadha* II.

ELIOT'S PREFERENCE FOR DRAMATIC POETRY :

The theory of suggestion of *rasa*, very briefly stated by Bharata in his *rasasūtra* is, so to say, again very succinctly presented by T. S. Eliot in his theory of "objective" as found in his paper on the *Hamlet*. Eliot who desires that poetry should "evoke" an "emotion" in the heart of the reader, discusses the process of this evocation very precisely as follows :

"The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative", in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events, which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion, so that when the external facts, which must turn in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.'[1]

F. O. Matthiessen's exposition of this theory of "objective correlative" shows that it has an undeniable correspondance with the Indian theory of *rasa*.[2]

In the context of this theory of "objective correlative" it may be gathered how Eliot also considers the drama and the dramatic poetry to be superior to other forms of composition. "Perhaps the most important thing that is revealed by applying Eliot's conception of the 'objective correlative' to his own work is the essentially dramatic nature of all his poetry", Observes Matthiessen.[3] It is also acknowledged in this context that the drama or the dramatic poetry is more appealing because of the evocation of 'emotion' or '*rasa*'. Matthiessen again says : "These reflections perhaps make clear why it is accurate to say that Donne is a dramatic poet but not Spenser; that the songs of Campion and Shakespeare are dramatic but not those of Swinburne, or why Keats at the time of his death was increasingly absorbed with the desire to write plays....."[4]

THE REASON BEHIND THE SAID PREFERENCE :

It is seen that the idea contained in the anonymous saying '*Kāvyeṣu nāṭakaṁ*

O Lady ! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live :
Ours is her wedding-garment, ours her shroud ! (Sec. IV)
Joy, virtuous Lady ! Joy that ne'er was given,
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour,.... (Sec. V)

The Poetical Works of S. T. Coleridge, Belford, Clarke & Company, p. 191ff.

1. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood*, Methuen & Co., London, 1953, pp. 100f.
2. Matthiessen, *The Achievement of T. S. Eliot*, Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 56. See also M. M. Sharma, *The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Peotics*, p. 183f.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

ramyam' has been endorsed by both Indian and Western and by both traditional and modern theorists. The drama and the dramatic composition are considered superior because of better evocation of emotion or *rasa*. This is again due to the fact that *rasa* can be suggested only by describing the affairs and emotions of human beings. This is the idea also of Ānandavardhana, for, he says that there can be suggestion of *rasa* from the description of non-sentient objects like rivers, etc., only when such objects are shown to have the behaviour of sentient beings.[1] Or, we may say that objects of nature may convey the relish of *rasa* only if they are personified or, at best, by way of being delineated as the *uddipana vibhāva* or the background of human emotion. That the drama, and for that matter the dramatic poetry, are invariably more intimately associated with human beings and their affairs and emotions is very effectively maintained by Eliot also, as he says :

'What great poetry is not dramatic ? Even the minor writers of the Greek Anthology, even Martial are dramatic. Who is more dramatic than Homer or Dante ? We are human beings and in what are we more interested than in human action and human attitude ?'[2]

Thus it appears that the saying *'Kāvyeṣu nāṭakaṁ ramyam'* is not a mere casual utterence, but it is pregnant with a very deep significance.

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1. यस्मादचेतनवस्तुवृत्ते वाक्यार्थीभूते पुनश्चेतनवस्तुयोजनया यथाकथञ्चिद् भवितव्यम् ।

Dhvanyāloka, II

2. *The Achievement of T. S. Eliot*, p. 67,

SOME NEW SUBHĀṢITA-S

Eugeniusz Sluszkiewicz

I also have been interested for years in aphorisms and have been searching, now and then, at my leisure, for *subhāṣita*-s preferably in the sense of maxim, sentence, adage or proverbial saying[1]. Sometimes I have even been translating selected examples, viz. Armenian proverbs, Turkish ones, Finnish and Hungarian ones (from their original wordings, of course)[2]. Yet my gleanings are extremely scanty, my vocation for Indology and the respective profession prevailing over other likings and even hobbies so much as to occupy most of my time.[3]

My private Indological library being not very rich (some 600 vols. only), I am no match for our Celebrity, being in possession of about 7,000 vols. But since pp. XVII, XIX and XLVII and XLVII of Vol. I of his *Mahā-subhāṣita-saṁgraha* do not mention Bhoja's *Campūrāmāyaṇa*, whereas I studied that text over half a century ago[4], I am taking the

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1. As for the multifarious sense of the term *Subhāṣita*, cf. L. Sternbach's very valuable disquisitions in his publication : *Subhāṣita, Gnomic and Didactic Literature. A History of Indian Literature*, ed. by Jan Gonda, Part of Vol. IV. Wiesbaden. 1974, pp. 2 seqq.
2. *Ksiega pamiatkowa ku czci Eugeniusza Sluszkiewicza* (i.e. Felicitation Volume in honour of E. Sluszkiewicz), Warszawa 1974, pp. 9-19, esp. Nos. 140, 152, 165, 166 (pp. 14-15).
3. L. c., pp. 9-19.
4. The result of my study, forming No. 1 of that bibliography of mine ((Rocznik Orientalistyczby, III, 1925, pp. 107-132), undertaken in order to show the presumable relation of the *Campūrāmāyaṇa* to the *Rāmāyaṇa* itself, is given in my paper : *Le Campūrāmāyaṇa de Bhōja et le Rāmāyaṇa de Vālmīki* (*RO* as above). Incidentally, as far as I can remember, my paper was cited in W. Ruben, *Studien znr Textgeschichte des Rāmāyaṇa* (Stuttgart 1936) and the late Prof. A. B. Keith acknowleged, about 1928 in a postcard, my "*Notes sur le Campūrāmāyaṇa de Bhōja*" to be "conclusive". A by far more important study relating to the history of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is my book *Contributions à l'histoire du Rāmāyaṇa* (Polish with a French résumé), Krakow

liberty of adding here some *subhāṣita*-s contained there. My very modest supplement will not be out of place, I suppose, because Sternbach himself writes *inter alia* : "it may be assumed that the entire *Mahā-subhāṣita-saṁgraha* will have to be published in some twenty volumes, plus additional volumes for verses which came to be known to me (or in the course of the preparation of the following volumes will come to be known to me) from sources either not published at the time when I started the work or from *subhāṣita-saṁgraha*-s preserved only in manuscripts which I did not have at my disposal at that time or several *subhāṣita-saṁgraha*-s, the existence of which came only recently to my notice."[1] As the very title of the *Campūrāmāyaṇa* indicates, the text contains numerous prose portions of various length as well as nearly 500 strophes. According to Prof. Sternbach's definite intention, I shall confine myself to quoting strophes only.

Now, aphorisms *et hoc genus omne* are there very rare. Here is what I have been able to find :

I. 115 (esp. ab) : *nūnaṁ janena puruṣe mahati prayuktam*
āgaḥ param tadanurūpaphalaṁ prasūte /
(kṛtvā Raghūdvahagateḥ kṣaṇam antarāyam
yad Bhārgavaḥ paragater vihatiṁ prapede) // Metre : *vasantatilakā*

Certainly, extreme offence committed by one against a very important person begets (or produces) a proportionate fruit. Since for having put an obstacle in the way of the scion of Raghu's family, Bhārgava (i. e. Paraśurāma) obtained (i. e. was affected (punished) with the loss (or forfeit) of heaven (or final beatitude).[2]

II. 6 (esp. cd) The minister's harangue :

(deve sthite'pi tanayaṁ tava Rāmabhadraṁ
lokaḥ svayaṁ bhajatu nāma kim atra citram /)
candraṁ vinā tadupalombhanahetubhūtaṁ
kṣirodam āśrayati kiṁ tṛṣitaś cakoraḥ // Metre : *ibid.*

1937, 274 pp., referred to quite recently by J. L. Brockington in his communications made during the Third World Sanskrit Conference (Paris, 20th to 25th June 1977; cf. also his resp. paper *Sanskrit Epic Tradition. I. Epics and Epitome (Rāmāyaṇa and Rāmopākhyāna)*, esp. 2 as also p. 11-12, moreover another paper of his : "*Parallels between the Rāmopākhyāna and the Rāmāyaṇa*, esp. p. 18 and references. Cf. also my own not too concise rejoinder, pace the late scholars: V. S. Sukthankar (Brockington, *Sanskrit Epic Tradition*, as sup., f. n. 2 and n. 7) and A. D. Pusalker, in *RO* XXXVII, 1, 1974, p. 103 seq., f. n. 10, where several other foreign opinions and reviews are mentioned as well.

1. P. VIII.
2. i e. about 40 more than in the bibliographical list in that Fel. Volume, p. 9-19 (cf. above. f. n. 2).

Although Your Majesty (i. e. Daśaratha) is still there to take care of the subjects, people may freely address the gracious Rāma, what wonder ? Does a thirsty *cakora* (i. e. Greek partridge, fable to subsist on moonbeams) take refuge in (or resort to) the Ocean of milk, not to the Moon, whose origin (literatim : cause of obtaining) it was ?

V. 421 (esp. cd) *(atha niśicaranāthaṁ pañcabāṇivibhinnam*
nahi Janakasutāyāḥ prāpad ekāpi vāṇi)
janam upanatamṛtyuṁ pañcavaktrādidaṣṭaṁ
viśati hṛtaviṣādher oṣadheḥ kim nu śaktiḥ // Metre : *mālinī*

Then not even one speech of Janaka's daughter reached the lord of the fiends ("moving by night"), piereced by the five arrows (of the god of love). Does a medicinal plant being able to annihilate a poison produce any effect on one who has been bitten by a "five-faced" (i. e. serpent) and such like and whose death is imminent ?

VI. 18 (esp. cd) Rāma addressing Sugrīva :
(abhayāgato mad apayāti cen mudhā
Raghavo bhavanti laghavo na kiṁ sakhe /)
anujo 'yam astu tanujo' thavā ripoḥ
karuṇāpadaṁ hi śaraṇāgato janaḥ // Metre : *mañjubhāṣiṇī*

If one asking for safety (literatim : having come) goes away without having obtained it, do the Raghus not become (s) light (or mean, low), oh friend ? A person (or people) asking for protection (or refuge) is (are) an object of compassion, be he (they) an elder brother or a son of the foe.

I could cite by far more strophes, but only as examples of descriptions, images, etc. They are more or less fine, yet since I do not know, whether Dr. Sternbach would be willing to include at least some of them, I prefer to content myself with giving one example only with a tentative translation and referring to several others.

IV. 26 *ayaṁ kālaḥ kālapramathanagalābhair abhinavair*
ahaṁyūnāṁ yūnām apaharati dhairyaṁ jaladharaiḥ /
smarādhārā dhārāparicayajaḍā vānti sahasā
nabhasvantah svantaḥ katham iva viyogaḥ pariṇamet // Metre : *śikhariṇī*

This season bereaves the haughty youngsters of firmness by its wholly fresh (or new) clouds, the colour of which resembles the neck of Śiva : i. e. is dark blue on account of masses of water. Winds, cold on account of contacts with showers and sustaining (supporting) love, are vehemently blowing. How indeed separation could have (or come to) a good end ? I should like to prefer the *varia lectio* to *°paricita°* of the text itself. If the latter form is retained, it ought to be understood, I suppose, as a substantive : 'cold, frost.' According to the Commentary, here *svāntaḥ=durantaḥ*, i. e. 'coming to a bad

end', which is not attested. cf. M. Williams, s. v.; moreover, in the opinion of that commentator *pariṇamet* would mean *atikrānto bhavet*, i. e. probably 'could be overpowered' which seems to me very doubtful and even improbable, unless we understand *svāntaḥ* as 'coming to a good end' (i. e. with *su* in its constant meaning) and take it as a *praedicativum*.

Some other similar stanzas deserve, in my opinion, to be taken into account as citeable. I should like to quote for instance :

IV. 27 *mahāsamarasūcakaḥ pratidiśam manojanmano*
mayūragalakākalikalakalaḥ samujjṛmbhate |
payodamaline dine paruṣaviprayogavyathāṁ
nareṣu vanitāsu vā dadhati hanta kekā iti || Metre : *pṛthvī*

VI. 10 *draṣṭum nālam agādhatāṁ phaṇipatiḥ sīmāntarekhāṁ diśo*
dvīpaḥ saikatamaṇḍalāni tad ayaṁ dūre girāṁ vāridhiḥ |
yeṣām eṣa sukhād akhāni nakharair yenāthavā pūritas
teṣām naḥ kulabhūbhujām avihatasthemne mahimne namaḥ ||
Metre : *śārdūlavikrīḍita*

VI. 11 *sarasapāṭīrakuñjavanasañjavanābhi patan—*
mṛgamadagandhagandhavahamedurite 'mbunidheḥ |
taṭanikaṭe luṭhatpanasatālarasālaphalair
uditamadā vicerur udarambharayo harayaḥ ||
Metre : *narkuṭaka* or *nardaṭaka*

But also, e. g., 8-9 ibid. and 43-46 as well, as also, e. g., 76-77, etc.

One could say that Prof. Sternbach's production is *kṣīrasāgarābha*, whereas my contributions, although numerically perhaps not too scarce and actually mounting to about 300 items, mostly resemble *goṣpada*-s, being *goṣpadamātra*, especially in the field of Indology, since I play the field. Nevertheless, I am able to appreciate the services rendered by Prof. Sternbach to the cause of Sanskrit and Indology; cf. e. g. my respective reviews in *RO*.[1]

The above additions are very slight, I must avow. But, as it is almost universally known, *many a pickle makes a mickle, petit á petit l'oiseau fait son nid, Stein auf Stein will ein*

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1. Nos. 158 (1961), 203-204 (1966), 218-220 (1968) 42 (1971), 260 (1973).
N. B. I must still add the title (etc.) of edition of Bhoja's work I availed myself of in 1924 and I am referring to now. Here are the necessary particulars: The *Campū-Rāmāyaṇa* of King Bhoja (1-5 *Kāṇḍa*-s) and Lakshmana Suri (6th *Kāṇḍa*). With the Commentary of Ramachandra Budhendra. Edited by Vasudeva Laxman Shâstri Pansikar. Second edition. Printed and published by Tukaram Jīvājī. Bombay 1907.

Haus gebauet sein, as also in Polish : *ziarnko do ziarnka,a zbierze sie miarka*, as also in other words, viz. in Russian : *kopejka k kopejke irublik i zberiotsia* or, as the Turks are accustomed to put it in similar cases, *kar'nca karar'nca*, i. e. "as much as an ant can achieve", which is a figurative expression idiomatically meaning "all one possibly can", "as much as possible". All these *subhāṣita*-s, pouring forth tiny bits of various nations' wisdom, may apologize just a little for the exiguity of the majority of my own papers. The frequent fact that *niḥsārasya padārthasya prāyenaāḍmabaro mahān* requires some counterpoise indeed, I daresay.

प्रतिभा-स्वरूप-विमर्शः

रामनारायणः त्रिपाठी

प्रतिभाशब्दो वेदे न लभ्यतेऽतस्तत्र प्रतिभायाः कोऽभिप्राय इति गवेषणैव निर्भित्तिचित्रणनिभा। तादृश्येव गतिर्ब्राह्मणभागेऽपि। उपनिषत्सु तु भा धातोः प्रतिपूर्वकं क्रियारूपं कारकरूपञ्च बहुशो दृश्यते। यथा—

"न साम्परायः प्रतिभाति बालं प्रमाद्यन्तं वित्तमोहेन मूढम्"[1]
प्रतिभाति न प्रकाशते नोपतिष्ठत इत्येतत्, तत्र शाङ्करभाष्यम्।
"स पञ्चदशाहानि .... स होवाच न वै मा प्रतिभान्ति भो इति।"[2]
प्रतिभान्ति मम मनसि न दृश्यन्त इत्यर्थः, शाङ्करभाष्यम्।
"शास्त्रेण नश्येत् परमार्थदृष्टिः कार्यक्षमं नश्यति चापरोक्ष्यात्।
प्रारब्धनाशात् प्रतिभाननाश एवं त्रिधा नश्यति चात्ममायया॥"[3]

ब्रह्मयोगिविरचितव्याख्यायामत्र प्रतिभानपदस्य प्रतिभासोऽर्थो गृहीतः। तद्व्याख्यानुसारेणास्याय भावः—शास्त्रेण मायायाः परमार्थदृष्टिर्नश्यति शास्त्रजन्यज्ञानानुभवादर्थाद् विज्ञानान्मायायाः कार्यक्षमं व्यावहारिकं रूपं नश्यति। प्रारब्धनाशसमकालमेव मायायाः शून्यतया प्रतिभासोऽपि नश्यति।

"सर्वं सुखं विद्धि सुदुःखनाशात् सर्वं च मद्रूपमसत्यनाशात्।
चिद्रूपमेव प्रतिभानयुक्तं तस्मादखण्डं मम रूपमेतत्॥"[4]

अत्र यद्यपि काचन व्याख्या नास्ति तथापि प्रतिभानस्य ज्ञानमेवार्थोऽत्र प्रतीयते।

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१ कठ० उ० १.२.६
२. छा० उ० ६.७.१
३. वराह उ० २.६९
४. तदेव ३.४

"न बाह्ये नापि हृदये सद्रूपं विद्यते मनः ।
यदर्थप्रतिभानं तन्मन इत्यभिधीयते ॥"[1]
"प्रतिभान्तितराम्"[2]

अत्रापि ज्ञानमेवार्थो विवक्षित इति प्रतीयते ।

न ह्येतावता विवेचनीयविषये साहाय्यं प्राप्यते यत उपनिषत्सु प्रतिभाशब्दो नास्ति तस्मात्तत्रापि तदर्थान्वेषणं शशशृङ्गमार्गणसममेव । अस्ति चेत्तर्हि तदुत्तरवर्तिकाले, महर्षिणा यास्केन निरुक्ते, पतञ्जलिना योगसूत्रे गौतमेन न्यायसूत्रे व्यासेन पुराणेतिहासयोश्चर्चितः । अनन्तरमाचार्यैः षड्दर्शननिकाये सौगतैरार्हतैश्च बौद्धजैनसाहित्ययोर्हरिणा वाक्यपदीये तान्त्रिकैस्तन्त्रेषु सर्वैश्चालङ्कारशास्त्राचार्यैः साहित्यलक्षणग्रन्थेषु मध्यवर्तिकालिकग्रन्थकारैराधुनिकैश्च व्यवहृतस्तावद् भूरिशस्तत्प्रयोगः स्वस्वसङ्केतितार्थविशिष्टो लभ्यते । तत्र क्रमशस्तत्तच्छास्त्रानुमोदितः प्रतिभाशब्दस्य सङ्केतितोऽर्थो निबन्धेऽस्मिन् विचार्यते, विहाय साहित्यशास्त्रीयां योगशास्त्रीयाञ्च प्रतिभाम् । यतो ह्येतयोः पृथक् पृथक् शास्त्रीयो निबन्धो मत्कृतोऽन्यत्र पूर्वमेव प्रकाशितो वर्तते ।

प्रतिभाशब्दार्थः

शब्दानामर्थो द्विविधो व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तश्च । अन्यो ह्यर्थो व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तोऽन्यश्चार्थः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तः[3] । एवं सति प्रतिभाशब्दस्याप्यर्थद्वयं जायते । तत्र व्युत्पत्तिस्तावत् 'प्रति'उपसर्गपूर्वकाद् 'भा'[4] धातोर् 'आतश्चोपसर्गे'[5] इति सूत्रेण कर्तरि 'क' प्रत्यये स्त्रीत्वविवक्षायां टापि प्रतिभाति शोभते प्रकाशत इति प्रतिभा । अत्र 'प्रति' इत्यस्याभिमुख्यमर्थः सादृश्यादानहिंसाऽङ्गीकृतिप्रतिनिधिव्याध्याभिमुख्यव्याप्तिवारणव्यावृत्तिप्रशस्तिसमाधिस्वभावार्थेषु प्रतिशब्दस्य निरूपितत्वम् । भा इत्यस्य दीप्तिः प्रकाशो ह्यर्थः । तथा प्रत्युपसर्गपूर्वकाद् भा दीप्तावित्यस्माद् 'आतश्चोपसर्गे'[6] सूत्रेण भावेऽङि टापि प्रतिभानं, प्रतिभायते वेति प्रतिभेति रूपं निष्पन्नम् । एवं सति प्रतिभाशब्दस्य दीप्तिर्ज्ञानं बुद्धिर्मतिरुपलब्धिः प्रेक्षा प्रत्युत्पन्नमतित्वं प्रज्ञेत्यादिव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तोऽर्थः । यतो हि बुद्धिर्निर्विषया नोत्पद्यतेऽपि तु सविषयैव, अतः सैव विषयाभिमुख्येन शोभते लोके नापरं किञ्चित्तत्त्वान्तरम् अन्येषां तद्द्वारैव भासकत्वमन्यथाऽऽभासकत्वमेव तेषाम् । आहोस्वित् सैव स्वात्माभिमुख्येन भातीत्यतोऽपि प्रतिभा बुद्धिरेव । चित्सम्पर्कात्तत्र भासकत्वं विराजते । अस्याः क्वाभिमुख्यमिति विचारकैः पृथक् पृथग् विवेचितं तत्सर्वमग्रे स्फुटीभविष्यति भिन्नभिन्नप्रकरणप्रसङ्गात् । एतद्भिन्नश्च

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१. महा उ० ४.५१
२. सामसार० उ० २८२.२
३. कौ० (अदा० प० से० १०५१)
४. पा० सू० ३.१.१३६
५. अमरभरतमेदिनीमुग्धबोधशब्दरत्नावलीषु ।
६. पा० सू० ३. ३. १०६.

प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तोऽर्थः । यथा घटत इति घटो घटत्वं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तीकरोति यथा वा गच्छतीति गौरिति गमनक्रियायां व्युत्पादितोऽपि गोशब्दो गमनक्रियोपलक्षितमेकार्थसमवेतं गोत्वं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तीकरोति तथैव प्रतिभाशब्दोऽपि प्रतिभात्वं धर्मविशेषं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तीकरोति । तेन तादृशधर्मविशिष्टैव बुद्धिः प्रतिभापदवाच्या न सर्वा, लोकव्यवहारोऽपि तादृश एव दृश्यते । अर्थाद् या सामान्येऽसामान्यम् असामान्ये सामान्यं पश्यन्ती चतुर्मुखी प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाद्यतिरिक्तमभिप्रेतमर्थं स्वबलेन प्रतिपादयन्ती प्रतिक्षणं नवं नवं निर्मातुमाविष्कर्तुं शक्ता सैव विशेषबुद्धिर्विशेषज्ञानं वा प्रतिभा, अत एव सामान्यबुद्धौ नास्या व्यवहारः । यतो हि सामान्यबुद्धिस्तु प्राणिमात्रे वर्तते किन्तु सर्वेषां कृते प्रतिभावानिति प्रयोगो न व्यवह्रियतेऽपि तूत्कटबुद्धिमत्स्वेव तदुक्तम्—प्रगल्भः प्रतिभान्विते[1], नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रज्ञा प्रतिभा मता[2], इत्यादि । एवम्भूता प्रतिभा भिन्नभिन्नरूपेण विविधाश्रयविशेषेषु विभिन्नकार्यनिर्माणाविष्कारोन्मुखी लक्ष्यते । अत एव वादप्रतिभा, विचारप्रतिभा, तर्कप्रतिभा, काव्यप्रतिभेत्यादिभिन्नभिन्ननाम्ना संकीर्त्यमानाऽऽस्ते । इमाः सर्वा अपि प्रतिभा नवं नवं विषयं सृजन्ति, आविष्कुर्वन्ति, कल्पन्ते, जानन्ति, विचारयन्तीत्यादि ।

निरुक्ते

वेदब्राह्मणोपनिषत्सु यद्यपि प्रतिभाशब्दो न प्राप्यतेऽतस्तद्युगेऽस्य कोऽभिप्राय आसीदिति विषय एव नोत्तिष्ठति किन्तु तदपरवर्तिसमये भगवता यास्केन निरुक्ते प्रतिभाशब्दश्चर्चितः । तद् यथा—

"आकाशगुणः शब्द आकाशाद् वायुर्द्विगुणः स्पर्शेन वायोर्ज्योतिस्त्रिगुणं रूपेण ज्योतिष आपश्चतुर्गुणा रसेनाद्भ्यः पृथिवी पञ्चगुणा गन्धेन पृथिव्या भूतग्रामस्थावरजङ्गमास्तदेतदहर्युगसहस्रं जागर्ति तस्यान्ते सुषुप्स्यन्नङ्गानि प्रत्याहरति भूतग्रामाः पृथिवीमपि यन्ति पृथिव्यप आपो ज्योतिषं ज्योतिर्वायुं वायुराकाशमाकाशो मनो मनो विद्यां विद्या महान्तमात्मानं महानात्मा प्रतिभां प्रतिभा प्रकृतिं सा स्वपिति युगसहस्रं रात्रिस्तावेतावहोरात्रावजस्रं परिवर्तेते स कालस्तदेतदहर्भवति । युगसहस्रपर्यन्तमहर्यद्ब्रह्मणो विदुः । रात्रिं युगसहस्रान्तां तेऽहोरात्रविदो जनाः ।"[3] इति

एवमूर्ध्वमार्गगतिव्याख्याने सृष्टिप्रलयनिरूपणावसरे प्रलयक्रमं निगदितवता मुनिना महत आत्मनः प्रकृतेश्च मध्ये प्रतिभानामकः कश्चन पदार्थस्तत्त्वं वाऽङ्गीक्रियते । किन्त्वनया प्रतिभया स किमभिप्रैतीति स्पष्टं न प्रतीयते । यतो हि सांख्ये योगे पुराणे च यत्र प्रकृतिसृष्टिलयक्रमोऽस्ति तत्र प्रतिभाशब्दो न वर्तते । प्रतिभां विहाय शेषोऽपरः क्रमः प्रायः सर्वत्र दृश्यते । सार्वत्रिकक्रमातिरिक्तत्वेन मुनिनोक्तायाः प्रतिभायाः कथं सामञ्जस्यं स्यात् कश्चाभिप्रायोऽत्र महर्षेरिति सुधियो विभावयन्तु । यद्यपि निरुक्तस्यास्मिन् भागे किमपि भाष्यं नास्ति नापि काचन टीका यतो निर्धारणसम्भवः तथापि पुण्यनगरप्रकाशिते दुर्गाचार्यवृत्तिसहिते निरुक्ते चरमभागे एका टिप्पणी वर्तते तत्र प्रतिभाविषये लिखितमेतत्—

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१. अमरः ३. १. २५ अभिधानचिन्तामणिश्च ३.७ (प्रगल्भः प्रतिभान्वितः)

२. भट्टतौतः । हलायुधे ४५४ पृष्ठे समुद्धृतम् (लखनऊ संवत् २०१४)

३. निरुक्ते १४.४

"विद्या व्यष्टिबुद्धिः । महानात्मा समष्टिबुद्धिः । केयं प्रतिभा इति न ज्ञायते । सांख्यकारिकासु सा न दीयते । 'निमित्तानपेक्षं मनोमात्रजन्यमविसंवादकं द्राग् उत्पद्यमानं ज्ञानं प्रतिभा । विवेकात् पूर्वभावि ज्ञानं प्रातिभम्'[1] द्वयोर्वस्तुनोर्बहूनां वस्तूनां वा भेदज्ञानं विवेकः । तद्विरुद्धज्ञानं प्रातिभम् । एतज् ज्ञानं वस्तुनि नावलम्बते । इदं ज्ञानं न केनापि वस्तुना संवदति नापि विसंवदति । तन्मनस एव झटिति उत्पद्यते । तस्मात् तन्निर्विकल्पकज्ञानवत् सामान्यम् ।"[2] इति

एतेन टिप्पणेन प्रकृते किमपि सुस्पष्टं निर्दर्शनं न जातम् । यतो हि टिप्पणीकारोक्ता मनोमात्रजन्या योगसूत्रवृत्तिपरिभाषिता प्रतिभा पूर्वकथितनिरुक्तवाक्यघटितां प्रतिभां न स्पृशति । कारणन्त्विदम्–निरुक्ते आकाशादनन्तरं मनसो लयो विद्यायां भवति, तदनन्तरं विद्याया महति महतश्च प्रतिभायामित्युक्तम् । तदानीं स्वकारणमनोविलयानन्तरं मनोमात्रजन्यं प्रतिभापदव्यपदेश्यं ज्ञानं कारणविलयेऽपि कथमवशिष्यते यस्य विद्याया महतश्च लयानन्तरं प्रकृतौ लयः स्यात्, इत्यसमञ्जसम् ।

अतोऽत्राहमित्थं मन्ये यदियं प्रतिभा बुद्धिप्रकृत्यतिरिक्तं तन्मध्यपाति किञ्चित्तत्त्वान्तरम्, अथवा प्रकृतेरवस्थाविशेषो वा । एवं सति यदि सा तत्त्वान्तरमेव तदा किं तल्लक्षणं किं वा तत्स्वरूपम्, किमेतस्या क्वचनान्यत्र चर्चा वर्तते न वेति शङ्कोदीयात् । तत्त्वान्तरविषये साङ्ख्यकारिकायाः 'प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः'[3] इति कारिकाया अवतरणे युक्तिदीपिकायां युक्तिदीपिकाकारा एवमवदन्—"तत्रेदानीं विप्रतिपत्तिराचार्याणाम् । केचिदाहुः प्रधानादनिर्देश्यस्वरूपं तत्त्वान्तरमुत्पद्यते ततो महानिति । पतञ्जलिपञ्चाधिकरणवार्षगणानां प्रधानाद् महानुत्पद्यत इति ।" किन्तु ग्रन्थकारेणानेन तादृशवादिनां तादृशतत्त्वान्तरस्य च नाम स्पष्टं न प्रतिपादितम् । किं महर्षियास्काभिमतमिदमेव अनिर्देश्यस्वरूपं तत्त्वान्तरं प्रतिभापदवाच्यं भवितुमर्हति । 'इदं तद्', 'इदमित्थम्' इत्यादिरूपेण निरूपयितुमशक्येयं प्रतिभेति सर्वैरेव वादिभिः स्वीकृतत्वात् । आहोस्विदवस्थाविशेषः स च कीदृशः ? एतद्विचारे सत्येवं वच्मि यत् सद्रजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिर्निश्चला, पुरुषसंयोगात् संक्षुब्धा कार्योन्मुखी भवति सैवावस्था प्रतिभापदवाच्या भवितुमर्हति । चिद्रूपपुरुषसंयोगेन प्रकृतौ प्रतिभात्वमुपयुज्यते । अथ च एवम्भूताया अवस्थाया एव लयत्वे प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिस्वापो वा सङ्गच्छते अन्यथा तादृगवस्थाया अविनाशे संसर्गकृता सृष्टिरविरामेणैव प्रवक्ष्यते कथं कीदृक् च लयः स्वापो वा सम्पत्स्यत इति ।

साङ्ख्ये

सांख्यशास्त्रे सांख्यकारिकायां प्रतिभायाश्चर्चा नास्ति नापि सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुद्यां वा । यदि प्रतिभाशब्दमुल्लिख्य काचन चर्चा वर्तते तर्हि सांख्यकारिकायास्तृतीयकारिकाव्याख्यानावसरे गौडपादभाष्ये युक्तिदीपिकायाञ्चैव । तत्रापि तस्याः प्रमाणान्तरत्वमेव निरस्तं नान्यत् किञ्चिद् विचारितं तत्त्वकौमुद्यान्तु प्रमाणान्तरनिरा-

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१. पातञ्जलयोगसूत्राणां भोजदेवविरचितवृत्तौ ३.३३ ।

२. टि० पृ० २३४ नि० द्वि० भाग ।

३. सां० का० २२ ।

करणप्रसङ्गेऽपि नैषा चर्चिता । अतोऽस्या विषये किं तेषां मतमिति किं वक्ष्यामः । किन्त्वेकमपरमेव पन्थानमाश्रित्य किञ्चिद् विचारयामस्तदेव यदि रोचते तर्हि गृह्णन्तु नात्र ममाग्रहः । बुद्धिसर्गेऽष्टसिद्धीनां मध्य ऊहनामात्मिकैका सिद्धिः । सैव प्रतिभापदव्यपदेश्या भवितुमर्हति । तदित्थं प्रतीयते—

ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
दानञ्च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥[1]

तत्र भगवता गौडपादाचार्येण 'ऊहो यथा—कश्चिन्नित्यमूहते किमिह सत्यं किं परं किं नैःश्रेयसं किं कृत्वा कृतार्थः स्याम्' इति चिन्तयतो ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, प्रधानादन्य एव पुरुषः, इतोऽन्या बुद्धिः, अन्योऽहङ्कारः अन्यानि तन्मात्राणीन्द्रियाणि पञ्च महाभूतानीत्येवं तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते येन मोक्षो भवति, एषा ऊहाख्या प्रथमा सिद्धिः । अग्रे च—आसामष्टानां सिद्धीनां शास्त्रान्तरे संज्ञाः कृताः 'तारं सुतारं तारतारं प्रमोदं प्रमुदितं प्रमोदमानं रम्यकं सदा प्रमुदितम्' इति, उक्तम् । एतेन निश्चीयते यदाचार्येण 'ऊहः' इति प्रथमा सिद्धिः सैव तारमिति स्वीक्रियते । अन्यत्र लिङ्गपुराणादिष्वपि प्रतिभा प्रथमा सिद्धिरिति कीर्तितम्[2] ।

आचार्यमिश्रपादेनेत्थं व्याख्यातम्—ऊहस्तर्क आगमाविरोधिन्यायेनागमार्थपरीक्षणम् । परीक्षणञ्च संशयपूर्वपक्षनिराकरणेनोत्तरपक्षव्यवस्थापनम् । तदिदं मननमाचक्षत आगमिनः, सा तृतीया सिद्धिस्तारतारमुच्यत इति । अस्य मते तर्कात्मिका ऊहाख्या सिद्धिस्तृतीया तारतारमिति पदवाच्याऽप्रधाना हेतुहेतुमती च । अनेनैवास्याः कारिकाया व्याख्यानेऽन्येषां व्याख्यातॄणां मतमप्येवमुपपादितम्-'अन्ये व्याचक्षते—विनोपदेशादिना प्राग्भवीयाभ्यासवशात् तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनं यत् सा सिद्धिरूह इति, अग्रे च—अस्य च युक्तायुक्तत्वे सूरिभिरेवावगन्तव्ये इति कृतं परदोषोद्भावनेन नः सिद्धान्तमात्र व्याख्यानप्रवृत्तानामिति' । एतेनेदमायाति यदेतद् व्याख्यानं मिश्रपादानभिप्रेतमेव ।

युक्तदीपिकायान्त्वेवं व्याख्यातम्—तत्रोहो नाम यदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमव्यतिरेकेणाभिप्रेतमर्थं विचारणाबलेनैव प्रतिपाद्यते साऽऽद्या सिद्धिस्तारकमित्यपदिश्यते—तारयति संसारार्णवादिति तारकम् । अग्रे च त एते त्रयः साधनोपायैराब्रह्मणः प्राणिनोऽभिप्रेतमर्थं प्राप्नुवन्ति । आह च—'साक्षात्कृतधर्माण ऋषयो बभूव तेऽवरेभ्योऽसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्य उपदेशेन मन्त्रान् सम्प्रादुरुपदेशाय ग्लायन्तोऽवरे बिल्मग्रहणायेमं ग्रन्थं समाम्नासिषुः वेदञ्च वेदाङ्गानि च'[3] इति । बिल्मं शासनं सम्यक् प्रतिभासाय विशिष्टः सङ्केत उक्तः ।

एतन्मते ऊहात्मिका प्रथमा सिद्धिरेषा तारकमिति पदवाच्या । एताश्च तिस्रः सिद्धयः पन्थान एव सन्ति परमसिद्धेर्मोक्षस्य । एतासां सिद्धीनां प्राप्तौ बिपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हि विरोधिन्यः सन्ति तन्निवारणे यत्नः कर्तव्यः ।

'प्रातिभाद् वा सर्वम्'[4] इत्यस्य तत्त्ववैशारद्याम् आचार्यमिश्रपादैः 'प्रतिभा ऊहः । तद्भवं प्रातिभम् ।

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१. सांख्यकारिका ५१ श्लो०
२. लिङ्गपुराणे ९.१३-१५
३. निरुक्ते १. २०. २
४. यो० सू० ३.३३

प्रसंख्यानहेतुसंयमवतो हि तत्प्रकर्षे प्रसंख्यानोदयपूर्वलिङ्गं यदूहजं तेन सर्वं विजानाति योगी तच्च प्रसंख्यासन्निधापनेन संसारात्तारयतीति तारकमित्युक्तम् ।

तत्रैव भाष्यम्—प्रातिभं नाम तारकम् । तद्विवेकजस्य ज्ञानस्य पूर्वरूपम्, यथोदये प्रभा भास्करस्य । तेन वा सर्वमेव जानाति योगी प्रातिभस्य ज्ञानस्योत्पत्ताविति ।

एतावद्व्याख्याप्रदर्शनेन सुतरां सिध्यति यत् सांख्ये या ऊहात्मिका सिद्धिः सैव प्रतिभा तन्नाम्नी सिद्धिर्वा । 'प्रतिभा ऊहः' इति कण्ठत एव मिश्रपादैरुक्तम् । अतः प्रतिभा, ऊहः, तारकमिति पर्यायवाचिन एव सन्ति । युक्तिदीपिकाकारकृतप्रातिभाप्रामाण्यखण्डनस्य विचारोऽन्यत्र प्रतिभाप्रामाण्यविमर्शे निबन्धे करिष्येऽत्रानवसरत्वात्त्यज्यते ।

योगे

यद्यपि योगशास्त्रीयप्रतिभाविचारोऽन्यत्र 'प्रातिभं ज्ञानम्' इति निबन्धे साधुकृतस्तथापि प्रकरणोपात्तत्वादिहापि किञ्चद् कथ्यते । उपसर्गासु षट्सिद्धिष्वन्यतमा प्रतिभा नाम्नी काचन सिद्धिः । सा चातीतानागतविप्रकृष्टसूक्ष्मातिसूक्ष्मपदार्थज्ञानसम्पादिका । तथा च योगसूत्रम्[१]—ततः प्रातिभश्रावणवेदनादर्शास्वादवार्ता जायन्ते इति । आसां षण्णां सिद्धीनां चर्चा पुराणेऽपि च लक्ष्यते—

प्रतिभा प्रथमा सिद्धिर्द्वितीया श्रवणा स्मृता ।
वार्ता तृतीया विप्रेन्द्रास्तुरीया चेह दर्शना ॥
आस्वादा पञ्चमी प्रोक्ता वेदना षष्ठिका स्मृता ।[२] इत्यादि ।

अस्यां सिद्धौ जातायां योगिनः सर्वज्ञता समायाति । तथा च सूत्रम्—प्रातिभाद् वा सर्वम् ।[३] पुराणवचनञ्च -

सूक्ष्मे व्यवहितेऽतीते विप्रकृष्टे त्वनागते ।
सर्वत्र सर्वदा ज्ञानं प्रतिभानुक्रमेण तु ॥[४] इत्यादि ।

परायाः सिद्धेरुपयोगिनीं योग्यतामधिगतवता योगिना व्युत्थानदशाप्राप्तावहङ्काररहिते चिन्मात्रस्वार्थप्रत्यये संयममनुतिष्ठता प्रतिभादिषट्सिद्धयोऽनायासेनाऽयत्नेन च स्वभावत एवाधिगम्यन्ते । एताः सिद्धयः स्वार्थसंयमस्यानुषङ्गिकं फलम् । तदुक्तं तत्त्ववैशारद्याम्—स च स्वार्थसंयमो न यावत् प्रधानं स्वकार्यं पुरुषज्ञानमभिनिर्वर्तयति तावत्तस्य पुरस्ताद् या विभूतिराधत्ते ताः सर्वा दर्शयति ततः प्रतिभेत्यादि इति । अपि चैषा प्रतिभासिद्धिर्महत्तत्त्वस्वरूपायाः बुद्धेः स्वातन्त्र्यादुदेति । तद् यथा—भगवतो गुरोः प्राक्तनपुण्योदयस्य च कृपया योगमार्गे प्रवृत्तः साधको बुद्धेः स्थैर्यमासादयति । प्रातिभदर्शनं स्थिरबुद्धित्वस्य पूर्वलक्षणम् । योगजधर्मानुगृहीतस्य

१. तदेव ३.३६
२. लिङ्गपुराणे ९.१४-१५
३. यो० सू० ३.३३
४. लिङ्गपुराणे ९. १७-१८

मनसः प्रातिभज्ञानापरोक्षहेतुभाव उत्पद्यते। यदा योगिनो विशुद्धा बुद्धिः सत्त्वगुणमधिगच्छति तदानीमेव भाग्यशालिना तेन प्रातिभदर्शनमनुष्ठीयते। तदीयान्ताराज्ये च प्रातिभस्थिरतापि सम्पद्यते। प्रातिभस्थिरतया बुद्धिसम्बन्धिनीनां सिद्धीनां सम्बन्धः। स्थिरे प्रातिभेऽत्र संयमेन योगिना यथाक्रमं ज्ञानराज्यञ्च सर्वा अपि सिद्धयोऽधिगन्तुं शक्यन्ते। इमामेव प्रातिभसिद्धिं द्वारीकृत्य पूज्यचरणा महर्षयो मन्त्रद्रष्टत्वं प्रपेदिरे ज्ञानराज्यञ्च करतलामलकवद् परिददृशुः। एतत्प्रातिभं ज्ञानं परमज्ञानोदयस्य लिङ्गम्। एषा सिद्धिः क्वचन जन्यते एवं नैसर्गिकी जायते क्वचिच्च औषधिभ्यो मन्त्रतस्तपसः समाधितो वा समुत्पद्यते। इति दिङ्मात्रं निर्दिश्य विरम्यते।

वैशेषिके

वैशेषिकास्तु–उपलब्धिज्ञानप्रत्ययादिपदैर्व्यवह्रियमाणा बुद्धिरर्थानन्त्येषु प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वादनेकधापि-सङ्क्षेपेण विद्या चाविद्या च भेदेन द्विधा, तत्राऽविद्या संशयविपर्ययानध्यवसायस्वप्नभेदाच्चतुर्धा, विद्यापि प्रत्यक्ष-लैङ्गिकस्मृत्यार्षभेदाच्चतुर्विधा, इति सङ्गिरन्ते। तत्र आर्षज्ञानम्—"आम्नायविधातृणामृषीणामतीतानागत-वर्तमानेष्वतीन्द्रियेष्वर्थेषु धर्मादिषु ग्रन्थोपनिबद्धेष्वनुपनिबद्धेषु चात्ममनसोः संयोगाद् धर्मविशेषाच्च यत् प्रातिभं यथार्थनिवेदनं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदार्षमित्याचक्षते। तत्तु प्रस्तारेण देवर्षीणां कदाचिदेव लौकिकानां यथा कन्यका ब्रवीति श्वो मे भ्राता आगन्तेति हृदयं मे कथयतीति।[1] तत्र प्रातिभमित्युद्धृता व्योमवत्यां निगदितं 'प्रतिभया संस्कारविशेषेण निर्वर्तितम्' इति।[2] इन्द्रियलिङ्गाद्यभावे यदर्थप्रतिभानं सा प्रतिभा, प्रतिभैव प्रातिभमित्युच्यते तत्र भवद्भिरिति न्यायकन्दलीकारः।[3]

अनेनेदमायाति यदिदमार्षज्ञानं तदेव प्रातिभं, तज्ज्ञानं सर्वेषामपि भवति किन्तु प्रस्तारेण देवर्षीणामेव भवति, अन्येषां कदाचित्। अतः प्रातिभं ज्ञानमत्रार्षपदेन निगदितम्। योगिनां ज्ञानन्तु प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भाविनं भाष्य-कृताऽस्मिन्नेव प्रकरणेऽतस्तन्न प्रातिभम्। सिद्धानां ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानार्षेष्वन्यतमस्मिन् भाष्यकारेणान्त-र्भावितत्वात्तु तज्ज्ञानं प्रातिभं भवितुमर्हति। इत्थं हि सर्वं ज्ञानं बुद्धिरिति। तां बुद्धिं प्रति आत्ममनःसंयोगः कारणम्। बुद्धिश्चात्मनो गुणः। तथा चोक्तम्—तस्य गुणा बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्मसंस्कारसंख्यापरि-माणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागाः[4] मनसश्च गुणाः संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वसंस्कार इति।[5] एवम-न्यत्रापि—प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणं प्रमेया द्रव्यादयः प्रमाताऽऽत्मा प्रमिति द्रव्यादिविषयं ज्ञानम्'[6] इति।

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१. प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये गुणनिरूपणे आर्षज्ञानप्रकरणे ३४७ पृष्ठे (वाराणसी १८८५ किरणावली-सहितन्यायकन्दलीसहिते ६२७ पृ० १९६३ वाराणसी)
२. व्योमवती ६२२ पृष्ठे
३. न्यायकन्दली ६२८ पृ० (वाराणसी १९६३)
४. प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये आत्मनिरूपणे २०८ पृ० (१९६३ वाराणसी न्यायक० सहित)
५. तत्रैव मनोनिरूपणे २२१ पृ०
६. तत्रैव प्रत्यक्षनिरूपणे ४७१ पृ०

सा च प्रतिभा संस्कारविशेषस्तस्मिंश्च संस्कारविशेषेऽदृष्टादिहेतुः । तेन प्रतिभाख्यसंस्कारेण निर्वर्तितं पदार्थस्वरूपावलम्बनं ज्ञानं प्रातिभं भवति । संस्कारश्च मनसोऽपि गुणः तादृशसंस्कारविशिष्टमनसा आत्मनः संयोगात् तादृशं ज्ञानं जायते । अत्र आत्मा मनश्च ज्ञानं प्रति समवायिकारणे तयोः संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणधर्मविशेषो निमित्तम् ।

यद्यपि वैशेषिकनये प्रत्यक्षानुमाने द्वे प्रमाणे वर्तेते तत्रैवान्येषां शब्दचेष्टोपमानार्थापत्तिसम्भवैतिह्यानां प्रमाणान्तराणां भाष्यकृताऽन्तर्भाव्यं[1] नाङ्गीकृतमतिरिक्तं प्रमाणम् । किन्त्वकामेनापि तेन श्वो मे भ्राताऽऽगन्तेति हृदयं मे कथयतीति प्रातिभज्ञाने हृदयपदेन प्रातिभस्य वैलक्षण्यं प्रतिपाद्य अग्रे सिद्धदर्शने 'प्रत्यक्षार्षयोरन्यतरस्मिन्नन्तर्भूतम्'[2] इत्यनुपदमेव प्रत्यक्षानुमानातिरिक्ते आर्षज्ञानेऽपि सिद्धानां ज्ञानस्यान्तर्भावं च विधाय अवचसा प्रतिभायाः प्रमाणताऽङ्गीकृता ।

नेयं प्रतिभा प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् इन्द्रियव्यापाराभावात् । नानुमानं लिङ्गाभावात् । नापि शब्दप्रमाणं विनापि शब्दं तदुदयात् । तस्मात् प्रमाणान्तरमेव प्रतिभा ।

न्यायदर्शने

नैयायिकास्तु बुद्धिव्यतिरिक्तां स्मृतितर्कोहादिभिन्नामेकामपरां प्रतिभानाम्नीं काञ्चन बुद्धिविशेषां स्मृतिविशेषां वा मानसीशक्तिमभिमन्यन्ते । तथाहि—स्मृत्यनुमानागमसंशयप्रतिभास्वप्नज्ञानोहाः सुखादिप्रत्यक्षमिच्छादयश्च मनसो लिङ्गानीति[3], प्रतिभास्फूर्त्याख्यो बुद्धिविशेषः[4], बुद्धिप्रतिभादिकारणकलापात्[5], बुद्धिर्ज्ञानं प्रतिभा तद्विशेषः स्फूर्त्याख्यः[6], स्फूर्तिः[7] इत्यादि ।

न्यायनये सर्वं ज्ञानं प्रति आत्ममनःसंयोगः सामान्यतः कारणम् । यद्यपि प्रातिभं ज्ञानं स्मृत्यनुरूपमेव प्रतीयते किन्तु स्मार्तं न । स्मार्ते प्रणिधानाद्यपेक्षा वर्तते प्रातिभन्तु प्रणिधानादिविनैव संस्कारसहितात्ममनःसंयोगमात्रादाकस्मिकमेवोत्पद्यते । तथा स्मरणादावनुपलभ्यमानान्यपि कारणक्रमश्च स्मृतिरूपकार्योत्पादक्रमेणानुमीयन्ते, एवं प्रातिभमपि ज्ञानं पुरुषादृष्टविशेषापेक्षेभ्य आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षादिभ्यः कारणेभ्य एवोपजायते नाप्यकारणमक्रमं वा किन्तु प्रातिभे वर्तमानान्यप्येतानि कारणानि नोपलभ्यन्ते क्रमश्च नानुभूयते इति विशेषः । कदापि स्मार्तं ज्ञानं प्रातिभं भवितुं नार्हति । यत्र स्मार्ते ज्ञाने प्रातिभाभिमानस्तत्र भ्रान्तिरेव हेतुः । सा तु भ्रान्तिस्तदैव भवति यदा कारणानि स्फुटं न ज्ञायन्ते तत्रैव 'प्रातिभमेतन्मे स्मरणमाकस्मिकम्' इति ।

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१. तत्रैव अनुमानप्रकरणे ५१२ पृष्ठे
२. प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये ३४८ पृ० (वाराणसी १८८५)
३. वात्स्यायनभाष्ये १.१.१६ गौ० सू० अवतरणे (पृ० ३५ बम्बई १९२२ ई०)
४. न्या० कौ० ५३४ पृ०
५. न्या० सि० मु० मङ्गलश्लोक० ९३ पृ० (वाराणसी ११५१)
६. तत्रैव दिनकरी १३ पृ०
७. नीलकण्ठः म० भा० १२. २६०.१

अपि च स्मृतिः पूर्वानुभूतस्यैव जायते प्रतिभया त्वननुभूतमपि तर्क्यते। स्मृतावुद्बुद्धसंस्कारो हेतुः संस्कारोद्बोधे च तत्सदृशपदार्थज्ञानादिकारणम्। प्रतिभायान्तु नैतादृशं किमपि कारणमवलोक्यते।

सा च प्रतिभा केषाञ्चिन्मते बुद्धेरवस्थाभेदो बुद्ध्यनुरूपा केषाञ्चिन्मते स्मृतेरवस्थाभेदः स्मृत्यनुरूपा। अस्तु किमपि किन्तु प्रतिभा तदवान्तरपातेऽपि तद्विलक्षणा कश्चन शक्तिविशेष एव। सा च मनसो धर्मविशेषः। तार्किकास्तावद् इच्छादिवद् ज्ञानं बुद्धिः, मनसो धर्म इत्यङ्गीकुर्वन्ति न त्वात्मनः। अन्ये आत्मनो बुद्धिः, मनस इच्छादय इति सङ्गिरन्ते। तस्याश्च प्रतिभाया हेतुर्जीवकर्मविशेष एव। विद्यमानायाञ्च प्रतिभायां प्रणिधानाद्यनपेक्षत्वेऽप्येकदा एकमेव प्रातिभं ज्ञानं जायते न तु अनेकम्। तथा चोक्तं भाष्ये–'यथोपभोगार्थं कर्म युगपदुपभोगं न करोति एवं पुरुषकर्मविशेषः प्रतिभाहेतुर्न युगपदनेकं प्रातिभं ज्ञानमुत्पादयति'।[1] अपि चान्यदपि कारणं युगपदनेकप्रातिभज्ञानानुत्पत्तौ–सामान्यतः सर्वेषामेव पुरुषाणामेवमेवानुभवो यदेकस्मिन् विषये अनेकेष्वपि वा युगपज्ज्ञानानि नैवोत्पद्यन्ते। अनेनानुभवेन ज्ञानानां क्रमिकत्वेन अनुमीयते यज्ज्ञानसाधनानामेवाऽयं धर्मो यत् क्रमिकस्तेषां व्यापारः। अतो ज्ञानायौगपद्यं कारणस्वभावमूलकमेव न तु पुनर्ज्ञातृस्वभावमूलकमिति। यद्यपि न्यायमञ्जर्यां प्रतिभायां वाक्यार्थत्वं सोत्प्रासं निरस्य तत्प्रामाण्यं चापि वैशद्येन विचार्य निराकृतं किन्तु तत्सत्ता त्वङ्गीकृतैव।

वैयाकरणनये

वैयाकरणास्तु याथार्थ्येन वर्णप्रकृतिप्रत्ययपदानामतिरिक्तां सत्तामर्थञ्च नाङ्गीकुर्वन्ति, अपि तु वाक्यार्थेनैवैषामर्थवत्ता सत्ता चेत्यभिमन्यन्ते। अत एवैषामतिरिक्तत्वेन या सत्ता अर्थश्च प्रतिभातः, तौ कल्पितावेव। उक्तञ्च हरिणा—

यथैवानर्थकैर्वर्णैर्विशिष्टार्थोऽभिधीयते ।
पदैरनर्थकैरेव विशिष्टार्थोऽभिधीयते ॥[2]

सङ्ग्रहे च—

नहि किञ्चित् पदं नामरूपेण नियतं क्वचित् ।
पदानामर्थरूपञ्च वाक्यार्थादेव जायते ॥[3]
शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते ।[4] इत्यादि ।

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१. गौ० सू० ३.२.३४ वात्स्यायनभाष्ये (पृ० ३०५ बम्बई सन् १९२२ ई०)
२. वाक्यपदीये २.४०९
३. वा. प. ब्र. का. स्वोपज्ञवृत्तावुद्धृतम् पृ० ७२ वाराणसी संस्करण १९६३
४. वा. प. २. २३३

भूषणसारेऽपि—

वाक्यस्फोटोऽतिनिष्कर्षे तिष्ठतीति मतस्थितिः ।[1]

हरिणा—

पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च ।
वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥[2]

लघुमञ्जूषायाम्—

वस्तुतस्तु सर्वं वाक्यमखण्डमेव पदान्यसत्यान्येव,[3] अन्वाख्यानलाघवाय पदानि, प्रकृतिप्रत्ययभागः, तत्तदर्थाश्च कल्पन्ते, तद्द्वारा पदार्थबोधनं वाक्यार्थबोधनञ्च शास्त्रफलम्[4] ।

पुण्यराजः—

अखण्ड एव स्फोटलक्षणो वाक्यार्थः, अध्यासः सम्बन्धः, पदार्थस्तु असत्य एवेति निर्णयः ।[5]

एवं हि सर्वं वाक्यातिरिक्तं शास्त्रकृत्कल्पनामात्रमेवाङ्गीकृत्य अखण्डमेव वाक्यमखण्डार्थस्य बोधकमित्यौचित्येन स्वीकृतम् । स च वाक्यार्थो विभिन्नशास्त्रवासनावशाद् विभिन्नैर्वादिभिरनेकधा कल्पितस्तद् यथा–अभिहितान्वयवादे आकाङ्क्षितपदसमुदायो वाक्यं संसर्गश्च वाक्यार्थः । अन्विताभिधानवादे तु संसृष्टः पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः । वाजप्यायनमते जातिरेव पदार्थः[6] केषाञ्चिन्मते आकृतिरेव, भाष्यकारमते यदत्राधिक्यं वाक्यार्थः सः ।[7] नैयायिकमते जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तिः, व्याडिमते द्रव्यमेव पदार्थः,[8] इत्यादि । यद्यपि शास्त्रकाराणामृषीणां ज्ञानं तात्त्विकं तथापि तात्त्विकेन ज्ञानने (ब्रह्मणा) व्यवहारासम्भवाद् व्यवहारकाले तेऽपि ऋषयो वादिनश्च अतात्त्विकपुरुषवद् अदृष्टतत्त्वतुल्याः शास्त्रवासनाभेदाद् विभिन्नप्रकारं व्यवहारं कुर्वन्ति ।

तदुक्तम्—

ऋषीणां दर्शनं यच्च तत्त्वे किञ्चिदवस्थितम् ।
न तेन व्यवहारोऽस्ति न तच्छब्दनिबन्धनम् ॥[9]

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१. भू. सा. स्फोटनिर्णये ६१ का.
२. वा. प. १. ७३
३. ल. मं: ४०१ पृ०
४. तदेव ४०० पृ.
५. वाक्यपदीये २. १४४ पुण्यराजकृतटीकायाम् ।
६. वा० प० २.२ हेलाराजः–तदित्थं वाजप्यायनाचार्यमतेन सर्वत्र जातिपदार्थव्यवस्थोपपद्यते ।
७. म० भा० (१.२.६४ पा० सू०) द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः भा० वा० ।
८. पा० म० भा० २.३।४९-२ वा० पदार्थादधिकोऽर्थः संसर्गः संसृष्टो वाक्यार्थ इत्यर्थः ।
९. वा० प० २.१३९ । (५ अ) ३.५३

रूपणव्यपदेशाभ्यां लौकिके वर्त्मनि स्थितौ ।
ज्ञाने प्रत्यभिलापे च सदृशौ बालपण्डितौ ॥[१]

अतस्तेषां वचसापि पदपदार्थसत्यत्वं न मन्तव्यम् । तादृशशास्त्रानुसारी लोकोऽपि 'प्रत्येकमपि पदं वाचकत्वेन वर्तते' इति मिथ्यात्मकं प्रत्येति यथा घटादिकः सर्वोऽपि प्रपञ्चः परिच्छिन्नत्वेन गृह्यते भावानामुत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा नित्यं ब्रह्मापि उत्पत्तिं मन्यते लोकस्तद्वत् । स च वाक्यार्थो यदि नित्यस्तदाऽद्वैतव्याघात अतो व्यावहारिकमेव सत्यत्वं स्वीकार्यं न तु पारमार्थिकं सर्वव्यवहारस्याऽसत्यविषयत्वात् ।

अस्यायं भावः—यथा वेदान्तिनो विश्वं चैतन्यमात्रविवर्तं मन्यन्ते तथैव शाब्दिका अपि नामरूपात्मकं वाक्यवाक्यार्थस्वरूपं जगच्छब्दब्रह्मविवर्तमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति । 'नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि'[२] इति श्रुत्या शब्दब्रह्मणो नानात्मिका रूपात्मिका चेति द्वेधा सृष्टिः । तत्रोपादानोपादेया भेदेन सर्वं ह्युपादानमयं 'मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'[३] इतिवत् वर्तते । अतो वाक्यं वाक्यार्थश्चाविकल्पनिर्विभाग एवेति निश्चितम् । तथा भूते तस्मिन् येऽमी विकल्पास्ते पुरुषाणामनेकशास्त्रवासनासमाश्रया बोद्धव्या न च वस्त्वनुपातिनः । तस्मात् परमार्थदृष्ट्या वाक्यार्थ एक एव । एवंभूतो हि वाक्यार्थप्रतिभामात्रविषयः । यद्यपि शाब्दिकनये अखण्डं वाक्यमभ्युपगतं तथापि पदपदार्थविभागमन्तरेण लाघवेन कार्यं न निर्वहति, अतः सामान्यरूपेण पदार्थमभ्युपगम्यैव शास्त्रतो लोकतश्च व्यवस्था वर्तते । एवं सति 'देवदत्त ! गामभ्याज शुक्लां दण्डेन' इति वाक्ये श्रुते अपोद्धृतेभ्यो भिन्नभिन्नदेवदत्तादिपदेभ्यस्तत्तत्पदानां भेदेनार्थग्रहणे सति तद्वेलायां पदार्थतो भिन्ना पदार्थबुद्धिभिन्ना असत्यैरुपाधिभूतैः पदार्थैरभिव्यक्ता एका प्रतिभा नाम्नी बुद्धिर्जायते तामेव प्रतिभां वैयाकरणा वाक्यार्थं इत्याहुः । यथा—

विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽन्यैव जायते ।
वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम् ॥[४]

अपरत्र च—

'प्रतिभा हि वाक्यार्थः' ।[५]

अन्यत्र—

बौद्धाः शब्दाश्च बुद्धिं कतिचिदभिदधुर्वाक्यवाक्यार्थरूपाम् ।[६]

इतरत्र—

एवमखण्डमेव वाक्यं, प्रतिभा च वाक्यार्थ इति समाश्रयणीयम् ।[७]

सा च प्रतिभा विच्छिन्नपदार्थबुद्ध्यनन्तरपदार्थैरभिव्यञ्जिता वाक्यार्थरूपापि 'इदं तद्, इदमित्थम्'

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१. ३.५३

२. छा० उ० ६.३,२

३. तदेव ६. १. ३

४. वा० प० २.१४३

५. लघुमञ्जूषायाम्

६. तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापे ९० श्लो, (बुद्धि० प्र०)

७. पुण्यराजः (वा० प० २. ११७)

इत्यादिरूपेणान्यैराख्यातुं सर्वथैवाऽशक्या केवलं प्रत्यात्मव्यापारनियता स्वसंवेदनसिद्धा । किन्तु स्वसंवेदनसमयेऽपि प्रतिपत्तृभिर्नियतरूपेण निरूपयितुं साऽशक्यैवाऽस्ति द्राक्षामधूकसितशर्करादीनां माधुर्यविशेषवत् । विशेषधर्मपुरस्कारेणाऽनिर्देश्यत्वेऽपि फलाश्रयाभिव्यञ्जकमुखेन निरूपयितुं शक्यत एव । यथा बह्निनिष्ठा शक्तिः फलाश्रय–मुखाभ्यां निर्दिश्यते । जाता च सा 'इदं तद्' इत्यनिर्धारिता प्रतिभा पृथक् पृथक् स्थितानामसंसृष्टानां पदार्थानां संसर्गं करोत्येकसूत्रे । सम्बध्य चैकीभूते पदार्थसात्म्ये सर्वपदार्थात्मके सर्वरूपे वाक्ये प्रतिभैव पदार्थानां विषयत्वेन वर्तते, अर्थात् प्रतिभानिष्ठाः पदार्था एव स्वार्थबोधे सफलतां भजन्ते नान्यथा ।

तस्याश्च प्रतिभाया जन्मजन्मान्तरसंजातस्वस्वजात्युचितव्यवहारानुकूलभावनासहकृतः सर्वोऽप्यागमः (शब्दः) एव हेतुः । स च शब्दः कदाचिदासन्न इह जन्मन्येवावगतः कदाचिज्जन्मान्तरावगतो वा पदरूपो वाक्यरूपो वा ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मको वा । धन्यात्मकेनापि व्यवहृतिर्यथा करतालिकाशब्दात् काकाः पलायन्ते । पश्वादीनां प्रवृत्तौ निवृत्तौ च नियतशब्दव्यवहारो दृश्यते लोके । हेतुता च शब्देऽभ्यासाद् भवति, अभ्यासश्च सामान्यत इदानीन्तनो जन्मान्तरीयोवेत्येष्यते कैश्चिज्जन्मान्तरभाव्येवेष्यते यथा कशाभिघातसमनन्तरमेव वाजिनोऽतियान्ति, अङ्कुशाभिघातेन च गजाः । एवमन्येऽपि यथास्वं प्राणिनोऽनादिवासनाभ्यासवशेन प्रतिभातः समुचितव्यवहारं कुर्वन्तो लोकयात्रां निर्वहन्ति । एवमविदितसङ्केतानां बालानां जनानां तिरश्चाञ्चानादिवासनावशात् तदर्थं प्रतीयमानो दृश्यते शब्दस्तदा विदितसङ्केतानां जनानां किं न भविष्यति शब्दः प्रतिभाहेतुः । तथा च जडानामपि प्राणिनां नियतपदः शब्दः सम्बोधनायोदीर्यते । तेन प्रतिनियतजात्यनुसारेणैव नियता काचित् प्रतिभा बोध्यते, इति प्रतिभामूल एव सर्वो बालादीनां व्यापारः । अत एतदुच्यते यदियं प्रतिभा सर्वप्राणिसंवेद्या शब्दनिमित्ता सकलव्यवहारमूलभूता अनपह्नवनीया । तदपह्नवे स्वात्मैव विप्रलभ्यते । तत्प्रतिभाभ्युपगमोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः ।[1]

हरिणा—

'अविकल्पेऽपि वाक्यार्थे विकल्पाभावनाश्रयः ।'[2]
'अभ्यासात् प्रतिभाहेतुः शब्दः सर्वोऽपरैः स्मृतः ।
बालानाञ्चं तिरश्चाञ्च यथार्थप्रतिपादने ॥
अनागमश्च सोऽभ्यासः समयः कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
अनन्तरमिदं कार्यमस्मादित्यपदर्शनम् ॥[3]

प्रतिभामूल एवेतिकर्तव्यतारूपो व्यवहारः सर्वस्य प्रवर्तते नैनां प्रतिभामतिलङ्घितुं कोऽपि शक्नोति । सा च इदानीन्तनी प्राक्तनी च । तत्रेदानीन्तनी मनुष्याणां सङ्केतग्रहसहकृतेन शब्देन कदाचिद् व्यवहारकालेन जन्यते । बहुशास्त्रश्रवणाभ्यासेन साक्षाज्जनिता । प्राक्तनी च बालानां तिरश्चां च गजवाजिप्रभृतीनाम्, प्राक्तनभावनासमुपजातप्रतिभावशेनैव ह्यशिक्षिता अपि बालाः स्ववयोऽनुरूपं वयस्यैः सह व्यव-

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१. वा० प० २.११७ पुण्यराजकृतव्याख्यायामुद्धृतमेतद्वचनम् ।

२. तदेव ।

३. तदेव २.११९–१२०

हरन्ति । गजवाजिप्रभृतयश्च स्वजात्युचितं चेष्टन्ते । सर्वो लोकस्तामेव भगवतीं स्वप्रतिभां प्रमाणत्वेन पश्यति ।

उक्तञ्च—

प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुगच्छति ।
व्यवहाराः प्रवर्तन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥[1]

अपरत्र—

सतां हि सन्देहपदेषु वस्तुषु प्रमाणमन्तःकरणप्रवृत्तयः ।[2]

इतरत्र—

श्वो मे भ्राताऽऽगन्तेति हृदयं मे कथयति ।[3]

सर्वेषां जातमात्राणां प्राणिनां प्रतिभामूल एव व्यवहारो वर्तत इति निश्चप्रचम्, इति न तदपह्नवेन आत्मा वञ्चनीयः । जडबुद्धयोऽपि जन्मान्तरभावनावशेन जातया प्रतिभयैव व्यवहरन्ति प्रत्यहमाह्न किम् । सा चैवं सर्वप्राणिषु जडेष्वजडेषु बुद्धिमत्सु मन्देषु स्वभावसिद्धा । यथा द्रव्यविशेषाणां पाकाद्यतिरिक्तयत्नान्तर-निरपेक्षाः परिपाकवशाद् गन्धादिशक्तयो दृश्यन्ते तथैव प्रतिभावतां जनानामियं प्रतिभापि प्रतिनियतसंस्कार-जन्या वासनावशादयत्नजा सती स्पष्टमुपलभ्यते ।

सा चैषा प्रतिभा प्रतिप्राणिनियता जन्मान्तराभ्यासहेतुका वर्तते यथा वसन्तसमये कोकिलो विना यत्नमेव केनाप्यशिक्षितोऽपि पञ्चमस्वरं विरौति, ऊर्णनाभः स्वतन्तुभिः कुलायरचनामारभते, एवमन्यत्रापि वोध्यम् । एतत् सर्वं प्रतिभामाहात्म्यमेव । नात्रैतत् सर्वं सम्पादयितुं शिक्षकोऽपेक्ष्यते । स्वाभाव एव शरणम् । स एव प्रतिभा । एवं मृगपक्षिजन्तूनां जातिवंशप्रसिद्धासु आहारप्रेमद्वेषप्लवनादिषु क्रियासु कोऽपि प्रयोक्ता न वर्तते । अर्थादेषां सर्वेषां प्राणिनामाहारादिक्रिया या नियता वर्तते साऽनादिप्रतिभावशादेव जायते ।

सा प्रतिभा निमित्तभेदात् षड्विधा स्वभावजा, चरणजा, अभ्यासजा, योगजा, अदृष्टजा, विशिष्टो-पहिता चेति । तत्र प्रथमा स्वभावजा यथा कपेः शाखाप्लवनादिषु । द्वितीया चरणजा यथा सदाचारावधूतत्रै-कालिकप्रकाशविशेषाणां वसिष्ठादीनां महर्षीणाम् । चरणपदेनात्र सदाचारो ग्राह्यः । तृतीया अभ्यासजा यथा कूपतटाकादिखनकानां कूपतटाकादिखननाभ्यासनिमित्तिका प्रतिभा । अभ्यासेनैव ते 'अत्र जलम्', 'अत्र न' इति क्षितितिरोहितं जानन्ति । चतुर्थी योगजा यथा योगिनामव्यभिचारेण पराभिप्रायज्ञानादिषु । पञ्चमी अदृष्टजा यथा रक्षःपिशाचादीनां परकायप्रवेशान्तर्धानादिषु । षष्ठी च विशिष्टोपहिता (विशिष्टैस्तपोयोगादिसिद्धिसम्पन्नैः पुरुषैः सद्यः सन्निधापिता) यथा सञ्जयादीनां कृष्णद्वैपायनादिभिः । महाभारतयुद्धावसरे व्यासेनोपहिता युद्धवृत्तदर्शनाय सञ्जयादीनां प्रतिभा ।

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१. तदेव २.१४७
२. अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तले १.१९
३. प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये गुणनिरूपणे आर्षज्ञानप्रकरणे ३४७ (वाराणसी १९८५ किरणावलीसहित)

एवं प्रतिभा बहुविधापि सर्वैव शास्त्रोक्तसाम्प्रदायिकवाक्याभिव्यङ्ग्या व्यवहारे लौकिकवाक्यप्रतिपाद्या च। प्रलये सर्वव्याकरणात्ययेऽपि सर्वभूतभौतिकशक्तीनां महाशक्तौ लये निलीननिविष्टशब्दशक्तिबीजकारणान्तर्भूता निबद्धबीजा वृत्तिकाले (शब्दशक्तेः स्वकार्यपदवाक्याद्यनुकूलप्रवृत्तिकाले) प्रथमं पश्यन्तीमध्यमानादादिरूपेण विवर्तस्वरूपतामनुभूय क्रमेण वर्णपदवाक्यैर्विस्तरं प्राप्नुवती प्राप्तबीजपरिपाकाकारा पुनर्व्यक्तेन रूपेण प्रत्यवभासते व्यवहारे।

एतत् सर्वं वैयाकरणसम्मतं मतमुपनिबद्धं वाक्यपदीये। तद् यथा—

विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽन्यैव जायते।
वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम्॥
इदं तदिति साऽन्येषामनाख्येया कथञ्चन।
प्रत्यात्मवृत्तिसिद्धा सा कर्त्रापि न निरूप्यते॥
उपश्लेषमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता।
सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्तते॥
साक्षाच्छब्देन जनिता भावनानुगमेन वा।
इतिकर्तव्यतां तां न कश्चिदतिवर्तते॥
प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुपश्यति।
समारम्भाः प्रतीयन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात्॥
यथा द्रव्यविशेषाणां परिपाकैरयत्नजा।
मन्दादिशक्तयो दृष्टाः प्रतिभास्तद्वतां तथा॥
स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य कः।
जन्त्वादयः कुलायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिताः॥
आहारप्रीत्येभिद्वेषप्लवनादिक्रियासु कः।
जात्यन्वयप्रसिद्धासु प्रयोक्ता मृगपक्षिणाम्॥
भावनानुगतादेतदागमादेव जायते।
आसत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामागमस्तु विशिष्यते॥
स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादृष्टोपपादिता।
विशिष्टोपहिता चेति प्रतिभां षड्विधां विदुः॥[1]

पुराणेतिहासयोः

पुराणेतिहासयोः क्वचित् प्रतिभाशब्दस्य प्रयोगः प्रज्ञायां वर्तते क्वचन च तन्नामकसिद्धौ किन्तु प्रज्ञार्थे

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१. वा० प० २.१४३–१५२

प्रयुक्तापि प्रतिभा साधारणप्रज्ञां नोपदत्ते ऽपि तु विशिष्टामेव । स्पष्टमेतदधस्तनैः पद्यैः---

ज्ञानं देहि स्मृतिं देहि विद्यां विद्याधिदेवते ! ।
प्रतिष्ठां कवितां देहि शक्तिं शिष्यप्रबोधिकाम् ॥
ग्रन्थकर्तृत्वशक्तिञ्च सच्छिष्यं सुप्रतिष्ठितम् ।
प्रतिभां सत्सभायाञ्च विचारक्षमतां शुभाम् ॥
लुप्तं सर्वं दैववशान्नवीभूतं पुनः कुरु ॥[1]

एषा प्रार्थना महर्षिणा याज्ञवल्क्येन भवगतीं शारदां प्रति कृता, अग्रे च पुनस्तेन शारदा तद्रूपैवाभिमता । यथा--

स्मृतिशक्तिर्ज्ञानशक्तिर्बुद्धिशक्तिस्वरूपिणी ।
प्रतिभाकल्पनाशक्तिर्या च तस्यै नमो नमः ॥[2]

भवति लोके शास्त्रे च वाण्या बुद्ध्याद्यभेदेन व्यवहारः । अतोऽत्र न किमपि वैलक्षण्यमेतेन ।

अन्यत्रापि बुद्धिविशेषे तत्स्फूर्तौ च प्रयोगो दृश्यते—

सूक्ष्मं साधुसमुद्दिष्टं नियतं ब्रह्मलक्षणम् ।
प्रतिभा त्वस्ति मे काचित्तां ब्रूयामनुमानतः ॥[3]

अत्र नीलकण्ठः—प्रतिभा स्फूर्तिः सा चानुमानलक्षणा । न्यायकोशे मुक्तावलीटीकायां रामरुद्र्याञ्चापि प्रतिभायाः स्फूर्त्याख्यो बुद्धिविशेषोऽर्थः स्वीकृत इति न्यायप्रकरणे द्रष्ठव्यम् । बुद्धिविशेषे त्वन्यदुदाहरणमिदं द्रष्टव्यम्---

भ्रमं संमोहमावर्तमभ्यासाद् विनिवर्तयेत् ।
निद्राञ्च प्रतिभाञ्चैव ज्ञानाभ्यासेन तत्त्ववित् ॥[4]

नीलकण्ठः—निद्रामननुसन्धानं प्रतिभामन्यानुसन्धानञ्च ज्ञानाभ्यासेन ।

अन्यानुसन्धानरूपबुद्धिविशेषोऽपि परमार्थे बाधक एव तस्मात् तत्त्वविदां तद्विनिवर्तनमेवोचितम् ।

इयञ्च प्रतिभा सदोषा निर्दोषा चेत्युभयरूपाऽस्ति संशयविपर्ययात्मिकाऽऽद्या तद्रहिता च द्वितीया । निर्दोषप्रतिभायाश्चर्चा यथा—

षण्णामात्मनि बुद्धौ च जितायां प्रभवत्यथ ।
निर्दोषप्रतिभा ह्येनं कृत्स्ना समभिवर्तते ॥[5]

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१. ब्रह्मवैवर्ते प्रकृतिखण्डे अ० ५ श्लोक० ७-८

२, तदेव अ० ५ श्लो० १६-१७

३. महाभारते शान्तिपर्वणि अ० २६०१ श्लो० नीलकण्ठीसहित, चित्रशाला सं० बम्बई १९३२

४. तदेव अ० २७४ श्लो० ७

५. तदेव २३६.२६

नीलकण्ठः—पञ्चभूतानि अहङ्कारश्च तेषामात्मभूतायां बुद्धौ । एतेनाहङ्काराद् बुद्धेरव्यतिरेक उक्तः । तेन सप्तैव धारणाः, प्रभवति ऐश्वर्यवान् भवति । निर्दोषप्रतिभासंशयविपर्ययशून्यं ज्ञानम् । सर्वेश्वरः सर्वज्ञश्च भवतीत्यर्थः ।

सदोषा यथा—

प्रतिभामपवर्गञ्च प्रतिसंहृत्य मैथिल ।
इन्द्रियग्राममखिलं मनस्यभिनिवेश ह ॥[1]

नीलकण्ठः—प्रतिभां विक्षेपम् अपवर्गं लयम् । इति । विक्षेपशब्दस्तु त्यागप्रेरणदूरीकरणान्तरायमायाशक्तिचित्तवृत्तिकम्पनालङ्कारभेदकथाविच्छेदनिग्रहस्थानभेदविक्षेपणार्थेषु प्रयुज्यते । किन्त्वत्र चित्तविक्षेपेणैव तात्पर्यं, तद्विक्षेपस्तु—व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादाऽऽलस्याऽविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनाऽलब्धभूमिकत्वाऽनवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तारायाः ।[2] मा शङ्कीर्यत् प्रतिभा सदोषेति । प्रतिभां चित्तवृत्तिमेव वदन्ति प्रतिभाविदः । चित्तवृत्तिस्तु भवत्येवोभयविधा नात्र मनाक् संशयः । प्रदर्शितञ्च न्यायकणिकायामाचार्यमिश्रपादैरस्याश्चित्तवृत्तित्वम् । यथा–'अत एव चित्तवृत्तिं तामिमामाचक्षते विकल्परूपामाचार्याः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्प' इति वदन्तः ।[3] अन्यत्रापि 'यदपि प्रातिभमक्षलिङ्गशब्दव्यापारानपेक्षमकस्मादेवाद्य मे महीपतिप्रसादो भवितेत्याद्याकारं स्पष्टतया वेदनमुदयते । तदप्यतीन्द्रियनिबन्धतया मानसमिति प्रत्यक्षकुक्षिक्षिप्तमेव ।[4] प्रतिभायाश्चित्तवृत्तित्वादेवास्याः प्रामाण्ये वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः सन्ति । अतश्चित्तवृत्तित्वे न कश्चन सन्देहस्तथा चोभयविधत्वेऽपि ।

प्रतिभानामकसिद्धौ प्रतिभाशब्दस्य प्रयोगो लिङ्गपुराणे स्पष्टतया वर्तते यथा—

उपसर्गाः प्रवर्तन्ते सर्वे ते सिद्धिसूचकाः ।
प्रतिभा प्रथमा सिद्धिर्द्वितीया श्रवणा स्मृता ॥
वार्ता तृतीया विप्रेन्द्रास्तुरीया चेह दर्शना ।
आस्वादा पञ्चमी प्रोक्ता वेदना षष्ठिका स्मृता ॥
स्वल्पषट्सिद्धिसन्त्यागात् सिद्धिदाः सिद्धयो मुनेः ।[5]

अपि च

सूक्ष्मे व्यवहितेऽतीते विप्रकृष्टे त्वनागते ।
सर्वत्र सर्वदा ज्ञानं प्रतिभानुक्रमेण तु ।[6]

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१. तदेव ३१६.१४
२. यो० सू० १.३०
३. विधिविवेके २४७ पृ० (काशी मेडिकल हाल प्रेस सन् १९०७)
४. स्याद्वादरत्नाकरे २.१ पृ० ३.४
५. लिङ्गपुराणे ९.१३–१५
६. तदेव ९.१७–१८

एषा सिद्धिरुपसर्गासु षट्सु सिद्धिष्वन्यतमा । उपसर्गत्वञ्चास्याः सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टातीतानागत-ज्ञानसम्पादकत्वेपि परमसिद्धेरवाधकत्वात् तदपेक्षया स्वल्पफलप्रदानत्वाच्च ।

महाभारतेऽपि —

प्रतिभामुपसर्गांश्चाप्युपसंगृह्य योगतः ।
तां तत्वविदनादृत्य आत्मन्येव निवर्तयेत् ।।[1]

नीलकण्ठः—प्रतिभा सकलशास्त्रार्थभानम् । उपसर्गा दिव्याङ्गनासङ्गादयः तांश्च उपसंगृह्य योगवलेन लब्ध्वा अनादृत्य च आत्मनि बुद्धावेव निवर्तयेत् संहरेत् । बुद्धिकल्पितत्वात् तेषां तत्रैव संहारस्य युक्तत्वात् ।

सा चैतादृशी प्रतिभा योगेनावाप्यते तत्प्रक्रिया योगे शैवतन्त्रे पुराणेतिहासयोश्च वर्णिता । तत एवावगन्तव्यम् ।

शैवसिद्धान्ते

यदा शिवभक्त्या मानवः कर्मसाम्यमलपरिपाकाभ्यां युज्यते तदा तस्मिन् पारमेश्वरी शक्तिः पतति । क्वचन वैराग्यधर्मविशेषविवेक—सत्सेवा—सत्प्राप्ति—देवपूजाभिर्मलपरिपाके शक्तिपातो भवतीति वदन्ति विज्ञाः । स च शक्तिपातस्तीव्रमध्यमन्दभेदेन उत्कृष्टमध्यनिकृष्टत्रितयावान्तरभेदेन च नवधा । तत्र मध्यतीव्रशक्ति-पातात् प्रतिभा जायते तया च सर्वमज्ञानं निवर्तते । सा चन्द्रिकावत् तमस्तापो हन्ति । तदुदये बाह्यसंस्कारं विनापि भोगापवर्गदं ज्ञानं जागर्ति । तद्बलात् पुरुषः स्वयमेव बन्धमोक्षतया आत्मतत्त्वं वेत्ति नात्र शास्त्राचार्याव-पेक्ष्येते ।

तदुक्तम्—

मध्यतीव्रात् पुनः सर्वमज्ञानं विनिवर्तते ।
स्वयमेव यतो वेत्ति बन्धमोक्षतयात्मताम् ।।
तत्प्रातिभं महाज्ञानं शास्त्राचार्यानपेक्षि यत् ।[2]

शिवशक्तिपातानुगृहीतः पुरुष एव प्रतिभाभाजनं प्रतिभया च युक्तः शिष्टः स्वयम्भूर्भवति तस्य तर्कः सांसिद्धिकः स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते । यद्यपि निखिलव्यवहारमूलं प्रतिभा, सर्वत्र सामान्यरूपेण विद्यमाना, तिर्यञ्चोऽपि यद्वशात् स्वव्यापारे प्रवृत्तिं लभन्ते (व्यवहाराः प्रतायन्ते तिरश्चामपि यद्वशात्[3]) इत्युक्त्या, तथापि तारतम्येन समुल्लासात् सा अनन्तप्रकारतामाश्रयते ।

सा प्रतिभा प्रथमतो दृढा कम्पमाना वाऽस्ति । कम्पमाना च प्रतिभा युक्तिं शास्त्रं गुरुं वीतरागक-थामभ्यासञ्चापेक्ष्य दृढा, क्वचनानपेक्ष्यैव, यथा कम्पमानं ज्ञानं स्वयमेव क्वचिद् युक्त्याद्यपेक्षां विनैव यथायथं

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१. म० भा० शा० प० २४०.२४ (चित्रशाला संस्करण, बम्बई १९३२)

२. तन्त्रालोके १३१.१३२

३. वाक्यपदीये २.१४७ एषः पाठः तन्त्रालोके १३.१३५ टीकायामुद्धृतः ।

दार्ढ्यं गच्छदवलोक्यते तद्वत् प्रतिभापि । यत्र ज्ञानं स्वयं दार्ढ्यं गच्छति तन्निर्भित्ति यत्र युक्त्यादिभिस्तत् सभित्ति । एवं यथा यथा प्रतिभा वर्धते तथा तथा मानवो विज्ञानपारगो भवति । अत्र यो गुरुमाराध्य शास्त्रार्थं वेत्ति सकल्पितः, यश्च गुर्वाराधनानपेक्षमेव स्वप्रतिभाबलादाकस्मिकं बोधमाप्नोति स कल्पिताकल्पितः प्रतिभावतो जनस्य न संस्काराद्यपेक्षा । स प्रातिभो गुरुः । तीव्रमध्यादिभेदैरुपलक्षितः सन् स्वयमात्मभावनया व्रतादिगुरुरिव स्वस्य दीक्षादिलक्षणं संस्कारं कल्पयति येनाकल्पितकल्पको भवति । अमुना प्रकारेण प्रातिभविज्ञानं सर्वं साधयति । प्रतिभाविशिष्टः पुरुषः स्वयं मुक्तः परान् मोचयति । तदुक्तम्—

इत्थं प्रातिभविज्ञानं किं किं कस्य न साधयेत् ।
यत् प्रातिभाद् वा सर्वं चेत्यूचे शेषमहामुनिः ॥[1]

प्रतिभापि शक्तिपातस्य बाह्यानामुपायानां वैचित्र्यात् तारतम्येनोदेति ।

स्वमुक्तिमात्रे कस्यापि यावद्विश्वविमोचने ।
प्रतिभोदेति खद्योतरत्नतारेन्दुसूर्यवत् ॥[2]

शैवाः प्रतिभोपलब्धये शैवशास्त्राभ्यसनमेव हेतुः । इतरशास्त्राभ्यासे शक्तिपातो न स्यादिति मन्यन्ते ।[3]

वस्तुतस्तु शैवमते चितः शक्तिरेव प्रतिभा, यतो हि परमेश्वरस्य द्वे शक्ती दृगात्मिका क्रियात्मिका च । तत्र दृगात्मिका शक्तिर्ज्ञानस्मृत्यपोहनभेदात् त्रिधा[4] । अनेन शक्तित्रयेण सर्वे व्यवहाराः प्रचलन्ति, तत्र स्मृतिशक्तिर्नवं भासयति स्मारयति वा । एवं ज्ञानस्मरणविमर्शशक्तित्रयोपेता चित् । प्रतिभाशब्दस्य निरुक्तिरपि एतादृशमन्वितार्थं प्रकाशयति । तथा हि प्रतीपं भातीति प्रतिभा । प्रतीपमाभिमुख्यं तच्चात्माभिमुख्यं विषयाभिमुख्यं वा भाति प्रकाशत इति । प्रतीपं स्वात्मावभासो हि न अननुभूतपूर्वः, अविच्छिन्नप्रकाशत्वात् । यद्यपि प्रतिभाति घट इत्यत्र विषयोपश्लिष्टमेव प्रतिभानं भाति तथापि न तद्विषयस्य स्वकं वपुः अपितु संवेदनमेव तत् । तथा चकास्ति 'मां प्रति भाति' इति प्रमातृनिष्ठतयैव स्फुरणात् । तथा च श्रुतिः—

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१. तन्त्रालोके १३.१४६
२. तदेव १३.१६५
३. तदेव १३.१६०
४. प्रत्यभिज्ञायाम्—न चेदन्तः कृतानन्तविश्वरूपो महेश्वरः ।
स्यादेकश्चिद् वपुर्ज्ञानस्मृत्यपोहनशक्तिमान् ।
माया शक्त्या विभोः सैव भिन्नसंवेद्यगोचरा ।
कथिता ज्ञानसङ्कल्पाध्यवसायादिनामभिः ॥ १.५.१८
केवलं भिन्नसंवेद्यदेशकालानुरोधतः ।
ज्ञानस्मृत्यवसायादिसक्रमं प्रतिभासते ॥ १.५.२१

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥[1] इति ।

अस्यायं भावः—एते हि सूर्यादयः प्रकाशाभासा महाप्रकाशविग्रहचैतन्याधीना भासन्ते न स्वतः । यत् स्वप्रकाशवपुषा भानं प्रतीयते तत्‌ घटो भातीति वत् प्रमातृनिष्ठतयैव । तथा चानया श्रुत्या एतेषां सूर्यादीनां स्वयम्भानस्वरूपाणां तेजस्वितया निषिद्धे का कथाऽन्येषां घटपटादीनाम् । अतस्तत्संवेदनात्मकमेव सर्वमेतद् भाति न स्वसत्तयेति । अत एव भट्टचन्द्रानन्देनोक्तम्—

पश्यतो रूपमालेखाद् भातो भानानुषङ्गि यत् ।
प्रतीपभानं प्रतिभा भावानां················ ॥[2]इति

सा च प्रतिभा द्विधा अक्रमा सक्रमा च तत्र अक्रमा अनन्तचिद्रूपः प्रमाता महेश्वर एव गीयते । तदुक्तमुत्पलाचार्येण—

या चैषा प्रतिभा तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमरूषिता ।
अक्रमानन्तचिद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ॥[3]

सक्रमा तु स स इति क्रमाक्रमादिचित्ररूपः (कार्यकारणभावादौ क्रमो यथा बीजादङ्कुरः, इतरत्र यौगपद्यं यथा घटपटादौ, अक्रमश्चेमा गाव इत्यादौ) यः पदार्थानां वस्तूनामीश्वरस्वातन्त्र्यरूपदेशकालशक्त्युपस्थापितः क्रमो देशकालपरिपाटी तेन रूषिता उपहिता । प्रतिबिम्बकल्पतया उपरक्ता प्रतिभा उक्ता ।

केवलं भिन्नसंवेद्यदेशकालानुरोधतः ।
ज्ञानस्मृत्यवसायादि सक्रमं प्रतिभासते ॥[4]

इत्यादिना कथिता या प्रतिभा एषा सर्वस्य स्वप्रकाशरूपा अन्तमुखत्वेन प्रकाशमात्रपरमार्थतया भेदाभावात् अक्रमा सैव महेश्वर इति सदैव सर्वस्य स्वप्रकाशा । वस्तुतस्तु अन्तर्मुखेन वपुषा देशकालकलनावैकल्याद् अक्रमा, स एव भगवान् अनन्तचिद्रूपो देशकालादिपरिच्छेद्यविरहितसंवित्स्वभावः । प्रमाणप्रमितिसमूहस्य यथारुचिसंयोजनादिकारणस्वातन्त्र्ययुक्तः शुद्धाहंप्रत्यवमर्शमयकल्पितेश्वराणां विष्णवादीनां महेश्वरः ।

अन्यत्र परस्या संविदः प्रथमः परिस्पन्दः तद्भेद्रूपापि प्रतिभा गीयते । यथा—

इयं सा प्राणनाशक्तिरान्तरोद्योगदोहदा ।
स्पन्दः स्फुरत्ता विश्रान्तिर्जीवो हृत् प्रतिभा मता ॥[5]

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१. कठोपनिषदि ५.१५
२. ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविवृत्तिविमर्शिनी खण्ड २ पृ० २०० जम्मू कश्मीर १९४१ ई०
३. ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञायाम् १.७.१
४. तदेव १.५.२१
५. तन्त्रालोके ६.१३

अनेन सिध्यति यत्सा परावाग्रूपैव

अनन्यापेक्षिता याऽस्य विश्वात्मत्वं प्रति प्रभोः ।
तां परां प्रतिभां देवीं सङ्गिरन्ते ह्यनुत्तराम् ॥[१]

निरतिशयस्वातन्त्र्यैश्वर्यचमत्कारमयानन्तशक्तिव्रातोल्लेखशालिनी प्रतिभा । इयञ्च परावाग्रूपा प्रतिभा चितिशक्तिरेव नान्या ।

प्रातिभपुरुषस्य प्रातिभेनैव योगेन आगमानुमानाभ्यां बिना 'श्वस्ते भ्रातागमिष्यति' इति त्रिकालाविसंवादिनी मतिर्दृश्यते तथैव योगिनोऽपि जायते । उक्तञ्च नरेश्वरपरीक्षायाम् —

दृष्टा च प्रातिभेनेह वाक्यार्थव्यापृतिं विना ।
मेये त्रिष्वपि कालेषु लिङ्गानि च विना मतिः ॥
प्रातिभस्य तथा योगी प्रकृष्टेन तु सर्वथा ।
मिनोति युगपत् सर्वं तत्सिद्ध्यै योगचोदना ॥[२]

प्रत्यभिज्ञाहृदयेऽपि चितिशक्तेरेव प्रतिभात्वं व्यवस्थापितम् । तद् यथा—"देहसुखनीलादि यत् किञ्चित् प्रथते, अध्यवसीयते स्मर्यते संकल्प्यते वा, तत्र सर्वत्रैव भगवती चितिशक्तिमयी प्रथा भित्तिभूतैव स्फुरति, तदस्फुरणे कस्यापि अस्फुरणात्, इत्युक्तत्वात् । केवलं तथा स्फुरन्त्यपि सा, तन्मायाशक्त्या अवभासितदेहनीलाद्युपरागदत्ताभिमानवशादभिन्नभिन्नस्वभावा इव भान्ति ज्ञानसंकल्पाध्यवसायादिरूपतया मायाप्रमातृभिर् अभिमन्यते, वस्तुतस्तु एकैव असौ चितिशक्तिः । यथोक्तम्—

या चैषा प्रतिभा तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमरूषिता ।
अक्रमानन्तचिद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ॥ इति

तथा—

मायाशक्त्या विभोः सैव भिन्नसंवेद्यगोचरा ।
कथिता ज्ञानसंकल्पाध्यवसायादिनामभिः ॥[३]इति

आधुनिकानां मते

पूर्वजन्मसिद्धान्तमनङ्गीकुर्वतां पाश्चात्त्यदार्शनिकानां कवीनां मते दैवी शक्तिः प्रतिभा, देवदत्तवरप्रदानमिति । साधारणजनापेक्षया प्रतिभावत्सु जनेषु यदधिकं सामर्थ्यमवलोक्यते तत् तत्र देवांशाधिक्याद् देवसम्पदतिशयसम्पर्काद् वा । एतेषां मतेन सह यदि भगवतः कृष्णस्य —

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१. तदेव ३.६६

२. नरेश्वरपरीक्षायाम् ३.११३–११४

३. प्रत्यभिज्ञाहृदये पृ० ५१-५२

यद् यद् विभूतिमत् सत्त्वं श्रीमदूर्जितमेव वा।
तत्तदेवावगच्छ त्वं मम तेजोंऽशसम्भवम् ॥[1]

वाक्यस्यास्य समन्वयः स्यात्तदा न कश्चिद् विरोधः। केचन भौतिकवादिनस्तु वंशपरम्परैव प्रतिभाहेतुरिति ब्रुवन्ति। विद्वत्कुलप्रसूत एव जनो जन्मजातसिद्धां प्रतिभां भजितुं समर्थो नान्य इति। यत्र क्वचन व्यभिचारः स्यात् तत्र सहकारिकारणविरहोऽन्यो वा हेतुर्ज्ञेयः किन्तु हेतोरेकत्र स्थले व्यभिचारदर्शनेन सर्वत्र ब्याप्तिसत्तायामपि हेतुस्त्याज्य इव इति तु न न्याय्यः। ते त्वस्मिन् विषयेऽनेकोदाहरणानि प्रस्तुवन्ति तानि सर्वाणि तत्तत्प्रतिपादितग्रन्थेभ्योऽवगन्तव्यानि, अथवाऽत्र लोकानुभव एव भवतां सविधे जाज्वल्यमानमुदाहरणमिति ज्ञेयम्। एतेषां मतेन सहेदृशस्य वचनस्य समन्वयः।

श्रेष्ठवंशसमुत्पन्नो बालो याति विशेषताम्।
नहि धत्तेऽखिलो वेणुर्धनुर्निर्माणयोग्यताम् ॥

अत्र केचन तादृशी प्रतिभाऽपि कारणान्तरवशादनङ्कुरिताऽनभिव्यक्तैवाऽऽस्ते तस्मात् परिस्थितिप्रभावोऽप्यस्याः सहकारिकारणमित्यङ्गीकुर्वन्ति। यथा सुयोग्यानां बालकानामध्ययनव्यवस्थासामाग्री समयविरहे दैन्यदशापातेनाशनवसनाद्यभावेऽसाध्यरोगाक्रमणे वा प्रतिभा आत्मन्येव विपच्य विलीना दृश्यते। केचन मानसिकान्तर्द्वन्द्वमेव प्रतिभाकारणमुद्घोषयन्तीति।

मनोवैज्ञानिकशब्दकोषे तु प्रतिभेत्थं परिभाषिता—असाधारणरूपा मनीषा, असाधारणा सहजा मानसी शक्तिर्वा प्रतिभा।[2]

अपरत्र या मानसी शक्तिर्नितरामुच्चकोटिमालम्बते, विशेषतो या कमपि पदार्थमाविष्कर्तुं स्रष्टुं वा शक्नोति, यस्याः कोऽपि पारिभाषिको विशेषोऽर्थोऽनिर्धारणीय एव। कुत्रचिदेषा प्रतिभा चत्वारिंशदधिकशतात्मिकां साधारणप्रज्ञामतिशेते तत्समतां वा भजतीति।[3]

क्वचन—इन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानातीता, वस्तूनां नित्यतत्वं सत्तत्वं वा ज्ञातुं समर्था बुद्धेरुच्चतरा शक्तिः प्रतिभेति।[4] मनोवैज्ञनिकेषु युंगमहाशयः प्रतिभावैशिष्ट्यमेवं प्रत्यपादि[5]

१—प्रतिभेयं व्यक्तित्वसंवर्धनोचितेतराङ्गानुपातानुसारं न विकसति, अपि तु प्रतिभापरिपाके व्यक्तित्वोचितानि अन्यानि अङ्गानि मानवीयगुणाश्च न पुष्यन्ति।

२—यथा मानवानां शीलस्वभावादिकं दैशिककालिकपरिस्थित्यनुसारम् अवस्थादिविविधपरिस्थित्यनुरूपं विपरिणमते तथा नेयं प्रतिभा आत्मानं परिस्थित्यनुकूलं विपरिणमयितुं शक्ता।

३—प्रतिभा कीदृशमपि व्याघातं प्रतिबन्धं वा न सोढुमक्षमा सती निरर्गलमबाधरूपेणप्रवहति।

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१. गीता १०.४१
२. दी न्यु डिक्श्नरी आफ सायकालोजी
३. डिक्शनरी आफ सायकालाजी
४. डिक्शनरी आफ फिलासफी एण्ड सायकालोजी १ भा० पृ० ५५८ (न्यूयार्क १९१८)
५. सायकालाजिकल रिफ्लेक्शन्स, पृ० १८४–१८६

४–सहजगुणास्तु नियन्त्रितुं शक्याः किन्तु प्रतिभा सर्वदा नियन्त्रणरहिता स्वतन्त्राऽस्ति । सा तु दैवी नाङ्कुशाधीना ।

५–प्रतिभा परिस्थितेः सभ्यताया रीतेर्व्यवहारस्य च पाशेष्वात्मानं न बध्नाति, अपितु स्वसामयिकीं सामाजिकीं रूढिं मर्यादाञ्च द्रागुल्लङ्घ्य शैलवत् सहसा प्रादुर्भवति ।

६–प्रतिभा सर्वदैवासाधारणस्थल्यामेव क्रीडति कदापि नीरसं साधारणं स्थलं न टीकते ।

इत्थं सिध्यति यत् प्रतिभा सर्जनात्मिका आविष्करणशीला वा विशिष्टा दैवी शक्ती रूढिरीतिनियमबन्धनान्युन्मुच्य स्वतन्त्रा विराजते ।

फ्रायडस्तदनुयायिनोऽपरे मनोवैज्ञानिकाः स्वसिद्धान्तानुसारं प्रतिभामेवं व्याचिख्युः ।

मनस्तु द्विविधं चेतनमचेतनञ्च । तयोः सङ्घर्षे प्रतिभोद्गमः । अस्यायं भावः – प्रायो हि मानवाः स्वजीवनं सुखमयं निर्मातुं प्रत्यहमेव निरन्तरं विचारयन्ति तदर्थं मानसिककल्पनयाऽनेकान् व्यूहान् रचयन्ति विरचय्य विनाशयन्ति च । एषा इच्छा स्वभाविकी मानवानाम् । किन्तु तासु सर्वासामिच्छानां पूर्तिरसम्भवैव । यतो हि इच्छापि द्विधा । नैतिकी अनैतिकी च । तत्र नैतिकीषु कासाञ्चित् पूर्तिर्भवति कासाञ्चिच्चासमर्थ्यान्न भवति, किन्त्वनैतिकीषु सर्वासामिच्छानां पूर्तिः सामाजिकधार्मिकनैतिकादिप्रतिबन्धवशात् कथमपि न सम्भवा ता एवापूर्णा इच्छा अचेतने मनसि स्थिताः सञ्चिता अत्यन्तप्रबलतामापन्ना अभिव्यक्तये निरन्तरं प्रयत्नशीला अपि विविधपरिस्थितिनैतिकादिकारणकलापादवरुद्धा विराजन्ते । तस्माद्धेतोश्चेतनाचेतनयोर्मनसोस्तीव्रतरसङ्घर्षो जायते यो हि सङ्घर्षः प्रतिभाया मूलोद्गमः (मूलप्रभवः) । येषां जनानां व्यक्तित्वे सङ्घर्ष एष यावान् अधिकस्तीव्रः प्रवलश्चाभविष्यत् तेषां प्रतिभापि तावत्येव प्रवला तीव्राऽधिका चाभविष्यत् । इत्थं हि तेऽतिक्रान्तमानवमर्यादामसामान्याञ्च प्रतिभायां विशिष्टतामचेतनमनसि प्रच्छन्नसङ्घर्ष एव जनयतीति मृगयन्ते ।

संस्कृतकाव्यशास्त्रे पुराऽऽचार्यैर्या प्रतिभाऽङ्गीकृता तामेव पाश्चात्या आलोचका मनोवैज्ञानिकाः कल्पनाशब्देन सङ्गिरन्ते । तेषु विशेषत इमौ द्वौ विद्वाँसौ कॉलरिज रिचड्समहानुभावौ कल्पनां विशदेन विवेचयतः । तत्र रिचर्ड्समहोदयः—कल्पनायास्तावदिदं मुख्यं कार्यं यद् 'अस्तव्यस्तमैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षप्रतिबिम्बितं वा सुसम्बद्धं समन्वितं च विधाय बिम्बरूपतया सुस्थिरमनोहररूपेण सम्पादनम्, इति । इत्थं विशृङ्खलितमसम्बद्धमन्तर्भावजातमेकस्मिन् सामञ्जस्ये पथि व्यवस्थापयन्ती कल्पना सर्वत्र स्वकीयमस्तित्वमभिव्यनक्ति अतिशेते च । एतदेव सामञ्जस्यविधानम्, अनेकतायामेकतास्थापनं, सर्वास्वनुभूतिषु व्यस्तप्रतिक्रियाचित्रचित्रणं वा कविकल्पनया सर्जनशीलकल्पनाया वा मूलधर्मः ।

कॉलरिज महोदयः—समन्वयव्यवस्थापनसमर्थायाः कल्पनाया ऐन्द्रजालिकशक्तिकृत एवाऽयं कल्पनाशब्दः प्रयुक्तः । कल्पनाधर्मस्तु परस्परविरोधिनां गुणानामसम्बद्धानां वा परस्परं तुलनासमन्वयश्च । अर्थाद् एकरूपताया अनेकरूपतया साधारणस्य विशेषेण, मनोभावस्य चित्रैः, व्यष्ट्याः समष्ट्या, नूतनस्य प्रत्नेन, विशेषभावावेशस्य असीमसंयमेन अनुक्रमेण वा, चिरोद्बुद्धविवेकस्य तथा स्वस्थस्यात्मसंयमस्य दुर्दमनीयगम्भीरभावुकतया सह समन्वयः तुलनात्मकविचारो वा कल्पनाया इतिकर्तव्यताऽस्ति । कल्पनाप्रभावेणैव कवयोऽनेकताया-

१. रिचर्ड्स —प्रिन्सिपिल्स ऑफ लिट्रेरी क्रिटिसिज्म, पृ० २४५

मेकतां मृगयितुं कुशला: सन्ति । तन्महिम्नैव विभिन्नानां विचाराणां भावानाञ्चैकस्मिन् विशेषविचारे भावे वा समन्वयं कुर्वन्ति ।

शेक्सपियरस्तु एनामेव स्वस्थकल्पनां कथयति । दार्शनिक: काण्टश्च उत्पादनशीलकल्पनाशब्देन कविकल्पनां व्यवहरति । क्रोचेमहोदय एनां सहजानुभूतिं मन्यते । अनयो: शक्त्योर्मूलधर्मस्त्वेक एव । उत्पादनशीलकल्पना मानवचेतनायां जीवनसम्पर्काद् उत्पन्नानां रूपरहितानां चमत्कृतिविशेषाणां चित्रीकरणम् एतदेव भारतीयाचार्याणां मतेऽभिव्यक्तिरिति गीयते । सहजानुभूतिस्तु समाहितचित्ते शब्दार्थयोर्वास्तविकरूप-साक्षात्कारो वास्तविकसौन्दर्यप्रतिभासनं वा । एतदप्यभिव्यञ्जनाऽभिन्नमेव । एतदेवास्तव्यस्तज्ञानानां सामञ्जस्यं, नीरूपहार्दभावानां चित्रीकरणं वा । समाहितचित्ते विशृङ्खलता व्यवस्थिता (शृङ्खलिता) भवति, अनेकता एकतामापद्यते । तदैव अस्तव्यस्तज्ञानानि सामञ्जस्येन मूर्तिमन्ति भवन्ति तथा शब्दार्थयो: सत्यं स्वरूपं प्रतिभासते । यया शक्त्या एतत् कार्यं सम्पद्यते सैव काण्टमहोदयस्य सर्जनशीलकल्पना, सैव क्रोचेमहाशयस्य सहजानुभूति, सैवचार्याभिनवगुप्तपादानां काव्यनिर्माणक्षमा प्रतिभेति ।

कोस्तलरस्तु मन्यते यत् प्रतिभाया जन्म प्रथमत आश्चर्यभावनातो भवतीति ।[1] वानरजातीयप्राणिषु वनमानुषोपजातीय: प्राणी यदाऽग्रिमपदद्वयमुत्थायाऽद्यतनमनुष्यवदुत्थितोऽभूत् तदानीं स्वकीयेऽस्मिन् कृत्ये महदाश्चर्यमन्वभूत् स: । तदनन्तरं क्रमशस्तस्यां मुद्रायामेवाऽऽभ्यामग्रिमचरणाभ्यां हस्तयो: कार्यं कर्तुं प्रारभत तथा ताभ्यामेव वृक्षान् फलान्यचिनोत् । तत: क्रमशस्तत्पादौ हस्तौ संवृत्तौ । सम्भवतोऽयं खलु प्रतिभाया: प्रथमो विस्फोटो यो वनमानुषं मानुषे परावर्तयत् । द्वितीयस्तु हेतु:—स्वयमेवात्मनात्मन्येव परम्परागतप्राप्तज्ञानं प्रति विद्रोहकारणम् । 'कापर्नीकस:' परम्परागतज्ञानस्य विरोधे प्राचीनज्यौतिषाचार्यस्य टालमीमहोदयस्य पृथिवीकेन्द्रीयसौरमण्डलसिद्धान्तस्य स्थाने सूर्यकेन्द्रीयसौरमण्डलस्थानं पर्यकल्पयत् । वस्तुतस्त्वयमेको बौद्धिको विद्रोह आसीद् यो नवामेकां प्रतिभां ज्योतिर्विज्ञानस्य नवं क्रान्तिकारिणं सिद्धान्तञ्च व्यवस्थापयत् । कोस्तलानुसारं न्यूटनस्य गुरुत्वाकर्षणसिद्धान्तो वर्तमानकालिकसर्वश्रेष्ठवैज्ञानिकस्य आइन्सटीनस्य सापेक्षवादसिद्धान्तश्च विस्मयविद्रोहभावनानां विस्फोटात् प्रतिभारूपेण व्यकसताम् । कोस्तलर: स्वकीयास्य ग्रन्थस्य प्रारम्भेऽवोचद् यल्ललितसाहित्यस्याभ्युदयस्तदानीमभूद् यदा मनुष्यो हासकलामशिक्षत् । इयमेव कला काव्यस्य समस्तरसानां जननी तथा प्रतिभाया: प्राथमिकं रूपञ्च यस्या जन्म विस्मयबौद्धिकविद्रोहादिभ्योऽभूत् ।

१. दी ऐक्ट आफ क्रिएशन (सृष्टिकर्म) पृ० ४२४ ४५२ सन् १९६३ लन्दन संस्करण ।

आधुनिकसंस्कृतसाहित्ये "चरितं रघुनाथस्य!'

श्रीधर भास्कर वर्णेकर

विदग्धसंस्कृतसाहित्यस्य ऐतिहासिकं समालोचनं तथा च सामग्र्येण चिकित्सात्मकम् अध्ययनम् इदं प्राथम्येण म्याक्समूलर-वेबर-कीथ-श्रोडर-ओल्डेनबर्ग-विण्टरनिट्झ-प्रभृतिभिः स्वनामधन्यैः यूरोपीयपण्डितैः गतशताब्द्यां समारभ्यत। ततश्च तत्पदचिह्नानुसारिभिः दासगुप्त-डे-वरदाचार्य-कृष्णम्माचार्य-प्रभृतिभिः भारतीयैः नवपण्डितैः आङ्ग्लभाषायां तथा प्रादेशिकभाषासु च विविधासु समग्रसंस्कृतसाहित्येतिहासपर्यालोचनात्मकाः बहुविधा ग्रन्थाः प्राकाश्यम् अनीयन्त। प्रा० हंसराज अगरवालेन, आचार्यद्विजेन्द्रनाथशास्त्रिणा च संस्कृतभाषायां संस्कृत-साहित्यस्य पर्यालोचनं कृतम्। साम्प्रतं संस्कृतसाहित्येतिहासपर्यालोचनपराणां ग्रन्थानां प्राचुर्यमवलोक्यते सर्वत्र ग्रन्थालयेषु परं हन्त प्रायेण सर्वेषु संस्कृतसाहित्येतिहासग्रन्थेषु पण्डितराजजगन्नाथोत्तरकालीनस्य संस्कृतसाहित्यस्य नामाऽपि न श्रूयते। मन्ये "शेखरान्तं व्याकरणम्" इति वत् "जगन्नाथान्तं संस्कृतसाहित्यम्" इति सिद्धान्तस्तैः साहित्यपर्यालोचकैः स्वीकृत आसीत्। केवलं श्रीमता माडिभाषिकृष्णम्माचार्येण एकलेन स्वीये आङ्ग्लभाषीये संस्कृतसाहित्येतिहासे जगन्नाथोत्तरकालीनस्य यत्र तत्र प्रकाशम् आगतस्य, प्रायेण दुर्लभस्य सर्वविधस्य संस्कृतसाहित्यस्य समालोचनं मनाक् स्वग्रन्थे कृतमिति सर्वथा खलु धन्यवादार्हः स महानुभावः।

स्वातन्त्र्योदयानन्तरं जगन्नाथोत्तरकालीनस्य अर्थात् अर्वाचीनस्य संस्कृतसाहित्यस्य पर्यालोचकाः केचन प्रबन्धाः प्रकाशमायाताः*। तथा च यत्र तत्र विश्वविद्यालयेषु आधुनिकं संस्कृतसाहित्यम् अधिकृत्य चर्चासत्राणि समायोज्यन्त। अनेन जगन्नाथान्तं संस्कृतसाहित्यम् इति सुशिक्षितैरपि स्वीकृतो मिथ्याभ्रमः दीपप्रकाशेन रज्जुसर्पवत् विलयं गतः। नेदानीं कोऽपि अनुन्मत्तः "संस्कृत इज़ ए डेड लैंग्वेज", "जगन्नाथान्तं संस्कृतसाहित्यम्" इति जल्पति। जगन्नाथोत्तरकालीनस्य एदंयुगीनस्य संस्कृतसाहित्यस्य अस्तित्वं नेदानीं विवादस्य विषयः। भारतीयसाहित्यशास्त्रज्ञैः महाकाव्यम्, खण्डकाव्यम्, चम्पूकाव्यम्, मुक्तकम्, गीतिकाव्यम् इत्येवंविधाः

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*मॉडर्न संस्कृत रायटिंग्ज़ (२) मॉडर्न संस्कृत लिट्रेचर (३) संस्कृत लिट्रेचर (१७०० तः १९०० पर्यन्तम्) इमे त्रयो निबन्धाः स्व० डॉ० राघवनस्य। अर्वाचीनसंस्कृतसाहित्य (मराठीभाषायां) डॉ० श्री.भा. वर्णेकरस्य अर्वाचीनसंस्कृतनाट्यम् डॉ० रामजी उपाध्यायस्य (हिन्दीभाषायाम्)।

काव्यप्रकाराः प्रतिपादिताः। प्राचीनसंस्कृतसाहित्ये एतत्प्रकारकाः परःशताः काव्यग्रन्थाः समवलोक्यन्ते। एतेषु दृश्यमानाः कथावस्तुविषयाः रामायण-महाभारत-भागवतप्रमुखेभ्यः पुराणग्रन्थेभ्य एव समाहृताः सन्ति। प्राचीनसाहित्यिकानां ते पुराणग्रन्था एव उपजीव्यग्रन्थाः आसन्। सा एव पौराणकथाप्रवणा काव्यपरम्परा अर्वाचीनेऽपि संस्कृतकाव्ये अखण्डितं प्रवहमाना समवलोक्यते।

काव्यपरम्परायां पुराणकथानिष्ठत्वं नाम न खलु संस्कृतकवीनाम् एव वैशिष्ट्यं वैगुण्यं वा। मध्ययुगीने सकलप्रादेशिकभाषीये साहित्येऽपि तदेव पुराणकथानिष्ठत्वं दृष्टिपथमायाति। विविधभाषीयमपि भारतीयं साहित्यं वस्तुदृष्ट्या समानगुणमेव सर्वथा। पौराणिककथातिरिक्तविषयेषु हर्ष-विक्रमाङ्कदेवसदृशाणां राजपुरुषाणां तथा शङ्कर-बुद्ध-चैतन्यसदृशाणां धर्मपुरुषाणां वा चरित्राणि कैश्चित् साहित्यकैः प्रतिभाविष्कारार्थं विषयीकृतानि सन्ति। यतो हि षोडशशताब्द्यां संस्कृतसाहित्यस्रोतस्विनी प्रलयं वा विलयं वा गतेति मन्यन्ते यूरोपीयाः समीक्षकाः अतः षोडशशतकोत्तरकालीनं सर्वं संस्कृतवाङ्मयम् अर्वाक्कालीनं गणनीयम्। सप्तदशतमं शतकं खलु अर्वाचीनसंस्कृतसाहित्यस्य प्रारम्भशतकत्वेन गणितव्यम् यो हि पण्डितराजः अन्तिमकविरिति गण्यते मृतभाषावादिभिः स खलु आदिकविः अर्वाचीनसंस्कृतसाहित्यस्य इति गणयित्वा विमर्शः कर्तव्यः अर्वाचीनसंस्कृतसाहित्यस्य। यतो हि नवयुगीनस्य भारतीयसाहित्यस्य किमपि वैशिष्ट्यं जगन्नाथीये काव्ये लेशतो दृग्गोचरीभवति।

रामायणस्य अप्रतिहतः प्रभावः

भारतीयपरम्परानुसारं भगवान् वाल्मीकिः आदिकविः तथा च तत्काव्यनायकः भगवान् श्रीरामचन्द्रः "सप्तमो विष्णोरवतारः" इति सर्वत्र द्रढीयसी श्रद्धा जागर्ति, अत एव रामायणं खलु प्रियतमो विषयः सर्वेषां भारतीयसाहित्यिकानाम्। अर्वाक्कालीनेषु महाकाव्यप्रणेतृषु चतुरधिकैकशत (१०४) ग्रन्थलेखकेन अप्पयदीक्षितेन तथा च तञ्जौरनृपतिना रघुनाथनायकेन रामचरितमधिकृत्य "रामायणकथासारसङ्ग्रहाख्यं काव्यं विरचितम्। रघुनाथनायकस्य सभाकवयित्री मधुरवाणीनाम्नी काचिद् विदुषी आसीत्। तयाऽपि चतुर्दशसर्गात्मकं रामायणकाव्यं तस्मिन्नेव काले विरचितम्। रत्नखेट-श्रीनिवासदीक्षितस्य पुत्रेण राजचूडामणिना मञ्जुभाषिणी इत्याख्यः रामचरितात्मकः "एकदिनप्रबन्धो" लिखितः यस्मिन् सुबन्धुसदृशं प्रत्यक्षरश्लेषकौशल्यं कविना सुष्ठु समाविष्कृतम्। "रामचन्द्रोदयम्" नाम काव्यद्वयं तस्मिन्नेव १७तमे शतके तामिलप्रदेशवासिना वेङ्कटेशेन वेङ्टकृष्णेन च लिखितमासीत्। काञ्चीसमीपस्थ (आरसालई) ग्रामवासिना श्रीनिवाससुतवेङ्कटेशकविना "रामयमकार्णवः" इत्याख्यं यमकालङ्कारप्रचुरं काव्यं विरचितम्। तेनैव कविना "रामचन्द्रोदयम्" नाम त्रिंशत् (३०) सर्गात्मकम् अन्यरामचरितं विरचितम्। १९ शतके चिदम्बरवासिना वेङ्टकृष्णेनाऽपि "रामचन्द्रोदयम्" इत्याख्यम् अपरं महाकाव्यं विरचितम्। १७ शतकान्ते रामचन्द्रतर्कवागीशाख्येन वङ्गीयकविना "रामविलासः" इत्याख्यं काव्यं लिखितम्। श्रीनिवाससुतेन वरदादेशिकेन गद्यरामायणम् रघूवीरविजयम् रामायणसग्रङ्हः इत्यारव्यानि त्रिविधानि रामचरित्राणि लिखितानि।

अष्टाशततमे शतके तञ्जौरवासिना पञ्चरत्नकविरिति विख्यातेन द्वादशसर्गात्मकं "राघवचरितं" लिखित्वा स्वस्वामिनः शरभोजिनृपतेः नाम्ना प्रकाशतां नीतम्। सोऽपि नृपतिः बहुभाषाकोविदः महामनीषी

आसीत् । अस्मिन्नेव शतके केरलवासिना महाकविना रामपाणिवादेन २० सर्गात्मकं "राघवीयम्" लिखितम् । तथा च तत्रत्येन क्रांगनोरयुवराजेन रामवर्मणा १२ सर्गात्मकं ""रामचरितम्" विरचितम् ।

मद्रासस्थ-पच्चयप्पासंस्कृतमहाविद्यालयस्य आचार्येण महामहोपाध्याय-लक्ष्मणसूरिणा "रामायण-सङ्ग्रहो" विरचितः । विशाखापट्टणमण्डलस्थेन गोपालशास्त्रिणा "सीतारामाभ्युदयम्" तथा च वाराणसेय-हिन्दूविश्वविद्यालस्याचार्येण कालीकिङ्करसुतेन श्रीमदन्नदाचरणठाकुरेण "रामाभ्युदयम्" नाम काव्यं विरचितम् ।

माडिभाषिकृष्णम्माचार्याणां संस्कृतसाहित्येतिहासग्रन्थे रामचरितम् अधिकृत्य लिखितानां भूयसां अर्वाचीन-संस्कृतग्रन्थानां नामानि यत्र तत्र विकीर्णानि उपलभ्यन्ते । तेषु केषाञ्चित् समुल्लेखनीयानां ग्रन्थानां सुसङ्कलिता नामावली अत्र दीयते ।

काव्यनामानि	**कविनामानि**
चित्रबन्धरामायणम्	वेङ्कटमखी
जानकीपरिणयः	चक्रकविः
सीतादिव्यचरितम्	श्रीनिवासः (वरदवल्लीवंशजः)
गद्यरामायणम्]	
रघुवीरविजयम्]	श्रीनिवासपुत्रो वरददेशिकः
रामायणसङ्ग्रहः]	
रामकुतूहलम्	गोविन्दसुतो रामेश्वरः ।
रामचरित्रम्	रघुनाथः ।
उदारराघवम्	चण्डीसूर्यः ।
कल्याणरामायणम्	शेषकविः ।
भद्रादिरामायणम्	वीरराघवः ।
रामकथासुधोदयम्	श्रीशैलश्रीनिवासः ।
यादवराघवीयम्	नरहरिः ।
रामामृतम्	वेङ्कटरङ्गः ।
रघुवीरवर्यचरितम्	तिरुमलकोणाचार्यः ।
दशाननवधम्	योगीन्द्रनाथः ।
रघुवीरचरितम्	सुकुमारः ।
सीतारामविहारः	लक्ष्मणसोमयाजी ।
रामगुणाकरः	रामदेवः ।
रामखेटकाव्यम्	पद्मनाथः ।
रामविलासः	रामचन्द्रः ।
रामविलासः	हरिनाथः ।

रामचन्द्रकाव्यम्	शम्भुकालिदासः ।
प्रसन्नरामायणम्	श्रीपादपुत्रो देवरदीक्षितः ।
रामचन्द्रोदयम्	कविवल्लभः ।
रामचरितम्	विश्वक्सेनः ।
राघवोल्लासः	अद्वैतरामभिक्षुः ।
राघवोल्लासः	पूज्यपाददेवानन्दः ।
बालराघवीयम्	शठगोपाचार्यः ।
रमणीयराघवम्	ब्रह्मदत्तः ।
अभिरामकाव्यम्	रामनाथः ।
रामकुतूहलम्	गोविन्दसुतः कमलाकरः ।
रामकथामृतम्	गिरिधरदासः ।
रामगुणाकरः	रामदेवो न्यायालङ्कारः ।
रामविलासकाव्यम्	हरिनाथः ।
रामचरितम्	काशीनाथः ।
रामचरितम्	मोहनस्वामी ।
रामलीलोद्योतः	बाणेश्वरसुतो रमानाथः ।
रामाभिषेकम्	केशवः ।
रामकाव्यम्	रामानन्दतीर्थः ।
रामाभ्युदयम्	वेङ्कटेशः ।
शितिकण्ठरामायणम्	शितिकण्ठः ।
रघुवीरविलासम्	दामोदरसुतो लक्ष्मणः ।
रघुपतिविजयम्	गोपीनाथः ।
रामचन्द्रोदयम्	पुरुषोत्तममिश्रः ।
रामचन्द्रोदयम्	रामदासः ।
रामचन्द्रोदयम्	कविवल्लभः ।
रामचन्द्रमहोदयम्	सच्चिदानन्दः ।
रामकाव्यम्	बालकृष्णः ।
रामरत्नाकरः	मधुव्रतः ।
रामरसामृतम्	श्रीधरः ।
रघुनन्दनविलासम्	वेङ्कटाचार्यः ।
रघुनन्दनविलासम्	पात्राचार्यः ।
विक्रमराघवीयम्	नूतनकालिदासः ।
पौलस्त्यराघवीयम्	पुल्लोलवंशीयो रामचन्द्रः ।

श्रीरामविजयम्	अरुणाचलनाथशिष्यः ।
बालरामरसायनम्	कृष्णशास्त्री ।
रामायणसारसङ्ग्रहः	ईश्वरदीक्षितः ।
ललितराघवम्	श्रीनिवासरथः ।
जानक्यानन्दबोधः	श्रीपतिगोविन्दः ।
सीतारामाभ्युदयम्	गोपालशास्त्री ।
सीताचरितम्	डॉ॰ रेवाप्रसाद द्विवेदी ।
सीतारामविहारकाव्यम्	ओर्गण्टीवंशवर्धनो लक्ष्मणाध्वरिः ।

राजस्थानान्तर्गतलक्ष्मणगढस्थऋषिकुलनिवासिना कवीन्द्रपरमानन्दशर्मणा समग्रं रामचरितं (१) मन्थरादुर्विलसितम् (२) दशरथविलापः (३) मारीचवधम् (४) मेघनादवधम् (५) रावणवधम् इत्येवं खण्डशः विभक्तेषु नानाकाव्येषु विरचितम् । सूर्यनारायणाध्वरिणः सीतापरिणयम्, कामराजकवेः सीतास्वयंवरम्, काशीनाथकवेः वैदेहीपरिणयम्, शिवरामकृतं हनुमत्काव्यम्, हनुमद्विजयम् इत्येवंविधानि काव्यान्यपि रामचरितपराण्येव सन्ति ।

रामकथाविषयाणि चम्पूकाव्यानि

आधुनिकसंस्कृतलेखकैः त्रिविक्रमभट्टेन प्रवर्तितं चम्पूकाव्यप्रकारस्य परम्परा चापि यथापूर्वं सुपरिपालिता । अर्वाचीनचम्पूलेखकेषु अण्णैयाचार्य-दत्तात्रेयवासुदेवनिगुडकर-श्रीनिवासाचार्यसुतराघवाचार्य-रामभट्टसुतनीलकण्ठ-वीरराघवात्मज–वेङ्कटकवि-केशवपुत्ररामचन्द्र-प्रभृतीनां कवीनां नामानि अविस्मरणीयानि सर्वथा । सप्तदशशतकोत्पन्नेन केरलीयेन कविना नारायणभट्टपादेन विशंतिमिताश्चम्पूग्रन्थाः शाक्यारजातीयानां कथाप्रवक्तृणां कृते विरचिताः तेषु अहल्यामोक्षचम्पूः तथा रामकथाचम्पूश्च रामचरित्रमधिकृत्य वर्तेते । रामायणविषयकाणां केषाञ्चित् प्रमुखचम्पूकाव्यानां नामावलिः अत्र दीयते ।

चम्पूः	**कविः**
चम्पूराघवम् ।	आसुरी अनन्ताचार्यः ।
रामायणचम्पूः ।	नरसिंह अयंगारसुता सुन्दरवल्ली ।
चम्पूरामायणम्	सीतारामशास्त्री ।
रघुनाथविजयचम्पूः	कृष्णकविः ।
रामचर्यामृतचम्पूः	कृष्णय्यगार्यः ।
रामचम्पूः	बंदलामूडी रामस्वामी ।

श्रीमता माडिभाषिकृष्णम्माचारियरमहाशयेन स्वीये संस्कृतसाहित्येतिहासग्रन्थे चतुर्थभागस्य ५४१ मिते परिच्छेदे कासाञ्चिद् अप्रकाशितानां रामायणचम्पूनां यानि नामानि प्रदत्तानि तान्यत्र समुल्लिख्यन्ते—

चम्पूः	कविः
अमोघराघवचम्पूः	श्रीविश्वेश्वरपुत्रो दिवाकरः ।
कुशलवचम्पूः	श्रीवेङ्कटय्यासुधीः ।
रामकथासुधोदयचम्पूः	देवराजदेशिकः ।
सीताविजयचम्पूः	घण्टावतारः ।
रामचन्द्रचम्पूः	रत्नखेटस्य पौत्रो रामचन्द्रः ।
रामचन्द्रचम्पूः	विश्वनाथः ।
रामाभ्युदयचम्पूः	रामः ।
उत्तरकाण्डचम्पूः	राघवः ।
उत्तरचम्पूः	ब्रह्मपण्डितः ।
उत्तरचम्पूः	राघवभट्टः ।
उत्तरचम्पूः	गंगाधरामात्यसुतः भगवन्तः ।
रामाभिषेकचम्पूः	पद्मनाभसुतो देवराजः ।
अभिनवरामायणचम्पूः	लक्ष्मणदान्तः ।
रामायणचम्पूः	रामानुजः ।
काकुत्स्थविजयचम्पूः	वल्लीसहायः ।
सीताचम्पूः	गुण्डुस्वामी शास्त्री ।
मरुतिविजयचम्पूः	रघुनाथः ।
आग्नेयविजयचम्पूः	नृसिंहः ।
उत्तरचम्पूरामायणम्	वेङ्कटकृष्णः ।
हनुमदपदानचम्पूः	?

गीतरामायणानि

द्वादशशतके जयदेवकवेः गीतगोविन्दकाव्येन गीतिकाव्यप्रकारः संस्कृतसाहित्ये प्रावर्तत। ततः प्रभृति परः-शतानि गीतिकाव्यानि संस्कृतसाहित्ये समुद्भूतानि। अर्वाचीनसंस्कृतलेखकैः इयमपि काव्यप्रणाली सुष्ठु सुरक्षिता संवर्धिता च। एतेषु रामचरितमधिकृतानि कानिचित् गीतिकाव्यानि समुपलभ्यन्ते। तानि यथा—

गीतिकाव्यम्	कविः
गीतराघवम्	प्रभाकरकविः ।
गीतराघवम्	हरिशङ्करः ।
गीतराघवम्	रामकविः ।
सङ्गीतरघुनन्दनम्	विश्वनाथः ।

सङ्गीतराघवम्	चिन्नबोमभूपालः ।
सङ्गीतराघवम्	गङ्गाधरकविः नागपुरस्थः ।
सङ्गीतरघुनन्दनम्	प्रियदासः ।
रामचन्द्राह्निकम्	प्रियदासः ।
श्रीरामसङ्गीतिका[1]	डॉ० श्रीधर भास्कर वर्णेकरः ।

रामकथामयी काव्यस्रोतस्विनी अतिप्राचीनकालाद् आरभ्य संस्कृतसाहित्योपासकैः स्वस्वकाव्यार्ध्य-जलप्रदानेन सम्प्रवाहिता आसीत्। यस्मिन् कालखण्डे संस्कृतसाहित्यसर्जनप्रक्रिया खण्डितेति भ्रान्तमतिभिः निर्णीतं, तस्मिन् अर्वाचीने सप्तदशशतकोत्तरे कालखण्डे केवलं श्रीरामचरितम् अधिकृत्य विविधानि काव्यानि निर्माय साऽतिप्राचीना काव्यपरम्परा कथं सुरक्षिता इति सूचयितुं निबन्धोऽयं समर्थः स्यात् ।

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१. नृत्याभिनयप्रदर्शनोचिता एता मम एकादशमिताः सङ्गीतिकाः साम्प्रतं मुद्रणालये सन्ति । नचिरात् तत्प्रकाशनं भविष्यति ।

SECTION V

Religion and Philosophy

शब्दाद्वैतवादः

को० अ० सुब्रह्मण्य अय्यर

यत्प्रसादान्मया बाल्ये संस्कृते पदमर्पितम् ।
नारायणाय कृतिने तस्मै श्रीगुरवेनम ॥ १ ॥

नीतो येनास्मि यूरोपशिक्षार्थं मे हितैषिणा ।
संस्कृते चैव शास्त्रे च श्रद्धा मे येन वर्द्धिता ॥ २ ॥

पाश्चात्यसंस्कृतेस्तत्त्वं प्रेम्णा येनास्मि बोधितः ।
दिवङ्गताय सुहृदे तस्मै वन्मार्लये नमः ॥ ३ ॥

मुनित्रयं नमस्कृत्य हरिं तद्वंशभूषणम् ।
भक्त्या स्मरामि तद्दृष्ट्वा मनागुन्मीलितेक्षणः ॥४॥

महान्तः कवयः सन्तु महान्तः पण्डितास्तथा ।
महाकविर्महाविद्वानेको भर्तृहरिर्मतः ॥५॥

शब्दाद्वैतसमाख्यं यद् दर्शनं तदुदीरितम् ।
तस्य द्वित्राणि तत्त्वानि व्याख्यास्येऽद्य यथामति ॥६॥

गम्भीरं दर्शनं तत् क्व क्व चाहं मन्दधी पुनः ।
तथापि श्रोतुमर्हन्ति सन्तो दोषपराङ्मुखाः ॥७॥

महावैयाकरणस्तत्रभवान् भर्तृहरिः शब्दाद्वैतस्य प्रवर्तकत्वेन प्रसिद्धिं गतः । दर्शनमिदं तद्विरचिते वाक्यपदीये प्रतिपादितं दृश्यते । अस्य दर्शनस्य मुख्यानि तत्त्वानि ग्रन्थकृता वाक्यपदीयस्य प्रारम्भ एव चतसृषु कारिकाषु निर्दिष्टानि सन्ति ।

तद्यथा–

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्वं यदक्षरम् ।
निवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥ १॥

एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥२॥
अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।
जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥३॥
एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चेयमनेकधा ।
भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥४॥

इति । अत्र प्रकृतदर्शनस्य यानि मुख्यानि तत्त्वानि तानीत्थं वर्णयितुं शक्यन्ते--

१. यदिदं जगतो मूलकारणं ब्रह्म तच्छब्दतत्त्वमित्यादौ प्रतिज्ञायते ।

२. इदं शब्दतत्त्वं ब्रह्मैकमभिन्नं च । तथापि सन्त्यस्य बह्व्यः शक्तयो याभिस्तद् भिन्नमिव प्रतीयते व्यवह्रियते च । तच्च शक्तिभ्योऽपृथक्त्वेऽपि पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ।

३. ब्रह्मणोऽध्याहितभेदां कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः जन्मादयः षड् विकाराः भावभेदस्य योनयो भवन्ति ।

४. अस्यैकस्य सर्वबीजस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनुभूयमानेयं भोक्तृभोक्तव्यभोगरूपेण स्थितिर्व्यवहारव्यवस्था प्रवर्तते । ब्रह्मतत्त्वमिति वेदागमसिद्धमिदं तत्त्वम् । तच्च तत्रभवता भर्तृहरिणा स्वकण्ठत एव प्रोद्घोषितम् ।

शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः ।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममिदं विश्वं व्यवर्तत ॥ [1]

सर्वविदितमेतद् यत् संहितासु ब्राह्मणेषु च ब्रह्मसम्बन्धीनि वाक्सम्बन्धीनि च बहूनि वाक्यानि तत्र तत्र विप्रकीर्णानि समुपलभ्यन्ते । तेषु कदाचित् समस्तस्य जगतो ब्रह्मैव मूलतत्त्वमिति कदाचिद् वागेव तथेति च श्रूयते । अत एव

आम्नाये संहृतभोग्यभोक्तृशक्तेर्वागात्मनो बहुधा कारणत्वमाम्नातम् इति वाक्यपदीयवृत्तौ दृश्यते । सर्वविदितमेतद् यदृग्वेदीयदशममण्डलस्य पञ्चविंशत्युत्तरशततमे सूक्ते वागम्भृणी ब्रह्मणा सह तादात्म्यमनुभवन्ती सर्वजगद्रूपेण सर्वस्याधिष्ठानत्वेन चाहमेव सर्वं भवामीति स्वात्मानं स्तौति । अतो वाक्तत्त्वस्य ब्रह्मणो विश्वप्रकृतित्वं श्रुतिसम्मतमिति वक्तुं शक्यते ।

श्रुतिसम्मतत्वेनापरितुष्यतेव भर्तृहरिणा तत्र युक्तिरपि प्रदर्शिता । यद्यपि युक्तिरियं कारिकासु कुत्रापि न प्रदर्शिता तथापि कारिकोक्तमेवार्थमाश्रित्य स्वोपज्ञवृत्तौ भर्तृहरिणेत्थमुपन्यस्ता सा । "तत्तु भिन्नरूपाभिमतानां विकाराणां प्रकृत्यन्वयित्वाच्छब्दोपग्राह्यतया शब्दोपग्राहितया च शब्दतत्त्वमित्यभिधीयते इति विकाराणां प्रकृत्यन्वयित्वमिति लोकसिद्धोऽयमर्थः । रुचकस्वस्तिककुण्डलादयो विकाराः सुवर्णप्रकृत्यन्विता दृश्यन्ते । अतस्तेषां प्रकृतिः सुवर्णमित्यवगम्यते । तथैवैते रूपादयः सर्वे भावाः शब्दरूपानुगता दृश्यन्ते इति प्रकृतिरूपे ब्रह्मणि शब्दापदेशः । यद्यपि भिन्नेन्द्रियग्राह्या भावा भिन्नाः प्रतिभान्ति तथापि परमार्थत एकरूपाः

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१. वाक्यपदीयम् । १. ११२

सर्वे भावा:, यत: सर्वे शब्दस्वभावा: । अविद्यावशाद्भिन्नरूपा इत्यभिमता: । भिन्नरूपाभिमतानामपि सर्वेषां भावानां शब्दोपग्राह्यतया शब्दोपग्राहितया च तेषां प्रकृतिर्ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वमित्यवसीयते । सर्वमपि ज्ञानमुपजायमानं समुल्लिखितशब्दकमेवोपजायते । शब्दोल्लेखविरहिणो ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशनमेव नास्ति । अनुत्पन्ननिर्विशेषं तज्ज्ञानम् । इदमीदृशमिति परामर्शरहिते ज्ञाने ज्ञानत्वमेव नास्ति । शब्दार्थसंम्बन्धेऽनवाप्तव्युत्पत्तयो बाला: प्रमातारोऽपि यत्-तत्-सत् किमित्यादिशब्दजातमनुल्लिखन्तो किमपि प्रमेयं प्रतिपन्ति । शब्दोन्मेषप्रभावादेव प्रकाशस्वभावत्वं भवति ज्ञानस्य इदं सर्वं मनसि विधायैवोक्तं तत्रभवता भर्तृहरिणा—

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके य: शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ।। इति ।।

एवमनभ्युपगमे ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशशून्यतयानधिगतविषय: सर्वोऽपि लोकोऽन्धमूकप्राय: स्यात् ।

वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाश: प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ।।

इति चोक्तं भर्तृहरिणा ।

एवं स्थित इदं सिध्यति यत् सर्व ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकमपि शब्दविशिष्टमर्थमवद्योतयति इति । गौ: शुक्लो गच्छतीति जातिगुणक्रियावच्छिन्नविषयावभासिनि ज्ञाने शब्दविशिष्ट एवार्थ: प्रस्फुरति । शब्दाख्यविशेषानुरक्तस्य तस्य विशेषस्य स्वरूपं पृष्ट: शब्दनैव दर्शयति । शब्दापरित्यागलब्धप्रकाशस्वरूपैवानुभूत्यानुभवति इति सोऽपि विशेष्य: शब्दरूप एव । तदेवं शब्द एवार्थोपारूढ: प्रतिभाति । यदुपारूढ: शब्द: प्रकाशते तस्य पृथक् प्रदर्शयितुमनुभवितुं वा शक्यत्वात् शब्द एव तथा तथा प्रतिभातीति शब्दविवर्त एवायमर्थ: नान्य: कश्चित् । इन्द्रियजेषु ज्ञानेषु य: क्रम: तथैव शाब्देष्वपि ज्ञानेषु शब्दविशिष्टो वार्थ: प्रतिभाति, शाब्दो वार्थारूढ: शब्द एवार्थरूपेण विवर्तते इति गृह्यताम् । अतश्च शब्दब्रह्मेदमेकमविद्योपाधिदर्शितनानात्वमविद्योपरमे यथावस्थितरूपं प्रकाशते इति युक्तम् ।

अमुमेवार्थं भङ्ग्यन्तरेणान्यत्र विशदीकरोति ग्रन्थकार: तद्यथा—

षड्जादिभेद: शब्देन व्याख्यातो रूप्यते यत: ।
तस्मादर्थविधा: सर्वा: शब्दमात्रासु निश्चिता: ।।[1]

इत्यत्र । अयमर्थ: । भावानां भेदावग्रहे शब्द: कारणम् । सर्वो ह्यर्थ: स्वविषयसंविज्ञानजनकपदप्रतिपादित एव तद्व्यवहारपथमवतरति । न हि शब्दाव्यपदेश्येन स्वरूपमात्रेण चक्षुरादिभि: परिच्छिन्नोऽर्थो व्यवहारविषयो दृष्ट: । भेदवानर्थ: खलु शब्देऽध्यारूढो भवति । अर्थे शब्दशक्तिसंसृष्टया शब्नानुविद्धया शब्दात्मिकया बुद्धया प्रकाश्यते, उपगृह्यते स्वीक्रियते ।

न केवलं भेदावग्रहे शब्द: कारणमपि तु भावानामुत्पत्तावपीत्याह भर्तृहरिणा पूर्वोदाहृतायां

शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदु: ।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममिदं विश्वं व्यवर्तत ।।[2]

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१. तदेव १.१११
२. तदेव १.११२

इत्यस्यां कारिकायाम् ।

एवं सर्वेषां भावानां शब्दस्वभावत्वात् सर्वस्यापि ज्ञानस्य शब्दानुविद्धत्वात् तेषां प्रकृतिर्ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वमिति निश्चीयते । अस्यैव तत्त्वस्य प्रतिपादकोऽयं चिरन्तनश्लोकः समुद्धृतो दृश्यते स्वोपज्ञवृत्तौ—

ब्रह्मेदं शब्दनिर्माणं शब्दशक्तिनिबन्धनम् ।
विवृत्तं शब्दमात्राभ्यस्तास्वेव प्रविलीयते ।।

"श्लोकेऽस्मिन् ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वमित्यत्र हेतुः प्रदर्शिताः" इत्युक्तं व्याख्याकारेण वृषभदेवेन। रूपादयो भावा शब्दरूपतया निर्मीयन्ते इतीदं तत्त्वमेव शब्दनिर्माणमिति विशेषणेन प्रत्यायते । "विवृत्तं शब्दमात्राभ्यः" इत्यनेन ब्रह्मणि याः शक्तयस्ताभ्यो विवृत्तमिदं जगदिति तत्त्वं प्रोद्घोषितम् । प्रतिसंहारकाले च तास्वेव शक्तिशक्तिषु जगदिदं प्रविलीयत इत्यप्यत्रोक्त भवति । अस्मिन् प्राचीने श्लोके यत्तत्त्वमुक्तं तदेव भर्तृहरिणा स्वशब्दैरित्थं प्रतिपादितम् ।

"शब्देस्वेवाश्रिता शक्तिर्विश्वस्यास्य निबन्धिनी ।"[1]

इति । वाच्यवाचकरूपस्यास्य विश्वस्य निबन्धिनी शक्तिः । "अयमेव शब्दोऽस्यैवार्थस्य वाचकः" इति नियामिका शक्तिः शब्देष्वेवाश्रिता । गोत्ववृक्षत्वशब्दत्वादयो जातयो महाप्रलयेऽवस्थान्तराभावान्नित्यं वाक्तत्त्वमेवाश्रयन्ते । तदेव निबन्धनं तासाम् । ताः खलु जातयस्तत्रावस्थिरा अपि न संवेद्या इत्यभिव्यक्तये वाक्तत्त्वस्थगवादिभावेन परिणतिमपेक्षन्ते ।

द्विविधश्च परिणामो भवति । पिण्डपरिणामः शब्दररिणामश्चेति । पिण्डपरिणामेनाभिव्यक्ता गोत्वादयो वाच्याः । गोवृक्षादिशब्दपरिणामेनाभिव्यक्ता गोशब्दत्वादिजातयो वाचिका भवन्ति । तदेवमाश्रयस्योत्पत्तौ जातीनामभिव्यक्तया वाच्यवाचकरूपस्य विश्वस्य वाक्तत्त्वं निबन्धनम् । अस्य विश्वस्य सूक्ष्मे वाक्तत्त्वं एव प्रविलयः । एतद्वैपरीत्येन च सर्गकाले सूक्ष्माद् वाक्तत्त्वाद् वाच्यवाचकोभयात्मनां विषयाणामुद्भवः । एवं विश्वस्य सर्गलयाधिष्ठानत्वादुपादानकारणं सूक्ष्मं प्रतिसंहृतक्रमं वाक्तत्त्वम् । एतदेवास्याऽप्याहुः—

वागेवार्थं पश्यति वाग् ब्रवीति
वागेवार्थं सन्निहितं सन्तनोति ।
वाच्येव विश्वं बहुरूपं निबद्धं
तदेतदेकं प्रतिभज्योपभुङ्क्ते ।।

इति । सूक्ष्मं वाक्तत्त्वमेव ज्ञातृरूपेणावास्थितं सत् स्वपरिणामेन स्थुलशब्देन प्रकाशितं स्वपरिणामभूतमर्थं पश्यति । तदेव वाक्तत्त्वं वक्तृरूपेणाबस्थितं सत् स्वपरिणामभूतं स्थूलशब्दं ब्रवीति, अर्थात् प्राणस्योदर्ध्वं समीरणेन करणकम्पं स्थानाभिधातं चोत्पाद्य स्थूलशब्दमुत्पादयति, तदेव वाक्तत्त्वं स्वस्मिन् शक्तिरूपेण स्थितं विषयजातं विस्ताररूपेण प्रदर्शयति । तस्मिन्नेव वाक्तत्त्वे बहुरूपं नानाजातीयं विश्वं निबद्धं शक्तिरूपेण स्थितम् । तदेतदेकमेव वाक्तत्त्वे भोक्तृलोकः स्वादृष्टद्वारा प्रविभज्य नानाभोग्यरूपतां स्वयमेवोत्पाद्योपभुङ्क्ते इति । एवमेकस्माच्छब्दतत्त्वाद् ब्रह्मणो निःसृतमिदं विश्वं प्रायेण वाच्या-

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१. तदेव १.११०

वाचकोभयात्मकमिति द्विधा विभक्तमिति, कदाचिद् भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण न स्थितिः इति त्रिधा विभक्तमिति, तद् दृश्यं दर्शनं द्रष्टा दर्शने च प्रयोजनमिति चतुर्धा विभक्तमिति च शास्त्र उक्तम् ।

सर्वमपि ज्ञानं शब्दानुविद्धमिति वदता तत्रभवता भर्तृहरिणा शब्दशब्देन कश्चिद् भाषाविशेषो नाभिप्रेतः । यतोऽनधिगतभाषाविशेषाणां नवजातबालानामपि ज्ञानं शब्दानुविद्धम् । न केवलं शब्दस्य विश्वप्रकृतित्वं विश्वनिमित्तत्वं च अपितु इदमेव कर्तव्यमितीति कर्तव्यताज्ञानेऽपि शब्द एव निमित्तम् । लोके शब्दपरिकल्पितेन वस्तुना व्यवहारो न तु सतापि शब्दागोचरेण दृश्यते । सदपि वाग्व्यवहारेणानुपगृहीतमसता तुल्यम् । न वस्तुनः सत्वमसत्वं वा व्यवहाराङ्गम् अपि तु शब्दकल्पितस्तदाकार एव । लोकेऽत्यन्तसत्वेन प्रसिद्धं शशविषाणादि आकाशे प्राप्ताविर्भावं तत्क्षण एव प्राप्ततिरोभावं गन्धर्वनगरादि च शब्देन समुत्थाप्यमानं कल्पितं स्वाकारं परिदधदेव मुख्यसत्तायुक्तं घटादिकमिव तेषु तेषु कार्येषु प्रतिभासते । जातमात्रस्य बालस्य मनुष्यजात्युचिताश्चेष्टाः स्वमातरमुदिद्श्य प्रवर्तन्ते । पूर्वजन्मार्जितशब्दसंस्कारद्वारा सूक्ष्मवाग्रूपानुषङ्गरूपशब्द-समावेशवतामव्यक्तवाचां बालानामपि स्वजातीयेषु बालेषु वयस्येषु तं तमव्यक्तमुच्चारयत्सु सत्सु क्रीडादिरूपं तत्तदर्थक्रियाविषया वयस्यबालोच्चारितानाख्ययाव्यक्तजनिता प्रतीतिरुत्पद्यते । इदं सर्वं मनसि निधायैवोक्तं भर्तृहरिणा—

इतिकर्तव्यता लोके सर्वा शब्दव्यपाश्रया ।
यां पूर्वाहितसंस्कारो बालोऽपि प्रतिपद्यते ॥[1]

एवमितिकर्तव्यताज्ञाने पूर्वशब्दभावनाया निमित्तत्वं व्याख्याय नवजातबालस्याद्यशब्दनिष्पादनेऽपि पूर्वशब्दभावनैव कारणमिति कथयति तत्रभवान् भर्तृहरिः ।

अशिक्षितशब्दोच्चारणो नवजातो बालस्तानि तानि कारणानि तत्र तत्र वर्णे प्रथमतो नियुङ्क्ते । अथवा स्वान्तःकरणस्य विन्यासं करोति । पूर्वमकृतशब्दोच्चारणोऽपि बालः विशिष्टवर्णशब्दोच्चारणे विशिष्टं प्रयत्नमारभते । ततः प्राणमूर्द्ध्वं प्रेरयति । ततः तत्तत्स्थानानामभिघातं करोति । एतत् सर्वं पूर्वशब्दभावना-मन्तरेण न भवति । सा चानादिः शब्दभावना ज्ञाने बीजपरिग्रहेण प्रतिपुरुषमवस्थिता, अर्थात् पूर्वजन्मानुभूत-शब्दोच्चारणेतिकर्तव्यतास्मृत्युपादानबुद्ध्या स्वस्मिन् तादृशस्मृतिबीजरूपेण परिगृहीता प्रतिपुरूषमवस्थिता या चैषानादिः । अस्याः कथञ्चित् पौरुषेयत्वं न सम्भवति । तादृशस्मृतिबीजरूपाणां शब्दभावनानां कालकृतेना-दृष्टपरिपाकेण समुद्बोधरूपे वृत्तिलाभे प्रथमं शब्दोच्चारणानुकूलप्रयत्नस्ततः शब्दोचारणरूपकार्यनिष्पत्ति-र्भवति, नान्यदा । करणविन्यासादयश्च प्रतिभागम्या एव नोपदेशसाध्याः । यद्यपि करणमिदं च स्थानमिदं व्यापारस्येति बाला उपदिश्यन्ते तथाप्युपदेशशब्दा बालस्य प्राक्तनशब्दभावनारूपप्रतिभायाः समुद्बोधनरूपमुद्-घाटनमेव कुर्वन्ति । यतस्तेऽप्युपदेशशब्दा बालस्याप्रसिद्धसम्बन्धा एव, न स्वार्थावबोधं कर्तुं समर्थाः । इममेवार्थं भर्तृहरिः कारिकयेत्थं प्रतिपादयति—

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१. तदेव १.११३

आद्यः करणविन्यासः प्राणस्योद्ध्र्वं समीरणम् ।
स्थानानामभिघातश्च न विना शब्दभावनाम् ॥[१]

ज्ञानस्य वाग्रूपतैव स्वरूपं यथाग्नेः प्रकाशकत्वं यथा वान्तर्यामिणश्चैतन्यं स्वरूपम् । ननु सुषुप्तौ का स्थितिः ? न तत्र वाग्रूपतानुषङ्गः इति चेत् । श्रूयताम् । या असञ्चेतितावस्था सुषुप्त्यवस्था तस्यामपि सूक्ष्मः वाग्धर्मानुगमो वर्तत इति तत्रभवतो भर्तृहरेरभिप्रायः । यो विषयोपनिपाती प्रथमः प्रत्यक्षोऽविकल्पकपदव्यपदेश्यः य इदं तदिति अव्यपदेश्यया वृत्या वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रं प्रत्यवभासयति । तत्रापि वाग्रूपानुषङ्गः सूक्ष्मो वर्तते । सुषुप्तौ वाग्रपाननुषङ्गे तज्जन्ये तत्समानविषये संस्कारे स्मरणे च शब्दानुवेधाभावे सुखमहमस्वाप्सेम् न किञ्चिदवेदिषमिति स्मरणस्याभिलापो नोपपद्येत । तथैवाविकल्पके इदं तदिति सर्वनामशब्दानुवेधोऽस्ति । किं च विशेषवाचकशब्दानुवेधोऽव्यक्तस्तत्रापि अन्यथास्यैव वस्तुनो द्वितीयलक्षणेन विशेषशब्दनुवेधोऽनुभूयते किं च तस्य वाग्रूपतायाममत्यामुत्पन्नोऽपि प्रकाशः शब्दरूपमनङ्गीकुर्वन् परं प्रतिस्वरूपप्रकाशनक्रियाकर्मतामर्थप्रकाशनक्रियाकरणतां च न प्रतिपद्येत । सर्वोऽयमर्थः—

वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामदेवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥

इति कारिकाव्याख्यायां स्वोपज्ञवृत्तौ विशदीकृतः ।

सर्वस्य ज्ञानस्य वाग्रूपत्वादेव गुरुः स्वज्ञानं शिष्यद्बुधौ संक्रामयितुं प्रभवति । ततश्च विद्याया विकासो भवति ।

अत एव—

सा सर्वविद्याशिल्पानां कलानां चोपबन्धनी ।
तद्वशादभिनिष्पन्नं सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते ॥

इत्युक्तं हरिणा । विद्यादयश्च वाग्रूपायां बुद्धौ निबद्धाः इति स्वोपज्ञवत्तौ दृश्यते ।
यस्यामवबोधस्य वाग्रूपतायां विद्यादयो निबद्धाः सैव संसारिणां संज्ञा, अर्थात् चैतन्यम् । सर्वेषु प्राणिषु यच्चैतन्यं तद्वाचः स्वरूपं नातिक्रामति, किन्तु वाग्रूपमेव तत् । नास्ति कोऽपि प्राणी यस्य चैतन्ये वाग्रूपानुषङ्गो नास्ति । प्राणिनो द्विविधाः, अन्तःसंज्ञा बहिःसंज्ञाश्चेति । अत एव हरिणोक्तम्—

सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरतन्श्च वर्तते ।
तन्मात्रामव्यतिक्रान्तं चैतन्यं सर्वजातिषु ॥[२]

योऽयं चैतन्ये वाग्रूपतानुगमस्तेन लोके ससंज्ञो विसंज्ञ इति व्यपदेशः क्रियते एवं ह्याह—

अर्थक्रियासु वाक् सर्वान् समीहयति देहिनः ।
तदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ॥

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१. तदेव १.११४
२. तदेव १.११८

इति अयमर्थः। वाग्रूपानुषङ्गे सत्येव पदार्थानां समीहनमर्थात् चेष्टनं भवति। वाचैव युक्ताः प्राणिनश्चेष्टन्ते। वाग्रूपानुविद्धं चैतन्यमेव प्राणिनः सकलासु क्रियासु प्रेरयति। मरणकाले तादृशस्य चैतन्यस्योत्क्रान्तौ प्राणी काष्ठकुड्यवत् विसंज्ञो दृश्यते। बहिर्विषयव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययानामन्तः संज्ञानामपि सुखदुःख-संवेदनं तावदेव भवति यावत्तेषां संवेदने वाग्रूपानुवृत्तिर्भवति। बाह्यवस्तुविषयकप्रत्ययानां बहिः संज्ञानामपि वाग्रूपतानुविध्दपदार्थप्रत्ययनिबन्धनो व्यवहारः। तदभावे स सर्वः समुत्सीदेत्। न हि चैतन्येनाविष्टा काचिज्जा-तिरस्ति यस्याः स्वपरसम्बोधो वाचा नानुगम्यते। अतश्चितिक्रियारूपं वाग्रूपानुषङ्गरहितं नास्ति। भिन्नयोरपि वाक्चैतन्ययोः सम्बन्ध इति भावः। अन्ये तु वाक्तत्त्वस्यरूपमेव चितिक्रियारूपमिति वदन्तस्तयोरभेदं स्वी-कुर्वन्ति। अर्थमिमं विशदं प्रतिपादयति स्वोपज्ञवृत्तौ समुद्धृतोऽयं श्लोकः—

भेदोद्ग्राहविवर्तेन भिन्नाकारपरिग्रहा।
आम्नाता सर्वविद्यासु वागेव प्रकृतिः परा॥

इति। अयमर्थः। निराकारापि भेदोद्ग्राहरूपेण विवर्तेन परिगृहीताकारा वागेव सर्वविद्यासु परा प्रकृतिराम्नाता एवमत्र वाक्चैतन्ययोरभेद उक्तः। लोके हि तेऽर्थरूपाः शब्दरूपाश्च पदार्थाः प्रतिपत्तारं प्रति वचनादेव नीयन्त इति ते वाङ्नेत्राः। वागेव तेषां निबन्धनम्। अर्थादुत्पत्तौ च ज्ञप्तौ च निमित्तमिति ते वाङ्-निबन्धनाः। अर्थाश्च शब्दाश्च भिन्ना अपि वागात्मतां नातिक्रामन्ति। वाचोऽव्यतिरिक्ता अप्यर्थाः पृथक् प्रत्यवभासन्ते। एतत् सर्वं मनसि निधायैवोक्तं—

एकत्वमनतिक्रान्ता वाङ्नेत्रा वाङ्निबन्धनाः।
पृथक् प्रत्यवभासन्ते वाग्विभागा गवादयः॥

इति। अतस्ते मृत्युमतिवर्तन्ते ये वाचमुपासते। कीदृशीं वाचम्?

"षड्द्वारां षडधिष्ठानां षट्प्रबोधां षडव्ययाम्"

इत्याह। वाग्घि षड्द्वारा। तस्या हि षट् प्रवृत्त्युपायाः। तस्या हि बहुविधाः शक्तयो याः षड्द्वारा प्रतिभां जनयितुं प्रवर्तन्ते। ताभिर्हि षड्भिः प्रतिभाभिः या परा वाक् प्राप्यते तासु प्रतिभासु येऽर्थाकारास्तेऽस्या अधिष्ठानम्। अतः षडधिष्ठानमित्याह। ताभिः षड्भिः प्रतिभाभिः जायमाने षड्भिः प्रबोधैः सा षट्प्रबोधा। तेऽर्थाः तत्संसर्गाश्चाव्यया नित्याः तस्याः परस्या वाचः इति सा षडव्यया। ताम्। एवंभूतां वाचं ये उपासते ते मृत्युमतिवर्तन्ते।

अत्रायं प्रश्नः समुल्लसति। यच्छब्दतत्त्वमथवा वाक्तत्त्वं ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपत्वेनात्र प्रतिपादितं यत्तस्य सर्वेष्वपि विकारेष्वन्वेति यन्नवजातेषु बालेषु सर्वस्वपि प्राणिषु चशब्दभावनारूपेणानुवर्तते येन सुषुप्तिप्रत्ययः सर्वेऽपि जाग्रत्प्रत्ययाः समानुविद्धाः यदनन्वये ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशकत्वमेव न स्यात् यत्सद्भावासद्भावाभ्यां ससज्ञविसंज्ञविभागो भवति तादृशेन शब्देन तादृश्या वाचा किमभिप्रेतं तत्रभवतो भर्तृहरेरिति। अत्र भर्तृहरिणोक्तम्—

वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी॥

इति । एतत्कारिकागता स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिस्तद्गता वृषभदेवटीका च पाठाशुद्धिबाहुल्यान्न सुगमा । न च हेलाराजकृता वाक्यपदीयप्रथमकाण्डस्य शब्दप्रभानाम्नी व्याख्याधुना समुपलभ्यते । अतो वयमस्मिन् विषयेऽन्यत्र कुत्रचिदवबोधसाहाय्यान्वेषणेऽकामा अपि निर्बद्धाः ।

सुविदितमेतद् यत् काश्मीरदेशीयं प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनं भर्तृहर्युपज्ञशब्दाद्वैतसम्पर्कप्रभावितमभूदिति । तद्दर्शनप्रतिष्ठापका आचार्यसोमानन्दोत्पलाभिनवगुप्तपादा वाक्यपदीयपारंगता आसन् । प्रकीर्णकापरपर्यायस्य वाक्यपदीयतृतीकाण्डस्य प्रकीर्णकविवरणसंज्ञकं व्याख्यानमपि विरचितमाचार्याभिनवगुप्तपादैः। अस्माकं दुर्भाग्यवशात् तदधुना नोपलभ्यते । अभिनवगुप्ताचार्यविरचितायामीश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविमर्शिन्यामीश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञा-विवृतिविमर्शिन्या च वाक्यपदीयादुद्धृता बहवः श्लोका दृश्यन्ते । आचार्योत्पलविरचितेश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिका-स्वऽपि वाक्यपदीयस्य प्रभावस्तत्र तत्रोपलक्ष्यतेऽस्माभिः । तत्र पञ्चमाह्निकगते एकादशत्रयोदशकारिकेऽस्माभि-र्विशेषतो विचारणीये । ते चेत्थम्—

स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा ।
प्रकाशोऽर्थोपरक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः ।।[1]

चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा वाक्स्वरसोदिता ।
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ।।[2]

इति । इदमत्रास्माभिः सावधानं द्रष्टव्यं यदनयोरुत्पलाचार्यकृतकारिकयोस्तान्येव तत्त्वानि प्रकारा-न्तरेण प्रतिपादितानि यानि पूर्वोदाहृतासु वाक्यपदीयकारिकासु प्रतिपादितानि । तानि च यथा सर्वमपि ज्ञानं शब्दानुविद्धमिति अवबोधस्य वाग्रूपतेति वाग्रूपतायामसत्यां न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेतेति । वाग्रूपतैव प्रत्यवमर्शिनीति च । प्रकृतयोरुत्पलाचार्यकारिकयोः" अवभासस्याथवा प्रकाशस्य विमर्श एव स्वभाव इति, अन्यथा प्रकाशोऽर्थो-परक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः स्यादिति, चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शस्वभाव इति, तदेव च परमात्मनो मुख्यं स्वातन्त्र्य-मैश्वर्यमिति च तत्त्वानि प्रतिपादितानि । वाक्यपदीयादुद्धृतासु कारिकास्विवेश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिकयोरपि वाक्शब्द-प्रकाश-प्रत्यवमर्शपदानां प्रयोगो दृश्यते । भर्तृहरिणा प्रकाशस्य वाग्रूपता, उत्पलाचार्येण च तस्य विमर्शस्वभावत्वमुक्तम् । किं भर्तृहरेर्वाग्रूपतैवोत्पलाचार्यस्य विमर्श अतोऽभिनवगुप्ताचार्यैः स्वविमर्शिन्यां पदान्ये-तानि कथं व्याख्यातानीत्यधुना द्रष्टव्यमस्माभिः । विमर्शिन्याः प्रकृतोंऽशोऽत्रोऽद्ध्रियते

"...प्रत्यवमर्शश्चान्तराभिलापात्मकशब्दनस्वभावः । तच्चशब्दनं सङ्केतनिरपेक्षकमेवाविच्छिन्नचमत्का-रात्मकम् अन्तर्मुखशिरोनिर्देशप्रख्यम् अकारादिमायीयसाङ्केतिकशब्दजीवितभूतनीलमिदं चैत्रोऽयमित्यादिप्रत्यवम-र्शान्तरभित्ति भूतत्वात् पूर्णरूपत्वात् परा, वक्ति विश्वमभिलपति प्रत्यवमर्शनेति च वाक्, अत एव सा स्वरसेन चिद्रूपतया स्वात्मविश्रान्तिवपुष्पा उदिता सदानस्तमिता नित्या अहमित्येव । एतदेव परमात्मनां मुख्यं

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१. ई० प्र० आ० ५.११
२. तदेव ५.१३

स्वातन्त्र्यमैश्वर्यमीशतृत्वमनन्यापेक्षित्वमुच्यते । भर्तृहरिणोक्तं प्रकाशस्यवाग्रूपतेति वाग्रूपता च प्रत्यवमर्शिनीति । अभिनवगुप्ताचार्यैर्वरुक्तं वक्ति विश्वमभिलपति प्रत्यवमर्शिनेति च वागिति । अत्र प्रत्यवमर्शेन पत्यवमर्शवृत्त्या नोच्चारवृत्त्या इति विमर्शिनीव्याख्याकारो भास्करकण्ठः । उभाभ्यामप्याचार्याभ्यां भर्तृहर्यभिनवगुप्ताभ्यां वाक्प्रत्यवमर्शयोः सम्बन्ध उक्तः—

अहंप्रत्यवमर्शो यः प्रकाशात्मापि वाग्वपुः ।

इत्यादिषष्ठाह्निकप्रथमकारिकाव्याख्यायामुक्तमभिनवगुप्ताचार्यैः विषयरूपात् श्रोत्रग्राह्यात् शब्दादन्य एव अन्तरमवभासमानः संविद्रूपावेशी शब्दात्मनाभिलापो वागित्यनेनोक्तः वक्ति अर्थं स्वाध्यायेन सोऽयमित्यभिसन्धानेन इति । अत्र निगमयति व्याख्याकारो भास्करकण्ठः एतेनात्र वाच्यवाचकसंकेतकरणहेतोरान्तरस्य वाक्त्वमुक्तं न तु वाह्यस्य स्थूलशब्दस्येति ।

भर्तृहर्युत एवार्थोऽनूदित उत्पलाचार्यैरिति स्पष्टमुक्तमभिनवगुताचार्यैः पञ्चमाह्निकस्य चतुर्दशकारिकागतायां विमर्शिन्याम् । तद्यथा—

तत्रभवद्भर्तृहरिणापि—

न योऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिवाज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ।।
वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्व शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ।।
सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते ।
यदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ।।

इत्यादि च । तदेतेन विदुः इत्येतन्निर्वाहितम् । अत्र भास्करकण्ठः श्रीभर्तृहरिवचनान्युदाहरति । वाक्यत्रयेऽपि अत्र प्रत्यवमर्शस्य सर्वात्मकत्वसाधनमेव । विस्तरभयात्तु न प्रपञ्चितम् । एतदवष्टम्भेन स्वभावमवभास्य इत्यत्र विदुः इत्येतस्य निर्वाहं करोति 'एतेन' इति । निर्वाहितम् निराकाक्षीकृतम् वादिरूपस्य कर्तृभावस्य पूरणात् ।

एवं वाक्यपदीयस्य स्वोपज्ञवृत्तावस्पष्टायां पत्यां प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनाचार्यसाहाय्येन वाक्प्रत्यवमर्शपदयोरर्थः किञ्चित् स्पष्टीकृतः । ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वमिति अवबोधस्य वाग्रूपतैव प्रत्यवमर्शिनीति च वदता तत्रभवता भर्तृहरिणा किमभिप्रेतमित्यपि मनागवगतमस्माभिः ।

इतः परा शब्दतत्त्वमिदमर्थभावेन विवर्तते ततो जगतः प्रक्रिया भवतीतीदं तत्त्वमप्यस्माभिः सम्यग् बोद्धव्यम् । प्रारम्भ एवोक्तं मया यद् भर्तृहर्यनुसारेण शब्दतत्त्वं ब्रह्म यद्यप्येकमभिन्नं च तथाप्यस्य सन्ति वहुवचः शक्तयो याभिस्तद् भिन्नमिव प्रतीयते व्यवह्रियते च । एतावतैवावगम्यते यद् भर्तृहरिदर्शने शक्तितत्त्वस्य प्राधान्यं वर्तत इति । शक्तिशक्तिमतोरभेद इत्यपि भर्तृहरेरभ्युपगमः । अभिन्नस्य शब्दतत्त्वस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तिरप्यभिन्ना । यद्यप्ययमेव परमार्थः तथापि शक्तीनां नानात्वमपि स्वीक्रियते । अस्य जगतो यदिदं महद् वैचित्र्यं तद्रूपस्य कार्यनानात्वस्योपपादनार्थं शक्तिवैचित्र्यं समुन्नीयते । अत एव शक्तिविषये वहुत्र बहुवचनप्रयोगो दृश्यते वाक्यपदीये । वैशेषिकसांख्यादिभिर्ये पदार्थाः स्वीकृता द्रव्यगुणादयस्तेषां सर्वेषामपि भर्तृहरिदर्शने भिन्नस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तित्वमेव । तदुक्तम्—

तस्माद् द्रव्यादयः सर्वाः शक्तयो भिन्नलक्षणाः ।
संसृष्टाः पुरुषार्थस्य साधिका न तु केवलाः ।।[१]

इति । शक्तीनां बह्वीनां सतीनामपि न समं प्राधान्यम् । कासांश्चिद् विशेषतः समुल्लेखो दृश्यते । शक्तिषु कालशक्तिरेव मूर्धाभिषिक्ता । ग्रन्थारम्भ एवोक्तं भर्तृहरिणा—

अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।
जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ।।[२]

इयं कालशक्तिरेव स्वातन्त्र्यमिति व्यपदिष्टा स्वोपज्ञवृत्तौ । वाक्यपदीपतृतीयकाण्डव्याख्यात्रा हेलाराजेन बहुत्र कालाख्या स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिर्ब्रह्मण इति प्रतिपादितम् । येयं ब्रह्मणः कर्तृत्वशक्तिर्निखिलस्यास्य जगत आविर्भावयित्री सैव कालशक्तिः । भर्तृहरिणा महता विस्तरेण व्याख्यातः कालो वाक्यपदीयतृतीयकाण्डगतकालसमुद्देशे । तत्रस्थोऽयं श्लोकः दृश्यताम्—

तमस्य लोकतन्त्रस्य सूत्रधारं प्रचक्षते ।
प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां तेन विश्वं विभज्यते ।।[३]

भेदावभासमयो हि संसारः । भेदश्च देशकालाभ्यां द्विधा यतो मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तरूपमिदं विश्वम् तत्र दिक्च्छक्त्यवच्छिन्नो मूर्तिविवर्तः कालशक्त्यवच्छिन्नश्च क्रियाविवर्तः । अकालकलितमप्यनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म कालाख्यस्वातन्त्र्यशक्त्या विनिवेशिताभ्यां प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां पौर्वापर्येणावभासते । योऽयं पदार्थानां कालक्रमेण जीवात्मगतः प्रतिभायाः एव कालशक्तेर्मुख्यं कार्यम् ।

अन्या अपि शक्तयो नामत उल्लिखिता पृथक् कारिकायाम् ।

दिक्साधनं क्रिया काल इति वस्त्वभिधायिनः ।
शक्तिरूपे पदार्थानामत्यन्तमनवस्थिताः ।।[४]

इति । एतासामेव शक्तीनां मौलिकत्वम् दृष्टिद्वयेन तासां मौलिकत्वम् । अस्य विश्वस्य यावाविर्भावतिरोभावौ तद्दृष्ट्या तावत्तासां प्रथमतो मौलिकत्वम् । यतस्तत्कृतावेव जगत आविर्भावतिरोभावौ । किं चास्य विश्वस्य योऽस्माभिः क्रियमाणः प्रख्योपाख्यारूपो । व्यवहारस्तद्दृष्ट्यापि तासां मौलिकत्वम् ।

अन्वर्थेन नाम्नैव कालो विश्ववैचित्र्यहेतुरित्युक्तं तत्रभवता भर्तृहरिणा ।

जलयन्त्रभ्रमावेशसदृशीभिः प्रवृत्तिभिः ।
स कलाः कालयन् सर्वाः कालाख्यां लभते विभुः ।

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१. वाक्यपदीयम् ३.२३
२. तदेव १.३
३. तदेव ३.४
४. तदेव ३.१

इत्याह सः । अयमत्राभिप्रायः। विश्वात्मैक एव परब्रह्माभिधानः सत्यो भावः। स एव नानाविध-कार्यकारितया अनन्तशक्तित्वेन व्यवह्रियते । स किल क्रमिकान् चक्रभ्रमवत् परावर्तमानान् भावान् प्रकाशयन् कालयति भूतानीति, काल उच्यते । स च विभुः स्वतन्त्र इति यावत् । अत एव कालाख्या स्वातन्त्र्यशक्ति-र्ब्रह्मण इति तत्रभवद्भर्तृहरेरभिप्राय इति वाक्यपदीयव्याख्यायां हेलाराजः यथा यान्त्रिको बाहुना जलयन्त्रं परिवर्तयति तथा कालशक्त्या विभुर्भावान् परिवर्तयति । सर्वेषां भावानां कालशक्तिपारतन्त्र्यमुभयथा विशदी-करोति तत्रभवान् भर्तृहरिः । धीवराः पक्षिग्रहणाय सूत्रप्रतिबद्धान् अन्यान् क्षुद्रपक्षिणश्चेष्टयन्ति । सूत्रप्रतिबद्धास्ते सङ्कोचविकाराभ्यां प्रतिबन्धोत्सर्गावनुभवन्ति । न तच्छृङ्खला इवोड्डीय गन्तुं प्रभवन्ति । तथेच्छायां सूत्रेणाकर्षणात् । तथैव कालसूत्रप्रतिबद्धाः संकोचविकासलक्षणौ ध्वंसोद्भवावनवरतमनुभवन्ति ।

अस्याः कालशक्तेर्व्यापारद्वयं भवति । अभ्यनुज्ञा प्रतिबन्धश्चेति । अत एवोक्तं 'प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां तेन विश्वं विभज्यते' इति । अभ्यनुज्ञारूपेण व्यापारेण सर्वेषां भावानां स्वस्वकाल एवोत्पत्तिर्भवति, न ततः प्राक् । प्रतिबन्धलक्षणेन व्यापारेण सर्वेषां भावानां युगपदुत्पत्तिः स्यादिति बीजाङ्कुरनालकाण्डादीनामानुपूर्वी-नियमाभावात् सङ्करः स्यात् । निखिलोऽपि कार्यकारणभावो विघटेत ।

यदि न प्रतिबध्नीयात् प्रतिबन्धं च नोत्सृजेत् ।
अवस्था व्यतिकीर्येरन् पौर्वापर्यं बिनाकृताः ॥[1]

इत्युक्तं तत्रभवता । अत एव—

"सर्वेषां हि विकाराणां कारणान्तरेष्वपेक्षावतां प्रतिवद्धजन्मनामभ्यनुज्ञया सहकारिकारणं कालः ।

इति स्वोपज्ञवृत्तौ प्रतिपादितम् । अभ्यनुज्ञया न केवलं पदार्थानामुत्पत्तिर्भवति, अपि तु तेषां स्थितिरपि तन्निबन्धनैव । प्रतिबन्धाख्येन कालव्यापारेण पदार्थानां स्वकालात् प्रागनुत्पत्तिः सिद्धायामर्थक्रियायां तेषां स्थितिश्च भवतः ।

प्रतिबन्धाख्यः कालव्यापार एव जरामुत्पादयति । जरा नाम कालस्य शक्तिः या प्राण्यप्राणिसाधारण-यौवनादिप्रतिबन्धिनी कार्यव्यक्तीनां कालान्तरपरिवासावधृतार्थक्रियासु सामर्थ्यं विघटतति ततश्च सामर्थ्यविरो-धिनोऽवस्थाविशेषाः प्राण्यप्राणिषु प्रज्ञामान्द्यशोषादयः प्रादुर्भवन्ति । यतः प्रध्वंसः प्रत्यासन्न इति लक्ष्यते ।

कालोऽयमेक इति भर्तृहरेर्मतम् । एकोऽप्ययं कालः उपाधिभेदेन नानात्वेन व्यवह्रियते । तस्यात्मा बहुधा भिन्नो भेदैर्धर्मान्तराश्रयैः ।[2]

इत्याह तत्रभवान् । पुनश्च ।

संसर्गिणां तु ये भेदा विशेषास्तस्य ते मताः ।
स भिन्नस्तैर्व्यवस्थानां कालो भेदाय कल्पते ॥[3]

इति

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१. तदेव ३.५
२. तदेव ३.६
३. तदेव ३.८

सूर्यादिग्रहसञ्चाररूपाः क्रियाविशेषाः कालस्य सम्बन्धिनः। तेषां भेदेनाहितभेदः कालः अहोरात्र-पक्ष-मास-ऋतु-अयन-संवत्सर-युग-मन्वन्तरादिव्यवस्थाभेदमापादयति।

योऽयं क्रियाधर्मा क्रमो नाम स कालेऽध्यारोप्यते। न तु स तत्र भाविकः। एवं यौगपद्यमपि क्रमविरोधी धर्मः काले समारोप्यते। क्रमो यौगपद्यमित्युभयमपि काल उपचरितम्। एवं योऽयं कालस्य समविषमविभागः सोऽपि कालस्योपचरितः। यदानुष्ठातारः श्रुतिस्मृतिनिबन्धनमाचारमनुतिष्ठन्ति तदा प्रकर्षमापादयन् कालः स एव कृतादिर्व्यपदिश्यते। शुभाचाराधिकारिबाहुल्यात् समः, अथवा अभिन्नः स कालो भवति। यदा तु कर्तारो विशृङ्खला यथावत् समाचारमुल्लङ्घयन्ति तदा समाचारापकर्षादपचयप्राप्तेः कलिप्रभृतिः विषमः कालो भवति एवमेकोऽप्यनुष्ठातृभेदाद् विभागमापादयति कालः। अत एवोक्तम्--

कर्तृभेदात् तदर्थेषु प्रकर्षापचयौ गतः।
समत्वं विषमत्वं वा य एकः प्रतिपद्यते ॥[1]

इति। अन्येऽप्यारोपिताः कालभेदाः सन्ति। विशिष्टपुष्पादिलक्षणः क्रियाभेदादेकस्यापि कालस्य वसन्तादिभेदेन समाख्या जायते। यथैक एव पुरुषस्तक्षणायोविकरणादिक्रियाविशेषैः तक्षायस्कारादिविशेषसंज्ञां लभते तथैकोऽपि कालो वसन्तादिसंज्ञां लभते। परं त्वध्यारोपितोऽयं विभागः न तु भाविकः।

आरम्भादिकालोऽप्यध्यारोपितः। पदार्थरूपं बुद्ध्याभिसन्धाय योग्यसाधनोपार्जनमारम्भकालः। उपार्जितसाधनस्य करणं क्रियाकालः। कर्तव्यस्य समाप्तिर्निष्ठाकालः।

आख्यश्च क्रिया चैव निष्ठा चेत्यभिधीयते।
धर्मान्तराणामध्यासभेदात् सदसदात्मनः ॥[2]

भूतादिव्यपदेशोऽपि क्रियाभेदनिमित्तः। उत्पन्नध्वस्ता यदा क्रिया भवन्ति तदा तदुपाधिः कालोऽभूत् इति व्यपदिश्यते। यदा तु सन्निहितसाधनाः सम्भाव्यमानोदयाः क्रियाः तदा तदुपाधिः कालो भविष्यन्तां प्रतिपद्यते। प्रारब्धापारिसमाप्तक्रियोपाधिस्तु कालो वर्तमानसंज्ञः।

काल एकोऽभिन्नश्चेति परमार्थः। परन्तु अभिन्नेन कालेन व्यवहर्तुमशक्यत्वाल्लोके त्रयो भेदा इव क्रियोपाधयः प्रसिद्धाः भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानाख्याः। क्रियाव्युपरमे भूतः। सम्भावितायां क्रियायां भविष्यन्। क्षणप्रवाहरूपेण प्रवर्तमानायां तस्यां वर्तमानः।

तस्याभिन्नस्य कालस्य व्यवहारे क्रियाकृताः।
भेदा इव त्रयः सिद्धाः यांल्लोको नातिवर्तते ॥[3]

अपरया दृष्ट्या शक्तिभूतस्यैव कालस्यातीतानागतवर्तमानाख्यास्त्रयः शक्तयः इति तत्रभवान् भर्तृहरिः।

एकस्य शक्तयस्तिस्रः कालस्य समवस्थिताः।
यत् सम्बन्धेन भावानां दर्शनादर्शने सताम् ॥[4]

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१. तदेव ३.३१
२. तदेव ३.३३
३. तदेव ३.४८
४. तदेव ३.४९

कालाख्यस्य जगत्कारणस्य मुख्यो भेदो नास्ति। तथा हि वर्तमानशक्तिसम्बन्धेन भावानां सतामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्जन्म अतीतानागतसम्बन्धेन सतामेव तिरोभावोऽदर्शनमनभिव्यक्तिर्विनाशः प्राक्प्रध्वंसाभाव इति शक्तिभेदात् कार्यभेदोपपत्तौ कालभेदकल्पना निर्निमित्ता।

अतीतानागतशक्तिभ्यां भावानां वरणं तिरोधायनं कालः करोति। वर्तमानशक्त्या दर्शनंभावरूपप्रकाशनं च करोति।

द्वाभ्यां किल शक्तिभ्यां भावानां वरणात्मकः।
शक्तिस्तु वर्तमानाख्या भावरूपप्रकाशिनी॥[1]

अनागता शक्तिः पदार्थानां जन्मनोऽप्रतिबन्धिका। यतः पूर्वभविद्यमानस्य अर्थात् कालान्तरे वर्तमानस्यैव पश्चाज्जन्म भवति।अतीताख्या शक्तिस्तु जन्मनो विरुद्धा भवति। यतो यदतीतं तदतीतमेव। न तस्य पुनर्जन्म भवति। नातीतेऽध्वनि पतितमाविर्भवति।

भविष्यदध्वनि य एव स्थितः स एव वर्तमानाध्वनि पतित्वातीतेऽध्वनि पुनः पतति। अत एव परिणामवादिभिः त्रैयध्विका पदार्था अभ्युपगम्यन्ते।

यद्यपि चैते त्रयः शक्तिविशेषाः कालात्मन्यक्रमाः एवावस्थिताः तथापि तमःप्रकाशरूपत्वादाधेयेषु भावेषु प्रवृत्तिं वर्तयन्तो दर्शनादर्शनाभ्यां सदसद्रूपोपकल्पनया पौर्वापर्यं विदधाति। अतीतानागताध्वानौ भावावरणहेतुत्वात् तमःस्वभावौ। आवरणं हि तमोधर्मः। वर्तमनोऽध्वा प्रकाशतुल्यः सत्वसदृशः। रजस्तु प्रवृत्तिसामान्यं कालस्वरूपं सर्वत्रान्वयि। प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां प्रवर्तकं प्रेरणानुरूपं रजः कालात्मकमेव। संक्षेपरुचयः केचित् पुनरतीतानागतयोर्भावस्य दर्शनं समानमाश्रित्य कालस्य द्वयमेव प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञापर्यायमभ्युपगच्छति। प्राक्प्रध्वंसाभावयोर्भावस्यादर्शनमविशिष्टमित्येकैव तत्कारणकालस्य सर्वप्रभविष्णुरूपस्य शक्तिः प्रतिबन्धलक्षणा भावाभावविधायिनी।

एवं कालशक्तिं तद्व्यापरांश्च व्याख्याय निगमयति हेलाराजः—

कालाख्या हि ब्रह्मशक्तिरविद्यैव क्रमावभासकारितया जीवात्मसु सफलेति। अविद्यायां संसारहेतुभूतायां प्रथमं भेदावभासमयो हि संसारः। भेदश्च देशकालाभ्याम्। तत्र कालभेदो जगत्सृष्टेराद्यः। अक्रमा पश्यन्तीरूपा संवित् प्राणवृत्तिमुपारूढा कालात्मना परिगृहीतक्रमेव चकास्ति। निष्क्रमं हि ब्रह्मतत्त्वं विद्यामयमकालकलितमविद्यावशात् क्रमरूपोपग्रहेण यथायथं विवर्तत इति कालानुवेधात् पदार्थानां क्रमेण प्रत्यवभासो ऽनादिमसिद्धजीवात्मगतः। सर्वस्य च भेदजातस्य विद्यामयत्वात् कालेनापि दर्शनभेदेन योऽयममृतप्रविभागः सोऽप्यविद्याविजृम्भित एव। आविर्भूतायां तु विद्यायां सर्वस्य भेदप्रपञ्चस्यापगमादयमप्यपैति। अतश्चात्र युक्तायुक्ततया विचारणं प्रयासमात्रफलमेव।

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१. तदेव ३.५०

BUDDHISM—ITS BASIC TEACHINGS

Anukul Chandra Banerjee

Gautama Buddha attained Bodhi (Enlightenment) and preached the noble truth he discovered for the welfare of the world. This indeed created a stir in the world. His teachings are embedded in the *Tipiṭaka* which is regarded as the earliest available source of our information. It is very difficult to dive deeply into the abstruse intricacies of his teachings which can only be comprehended by those who are advanced in the path of spiritual progress. Many exegetical texts were subsequently composed for proper understanding of his noble teachings. These works have indeed constituted greatly towards making Buddhism popular among the people of the world.

Buddha's first discourse delivered at Migadāva (modern Sarnath) to Pañcavaggiyas, his quondam friends, is known as the *Dhammacakkappavattanasutta*. It deals with *Cattāriariyasaccāni* (four noble truths), viz., *dukkha* (suffering), *samudaya* (cause), *nirodha* (cessation) and *nirodhagāminipaṭipadā* (path leading to the cessation of suffering). These truths are not meant for the people in general (*puthujana*). They are for those who have progressed in their spiritual life and have attained one of the stages of sanctification, viz., *sotapatti*, *sakdāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arhatta* and that is why they are called the noble truths (*ariyasacca*). Thus it is seen that these noble truths are realized fully by the *Ariya*-s (Noble Ones). These four *sacca*-s (truths) are nothing else but the four cardinal articles of Indian medical science, applied to the spiritual heading of mankind, exactly as in the Yoga doctrine.[1] Regarding the first noble truth, the Buddha maintains that life is full of misery and all worldly enjoyments are short-lived and are really source of pain and misery. The second noble truth follows from the Buddha's analysis of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* (theory of Dependent Origination). The Buddha holds that nothing is permanent in this world. All things are subject to change and our misery, like every other thing, is caused by a few conditions. The third noble truth is deduced from the second noble

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1. Cf. *Yogasūtra* II.15 Comm. *yathā cikitsāśāsturaṁ caturvyūham; yoga, rogaheturaiogam bhaiṣajyam.*

truth that the misery depends on some conditions and it must cease, if its conditions are completely removed. The fourth noble truth is known as the *Majjhimapaṭipadā* (Middle path) which advocates neither rigorous asceticism nor a life dedicated to the pleasure of the senses.[1] It enjoins a monk to lead a moderate life with the bare necessities in respect of food, clothing and the like. The fourth noble truth is also called the ***Ariyaaṭṭhaṅgi-kamagga*** (the Eightfold path). It consists of eight good practices, viz., ***sammāvācā*** (right speech), ***sammākammanta*** (right action), *sammā-ājīva* (right livelihood), *sammā-vāyāma* (right exertion), ***sammāsati*** (right recollection), *sammāsamādhi* (right meditation), ***sammāsaṅkappa*** (right thought) and *sammādiṭṭhi* (right view). *Sammāvācā* (right speech) is not mere abstinence from falsehood. It includes four kinds of speech—abstinence from telling lies, harsh words, malicious words and frivolous talks.[2] *Sammakammanta* (right action) is abstinence from killing,[3] stealing[4] and misconduct.[5] *Sammā-ājīva* (right livelihood) is abstinence from trafficiking in deadly weapon, in animals for slaughter and in intoxicating drinks. *Sammā-vāyāma* (right exertion) may be classified into four categories, viz., avoiding such demeritorious deeds as have not yet been done, keeping away from the evil which is already there, performing such meritorious action that has not yet been done and increasing the merit of such good deeds as have already been performed.[6] *Sammāsati* (right recollection) is thinking again and again about the object of mind (***ālambana***). *Sammāsamādhi* (right meditation) is the fixing of the mental faculty on a particular object. *Sammā saṅkappa* (right resolution) is the determination for renunciation and abstaining from causing any injury to living beings. *Sammā diṭṭhi* (right view) is the realisation of the worldly things and the ultimate. Each of the eight noble practices makes an adept advance towards the goal in his life. These right terms are further classified under three heads : ***sila*** (moral precept), ***citta*** (mental development) and ***paññā*** (knowledge). Of the above eight practices the first three lead to ***sila,*** the second three to ***citta*** and the last two to ***paññā***. This eightfold path removes *taṇhā* (desire) and *avijjā* (ignorance) and creates true insight and intelligence. It further leads to ***upasama*** (tranquility of mind), ***abhiññā*** (super natural faculty) and ultimately to the attainment of ***nibbāna*** (eternal bliss). "If this Buddhist ideal of perfect life", observes Rhys Davids, "is remarkable when compared

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1. *Kāmesu Kāmasukhallikānuyogo attakilamathānuyogo* /
2. *Musāvād, pharusavāca, pisunavāca and sampalāpa* / /
3. *Paṇātipāta.*
4. *Adinnādāna.*
5. *Kamesumicchācāra.*
6. *Anuppannānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ anuppādāya, uppānnānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ pahārāya, anuppannāṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ uppādāya* and *uppannānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ pavaddhāya—Majjhima,* 11.2.

with the thought of India at the time, it is equally instructive when looked at from the comparative point of view".[1]

The theory of *Anattā* (non-existence of soul) advocated by the Buddha forms the key-note of Buddhism. It is a striking departure from the existing beliefs for which the Buddha had to face many bitter criticisms. The Buddha denied the existence of soul which is permanent and immaculate. According to him a being is composed only of ***pañcakkhandha***-s (five elements) which are ***rūpa*** (material quality), ***vedanā*** (feeling), ***saññā*** (perception), ***saṅkhāra*** (co-efficient of consciousness) and ***viññāṇa*** (consciousness). If these constituents are analyzed, it is found that there are no permanent entities like the self. As they are ***anattā*** (devoid of self) they are sources of suffering. From the *Anattalakkhana-sutta* of *Vinayapiṭaka* preached to the *Pañcavaggiya* monks we learn that 'no self is to be found in any of the five *Khandha*-s, all of which are impermanent and are subject to woe.'[2] All the five *Khandha*-s are void of ***atta*** (self). This doctrine of ***anattā*** (non-existence of soul), one of the three characteristics of Buddhism, distinguished it from all other religions.

The Buddha accepted the doctrine of ***karma*** (action). According to him 'every living being has *karma* as its master, its inheritance, its congenital cause, its kinsman, its refuge. It is *karma* that differentiates all beings into low and high states'.[3] It lays down that the actions of one existence are very closely connected with those of former or future existences. Actions determine an individual's future. *Karma* (action) produces its effects then and there, as things of the world are in a state of flux and they are not identical with any two moments. Buddhism thus lays the greatest emphasis on *Karma* (action) and the theory of *Karma* is one of its cardinal features.

Paṭiccasamuppāda (Skt. ***Pratītyasamutpāda***, the theory of Dependent Origination) was Buddha's another outstanding contribution to Buddhism. It states that the things of the world are neither due to ***ekahetuka*** (one cause) nor are they ***ahetuka*** (causeless). It proves that the things are due to ***nānāhetuka*** (manifold causes). It is one of the most fundamental doctrines of Buddhism, as the Buddha himself has declared : 'he who realises ***paṭiccasamuppāda*** (Skt. ***pratītyasamutpāda***) sees ***dhamma*** (truth) and he who sees ***dhamma*** sees (***paṭiccasamuppāda***'.[4] It is a very important philosophical doctrine in the *Mahāyāna* philosophy.

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1. *American Lectures*, p. 139.
2. G. P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, Vol. I, London, 1960, p. 62.
3. *Kammassakā sattā kammadāyādā kammayonī kammmabandhū Kammapaṭisaraṇā, kammaṃ satta vibhajati yadidaṃ hīnapaṇītāya.*
4. *Yo pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati, so dharmaṃ paśyati/*
   Yo dharmaṃ paśyati, so pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati//

Nāgārjuna, the founder of the *Mādhyamika* system, has established his whole philosophy on ***Paṭiccasamuppāda***.

Nibbāna is without doubt the ultimate goal of life both for the monastic and lay communities in Buddhism. There is no difference on the ultimate goal, both of them yearn for. But the process of realisation of ***Nibbāna***, the Buddhist ***summum bonum***, by the monastic and lay communities differs. Each of them can atttain to the same blissful state ***Nibbāna***, by reason of the right conduct (***sammāpaṭipatti***) peculiar to each. The ***Milindapañha***, a very important Pāli non-canonical text, states that it practically makes no difference between the easy-going householder (***gihi***) and a rigid recluse (***pabbajita***) in regard to the attainment of this blissful state (***nibbāna***) through the observance of the right conduct (***sammāpaṭipatti***). The only difference is that the recluse attains to this state more rapidly than the householder.

There is no dogma in Buddhism. It does not rely on blind faith or belief. It admits the dignity of man. There is no higher being who decides man's fortune. Man is the builder of his own fortune. Buddhism thus always insists on self-reliance and teaches people to pursue knowledge and practise essential virtues, viz., friendship, compassion, non-violence, love and service to the people. The lofty ideal, universal love, tolerance and practical approach to the problems of life had further a wide appeal and made Buddhism popular not only in the land of its origin but also in far distant lands.

It should be mentioned in passing that 'the message of Buddhism and the principle on which it rests have assumed new significance in the world today, and the peace of which U. N. O. speaks is but an indication that the whole world is gradually veering round to the beliefs embodied in the religion of the Buddha'.

A NOTE ON THE MAHĀSUKHA IN BUDDHISM

Biswanath Banerjee

Already in the early centuries of the Christian era Buddhism started adjusting itself to the pressure of its environment. Mahāyānism with its promise to deliver all beings and with the idea of making Buddhism acceptable to all classes of people, began to incorporate all sorts of popular ceremonies and practices in their religion and the ethico-religious nature of Buddhism started changing. In the eighth century and thereafter Buddhism underwent a great change when ***mantra***, ***mudrā***, ***maṇḍala*** and many other popular religious practices began to make their way into Buddhism. An altogether new form of Buddhism called the *Vajrayāna* appeared with much emphasis on rituals, meditational practices, gods and goddesses etc. Various groups or sects like the ***Sahajayāna***, *Kālacakrayāna* etc. began to grow within its fold with totally new and different interpretations of the cardinal principles of Buddhism. This new phase of Buddhism is more or less a kind of Buddhist Tantrism and the general appellation *Mantrayāna* or ***Tantrayāna*** is given to all the sects taken together, as their principles and doctrines are based on ***mantra***, ***mudrā***, etc. The elements on which the whole system of ***Tantrayāna*** was based were not evolved by Buddhism out of its own materials but were the growth of the soil utilised both by the Hindus and the Buddhists.

The general name of *Vajrayāna* is derived from the ***Bodhicitta*** which is considered as the '*Vajra*'—*bodhicittam bhaved vajram*.[1] After intense ***sādhanā*** the ***Bodhicitta*** of a ***sādhaka*** attains the state of tranquility. It then becomes of the nature of the '*vajra*', as invincible and indestructible as the '*vajra*'. A ***sādhaka*** realises the ***bodhi*** when his ***Bodhicitta*** attains this state. The conception of *Bodhicitta* has an important role in the system of ***Vajrayāna***. These later Buddhists consider ***Bodhicitta*** as a unified state of pure knowledge of the true nature of things i. e., *śūnyatā*, and a compassionate mind, i. e., ***karuṇā***, a state absolutely

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1. *Two Vajrayāna Works* (G. O. S.), p. 80.

pure and free from subjectivity and objectivity.[1] That is the immutable state of the *yogin* and this is the state of *advaya* (nonduality), *yuganaddha* (unification of all dualities) etc. *Karuṇā* or *upāya* is considered as the positive and active aspect of reality whereas *śūnyatā* or *prajñā* is the negative or passive aspect. *Upāya* brings the entities into existence in the phenomenal world from the potency latent in the *prajñā*. These positive and negative aspects of *upāya* and *prajñā* make these Buddhists gradually represent them as the male and the female energies respectively. They generally believe that all men and women are *upāya* and *prajñā* in their ultimate nature.

This idea of unification is gradually transformed by the *Tantrayāna* school into the production of *mahāsukha* or Sublime Bliss through the yogic union of the male and the female.

The principle of union is illustrated in the Buddhist Pantheon by the representation of many of the gods as locked in deep embrace with their respective *prajñā* or *śakti*, i. e., their divine consorts or female counterparts. Vajrasattva has been often illustrated as embracing his consort Vajravārāhī, who is of red colour, the colour of love, in sexual union touching at all points of contact. It has often been said that the gods to be worshipped are to be meditated on as in union with his *prajñā* and as enjoying the great bliss, *mahāsukha*. The Dhyānī Buddhas are generally described as in union with their respective *Śakti*-s. Many of the gods in Buddhism have been depicted in Nepal and Tibet as in *yab-yum* or union. Often a god is illustrated as having held his *śakti* on the knee and Avalokiteśvara holds his consort on the knee in the manner of Śiva holding Pārvatī in Hindu texts.

The principle of *mahāsukha* is a very important innovation in later Buddhism which moulded the character of Buddha's religion in a different form. *Mahāsukha* has been described as the ultimate reality absorbing within it all ideas of existence and extinction.[2] It has been described much in the same way as the *Nirvāṇa* of the Mahāyānists and perhaps evolved from the conception of *Nirvāṇa* in earlier Buddhism. *Nirvāṇa* is the final stoppage to the flow of *saṃsāra*, complete cessation of the cycle of birth and death, a state of tranquility resulting from the cessation of all the *vāsanā* and *saṃskāra*-s. The idea of perfect peace in *Nirvāṇa* developed from this idea of cessation and tranquility. *Nirvāṇa* has been referred to in many earlier Pāli texts as a state of intense bliss. Pure consciousness of the *Vijñānavāda* school of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, referred to as *nirvāṇadhātu*, has also been described as the immutable element, the liberation and perfect bliss.

1. *Guhyasamāja*, Ch. XVIII; *Prajñopāyaviniścaya-siddhi* (*Two Vajrayāna Works*), p. 10; *Advayavajra saṅgraha*, p. 26.
2. *Hevajra Tantra*, pp. 48-52.

This positive aspect of *Nirvāṇa* as supreme bliss or *mahāsukha* has been emphasised in esoteric Buddhism and in course of time *mahāsukha* has come to be regarded as identical with *Nirvāṇa* which has often been described in the tantra-s as *satata sukhamaya*, a state of changeless supreme bliss. This idea of *mahāsukha* has gradually acquired a cosmological and ontological significance in later Buddhist schools of esoterism and described as the ultimate reality absorbing both existence and extinction. Like the *Nirvāṇa* described by the Mahāyānists it has also been described as something without a beginning, middle or end, without existence or annihilation, and which is neither the self nor the non-self. It is the quintessence of all the entities. When *prajñā* and *upāya* combine into the state of *oneness* the non-dual knowledge which is produced is the *mahāsukha*. The realisation of the *mahāsukha* which is equated with perfect enlightenment is the ultimate goal of the *sādhanā* of a Tantrik Buddhist.

All esoteric practices of the Tantrik Buddhists have grown and developed round this principle of *mahāsukha* and the attainment of this state of intense or supreme bliss has been considered to be the *summum bonum* of life by all these Buddhists. They say that *Bodhi* is never possible without supreme blisss and *Bodhi* itself is of the nature of supreme bliss. It is the Lord Vajrasattva, the nature of the unity of *prajñā* and *upāya* and everything is by nature nothing but this *mahāsukha*. This bliss as the highest reality can only be realised through the medium of the body. These Buddhists hold the body as the abode of all truth as it is the microcosm embodying the truth of the whole universe. Though within the body the *mahāsukha* is, however, never conceived as something physical.[1]

In the esoteric practices of *Tantrayāna*[2] this Infinite Bliss is realised when the discharge of matter is controlled and, its downward flow being checked by subtle yogic processes, remain steady. The bliss resulting from this steady matter is the *mahāsukha*. The semen-virile has often been described as the *mahāsukha* and it is the Lord himself who resides in the *Sukhāvatī*, the abode of bliss. The female organ has been mentioned as the *Sukhāvatī* where the lord *Mahāsukha* dewells in his own nature as the supreme bliss. It is stated that the Lord exists in the *Sukhāvatī* of the female organ of the *sad-vajra-yoṣit* in the form of the letter 'e', the abode of the jewels of the Buddhas, and in the name of semen-virile. We learn that without the semen-virile there is no bliss and without bliss he can not be and there cannot be any other source of realising him excepting the divine esoteric practice.

The Mahāyānic idea of the production of *Bodhicitta* has been modified by these

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1. *Dehastho 'pi na dehajaḥ, Hevajra Tantra*, p. 2.
2. See Dasgupta, *Obscure Religious Cults*, Chapter IV and *An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism*, Chapter V.

Tantrik Buddhists and transformed into the production of the state of supreme Bliss through subtle sexo–yogic practices. Just as the Mahāyānic Bodhicitta, when produced, rises upward through the ten *bhūmi*-s (*Bodhisattva-bhūmi*-s), in the like manner the yogic process of breath control and other psycho-physical practices help these Vajrayānist *sādhaka*-s to check the semen-virile in the *maṇipura*, generally known as the *Nirmāṇa-cakra* and situated near the navel; thereafter, it flows upwards through the *Dharma-cakra* located in the heart and the *Sambhoga-cakra* located in the throat to reach ultimately to the *Uṣṇīṣa-cakra* i. e., the lotus in the cerebrum region and produce the *Mahāsukha* of the nature of *Nirvāṇa*, when all ideas of duality disappear in a transcendental realisation of the *bliss*. The *uṣṇīṣa* is also called the *Mahāsukha-Cakra* as it is the seat of supreme bliss.

It is also maintained[1] that the *yogi* should produce the *Bodhicitta* in the form of both *vivṛta* and *saṃvṛta*. The *saṃvṛta* is white like the *kunda* flower in its physical form and the *vivṛta* is of the form of bliss. It has been shown how the gross *Bodhicitta* should be produced through the physical process and how this should be turned to the *vivṛta* form through the yogic process. As long as the *yogī* does not discharge the *Bodhicitta* he enjoys the intense and unruffled ecstasy from the blissful sensations and obtains perfection in his *sādhanā*. If the *Bodhicitta* flows down it can not be made to rise again and the *yogin* fails to obtain his goal. There is no greater sin than this discharge and no greater merit than this bliss arising from the motionless Bodhicitta. It has been declared that salvation is impossible through the discharge and the serious *yogin* must take care of it to avoid all worldly pleasures.[2]

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1. *Hevajra Tantra*, p. 66.
2. *Bindor mokṣe kva mokṣo*
   gata paramasukhe yogināṃ janma-bīje /
   tasmāt saṃsāra-saukhyam
   Kṣaṇamiha yatibhiḥ sarvadā varjanīyam //
   Śrī Laghukālacakra Tantra, Ch. V.126.

BENARES ET LE BOUDDHISME ANTIQUE

Per Andre Bareau

Selon une tradition très ancienne et unanimement acceptée par les sectes du bouddhisme antique, celui que l'on désigne sous le nom de Hīnayāna, c'est près de Bénarès, au Mṛgadāya du Ṛṣipatana, aujourd' hui Sārnāth, que le Buddha prononça son premier sermon. Convertissant par ce moyen cinq ascètes qui avaient été naguère ses condisciples dans la recherche de l'Eveil, il en fit les cinq premiers moines bouddhistes, fondant ainsi sa Communauté ou Saṃgha. Pour cette raison, cet endroit devint l'un des quatre principaux buts de pèlerinage conseillés aux fidèles dès avant le règne de l'empereur Aśoka.

Les témoignages, bouddhistes et autres, concordent pour faire de Bénarès, durant la vie du Bienheureux et depuis assez longtemps déjà, l'unde des principales villes du bassin moyen du Gange, avec Śrāvastī et Kauśāmbī dans la partie occidentale de celui-ci, Rājagṛha, Vaiśālī et Campā dans sa partie orientale. On est donc tenté de croire que c'est la prospérité et la renommée de cette cité qui ont conduit le Buddha à y aller, peu après le Grand Eveil, pour y faire la première prédication de la doctrine de salut qu'il venait de découvrir. On est aussi incliné à penser que Bénarès elle-meme a joué, dans l'histoire du bouddhisme et notamment dans ses premiers temps, un rôle comparable à celui qu'assumèrent les autres grandes villes nommées plus haut, que la jeune Communauté bouddhique y reçut un acueil aussi favorable de la part de ses citadins et put y faire parmi eux d'aussi nombreuses conversions. L'examen détaillé des textes canoniques, pālis, sanskrits et en traduction chinoise, confirm-t-il cette idée ou conduit-il au contraire à douter de l'existance de bonnes relations entre les moines bouddhistes et les habitants

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Abreviations: PTS=édition de la Pali Text Society; T.=édition dite de Taishô Issaikyô du Canon bouddhique chinois; D. N.=*Dīgha-nikāya* M. N.=*Majjhima-nikāya*; S. N.=*Saṃyutta-nikāya*; A. N.=*Aṅguttara-nikāya*.

de Bénarès de la penétration du bouddhisme antique dans cetle ville si célèbre à mainıs égards? Nous allons tenter de répondre à cette question.

Plusiers dizaines de *sūtra* en pāli ou en traduction chinoise et un nombre moins grand de passages des *Vinaya-piṭaka* appartenant aux diverses sectes anciennes racontent effectivement des événements de la vie du Buddha qui auraient eu lieu près de Bénarès, mais presque toujours au fameux Mṛgadāya du Ṛṣipatana où le Bienheureux avait prononcé son premier sermon. Ce Parc aux Gazelles, comme on l'appelle aujourd'hui pour traduire le nom Mṛgadāva, est situé à 9 km au nord du centre de la ville, c'est-à-dire nettement plus loin que les autres endroits où le Bienheureux aimait à résider ne l'étaient par rapport au centre des autres grandes cités, Śrāvastī, Rājagṛha, Kauśāmbī etc. Quand le Buddha séjournait au Ṛṣipatana, il lui fallait donc marcher pendant une heure et demie avant d'atteindre las remparts de Bénarès, autant pour en revenir, plus le temps nécessaire pour parcourir les rues de la ville en y mendiant sa nourriture. Ce n'était sans doute pas au-delà des possibilités physiques du Bienheureux et de ses moines, mais cette promenade quotidienne devait représenter pour eux un gaspillage de temps et d'efforts qu'il aurait mieux valu empioyer à la méditation, à la prédication ou à la discussion. C'est du reste peut- etre une des raisons pour lesquells les textes canoniques omettent, sauf à de très rares exceptions, de parler des tournées d'aumônes que ces ascètes bouddhistes et leur maître devaient accomplir dans les rues de Bénarès quand ils séjournaient au Mṛgadāya, alors qu'ils les mentionnent au contraire fréquemment quand le Buddha et ses moines se trouvaient près de Śrāvastī, de Rājagṛha ou d'une autre ville importante.

Parmi les nombreux textes canoniques dont les récits sont situés au Ṛṣipatana, seule une faible minorité possède des versions parallèles en pāli et en traduction chinoise qui soient localisées à ce meme endroit par les unes et par les autres. Comme un tel accord montre que les versions primitives de ces récits sont probablement antérieures aux grands schismes qui séparèrent les Theravādin des autres sectes au cours du IIIe siècle avant notre ère, on peut en déduire que Bénarès et ses environs immédiats, tout particulièrement le Ṛṣipatana, n'ont guère intéressé les auteurs des textes canoniques avant le règne d'Aśoka, à la seule exception de l'événement capital qui a fait plus tard du Mṛgadāya l'un des quatre principaux lieux de pèlerinage.

Les plus importants de ces textes présentant untel accord entre toutes leurs versions, ceux dont l'origine est certainement aussi la plus ancienne, sont en effet ceux qui racontent le premier sermon, ce qu'on appelle la "Mise en mouvement de la Roue de la Loi", *Dharmackrapravartana.*[1] Bien que la prudence empeche de les considérer comme

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[1] *Vinaya-piṭaka* Pāli, PTS vol. I, p. 10 sq.; S. N. PTS vol. V, p.420 sq.; T. n° 1421, p. 104; T. n° 1428, p. 788; T. n° 99, p. 103 c; T. n° 109, p. 503 b; T. n° 110, p. 504 a; *Mahāvastu,* édition Senart, vol. III, p. 330 sq.

de fidèles relations d'un fait historique, réel on doit cependant reconnaître que, dans leurs grandes lignes et leurs éléments communs, leurs récits ne sont pas invraisemblables. Ils peuvent donc dériver des témoignages des cinq premiers disciples ordonnés moines, voire de celui du Bienheureux lui-meme, des souvenirs qu'ils ont pu évoquer devant leurs compagnons plus jeunes.

Une courte série d'épisodes contenue dans les *Vinaya-piṭaka*[1] des Theravādin, des Mahīśāsaka et des Dharmaguptaka comme dans celui, plus tardif, des Mūlasarvāstivādin, mais non dans les autres et qui doit donc remonter à la fin du IIIe siècle avant notre ère, conte longuement la conversion et l'ordination monastique du jeune Yaśas, fils d'un riche marchand de Bénarès, puis, brièvement, celles de ses quatre compagnons, Vimala, Subāhu, Pūrṇaji et Gavāṃpati. Or, de ces cinq personnages, trois sont totalement ignorés du reste des textes canoniques ainsi que des textes post-canoniques, et Yaśas et Gavāṃpati sont presque aussi inconnus, si meme il ne s'agit pas d'homonymes dans les très rares passages où ils sont mentionnés ailleurs que dans le récit de leur conversion. Cela conduit à penser que ces cinq hommes n'ont jamais appartenu au groupe des disciples directs du Buddha ni meme à l'histoire, qu'ils sont des personnages de fiction, imaginés vers la fin du règne d'Aśoka en meme temps que l'édifiante légende de leur conversion et de leur ordination que racontent les quatre *Vinaya-piṭaka*. Or, Yaśas et ses quatre amis sout les seuls habitants de Bénarès que les textes canoniques, à quelque secte qu'ils appartiennent, mettent en relation avec le Bienheureux ou avec ses moines, que ce soit au Ṛṣipatana ou ailleurs.

Si l'on ne considère d'abord que les récits localisés au Mṛgadāya par leur version pālie comme par leur version chinoise, le Bienheureux s'y adresse toujours, soit à un groupe de moines qui l'accompagne dans ses déplacements et dont rien ne laisse supposer un seul instant qu'il soit composé d'anciens habitants de Bénarès, soit au dieu Māra, dont cette ville n'est évidement pas la résidence habituelle.

Examinons maintenant les *sutta* pālis qui n'ont pas de parallèle en traduction chinoise, et qui sont par conséquent postérieurs au règne d'Aśoka. Les interlocuteurs du Buddha sont aussi, dans ces textes, soit le groupe de moines qui lui fait escorte pour profiter de son enseignement, soit le dieu Māra,[2] soit encore les grands disciples Sāriputta et Mahākoṭṭhita, nés l'un près de Rājagaha, l'autre à Sāvatthi, donc très loin de Bénarès. Quant aux *sūtra* en traduction chinoise qui n'ont pas de parallèle en pāli, le Bienheureux s'y adresse toujours aux moines qui l'entourent, sauf une fois où il discute avec un brahmane venu d'un village des environs, mais non de la ville elle-meme.

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1. *Vinaya-piṭaka* Pāli, PTS vol. p. 15-19; T. n° 1421, p. 105 a-106 a; T. n° 1428, p. 789 b-790 b; T. n° 1450, p. 128 c-129 c; *Mahāvastu*, édition Senart, vol. III, p. 409-413.
2. *Pāsa-sutta*, PTS S.N. vol. I, p. 105, T. n° 99, p. 288 a.

Très souvent, les versions pālie et chinoise d'un meme récit diffèrent sur l'endroit qui sert de théâtre á ce dernier : si l'une des deux a choisi le Ṛṣipatana, près de Bénarès, l'autre désigne au contraire une ville différente et éloignée, comme Śrāvastī, Rājagṛha ou Kauśāmbī. Cela montre que, si l'anecdote ou le sermon a sans doute une origine assez ancienne, antérieure au règne d'Aśoka, aucune indication de lieu n'était donnée dans sa version primitive dont dérivent les textes pāli et chinois qui nous sont parvenus et que le choix de Bénarès ou d'une autre ville est arbitraire, sans aucun rapport avec l'histoire. Il est d'ailleurs fort douteux que ces récits soient fondés sur des souvenirs d'événements réels. Dans de tels *sūtra*, il est clair qu'aucun des éléments de la narration, en particulier les personnages avec lesquels s'entretient le Buddha, n'a la moindre relation avec le lieu indiqué, qu'il s'agisse de Bénarès, de Rājagṛha au d'une autre cité. L'examen de ces personnages, qu'ils soient les moines accompagnant le Bienheureux, comme dans la très grande majorité des cas, ou tel grand disciple ou tel laic nommément désignés et connus par ailleurs, confirme de jugement car aucun d'eux n'est reconnu par la tradition comme étant né à Bénarès ou y ayant habité.

Si l'on en croit tous ces textes, le Buddha n'aurait pas fait au Ṛṣipatana un seul séjour, celui au cours duquel il prononça son premier sermon et fonda sa Communauté en ordonnant moines ses cinq anciens compagnons, mais il y serait revenu plusieurs fois, plus tard, avec sa troupe de disciples. Presque tous les récits de ces séjours ultérieurs du Bienheureux au Parc aux Gazelles sont de la plus grande banalité et appartiennent au type le plus courant, celui dans lequel le Maître se contente d'enseigner à ses moines tel ou tel article de sa doctrine ou de prescrire telle ou telle règle de discipline. Bien qu'un peu plus complexes, les autres ne sont pas pour autant d'une grande originalité et sont analogues à beaucoup d'autres qui, dans les recueils canoniques, sont localisés ailleurs : conversations entre deux grands disciples, discussions entre des moines anonymes qui vont ensuite demander au Buddha d'arbitrer leur désaccord, entretiens du Bienheureux avec un laīc venu lui demander conseil, taquineries de Māra le Malin, Il n'y a rien, dans tout cela, qui présente un intéret majeur pour l'histoire du bouddhisme, de sa doctrine ni de sa Communauté, et l'on peut regarder tous ces récits comme les purs produits de l'imagination si fertile de disciples vivant deux nu trois siècles après le Parinirvāṇa du Buddha.

Le *Sutta-piṭaka* pāli situe en deux autres endroits proches de Bénarès deux scènes d'un genre moins ordinaire. Dans le *Ghoṭamukha-sutta*,[1] qui n'a pas de parallèle en traduction chinoise et fut donc inventé assez tard, le doyen Udena, faisant halte au bois de manguiers (*ambavana*) de Khemiya peu après la disparition du Buddha, reçoit la visite

1. PTS M. N. vol. II, p. 157 sq.

du brahmane Ghoṭamukha, venu du pays des Magadha pour accomplir ses devoirs pieux á Bénarès. Les deux hommes discutent, le brahmane soutenant des opinions fausses que le sage doyen réfute si bien que Ghoṭamukha se convertit au bouddhisme et fait une offrande généreuse à Udena. La scène racontée par le *Kaṭuviya-sutta*[1] se passe au pied d'un figuier (*pilakkha*) appelé Goyoga, non loin du Parc auv Gazelles, mais les deux versions chinoises de ce texte donnent des indications de lieu quelque peu différentes, tout en précisant elles aussi que l'endroit est près de Bénarès : au pied d'un arbre, sur le bord de la route, selon l'une ; à côté, du temple d'un dieu, d'aprés l'autre. Passant par là en allant faire sa tournée d'aumônes dans la ville, le Buddhn y voit un moine en proie à de mauvaises pensées et il s'arrete un moment pour l'admonester, ce qui émeut grandement son disciple. On doit bien noter que, dans ces deux récits comme dans les précédents, aucun des personnages n'est un habitant de Bénarès et que le second de ces deux *sutta* est l'un des rares textes où le Bienheureux se rende dans cette ville pour y mendier sa nourriture.

Bénarès n'apparaît donc guère, dans le récits canoniques contant des épisodes de la vie du Buddha ou de ses grands disciples, que pour servir à situer, par rapport à elle, les endroits précis et voisins où font halte le Maître ou ses moines, qu'il s'agisse du Mṛgadāya du Ṛṣipatana ou d'un autre lieu.

Au contraire, c'est la ville elle-meme qui sert de théâtre à de nombreux *Jātaka*, dont l'action est repoussée dans un passé fabuleusement lointain et dont l'un des principaux personnages est un roi des Kāsi, vivant à Bénarès.[2] Très probablement ces contes ont-ils été empruntés par le bouddhisme à tout un cycle de légendes, fort riche et très populaire, et qui s'était formé, bien avant l'avènement d'Aśoka, à partir du souvenir prestigieux laissé par cette grande et antipue cité, dont l'importance politique avait sensiblement décliné à l'époque du Buddha mais qui était restée l'une des principales villes saintes du brahmanisme.

C'est peut-etre ce dernier caractère qui explique le fait surprenant que nous avons constaté en examinant les textes canoniques, à savoir que, lors des séjours qu'ils auraient faits au Ṛṣipatana ou en d'autres endroits voisins de Bénarès, ni le Bienheureux ni ses moines ne semblent avoir eu aucune relation avec les habitants de cette ville. Plus encore, comme nous l'avons vu, les récits dont la version primitive paraît etre antérieure au règne d'Aśoka sont très rares et un seul d'entre eux, d'une importance exceptionnelle il est vrai, celui du premier sermon, peut remonter à une époque très haute et meme avoir pour

1. PTS A. N. vol. I, p. 280 sq; T. n° 99, p. 283 a; T. n° 100, p. 380 b.
2. *Jātaka*, PTS vol. I, p. 102, 178, 249, 261; vol. III, p. 97, 444, 452; vol. IV, p. 119; vol. V, p. 354, 382, 458, 481; vol. VI, p. 203, etc.

origine le souvenir de l'événement qu'il raconte, le témoignage transmis par les cinq premiers disciples ordonnés moines à leurs compagnons plus jeunes. En some, à cette exception près, dont l'importance ne saurait etre négligée, pendant deux siècles environ la Communauté semble n'avoir guère attaché d'intéret au Ṛṣipatana ni à Bénarès, et n'avoir pas pensé que le Buddha y avait séjourné après la fameuse Mise en Mouvement de la Roue de la Eoi. C'est seulement plus tard, dans le courant du IIIe siècle et plus encore dans les deux siècles suivats, c'est-à-dire à l'époque où le Ṛṣipatana était devenu l'un des quatre grands buts de pèlerinage bouddhique, que les disciples éloignés du Bienheureux furent amenés à croire que celui-ci avait dû faire d'assez nombreux séjours en cet endroit sacré pour eux et y enseigner à ses moines tant de points de sa doctrine et de règles de sa discipline. Cependant, meme à cette époque tardive, on se retint presque toujours de croire que le Buddha avait établi des relations étroites avec les habitants de Bénarès elle-meme, qu'il avait reçu d'eux un accueil favorable et avait fait parmi eux de nombreuses conversions comme cela avait été le cas, croyait-on, dans les autres grandes villes du bassin moyen du Gange, à Śrāvastī, à Rājagṛha, à Kauśāmbī, à Vaiśālī, à Campā.

Une telle réserve appelle une explication. L'éloignement du Parc aux Gazelles par rapport à Bénarès peut assurément en etre une, mais on peut alors se demander pourquoi le Buddha avait choisi cet endroit qui, s'il présentait sans doute des avantages comme lieu d'étape ou de séjour, avait le grave inconvénient de l'obliger à faire, chaque matin, une merche très longue et fatigante pour aller se revitailler dans la ville. N'y avait-il pas, beaucoup plus près de celle-ci, d'autres bois à l'ombre desquels il aurait aussi bien pu se reposer, méditer et enseigner? Certainement si. On peut donc penser que, lorsqu'il faisait halte au Ṛṣipatana, le Bienheureux allait faire sa tournée d'aumônes, non pas dans Bénarès, mais dans les villages proches du Mṛgadāya et que, lorsqu'il déssirait parcourir les rues de la ville pour y mendier et pour tenter de convertir des citadins, il passait l'après-midi et la nuit dans un bois beaucoup plus proche des remparts de Bénarès.

Selon la tradition, ce qui conduisit le Buddha à s'arreter dans le Parc aux Gazelles, et meme à y venir depuis Uruvilvā qui se trouvait à plus de 200 km de là, ce ne fut nullement le désir de convertir des habitants de la célèbre cité, mais la résolution de precher sa doctrine à ses cinq anciens condisciples dont il savait qu'ils demeuraient alors au Ṛṣi:atana. Il est cependant permis de douter que le Bienheureux soit venu là avec cette intention et meme qu'il ait connu ces cinq hommes avant d'arriver à cet endroit en de les y trouver. On peut penser que le hasard seul mit ainsi en relations le Buddha avec ces ascètes et que le sage Gautama ignorait tout de l'existence de ceux-ci jusqu'à ce moment. Meme dans ce cas, cette rencontre purement fortuite et ce qui en fut la conséquence, le

premier sermon et la fondation du Saṃgha bouddhique, a parfaitement pu suffire à fixer l'attention des moines des générations postérieures sur ce lieu précis et causer l'oubli rapide des autres endroits voisins où le Bienheureux avait fait halte mais où aucun événement important, aussi, digne de mémoire que le précédent, ne s'était produit. En somme, le récit soigneusement conservé de ce fait capital a fort bien pu concentrer définitivement toute l'attention des disciples sur le Ṛṣipatana qui en avait été le théâtre, "cristalliser" en quelque sorte la tradition sur celui-cict effacer par contre-coup les souvenirs beaucoup plus ternes dès l'origine des autres endroits proches de Bénarès où le Buddha s'était arreté. Telle est la première raison qui se présente à l'esprit pour essayer d'expliquer le fait surprenant que nous avons constaté.

Une autre raison, sans doute plus déterminante, peut etre à l'origine de ce fait. En effet, le premier sermon et la fondation consécutive de la Communauté ne permettent pas de comprendre pourquoi, à l'exception de Yaśas et de ses quatre amis, peronnages de fiction, le Buddha n'a converti aucun des habitants de Bénarès et n'a meme eu aucune relation avec eux, si l'on en juge d'après l'étonnant silence des textes, comme s'il avait considéré inutile d'aller leur enseigner sa doctrine de salut quand il s'était arreté si près de leurs remparts. En agissant ainsi comme en renonçant à faire halte dans un endroit plus rapproché de la ville, d'où celle-ci aurait été plus accessible, le Bienheureux paraît avoir manqué gravement à son devoir de prédication, à sa "grande compassion" (*mahā karuṇā*) ne privant délibérément les habitants de Bénarès de la connaissance de la Voie menant à la Délivrance, au Nirvāṇa. Cela est beaucoup trop contraire au comportement habituel du Buddha, tel que le décrivent d'innombrables textes canoniques de toutes sortes, comme à l'enseignement qu'il ne cesse de répéter à ses disciples pour qu'on puisse l'admettre. On est donc conduit à penser qu'il a tenté sérieusement de convertir les citadins de Bénarès et que ses moines en ont fait autant par la suite, mais que ces efforts sont demeurés vains et que les habitants de la grande ville, résolument brahmanistes dans leur très grande majorité, sont demeurés sourds à la prédication bouddhiste, insensible aux appels et aux arguments que leur adressaient le Bienheureux et ses fils spirituels. Cet échec dut etre assez net et assez durement ressenti par la jeune Communauté pour que la tradition le masquât sous le voile épais du silence, à la seule exception de la légende de Yaśas et de ses quatre compagnons. Pour ne pas avoir à reconnaître que ni le Buddha ni ses meilleurs disciples n'avaient pu obtenir à Bénarès des succès analogues à ceux qui avaient couronné leurs efforts dans les autres grandes cités du bassin moyen du Gange, que leur prédication s'y était heurtée à des convictions religieuses contraires et invincibles, on a préféré ne rien dire des tentatives faites par le Maître et par ses élèves pour convertir au bouddhisme les gens de Bénarès.

La résistance de cette ville au bouddhisme paraît avoir continué, toujours auss

forte, jusqu'à la disparition de cette religion dans l'Inde puisque Hiuan-tsang en témoigne au milieu du VIIe seècle de notre ère, alors que la doctrine prechée par le Buddha commençait a décliner dans les régions qui l'avaient vu naître. Le grand voyageur chinois note en effet qu'a l'époque où il y passa, Bénarès était très peuplée et florissante mais que les bouddhistes y étaient très peu nombreux, la grande majorité de la population y appartenant aux diverses sectes hindoues. Pourtant, en dehors de la cité elle-meme, dans la région dont celle-ci était la capitale, le bouddhisme ne se trouvait pas dans une mauvaise situation, puisqu'on y comptait trois mille moines, tous de la secte des Sammatiya, et trente monastères. Le Parc aux Gazelles était alors en pleine prospérité, avec des monumens nombreux et variés, dont quelques-uns étaient vastes et splendides, et mille cinq cents moines y demeuraient.[1]

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1. Thomas WATTERS, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London 1904, vol. II, p. 46-59.

ON A PASSAGE OF THE SIDDHĀNTALAKṢAṆA JĀGADĪŚĪ

Kamalehswar Bhattacharya

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra, the famous seventeenth-century Navya-naiyāyika of Navadvīpa (Bengal), in his commentary on the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Didhiti* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, explains the *Didhiti* passage *yo yadiyayāvadviśeṣābhāvavān sa tatsāmānyābhāvavān*, "that which possesses the totality of the particular absences of a certain thing possesses the generic absence of that thing", as follows : *yo yajjātisamānādhikaraṇobhayāvṛttidharmāvacchinna-yatsaṃbandhāvacchinnapratiyogitāka-yāvadabhāvavān sa tajjātyavacchinnatatsaṃbandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvavān*, "that which possesses the totality of the absences the counterpositivenesses to which are delimited, on the one hand, by properties which share a locus with a certain generic property and do not occur in two things taken together, and, on the other hand, by a certain relation, possesses the absence the counterpositiveness to which is delimited by that property and by that relation". To explain : If the determination "which does not occur in two things taken together" (*ubhayāvṛtti*) is omitted, then it would be possible to take, as properties sharing a locus with contact-ness (*saṃyogatva*), which is a generic property (*jāti*), the property of being a quality (*guṇatva*) or existence (*sattva, sattā*) ; and the absences the counterpositivenesses to which are delimited by these properties, being included in the totality of the absences, would be the "reason" (*hetu*). However, these absences do not exist in the subject (*pakṣa*), namely a substance (*dravya*) like a tree, where an attempt is made to prove the generic absence of contact (*saṃyoga-sāmānyābhāva*) : there is in a substance neither absence of quality (*guṇa*) nor absence of something that has existence (*sattāvat*). In other words, the "reason" here would only be a "semblance of reason" (*hetvābhāsa*), being vitiated by the defect of "not being established according to its own nature" (*svarūpāsiddhi*). Thanks to the determination *ubhayāvṛtti*, however, one can take, as property sharing a locus with contact-ness (*saṃyogatva*), only the "property of being such and such contact" (*tattatsaṃyogatva*), which is a property that occurs in only one thing and, consequently, does not co-occur in two things taken together; and the totality of the absences the counterpositivenesses to which are

delimited by this property exist, indeed, in a substance like a tree.

Now the following objection may be raised : the determination *ubhayāvṛtti*, preventing only "non-establishment according to its own nature" (*svarūpāsiddhi*), is superfluous (*vyartha*). It is generally admitted that when a "reason" (*hetu*) is accompanied by a determination, this determination is significant (*sārthaka*) only insofar as it prevents the defect of "deviation" (*vyabhicāra*), which consists in the fact that the "reason" is present where the object to be established (*sādhya*) is absent. In fact, the apprehension of the deviation constitutes an obstacle to the apprehension of the Invariable Concomitance (*vyāptigraha*) which is the ground of all inferential knowledge (*anumiti*). A determination that prevents only the defect of "non-establishment according to its own nature" is superfluous : the apprehension of this defect constitutes an obstacle only to the Consideration (*parāmarśa*), and, consequently, only to the inferential knowledge in a given subject. According to Gaṅgeśa, however, every determination without which it is impossible to apprehend the Invariable Concomitance (*yena viśeṣaṇena vinā vyāptir grahītuṃ na śakyate*) is significant, and, for that reason, a determination that prevents "non-establishment" is also significant in certain cases[1]. "Where there is apprehension of the Invariable Concomitance even without the determination, there (the reason) has a superfluous determination[2]". Be that as it may, the determination *ubhayāvṛtti* here is superfluous : it only prevents the defect of "non-establishment according to its own-nature". True, without this determination, it would be possible to take, as properties sharing a locus with contactness (*saṃyogatva*), the property of being a quality (*guṇatva*) or existence (*sattva*) ; but the absences the counterpositivenesses to which are delimited by these properties, i. e. the absence of a quality or the absence of something that has existence, exist in all the categories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika except substance (*dravya*) ; and there is also, in the same categories, generic absence of contact. Thus, there is apprehension of the Invariable Concomitance. Only there cannot be any inferential knowledge if one takes as subject a substance.

However, Jagadīśa justifies the use of this determination by citing the authority of the well-known pre-Raghunātha commentator on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pakṣadhara (Jayadeva) Miśra : *vyabhicāravārakasyevāsiddhivārakasyāpi viśeṣaṇasya sārthakatāyāḥ Pakṣadharamiśrādisammatatvāt.* "Pakṣadhara Miśra and others admit that a determination that prevents 'non-establishment' is as significant as one that prevents 'deviation' ". Then he refers to a passage in Pakṣadhara's commentary *Āloka* on the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. This passage of the *Jāgadīśī*, as we usually have it, runs as follows :

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1. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, 1888-1901), I (*Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa*), *Nirvikalpakavāda*, pp. 820-821.
2. *viśeṣaṇaṃ vināpi yatra vyāptigrahas tatra vyarthaviśeṣaṇatvam* : *Ibid.*, p. 821.

-ata eva śabdo 'nityaḥ sāmānyavattve sati viśeṣaguṇāntarāsamānādhikaraṇabahirindriyagrāhyatvād iti hetāv asiddhivārakasya śabdetarārthakasya viśeṣaguṇāntarapadasya Śabdamaṇyāloke taiḥ sārthakatvaṃ samarthitam[1].

The modern commentators are aware that the reading *śabdo nityaḥ* is also found, and efforts are made to justify logically both the readings in the context. This is, of course, the procedure that is usually followed today by traditional learning in Navya-Nyāya. One may, nevertheless, raise the question : which is the correct reading ? And it should not be particularly difficult to answer this question. The first step, evidently, would be to see whether, in the relevant section of the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, a similar passage is found in connection with the *siddhānta* of the Naiyāyikas (who hold that sound is non-eternal : *śabdo 'nityaḥ*), or in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas (who hold that sound is eternal : *śabdo nityaḥ*)—both having this much in common that they hold that sound is a quality—the "specific quality" (*viśeṣaguṇa*) of space (*ākāśa*)—, thus differentiating themeselves from the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that sound is a substance (*dravya*). The next step would be to consult Pakṣadhara's commentary. This is a bit more difficult, since this part of the *Āloka* has not been edited so far. Manuscripts of this important text are available, however, and one of them is preserved in Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale).

Now a little investigation enables me to say that all that has been written on the subject is useless. The allusion is clearly to one of the inferences used by the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas to prove the eternity of sound : *śabdo nityaḥ, viśeṣaguṇāntarāsamānādhikaraṇa-ikavṛttiguṇatvāt*. "Sound is eternal, because it is a quality which resides in a single locus and which does not share a locus with another specific quality"[2]. Pakṣadhara, in his commentary, states that the expression *viśeṣaguṇāntarāsamānādhikaraṇa* means here "which does not share a locus with a specific quality other than sound" (*śabdetaraviśeṣaguṇāṇsamānādhikaraṇety arthaḥ*), and he observes : "Although (the determination) *śabdetara* ('other than sound') is superfluous, this should be considered in accordance with the point of view of the others for whom a determination which prevents non establishment is also significant" (*yady api śabdetareti vyartham, tathāpi pareṣām asiddhivārakaviśeṣaṇasyāpi sārthakatayedaṃ draṣṭavyam*).[3]

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1. *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Jāgadīśī* with the commentaries of Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Guruprasāda Śāstrī, and Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya, ed. by Guruprasāda Śāstrī, Benares 1933, pp. 51-53.—The manuscript preserved in Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale, Sanscrit 901, fol. 93b) gives : *viśeṣaguṇāntarāsamānādhikaraṇabahirindriyagrāhyaguṇatvāt*.
2. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* IV (*Śabdakhaṇḍa*), 1, pp. 424-425.
3. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Sanscrit 903, fol. 54a.

In the light of all this, it is now easy to restore the correct reading of the passage under consideration. Basically, it is the same as the reading given in the Chowkhamba edition of the *Jāgadīśī*[1] :

ata eva nityatvasādhyakānumāne viśeṣaguṇāntarāsamānādhikaraṇikavṛttiguṇatvahetau śabdetarārthakasyāntarapadasya Śabdamaṇyāloke sārthakatvaṃ taiḥ samarthitam. (The determination ***sāmānyavattve sati***, which in this edition precedes *viśeṣaguṇāntarāsamānādhikaraṇa*°, is incongruous in the context of the Prābhākara doctrine).

"Thus, in the *Śabdamaṇyāloka*, he (Pakṣadhara Miśra) has established the significance of the word ***antara*** 'other', meaning 'other than sound', in the reason 'property of being a quality which resides in a single locus and which does not share a locus with another specific quality', in connection with the inference where the object to be established is eternity".

It was not evident to me how without the determination *śabdetara* there would ensue the defect of "non-establishment" (*asiddhi*) in the inference in question. Pakṣadhara does not explain this. But the explanation is found in the ***Prakāśa*** commentary by his pupil Rucidatta, who, commenting on the same passage of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, observes : "Because the same thing shares a locus with itself" (*svasyāpi svasamānādhikaraṇatvāt*)[2]. Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa also states in his commentary on this passage : "Because : sound also shares a locus with the specific quality consisting in sound" (*śabdasyāpi śabdātmakaviśeṣaguṇasamānādhikaraṇatvāt*)[3].

Thus, without this determination, the "reason" (*hetu*)—which would be "property of being a quality which occurs in a single locus and which does not share a locus with a specific quality" (*viśeṣaguṇāsamānādhikaraṇaikavṛttiguṇatva*) would not exist in the subject : sound (*śabda*). It would only be a "semblance of reason" (*hetvābhāsa*), being vitiated by the defect of "not being established according to its own-nature" (*svarūpāsiddhi*). The determination *śabdetara* prevents this defect and, therefore, is significant.

Now it is also manifest that the theory under consideration is not Pakṣadhara's own theory : it is the theory "of the others" (*pareṣām*), i. e., of the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas, and Pakṣadhara only mentions it without approving it. The Prābhākaras hold that a determination which prevents the defect of "non-establishment , without being at the same time indispensable for the apprehension of the Invariable Concomitance, is also

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1. Text of the *Dīdhiti* with the *Jāgadīśī*, ed. by Somanāthopādhyāya, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares 1908, vol. I, p. 216.
2. *The Paṇḍit* VI (1872), p. 587.
3. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Bibliotheca Indica edition), IV, 1, p. 425.

significant—obviously because it leads to an inferential knowledge (which, for this reason, would be considered suspect by the Naiyāyikas)[1].

It is hardly conceivable that Jagadīśa thus misread the *Āloka* by ascribing this theory to Pakṣadhara. The passage seems to be an interpolation. But this question can be settled only after a thorough examination of the manuscripts—a task that must be reserved for a future occasion.

In any case, the idea that such a theory was held by Pakṣadhara Miśra should now be discarded. The "thought" of Miśra, as cited, for instance, by Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya[2], seems to exist only in the imagination of the modern exegetes.

It is high time that pre-Raghunātha commentaries on the ***Tattvacintāmaṇi*** be made available in print.

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1. Cf. also **Rucidatta,** ***loc. cit.,*** **d. 286b :** ***paramate vā svarūpāsiddhivārakasyāpy anumitiprayojakatvena ca;*** **p. :** ***paramate asiddhivārakasyāpi sārthakatvān na śabdabhinnapadaṃ vyartham.***

2. *Loc. cit.,* p. 51; cf. p. 53.

WHAT IS THE MEANS OTHER THAN THE ĪŚVARA-PRAṆIDHĀNA

R. S. Bhattacharya

The particle *vā* in the *sūtra* *iśvarapraṇidhānād vā*[1] indicates that there is an alternative means to achieve the desired goal. That this goal is no other than *yoga* or *samādhi* can easily be understood from the *pātanikā bhāṣya* on *Sūtra* 1.23[2].

As to what is the means other than *iśvarapraṇidhāna* the commentators observe that it is the *tivrasaṁvega*[3] stated in *sūtra* 1.21[4]. We hold that this view is untenable since it does not suit the context. Moreover, *saṁvega* or *tīvrasaṁvega* cannot be taken as a means to be practised like *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*. Our reasons are as follaws :

The *sūtra* 1.23 mentions the means *iśvarapraṇidhāna* by using this word in the fifth case-ending, and as such it is expected that the word expressing the alternative means must have been used in same case-ending in some preceding *sūtra*. The word *tivrasaṁvega* is not used in this case-ending in *sūtra* 1.21.

Moreover, the word *tivrasaṁvega* in *sūtra* 21 is an adjective and as such it cannot be taken as expressive of a means like *abhyāsa*. In this *sūtra* nothing is enjoined. It simply says that *phala-lābha* (acquirement of results) of the persons having *tivrasaṁvega* becomes *āsanna* (imminent). Had the word been used as *tivrasaṁvegena* or *tivrasaṁvegāt* then and

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1. *Yogasūtra* 1.23.
2. किमेतस्मादेव आसन्नतरः समाधिलाभो भवति अथास्य लाभे भवति अन्योऽपि कश्चिदुपायो न वेति ।
3. एतस्मादेव तीव्रसंवेगस्य अधिमात्रत्वादेव (*Yogavārttika*); एतस्मात् ··तीव्रसंवेगादेव (*Bhāsvatī*). It appears that Bhoja, Bhāvāgaṇeśa, Nāgoji and others subscribe to this view. Woods translates *etasmāt*—'as a result of this last method; the method is no other than the *tivrasaṁvega*.'
4. *Tīvrasaṁvegānāmāsannaḥ* The word *tivrasaṁvega* has two senses according to the context. In *Sūtra* 1.21 it is used as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound 'One who has *tivrasaṁvega;* (तीव्रः संवेगो यस्य): It is used as a *Karmadhāraya* compound (तीव्रश्चासौ संवेगश्च acute *saṁvega*) in the *bhāṣya* 2.12 (तीव्रसंवेगेन निर्वर्तितः) ।

then only *tīvrasaṁvega* could have been taken as a means. The plural number of the word *tīvrasaṁvegānām* becomes inexplicable if we take the word as a means.

We believe that the word showing the alternative means must be in the fifth case-ending and it is gratifying to note that the *upāya* prescribed in *sūtra* 1.12 is used in the fifth case-ending (*abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṁ tannirodhaḥ*)[1]. In this *sūtra abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* are used as a compound word with dual number. There is nothing to prevent us from taking *abhyāsa-vairagya* as a means (two means tied together inseparately as will be shown afterwards). The *bhāṣya* uses the word *upāya*[2] for these two.

From the foregoing consideration it follows that there are two means to *cittavṛtti-nirodha*; the first is the joint application to *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* and the second is the *praṇidhāna* to *Īśvara*.

It may be asked : how can it be ascertained that these two words are used in the fifth case-ending in *sūtra* 1.12 because in the *bhāṣya* they are shown to have been used in the third case-ending (Vide the *bhāṣya*–expressions : *vairāgyeṇa* and *vivekadarśanābhyāsena*)[3].

Our reply is : The meaning of the fifth case-ending is *hetu* (*Hetau pañcamī*) which is also the meaning of the third case-ending[4] and as such it is no fault on the part of the *bhāṣyakāra* to use the third case-ending with a word which is used in the fifth case-ending in the original text. Such a licence is permitted to commentators, particularly to the *bhāṣyakāra*-s, who are not bound to explain the words in the text by using them in the way, in which they are used in the original text[5].

The chief aim of a *bhāṣyakāra* is not to explain the words in the text but to elucidate the views of the original author, or to refute the criticisms of opponents or even to introduce a new topic not expressly stated in the original text.

It may be asked : the *bhāṣya* refers to the means other than the *īśvarapraṇidhāna* by the word *etasmāt* (किमेतस्माद् एव आसन्नतरः (v.l. आसन्नतमः) समाधिर्भवति न वेति, 1.23)—a word in the singular number of the fifth case-ending. Does it not prove that the alternative means must be one in number and not two (in the form of *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*)?

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1. Cf. *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 3.36 in which both these words are used in the fifth case-ending (वैराग्याद् अभ्यासाच्च). The goal to be achieved by these two means appears to be *dhyāna*.
2. In the original *Sāṅkhya* treatise by Pañcaśikha there was a discussion on *upāya*-s as can be inferred from *Śānti*. 320.165.
3. Cf. *Gītā* 6.35 (अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च गृह्यते) which speaks of two means to *manonigraha* (subjugation of mind).
4. Vide Pāṇini : *Hetau* II.3.23.
5. The *sūtra* 1.3 has the word द्रष्टा (द्रष्टुः) while the *bhāṣya* uses its synonym *puruṣa*. In the *sūtra* 1.16 the word गुणवैतृष्ण्य expresses the sense of quality. The *bhāṣya* on it does not mention the quality but speaks of a person who possesses this quality.

Our reply is : Both *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* can be taken by the word *etasmāt* since they cannot be detached from each other. Both of them, being interdependent, form one *upāya*. *Abhyāsa* is explained as *vivekadarśanābhyāsa* (in the *bhāṣya*) or as *sthitau yatnaḥ* (in the *sūtra*). No person can realize the character of *viveka* without cultivating *vairāgya*. Similarly an aspirant being devoid of *vairāgya* can never attempt for *sthiti*, which is explained as *cittasya avṛttikasya praśāntavāhitā*. In the same way practice of *vairāgya* largely depends upon *abhyāsa* of the afore-said character. The element of *karman* is predominent in *abhyāsa* while that of *jñāna* in *vairāgya* and they become two inseparable aspects (component parts) of a single whole (i.e., *upāya*, one in number).

That these two are like the two component parts of a whole can clearly be understood from the expression *ubhayādhīnaḥ cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* in *bhāṣya* 1.12. The word *ubhaya* is significant ; it means 'the whole that has two parts' *ubhau avayavau asyeti ubhayaḥ*[1]. The inseparable character of these two means (forming one *upāya*) can also be understood from the *pātanikā bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 1.13 '*athāsāṁ nirodhe kaḥ upāyaḥ*' in which the word *upāya* is used in the singular number, though the *sūtra* 1.13 speaks of two *upāya*-s viz., *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*. This *bhāṣya* statement clearly points out that neither *abhyāsa* nor *vairāgya* alone is competent enough to bring about *vṛttinirodhaḥ*. Both of them should be practised to subjugate *vṛtti*-s. Thus it is quite justified to use the word *etasmāt* which indicates that the *upāya* is one in number.

Saṁvega cannot be taken as an *upāya* to be practised with effort and will. *Saṁvega* is of the nature of quality that arises in *citta* after a long and vigorous practice of *sadācāra*-s favourable to *yoga*. It may be a kind of *saṁskāra*[2] (impression), that helps a person to practise an act with much devotion and easiness. *Saṁvega* must be understood as an incentive because it can make the application of *abhyāsa*, *vairāgya* and *īśvarapraṇidhāna* more acute, serious and firm[3]. It is a general quality which can be associated with the

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1. Compare the expression उभयो मणिः which means a *maṇi* that has two *avayava*-s.
2. It is wrong to explain *saṁvega* as *vairāgya* as explained by Vācaspati, for *vairāgya* is already mentioned with *abhyāsa* in a previous *sūtra*. This meaning of *saṁvega* is not recorded in the lexicons also. Fortunately the word is explained in a work called *Āyurvedasūtra* (of unknown author) as क्रियाहेतुर्दृढतरः संस्कारः (4.3). This meaning suits the context highly.
3. Vide *bhāṣya* 1.21 (तत्र मृदूपायोऽपि त्रिविधः, मृदुसंवेगो मध्यसंवेगस्तीव्रसंवेग इति). Here मृदूपाय is a *Bahuvrīhi* compound meaning one whose *upāya*-s are mild. The category of मृदूपाय योगिन् has three subdivisions viz. मृदुसंवेग etc. This shows that *upāya*-s may be associated with *saṁvega*. This also tends to prove that *saṁvega* is no *upāya* but a quality which can make an *upāya* more powerful. The *upāya*-s may be मृदु, मध्य or अधिमात्र but if they are endowed with तीव्रसंवेग, the result will be imminent (*āsanna*).

worldly acquisitions also. But the aforesaid means viz. *abhyāsa*, *vairāgya* and *iśvarapraṇidhāna* (as defined in the *bhāṣya*) belong to the field of *yoga* only.

If the word *tīvrasaṁvegānām* (a word in the sixth case-ending with plural number) in *sūtra* 1.21 is compared with *videhaprakṛtilayānām* (1.19) and *itareṣām* (1.20), it would appear that *tīvrasaṁvega* yogins belong to the classes mentioned in 1.19 and 1.20. Such yogins may belong to any other classes also. Since the word *tīvrasaṁvega* refers to yogins (being a *Bahuvrīhi* compound) it is quite proper to use it in the plural number. Had *tīvrasaṁvega* been the name of a means (and in such case it must be analysed as *tīvraścāsau saṁvegaśca*) it should have been used in the third or fifth case-ending with singular number.

It may be argued that the stem *etad* (of which *etasmāt* is used in the *bhāṣya* 1.23) refers to an entity preceding immediately and as such it cannot be taken as referring to a means that is mentioned in a remote *sūtra* (1.12) intervened by as many as ten *sūtra*-s. Our reply is that *etad* refers not only to an entity that precedes immediately but also to a preceding entity after which no new topic has been taken up for discussion, though there may exist many propositions between the preceding entity and the pronoun *etad*.[1] In the *Yogasūtra*-s the topic *abhyāsa-vairāgya* begins from 1.12 and ends in 1.22. The alternative means *iśvarapraṇidhāna* is mentioned in 1.23 on which the *bhāṣya* employs the word *etasmāt*. All the *sūtra*-s from 1.12 to 1.23 deal with nature of *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*. Thus it is quite reasonable to hold that *etasmāt* in the *bhāṣya* 1.23 can be attached to *abhyāsa-vairāgya* prescribed in *sūtra* 1.12.

At the end let us compare the nature of these two means. It appears that the enjoining of *abhyāsa-vairāgya* in the first place and of the *iśvarapraṇidhāna* as an alternative means has some purpose behind it. After examining the nature of *Yoga* and the *Yogāṅga*-s with their respective results we have come to the conclusion that according to the school of Patañjali the path of *abhyāsa-vairāgya* is more powerful and logical than that of *iśvarapraṇidhāna*.

It can easily be understood that while the former is certain, regular and possesses a firm philosophical basis, the latter, though easy, attractive and suitable to all, is 'unsound' in as much as it is liable to be misused to a great extent even by those who have a desire to follow this path faithfully. Human history is replete with such disastrous and agitating acts as are performed by those who honestly claim themselves to be the devotees of some gods and declare that the acts performed by them have some 'divine mission'. Such acts can never be performed by those who follow, even insufficiently or improperly, the path of *abhyāsa-vairāgya*.

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1. Cf. Pāṇini IV.3.143 in which एतयोः refers to *sūtra* IV.3.134 and IV.3.135. Similarly एतेभ्यः in Pāṇini V.4.88 refers to the two preceding *sūtra*-s V.4.86-87 and not V.4.87 only.

Moreover, it is a proved fact that the practice of *īśvarapraṇidhāna* cannot be taken up profitably without cultivating *abhyāsa-vairāgya*, while *abhyāsa-vairāgya* can be successfully practised without fixing the mind to some super-normal ideal, which is the essence of *īśvarapraṇidhāna*. This path is known as the *jñānayoga*, a vivid description of which may be found in the teachings of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*[1] which shows this path precisely and succinctly.

This difference in character of these two means is, however, external, since none is opposed to the other. On the contrary, *īśvarapraṇidhāna* is doubtless capable of bringing about *samādhi*[2]. It is the aforesaid weak character of *īśvarapraṇidhāna* which seems to be the reason for prescribing it as an alternative means to *cittavṛttinirodha* and also for placing it after the means known as *abhyāsa-vairāgya*.

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1. Vide 1.3.13.
2. *Yogasūtra* 2.45.

OḌḌIYĀNA : A NEW INTERPRETATION

Lokesh Chandra

PRELUDE

Oḍḍiyāna played a pivotal role in the development, redaction and dissemination of the Tantras. It was the centre whence the Tantras originated. According to Bu-ston it was at Oḍḍiyāna that Vajrapāṇi collected "endless revelations of Vajrayāna" and gave them to Indrabhūti. *Guhyasamāja*, the culmination of Tantric thought, was also revealed to Indrabhūti in Oḍḍiyāna. The *Tattva-prabhāsa-karaṇḍa-dīpa* (Toh. 2643) and *Jñāna-tilaka-yogini-tantra-rāja* (Toh. 422) of the *Guhyasamāja* tradition point out that Indrabhūti was an incarnation of Vajrapāṇi, and it was he who knew and could explain the *Guhyasamāja*. The *Guhyasamāja* was commented upon by Candrakīrti who was a follower of the Tantric Nāgārjuna who was born at Kanci and whom the texts call *Kancannara* (sic, Tucci 1949 : 1.214). The explicit reference to Kanci holds the key to the identification of Oḍḍiyāna. It is significant that Indrabhūti was an incarnation of Vajrapāṇi, who was the presiding deity of Maṅgakoṣṭha situated in Oḍḍiyāna, or modern Ekāmreśvara at Kanci.

It was from Oḍḍiyāna that Padmasambhava went to Tibet and firmly laid the foundation of *Vajrayāna* in the Land of Snows.

Hence the present multidimensional approach to a fresh consideration of the geographic location of Oḍḍiyāna, the heart land of *Vajrayāna*.

INTRODUCTORY

1.1 The identification of Oḍḍiyāna has been clouded by the fact that it was sought to be equated with the Sanskrit toponyms Udyāna and Udra. The phonology of the term Oḍḍiyāna is so clear that it cannot be mixed up with Udyāna. The identification of Oḍḍiyāna with Udyāna/Ujjānaka in the North West of India was enunciated in a period of the euphoria of discoveries of Buddhist antiquities from Gandhāra and other North-Western regions of India which seemed to be the prime locus of Buddhism. At

that time, it was but natural that Udyāna came foremost to the minds of Buddhologists as the place to be equated with Oḍḍiyāna, in spite of the difficulties posed by phonological considerations.

1.2 The Chinese characters for Udyāna in Hsüan-tsang are Wu-chang-na[1] 烏仗那 and represent the Mid-Indic form Ujjāna. The character *chang* cannot be forced to yield *ḍ*. The cerebral *ḍ* is transliterated by 荼 by Hsüan-tsang, who follows a consistent system for the transliteration of Sanskrit.

1.3 When Oḍḍiyāna was identified with Udyāna, South India had not come to occupy a place of relevance in the evolution of Buddhism, and as such how could it strike any investigator that Oḍḍiyāna could have a South Indian derivation. It was beyond speculation that it could be a Tamil word. As it will be clear in sequence, Oḍḍiyāna in Tamil means 'girdle' like its Sanskrit counterpart *kāñci*. In fact, Oḍḍiyāna is Kanci. Kanci was one of the seven great cultural metropolis of India and the glorious capital of the Pallavas, who played a major role in the diffusion of *Vajrayāna* to lands beyond the seas. The South Indian places of Śrīparvata, Dhānyakaṭaka, Potalaka and Oḍḍiyāna were some of the foremost creative centres of *Mantrayāna*, especially, of systems centring around Vairocana namely the (i) *Avataṁsaka sūtra*-s (ii) *caryā tantra*-s, and (iii) *yoga tantra*-s —in all the three the Cosmic Buddha was Vairocana with varying iconographic attributes. It is not surprising that the land par excellence of *Vajrayāna* in the Tibetan tradition, should be Oḍḍiyāna=Kanci.

FORMS OF THE WORD OḌḌIYĀNA

2.1 The toponym Oḍḍiyāna occurs in the following eleven forms in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts :

(i) *Uḍḍiyāna-vinirgata-Kurukullā* occurs in *sādhana* 179 of the *Sādhana-mālā*, where the variant reading is Oḍiyāna. She is equivalent to Hevajra-Kurukullā, *Hevajra-tantra-krameṇa Kurukullā*.[2]

(ii) *Uḍḍiyānaka* appears in the *Mahāmāyūri* 97 as the place of residence of yakṣa Karāla.[3]

(iii) The spelling *U-ḍyan* can be seen in two titles of the Tanjur dedicated to Oḍḍiyāna-Mārīcī and both translated by Don-yod-rdo-rje and Ba-ri lotsava :

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1. Watters 1905 : 1.225.
2. *Niṣpannayogāvalī* 6, *HT* 1.11.13, *SM* 179, 183, 186, 187—cited in *Mallman* 1975 : 228.
3. Lévi 1915 : 56, 105f.

Toh. 3344 U-ḍyan-gyi ḥod-zer-can-gyi sgrub-paḥi-thabs : *Uḍḍiyāna-Mārīcī-sādhana.* Author : Lhan-cig-skyes-paḥi-rol-pa. Toh. 3345 U-ḍyan-gyi rim-paḥi ḥod-zer-can-gyi sgrub-paḥi-thabs= *Oḍḍiyāna-krama-mārīci-sādhana.*

(iv) *Oḍiyāna* is prefaced to Mārīcī : Oḍiyāna-Mārīcī[1]. In *SM* 140 Oḍiyāna-pīṭha has the variant reading Oḍḍiyāna-pīṭha in the manuscript of Cambridge University Library dated N. S. 285=A. D. 1165. Oḍiyāna-Mārīcī is also termed Vajradhātvīśvarī Mārīcī[2]. The replacement of Oḍiyāna by Vajradhātu may enshrine the secret of its identification with Kanci. It was from Kanci that the *Vajraśekhara-tantra* and its *Vajradhātu-maṇḍala* was transmitted to China. Oḍiyāna was the vajrapīṭha. We find Oḍiyāna-vajrapīṭha Vajravārāhī in *SM.* 225[3]. Here the Nepalese manuscript of N. S. 285=A. D. 1165 kept at the Cambridge University Library has the reading Oḍyāna.

The form *O-ḍi-yā-na* occurs in the *Blue Annals*[4] as well as in three titles of the Tanjur which were translated by Gragspa-rgyal-mtshan :

Toh. 3528, 3529 O-ḍi-yā-naḥi ḥod-zer-can-gyi sgrub-thabs :
Oḍḍiyāna-mārīci-sādhana (ms. Oḍi°).
Toh. 3566 O-ḍi-yā-na-las byuṅ-baḥi rigs-byed-maḥi sgrub-thabs :
Oḍḍiyāna-vinirgata-kurukulle-sādhana (ms.Oḍi°).

It may be noted that while Ba-ri lotsva (A. D. 1038-1109 ?) used the form U-ḍyan, Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan (A. D. 1147-1216) employed O-ḍi-yā-na.

(v) We find *O-ḍi-yān* in the Tanjur title (Toh. 3370) : O-ḍi-yānnas byuṅ-baḥi rigs-byed-maḥi sgrub-paḥi-thabs= *Oḍḍiyāna-vinirgata-kurukulle-sādhana*, translated by Don-yod-rdo-rje and Ba-ri lotsava.

(vi) *Oḍiyānaka* appears in a Mathura inscription dated Saṁ 77[5] commemorating the donation of a pillar to a *vihāra* of king Huviṣka by the monk 'Jīvaka Oḍiyānaka'[6].

(vii) *Oḍḍiyāna* is by the most common form. It occurs in the colophon of *SM.* 35[7]. The colophon in the next *sādhana* reads[8] : In a Nepalese manuscript of the ninth century Vajrapāṇi of Maṅgakoṣṭha in Oḍḍiyāna is mentioned[9]. Maṅgakoṣṭha is an earlier name of Ekāmreśvara temple near the Kāmākṣī temple at Kanci : Tamil *mankay*= *man* 'mango-tree'+*kay* 'fruit', heard and recorded by the Portuguese as *manga* > English

1. *SM.* 138 (1.283-4), 139.
2. *SM.* 136, Mallmann 1975 : 261.
3. 1.439 : *śrīoḍiyāna-vajrapīṭha-vinirgata ūrdhvapāda-vajravārāhī-lokeśvara-sādhanaṃ samāptaṃ*, colophon.
4. 2.753.
5. Lüders, *Liste,* no. 62.
6. Lévi 1915 : 105, Naudou 1968 : 36.
7. 1.80 *sarahapāda-kṛtam oḍḍiyāna* (v. l. Od yana) *krameṇa trailokyavaśaṁkara-sādhanaṁ samāptam.*
8. *Iti sarahapādāvatārita-oḍḍiyāna-vinirgata-trailokyavaśaṁkara-lokeśvara-sādhanaṁ samāptam* (Mallmann 1975 : 108, 36 (1.83).
9. Foucher 1900 : 121, Naudou 1968 : 36.

mango. The ancient name of the site where the present Ekāmreśvara temple stands, must have been intentionally changed to signal its new religious associations. The word Maṅgakoṣṭha may also conceal a double entendre to an emanation of goddess Tārā, for Tamil *maṅkai* means 'a girl between 12 and 13 years', Malayalam *maṅka* 'a young, playful woman'. Tārā was the presiding deity (*pīṭheśvarī*) of holy Oḍḍiyāna, and today her apotheosis is significantly Kāmākṣī 'one of amorous eyes'. In the *Hevajratantra*[1] Oḍḍiyāna is specified as a *pīṭha*. Here the Tibetan text renders Oḍḍiyāna by U-ḍi which stems from the reading Uḍiyāna.

(viii) O-ḍyan is the form in the Tanjur title[2] : O-ḍyan-gyi ḥod-zer-can-gyi sgrub-paḥi-thabs : *Oḍiyāṇa-māricyai sādhana* (so in the xyl.), translated by Don-yod-rdo-rje and Bari lotsava. The toponym *Oḍyāṇam* is found in the *Malayalam Lexicon.*[3]

(ix) *Au-ḍyan*-nas byuṅ-baḥi ḥod-zer-can-gyi sgrub-thabs = *Oḍḍiyāna-mārīcī-sādhana*[4] provides a variation of the previous form.

(x) *U-rgyan*, also Oḍiyana, often written in the abbreviated form . Jäschke 606b. George N. Roerich consistently adopts the spelling U-rgyan in his translation of the *Blue Annals*[5]. In the Tanjur, the following titles have the spelling U-rgyan :

Toh. 1707 Dpal u-rgyan-gyi sgrol-maḥi mṅon-par-rtogs-paḥi rim-pa : *Śrī-Uḍḍiyāna-tārā-'bhisamaya-krama* (ms. Uḍiyāna). Trans. Saṅghaśrībhadra, Ḥjam-dpal-sgeg-paḥi-rdo-rje. In the *Blue Annals* the title is shortened to Jo-mo U-rgyan-ma.

Toh. 1708 U-rgyan-gyi sgrol-maḥi rim-pa : *Uḍḍiyāna-tārā-krama.* Transl. as above in 1707.

Toh. 1711 U-rgyan-gyi rim-paḥi sgrol-maḥi sgrub-thabs : *Uḍḍiyāna-krama-tārā-devī-sādhana.* Transl. Parahita, Śes-rab-rgyal-mtshan.

Toh. 1744 Dpal u-rgyan-gyi rnal-ḥbyor daṅ rnal-ḥbyor-maḥi raṅ-byuṅ-gi loṅs-spyod dur-khrod-kyi rtog-pa : *Uḍḍiyāna-śrī-yoga-yoginī-svabhūta-sambhoga-śmaśāna-kalpa.* Author : Virūpa, transl. Prajñāśrījñānakīrti.

(xi) The abbreviated form of the name . in Tibetan is an indication that once the most common spelling was *O-rgyan*. The iconographic xylograph Rin-lhan, the so-called Five Hundred Gods of Narthang, illustrates the O-rgyan sgrol-ma gnas-kyi-dbah-

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1. 1.7.12.
2. Toh. 3340.
3. 2.1246.
4. Toh. 3231.
5. Index p. 1264.

phyug-ma=*Piṭheśvarī Oḍḍiyāna Tārā* on folio 45b. In the Padma-thaṅ-yig O-rgyan is used [1]. Oḍḍiyāna was the *piṭha* of Tārā. This is reflected in the popular belief that the Kāmākṣī temple was originally dedicated to the Buddhist goddess Tārā later converted into that of a Hindu goddess at the time of Śaṅkarācārya's establishment af *Kāmakoṭi piṭha* in the ninth century A. D.[2] It is significant that from among the four *piṭha*-s of Oḍḍiyāna, Pūrṇagiri, Kāmarūpa and Śrīhaṭṭa mentioned in *sādhana* 234 of the *Sādhanamālā*[3], there was Kāmākhyā in Kāmarūpa and Kāmākṣī at Kanci (Oḍḍiyāna), both of them goddesses. In the Hindu tantric tradition too the four are *Śākta pīṭha*-s devoted to the cult of the goddess *Śakti*.

2.2 Thus we have the following variants from Indian and Tibetan sources :

(a) Uḍḍiyāna, Uḍḍiyānaka, Uḍyan, Uḍi
(b) U-rgyan
(c) Oḍiyāna, Oḍiyān, Oḍiyănaka, Oḍḍiyāna, Oḍyan, Auḍyan
(d) O-rgyan

The variations are in the initial vowel *u~o*, single or double ḍḍ, (*ḍ*) *ḍiy* or *ḍy* (with the elision of *i*), dropping of the final *a* in Uḍyan/Oḍyan Auḍyan, addition of the pleonastic *ka* in Uḍḍiyānaka and Oḍiyănaka.

2.3 The Tibetan terms U-rgyan and O-rgyan represent a transliteration of the initial syllable *u~o* of Uḍḍiyāna or Oḍḍiyāna and *rgyan* means 'an ornament'. The word U-rgyan~O-rgyan signifies 'the ornament termed U (ḍḍiyānā) or O(ḍḍiyāna)'. Thus in the Tibetan term U-(O-) rgyan, *u*-(*o*-) is the phonetic and *rgyan* is the semanteme.

2.4 In fact in Tamil and other South Indian languages *oḍḍiyāṇam* means a "gold or silver girdle or belt, an ornament worn by women round the waist"[4]. The Lexicon also gives the meaning "girdle worn by *yogi*-s while in a sitting posture, so as to bind the waist and the doubled up legs together", and translates it in Tamil as *yogappaṭṭai*. The Lexicon gives variant forms in Telugu *oḍḍāṇamu*, Kannaḍa *oḍḍyāṇa*, Tulu *oḍ yāṇa*.

2.5 Burrow and Emeneau[5] give the following morphological variations of the lexeme in different South Indian languages : "810 Ta. *Oṭṭiyāāam* gold or silver girdle or belt worn by women. Ma. *uṭaññāṇ* gold chain round the loins. Ka. *oḍyāṇa*, *oḍḍyāṇa*,

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1. Jäschke p. 607a.
2. Ramachandran 1954 : 10, Champaklakshmi 1978 : 116.
3. 2.455.
4. *Tamil Lexicon*, Madras 1936, 1.585b.
5. 1961 : 71 no. 810,

oḍḍaṇa, oḍḍavāna, oḍḍivāṇa, oḍvāṇa belt of gold or silver chiefly worn by women. Tu. *oḍyaṇe, oḍyāṇa* belt or girdle made of gold and generally worn by a devil-dancer. Te. *Oḍḍāṇamu* belt of gold or silver worn by women."

2.6 All the morphological variations noted above from Indian and Tibetan sources, can be traced back to South Indian languages, thus proving that Oḍḍiyāna is the Tamil equivalent of Kanci, both meaning 'a girdle'. V. A. Devasenapathi says[1] : "The meaning of the word Kañcī in Sanskrit is *Oḍḍiyāṇam* (a belt worn as an ornament around the waist by women). This ornament is worn only around the navel. Kanci is so-called because it is the naval position for the earth. *Kāñcīmāhātmya*[2] and *kāmākṣī-vilāsa* speak of Kanci as the navel of the world : (i) *ādhibhautikam aṁhghnaṁ nābhisthānam bhuvaḥ param*[3] (ii) *jagad-kāma-kalākāram nābhisthānam bhuvaḥ param*[4]. Śivajñāna Munivar in his *Kāñcipurāṇa* refers to Kanci as the navel-region of the Goddess Earth who wears the sea as Her Garment and who shines as the Supreme *ākāśa*.

SOUTH INDIAN WORDS IN DHĀRAṆĪ-S

3.1 The presence of Draviḍa expressions in the *dhāraṇī*-s is explicitly pointed out by several Buddhist texts[5], some of which were translated into Chinese as early as A. D. 265-316 (T. 310), A. D. 383 (T. 1547), and A. D. 398-399 (T. 212). In the three Chinese translations of the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (T. 1547, tr. A. D. 383; T. 1546, tr. A. D. 437-439; T. 1545, tr. Hsüan-tsang A. D. 656-659) it is stated that Lord Buddha preached the Noble Truths (*ārya-satyāni*) to the *lokapāla* Virūpākṣa in the language of the South Indian borderlands, as he did not understand Sanskrit. The Northern Liang version (T. 1546) employs the words : in the Draviḍa language. In the Vinaya of the *Mūla-sarvāstivādin*-s, the Buddha preaches in the 'language of the borderlands' (Tib. *mthaḥ-ḥkhob-paḥi tshig*). In the *Udānavarga* it is the Damiḍa language (ib. 154). In the *Mahāmāyūrī Vidyārājñī*[6] it is stated : *sidhyantu drāmiḍā mantrapadāḥ svāhā*[7]. Bernhard's in-depth study of a single South Indian expression *ine mine dapphe daḍapphe* employed by Lord Buddha to explain the Truths to Virūpākṣa, clearly manifests the urgent need of a comprehensive study of the language of *dhāraṇī*-s, their South Indian vocabulary, the patterns of assonance developed in them to explain the jingling concatenation of words, the role of South India in the

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1. 1975 : 3.
2. 31.70.
3. *Kāmākṣīvilāsam* 11.6.
4. Ibid. 13.73.
5. Bernhard 1967 : 148-168.
6. Ed. S. Oldenburg, p. 250f.
7. Ibid. p. 162.

development of tantra-s, and other related problems. The *dhāraṇī-s* cannot be brushed aside as meaningless, for they conceal in their intentional camouflage frozen levels of cultural modulation in various geographic locales going back deep into two millenia or more. Such a study will reveal the beginnings of hidden archetypes which later on developed into the complex philosophical systems of the tantra-s, and the diverse that converged unto them.

3.2 Virūpākṣa is the *lokapāla* who guards the west and understands the Dramiḍa language. Thus the west here refers to the Dramiḍa land, and not the 'west of India'.[1] This fact is very important for the interpretation of a crucial passage in the *Blue Annals*[2] which has often been misinterpreted. In this context 'the west' with reference to Oḍiyan is a clear proof that it was located in the Tamil area : "After that from the West Śrī Kambala and others discovered the yoginī-tantras in the country of O-ḍi-yan. They also spread towards Madhyadeśa". The directions mentioned in Buddhist texts pose a complex problem which has to be sorted out. It is significant that the *Mañjuśrī-mūla-kalpa,* which was discovered from the Manalikkara maṭha near Padmanabhapuram in South India, "refers to Vidiśā (modern Bhelsa, M. P.) as being situated 'between west and north' (*paścimottarayor madhyam*). Rahula Saṃkṛtyayana[3] rightly suggested that the author wrote this from a place in south, probably from Dhānyakaṭaka".[4] The great Tibetan historian, Bu-ston speaks of the "southern country of Saurāṣṭra".[5] The starting point of geographic reference has to be sought for. Tucci says : "But from this passage no definite conclusion can be drawn. Uḍḍiyāna being in the legend of Padmasambhava a great kingdom, it is imagined to extend to the extreme ends of India. In chapter XI, that same text [=*Padma-thang-yig*] locates Za hor to the Southeast of Bodhgaya while Kāmarūpa (Assam) is placed to the North-East, in this case Za hor would roughly correspond to Orissa. But this division of India has no great geographical value : India is for this text a *maṇḍala* whose center is Bodhgaya ; it is a kind of miraculous lotus, four leaves corresponding to the four cardinal points (Uḍḍiyāna=West, Bengal=East, Kashmir=North, Baiddha=Vaideha=South) and four other leaves to the intermediate points"[6].

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1. Joshi 1967 : 329.
2. 2.753.
3. *Purātattva-nibandhāvalī* p. 108.
4. Joshi 1967 : 325.
5. Obermiller 1932 : 2.161.
6. 1949 : 2.736.

3.3 The presence of South Indian words in *dhāraṇi*-s, which were precursors of *Mantrayāna*, is borne out by the *Karuṇā-puṇḍarīka-sūtra* which speaks of *Drāmiḍa-mantra-pada*[1] and by the *Sarvajñatākāra-dhāranī* : *iyaṁ Drāviḍa-mantra-padā sarvajñatākāra-dhāraṇī*[2], and *Draviḍa-mantra-padāḥ*[3]. In the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra*[4] *rākṣasi*-s expound the *dhāraṇi iti me*[5](*nime*[5]) . . . . . The first expressions conjoined as *itime* by Watanabe[5] and also by Mantri[6] who says : "In the text the words '*iti*' and '*me*' are separated, but taking into consideration the whole structure of the *Dhāraṇī-mantra*-s, I would like to suggest that two words should be connected and read as '*itime*'. It may then mean—'O Itimā'. This can be conjectured from the *Dhāraṇi* that follows—'Nime, nime, nime, nime, nime', which means 'O Nimā' ".

3.4 The above *dhāraṇi* can be explained in the general background of the world-view of the *siddha*-s. In song number 10 of the *Caryāgītikoṣa* "Kānhu says : Oh Ḍombī, you live outside the city; but how is it that you have now dared to touch the son of a brahmana ? But Oh Ḍombī, I will live with you because I am only a naked *yogin*, who uses the skull (for drinking) and is hated by all. The lotus is one but it has 64 petals and the Ḍombī is now d a n c i n g on it. She is now eating the lotus stalk in the lake. I shall now get hold of her and reach the other shore' ".[7]

3.5 Furthermore, the interpretation of the *dkāraṇi* cited above is possible as a Tamil expression. In Tamil *i* is a demonstrative base expressing the nearer or proximate person or thing; prefaced to nouns, expressing nearness[8]. It is *i* before a consonant and *ivv* before a vowel. The second word *timi-timi* is explained by Burrow and Emeneau[9] as 'syllables sung to keep time in dancing', Kannada *dimi* 'sound produced by the quick motion of the feet in dancing', Tulu *dimidimi* 'dancing nimbly, agility'. In the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*[10] we find the spelling *dime-dime*. *i time* refers to the nimble dancer who is near the heart of the *yogin*. The third word *nime-nime* is a jingling assonance of *time-time*. The variation *t~n* reflects the sound sequence of the Tamil alphabet. In the *Laṅkāvatāra* there is another assonance *dime-dime hime-hime*, which echoes the sequence of *t/d* and *p~h*, that is, the

1. 39 : 1.3.
2. 16.1.
3. 19.8, Mantri 1977 : 88-80.
4. Chap. 21 (ed. Kern/Nanjio 1912 : 401).
5. 1975 : 158,284.
6. 1977 : 88.
7. Sastri 1977 : 687.
8. Burrow/Emeneau 1961 : 30 no. 351a.
9. 1961 : 209, no. 2644.
10. Ed. Nanjio 1956 : 260.

dentals are followed by the labials. Regarding the $p \sim h$ phenomenon, Caldwell says : "Tamil and Malayalam are destitute of the sound of *h*..... In Modern Canarese *h* is regularly used as a substitute for *p*, as is sometimes the case in Marathi; but ancient Canarese agrees in this particular with Tamil"[1]. Thus the jingling sequence of *dime hime* is a feature that could have arisen only in the Tamil-speaking area.

3.6 Traces of Tamil words underlie cryptic expressions in the tantras, which await research. The *anuttara-yoga tantra*-s are classified[2] into (i) neither father nor mother tantra-s, (ii) mother tantra-s and (iii) father tantra-s. The mother tantra-s are divided into seven groupings. The second group of Heruka (i. e. *Akṣobhya*) is subdivided into five classes. The fifth class pertains to Ārali which has two texts : *Vajra-Ārali-mahātantra-rāja* (Toh. 426) and *Rigi-Ārali-tantra-rāia* (Toh. 427), both translated by Kāyasthāpagayā-dhara and Śakya-ye-śes. A *sādhana* to Rigi-Ārali in the Tanjur was translated by Rin-chen-grub : *Rigi-Ārali-sādhana* (Toh. 1658). Rigi corresponds to Telugu *rēku* 'petal', Kolami (W) *rekka* 'leaf'[3]. Tamil *araḷi*, *alari* 'oleander, *Nerium odorum*', Malayalam *araḷi* 'Nerium; *Plumeria acuminata*'[4]. Tamil *ari* is 'beauty', *arivai* 'woman between the age of 20 and 25, woman, lady', Malayalam *aruva* 'fine woman'[5], Tamil *ari* 'fermented liquor, toddy[6]. Thus *Rigi-ārali* means the petals of the *Nerium odorum* alluding to the 64 petals of the lotus on which the Ḍombī dances. The word *ārali* veils an allusion to *ari* 'beauty' and *arivai* 'the charming lady'. It may also conceal an allusion to *ari* 'toddy', for the *Caryā-gīti-kośa* says : "The customer who comes on seeing the signs of wine, seems to be the *antarābhava citta*,, who now enters the vacuity where the lotus with 64 petals is located, without leaving any sign behind, and drinks the nectar from the lotus of great bliss"[7]. The use of Tamil words in Sanskrit *dhāraṇī*-s was a deliberate efforts at charging the language with esoteric effects, as a special terminology or *sandhā-bhāṣā* 'union of two meanings, the ordinary as well as the symbolic', the union of two divergent vocabularies by the insertion of Tamil words in Sanskrit *mantra*-s to render them more thaumaturgic in their unfathomable obscurity : the gods love the cryptic (*parokṣa-priyāḥ devāḥ*). The special tantric terminology is also termed *sandhyā-bhāṣā* 'the language intentionally vague, hidden and enigmatic as the twilight', for it points—without regrets—to the symbolism of the dusk or eventide (*sandhyā*) which is joyfully ingrained in the vocabulary of the vacuity

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1. 1961 : 147.
2. Wayman 1973 : 235.
3. Burrow/Emeneau 1961 : no. 4245.
4. *Ibid.* : no. 174.
5. *Ibid.* : no. 180.
6. *Ibid.* : no. 182.
7. Sastri 1977 : 688.

where the lotus with 64 petals is located, and the "*tāruṇi* or wine stands for the *sāṃṛtika bodhicitta* or the *semen virile*. According to a particular belief of the *yogin*-s, when the *śakti* marches upwards through the *nāḍi*-s, the *śukra* or the *sāṁṛtika bodhicitta* also proceeds upwards to the head. The aim of the *yogin* is to see that it proceeds quietly through the middle *nāḍī* after leaving the *nāḍi*-s on either side and gets accumulated in the *vajramaṇi* in the head and loses its restless character"[1]. The nocturnal intensities of *mahāmudrā* and *mahāsukha* are clothed in the rapture and enigma of the mediative glory and depth of the *sandhyā-bhāṣā*, accentuated by the use of exotic Tamil vocables, wherein *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* become one.

4. SOUTH INDIA AS A CRADLE OF PĀRAMITĀYĀNA AND MANTRAYĀNA ŚRIPARVATA

4.1 The cradle of *Pāramitā-yāna*, *Mantrayāna* and *Vajrayāna* was in South India, around Śrīparvata, Dhānyakaṭaka, Potalạka and Oḍḍiyāna which are in Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu, and in the 8th century this area became an important centre for the transmission of tantra-s to Indonesia and China. Joshi opines, "It is, therefore, clearly established that the earliest seats of Tantrika Buddhism were not in Bengal, Orissa and Assam, but in Uḍḍiyāna and Āndhradeśa"[2]. From early centuries Southern India played a leading role in the development of Buddhism. Nāgārjuna, the founder of *Māhāyāna*,[3] was a South Indian Brāhmaṇa, who rescued the *Prajñā-pāramitā* from the nāga-s, from his hermitage at Śrīparvata :

> "*Dakṣiṇāpatha-vedalyāṁ bhikṣuḥ śrimān mahāy aśāh* |
> *Nāgāhvayaḥ sa nāmnā tu sadasat-pakṣa-dārakah* ||
> *Prakāśya loke madyānam mahāyānamanuttaram* |"

4.2 Hsüan-tsang informs us that the Mahāsāṅghikas had a *dhāraṇi-piṭaka*[4] and inscriptions prove that they were widely disseminated in Andhradeśa[5].

4.3 The *Nikāyasaṅgraha* mentions the Vajraparvata and many *Vajrayāna* works are attributed to the *vajraparvata-vāsi-nikāya*. The Vajraparvata may be another name of Śrīparvata because of its close association with *Vajrayāna*[6]. Sanskrit works like the

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1. *Ibid.*
2. 1967 : 329.
3. *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, BST. 118.
4. Beal 1884 : 2.165.
5. Joshi 1967 : 325.
6. *Ibid.* : 327.

Harṣacarita[1], *Kādambarī*[2], *Mālatī-mādhava*[3], and *Rājataraṅgiṇī* of Kalhaṇa[4] testify to the repute of Śrīparvata as a centre for attaining *siddhi*. The *Mañjuśrī-mūla-kalpa*[5] says that in Śrīparvata and Dhānyakaṭaka one realises the mantra-s quickly :

> "*Śrīparvate Mahāśaile dakṣiṇāpatha-sañjñike* /
> *Śrīdhānyakaṭake caitye jinadhātudhare bhuvi* //
> *sidhyante tatrā mantrā vai kṣipraṁ sarvārthakarmasu* /"

4.4 *Avataṁsaka* and South India. In the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra* Gaṇḍavyūha Buddha resides at Jetavana amidst an array of *śrāvaka*-s and Lokendras, who find it impossible to comprehend the great spiritual power of the Tathāgata. In accordance with the wish of the assembly, Buddha enters the *siṁha-vijṛmbhita samādhi* and as a result miracles follow. "After this finale of miracles Mañjuśrī departs for Dakṣiṇāpatha, followed by Bodhisattvas, Lokendras and a host of six thousand bhikṣus led by Śāriputra. Upon his arrival at the *caitya* of Vicitrasāladhvaja near Dhanyākara inhabitants of this town turn out in large numbers to hear him[6]". From among the thousands who flock to the *caitya* Mañjuśrī singles out Sudhana to receive instruction in Supreme Knowledge. Mañjuśrī advises and sends Sudhana off to the south and other regions to receive instruction in the conduct of the Bodhisattva. In his pilgrimage Sudhana visits over 50 teachers. Among them are : Sāgaramegha who had spent twelve years in meditation on the seashore at Sāgaramukha, Supratiṣṭhita of Sāgaratīra on the way to Laṅkā, the Dramiḍa Megha of Vajrapura in Dramiḍapattana, Queen Āśā who lives in the Samantavyūha forest at Samudravelatī, sage Bhīṣmottara-nirghoṣa of Nālayur, and finally he reaches Maitreya who resides at the Mahāvyūha kūṭāgāra in the country of Samudrakatīha. It is interesting to observe that journey of Sudhana takes him to the South Indian city of Nālayur and to a number of places associated with the sea, which renders it likely that the composition of the Gaṇḍavyūha be associated with Southern India. The fact that Mañjuśrī witnesses the marvels of the Buddha and returns to Dakṣiṇāpatha corroborates the aforesaid contention. Behind the right shoulder of Mañjuśrī appears a crescent-shaped ornament—an attribute often associated with Mañjuśrī. This crescent is used to denote boys of supernatural descent, thus it came to be associated with gods or Bodhisattvas of youthful appearance[7]. Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta bears affinity with Kumāra or Murugan of Tamil. *Avataṁsaka* was the first step in the evolution to the tantra-s connected with Vairocana and we cannot rule

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1. Chowkhamba ed. p. 9.
2. Ed. Peterson p. 224-8.
3. 1.8,10.
4. 3.267; 4.390.
5. P. 88.
6. Fontein 1967 : 6.
7. *Kumārabhūta*, Fontein 1971 : 145 fig. 6.

out the evolution of the Vairocana systems in the Tamil area, culminating in the *caryā*, *yoga* and *anuttara* tantra-s. In the *Abhidhānottara* and *Saṁvarodaya* tantra-s the 24 heroes and *ḍākinī*-s are supposed to reside in different regions called Pullīrmalaya, Jalandhara, Oḍiyāna, etc.[1] Pullīrmalaya is a South Indian toponym. There are several South Indian cities beginning with Puli (y)° : Puliyur, Pullur, Pulluru[2]. This becomes more relevant when we remember that the *Abhidhānottara* and *Saṁvarodaya* tantra-s belong to the *Prajñā Tantra* division which is also called the *Ḍākinī Tantra* division[3]. The very word *ḍāka* may be akin to Tamil *ṭākku*< T. *ḍāka* 1. strength, robustness. 2. petulancy, pride[4].

4.5 In Japanese *Vajrayāna* or Shingon, the ritual of the *Mahākaruṇā-garbhadhātu maṇḍala* of the *Mahāvairocana-tantra* and the *Vajradhātu maṇḍala* of the *Vajraśekhara-tantra* has in between the ritual of Acala. Acala (Jap. Fudō) is the main deity (Jap. honzon) of homa[5]. Acala is an emanation of Śiva in Japan, and in the Tibetan tradition he is Caṇḍa Mahāroṣaṇa. In the Tamil Lexicon[6] Caṇḍeśa is Śiva's seneschal. The role of Acala in the Japanese tradition and his Tibetan name indicate his evolution from Caṇḍeśa in the predominantly Śaiva area of Tamil. In the legend of the Avalokiteśvara on the Potalaka mountain, Hsüan-tsang says[7] : "to the people at the foot of the mountain who pray for a sight of the Bodhisattva, he appears sometimes as a Pāśupata Tīrthika or as Maheśvara". An instance of this syncretism is the *Nīlakaṇṭha-Lokeśvara-dhāraṇī* which represents Śiva as the Thousand-eyed, Thousand-armed Lokeśvara Bodhisattva. It has been a very popular work in China since the later Śung dynasty (A. D. 960-1127). It was translated in to Chinese four times : by Chê-t'ung of Loyang (w. 627-649)[8] by Bhagavaddharma (w. 650-660, Nj. 320, T. 1060), and by Bodhiruci in A. D. 701.[9] The acculturation of Śaiva into Buddhist tradition may have taken place in South India and thence it was transmitted to Indonesia where Śiva-Buddha syncretism was deeply entrenched.

MANTRAYĀNA PROCLAIMED AT DHĀNYAKAṬAKA/ŚRĪDHĀNYA

4.6 The *Sekoddeśa-ṭikā*[10] by the great *Vajrayāna* teacher Nāropā says that Śrī-

1. Kalff 1978 : 158.
2. List of Indian Post and Telegraph Offices, 1954, p. 567-568.
3. Kalff 1978 : 149.
4. *Tamil Lexicon* 3.1696.
5. Toki 1899 : 142.
6. Suppl. 314a.
7. Watters 1905 : 229.
8. Nj. 318, T. 1057b.
9. Nj. 319, T. 1058.
10. Pp. 3-4.

dhānya is the place where Mantranaya was proclaimed : *Śrīdhānye niyata-mantranaya-deśanā-sthāne*; the following is quoted from the *mūlatantra* :

Gṛdhrakūṭe yathāśāstaḥ prajñāpārami tānaye |
Tathā mantranaye proktā Śrīdhānye dharmadeśanā ||

4.7 Hsüan-tsang confirms[1] that Dhānyakaṭaka was famed for its shrine to Vajrapāṇi. Avalokiteśvara had directed Bhāvaviveka to this shrine in the mountain to the south of the capital so that he would gain his desire on reciting the *Vajrapāṇi-dhāraṇī*. A note added to Hsüan-tsang's text tells us that another name for the country was "Great Andhra'.[2]

4.8 According to the Tibetan tradition, it was at the Stūpa of Dhānyakaṭaka that Buddha gave initiation into the *Vajradhātu mahāmaṇḍala* and the *mūla-tantra* of the *Kālacakra* : "Before this last deed, on the fifteenth day of the fourth month of the Iron-dragon year of the Nam-non cycle, at the *stūpa* of Dhānyakaṭaka in South India, Buddha arose in the bodily form of the main deity of the *Kālacakra maṇḍala* before King Sucandra (Zla-ba-bzaṅ-po) and a host of countless gods, nāga-s and men of such places as the ninety-six districts of Śambhala .. Further, he gave there the initiation into the great *maṇḍala* of *Vajradhātu* and the root text of the *Kālacakra Tantra*. King Sucandra recorded all this in writing and upon returning to Śambhala, constructed a three-dimensional *Kālacakra maṇḍala* and composed 12,000 commentaries to the *mūla tantra*".[3]

4.9 Tāranātha says that Candragomin went from Nālandā to Dhānyakaṭaka *caitya* to worship Tārā and Avalokiteśvara and thence to the Potala hill[4]. Hsüan tsang's journey took him to Kancipura, the capital of the Draviḍa country[5], and 3000 li south from this he came to the Malakūṭa country in which was situated Mount Potalaka the abode of Avalokiteśvara.

5. KĀÑCĪ AS A FOUNTAINHEAD OF BUDDHISM

5.1 From very early times Kanci had become a cradle of Buddhism. In the excavations at Kancipura, a Buddhist shrine has been uncovered, and there has also come to light a greyware sherd with Brāhmī letters of the first-second century A. D. which have been read as *Pu ta li ti sa*[6].

1. Watters 1905 : 2.215, Joshi 1967 : 325.
2. Beal 1884 : 2.220 no. 97.
3. Adapted from Gar-je K'am-trul Rinpoche, A geography and history of Shambala, *The Tibet Journal* 3.3 (1978) : 6.
4. Chimpa/Chattopadhyaya 1970 : 209.
5. Beal 1884 : 2.228.
6. Champaklakshmi 1978 : 116.

KĀÑCĪPURA AS A CENTRE OF PĀLI BUDDHISM

5.2 The *Gandhavaṁsa* says that Kāñcīpura, Avanti and Arimaddana were the three renowned centres of Theravāda. Buddha-ghoṣa confirms this in his *Manorathapūraṇi,* and further points out that he wrote this work on the request of Jotipāla, while both were residing at Kancipura. Buddhaghoṣa refers to Srinivāsa or Siripāla as the king of Kancipura in his *Samantapāsādikā.*

5.3 The Tamil Thera Buddhadatta, who lived in the fifth century under the patronage of the Cola king Kalabhra Accutavikkanta, was the abbot of several Buddhist monasteries, including those at Anurādhapura in SriLanka and at Kancipura.

5.4 The *Gandhavaṁsa* names ten South Indian Theras who wrote Pāli works : Buddhadatta, Ānanda, Dhammapāla, two unnamed, Mahā-vajirabuddhi, Culla-vajirabuddhi, Dīpankara alias Buddhapriya, Culla-dhammapāla, and Kassapa. This work also refers to twenty other Theravāda teachers who wrote in Pāli at Kancipura. Among the ten Theras, Dhammapāla (5th-6th century A. D.) headed the Bhatārāditta Vihāra at Kancipura and Dīpaṅkara Thera (1100 A. D.) became the head of the Bālādicca Vihāra at Kancipura.

5.5 Anuruddha (12th century) of the Pandya land, whose Pāli works were popular in Ceylon and Burma, headed the Mūlasoma Vihāra at Kancipura. For the last eight centuries his *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* has served as a tex-book for *abhidhamma* philosophy in the Pāli countries till our times.

5.6 "South India continued to be the centre of Pāli Buddhism as late as the 12th century A. D. The Kalyāṇi stone inscriptions of King Dhammadazedi (Dhammaceti 1472-1492 A. D.) and the *Sāsanavaṁsa* of Paññasāmi (A. D. 1861) give an account of Chapada who returned to Burma during the reign of King Anawratha (10th century A. D.), taking with him to Arimaddananagara (city of Pagan) five Buddhist savants well-versed in the Pāli lore, two of whom, namely, Ānanda Thera and Rāhula Thera, were residents of Kancipura. Ānanda Thera (died 1245 A. D.) was a native of Kancipuram, who was taken to Arimarddanapura in Burma by Saddharma Jyoti Pāla, where the Burmese king Jayāsūra received him with great honours and loaded him with presents including an elephant which he sent to his relatives at Kanci. Ānanda was the head of the Burmese Buddhist Church for about fifty years and died in 1245 A. D."[1]

5.7 It may be remembered that Diṅnāga was a native of Kanci, lived there for a long time in the early part of his life, went to Ayodhyā to learn from Vasubandhu and ultimately settled down at Kanci.

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1. Ramachandran 1954 ; 7.

5.8 Prior to the third century A. D., Kanci played a prominent role as one of the four capitals of the Tamil area, the other three being Puhār, Madura and Vanji. These four capitals are mentioned in the Tamil work *Maṇimekhalai*. Alongwith the *Śilappadhikāram*, the two are outstanding Tamil classics of the Śangam period and constitute a twin epic : "the subject-matter of the two is one continuous story, and describes what befell a householder and his wife of the city of Puhār, and, as a consequence, the renunciation of the daughter of the hero of her life as the first courtesan of the Cola capital".

5.9 The author of the *Manimekhalai Sāttan* (from Skt. *śāstā*=Buddha), figures among the traditional Fortynine of the Third Tamil Śangam (according to Champakalakshmi 1976:116 the *Maṇimekhalai* is a post-Sangam work of about the fifth century A. D.). His only important work is the *Maṇimekhalai*, whose main purpose is the exhaltation of Buddhism as a religion and philosophy. The *Śilappadhikāram* contributes to this end in a general way. It is remarkable that two of greatest Tamil classics are Buddhist works, for Buddhism held sway in the Tamil area.

5.10 Maṇimekhalā found enough to learn of Buddhism in the initial stages at Puhār. She also learnt all that the heretical teachers had to teach at Vanji. She happened to see her grandfather there in the Buddhist *vihāra* outside the fortress. The grandfather requested her to proceed to Kanci which was suffering from a severe famine and to relieve the acute distress by her inexhaustible alms bowl that she carried in her hand. Her grandfather also advised her that at Kanci alone could she get the most authoritative teaching of Buddhism from Aṛavaṇa Aḍigal. At the direction of her grandfather Maṇimekhalā flew through air to Kanci. She was received by the Viceroy, Iḷaṁ Kiḷḷi and was allotted accommodation in the southwestern corner of the city in a grove called Dharmadavana, wherefrom she fed the suffering people from her inexhaustible bowl much to the relief of all. The grateful Viceroy provided for her a big new *vihāra* with all necessary appurtenances for her residence in the city and did all else she wanted. She got a Buddha seat erected and a special *caitya* for holding the footprints of the Buddha, and received the teaching of Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ, as she was not satisfied with all that she had learnt earlier. Chapter 19 of the poem details Buddhist logic that Aḍigal teaches to Maṇimekhalā, and he is introduced as a Buddhist saint of the highest reputation in Tamil area at the time. The epic gives an elaborate description of the town of Kanci where Maṇimekhalā ultimately attained enlightenment. So during the period to which the story of *Maṇimekhalai* refers, Kanci was still a Cola viceroyalty, and the viceroy at the time was a younger brother of the reigning Cola[1]. "No princely viceroy of the Cola was possible in Kanci

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1. Aiyangar 1928 : 20-21.

after A. D. 300, from which period we have a continuous succession of Pallava rulers holding sway in the region"[1].

5.11 The Dhyāna school (Jap. Zen-shu) of Buddhism is associated intimately with Kanci. It was introduced into China by the Indian teacher Bodhidharma, who was the third son of a king of Kanci. He reached China in A. D. 520 or 527. He had transmitted a copy of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* to his disciple Hui-k'o (traditional dates A. D. 487-593, Fontein and Hickman 1970 : xv, 2). The title of *Laṅkāvatāra* indicates the likelihood of this text having been written at Kanci which was "situated on the mouth of the southern sea of India, looking towards the kingdom of Siṁhala"[2]. It was the port for sailing to Laṅkā : the *Laṅkā-avatāra*. Tantric commentators "quote the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* for their *Yogācāra*-type vocabulary; and this *sūtra* was first translated into Chinese in 443 A. D. and in the fifth century had become so popular among Indian Buddhists that it was the chief text of Bodhidharma when he came to China in either 520 A.D. or 527 A. D. (the alternate dates of the Sino-Japanese tradition)"[3]. The *Vajraśekhara-tantra* which took form in the South is closely related to *yogācāra* (Malalasekera 1973 :379b). This relationship may conceal in it the history of the development from *yogācāra* to the *yoga-tantra*-s (of which *Vajraśekhara-tantra* is the second fundamental text) in the Kanci region itself. It requires further investigation.

5.12 Dharmapāla (A. D. 528-560) the head of the Nālandā monastery was the eldest son of a minister of Kanci[4]. His disciple was the famous Śīlabhadra of Nālandā, under whom Hsüan-tsang studied.

5.13 Mahendravarman in his *Mattavilāsa-prahasana* gives additional proof of the existence of a Buddhist *vihāra* in Kanci in the early part of the seventh century A. D.[5].

5.14 In A. D. 640 Hsüan-tsang stayed at Kanci[6] where he halted for some time in the hope of visiting Srilaṅka[7]. Shaman Hwui-li in his biography of Hsüan-tsang makes some important observations[8] that Kancipura was the capital of the Ḍraviḍa Kingdom and it "is situated on the mouth (bay) of the southern sea of India, looking towards the

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1. Ibid. 1928 : xxvii.
2. Beal 1911 : 139.
3. Wayman 1977 : 97.
4. Raghavan 1976 : 8.
5. Champaklakshmi 1978 : 116.
6. Watters 105 : 2.335.
7. Beal 1911 : 139.
8. *Ibid.* 1911 : 138, 139,

kingdom of Siṁhala, distant from it three days' voyage". Hsüan-tsang had come to Kanci for going to Srilanka, but prior to his departure the king of Siṁhala died and the country was in disorder, so much so that Bodhimegheśvara and Abhayadaṁṣṭra with three hundred priests left the country and arrived at Kancipura. Hwui-li continues :

"The Master of the Law, having obtained an interview with them, asked them as follows : "It is reported that the chief priests of your kingdom are able to explain the *Tripiṭaka* according to the Sthavira school, and also the *Yoga-śāstra*. I am anxious to go there and study these books. May I ask why you have come to this place ?" In reply, they said : "The king of our country is dead : and the people are suffering from famine, without any resource for help..."

"Moreover, among the members of our school who know the Law there is none who excel ourselves as to age and position; if you have any doubts, therefore, let us according to your will, speak together about these things".

"The Master of the Law [i. e. Hsüan-tsang] then gave examples of choice passages of the *Yoga-śāstra*, both long and short sections, but they were not able to explain any of them as Śīlabhadra did".

In the above passage we find the expression : "are able to explain the *Tripiṭaka* according to the Sthavira school, and also the *Yoga-śāstra*", which refers to the wide-ranging dimension of the knowledge of the Srilanka monks who were well-versed in the most ancient Theravāda tradition as well as the latest system of *yü-ch'ieh-lun*. Beal translates *yü-ch'ieh-lun* as *yoga-śāstra*. In fact *yü-ch'ieh-lun* means the *yoga-tantra*-s. At the end, in "choice passages of the *yoga-śāstra*" the Chinese text has the term *yu-ch'ieh* which is a transcription of *yoga*. In fact, the term *yü-ch'ieh* '*yoga*' is employed by Vajrabodhi (who arrived in China in A. D. 719 and died there in A. D. 732), to denote the *yoga-tantra*-s, and he is the great teacher who introduced this genre of *tantra* in China by translating the *Vajraśekhara-tantra* into Chinese. An abridged version of the *Vajraśekhara* translated for recitation (Nj. 534) in A. D. 723 has *yü-ch'ieh* for *yoga-tantra*. An extract from the *Vajraśekhara* on the rites of *Cintāmaṇicakra—Avalokiteśvara* (Nj. 538) was translated by Vajrabodhi in A. D. 730. Its Chinese title is Kuan-tzŭ-tsai ju-i-lun p'u-sa yü-ch'ieh fa-yao, whose word-to-word equivalence would be : *Avalokiteśvara cintāmaṇi-cakra bodhisattva yoga vidhi*. It has been mis-translated by Nanjio as "The importance of the law of Yoga of the Bodhisattva *Avalokiteśvara-cintācakra* (or—*maṇi* ?). The correct translation is : "Rites of *Cintāmaṇicakra Avalokiteśvara* according to the *yoga-tantra*-s". Here *yoga* connotes the system of *yoga-tantra*-s. Similarly, in other works translated by Vajrabodhi during A. D. 723-730, namely in Nj. 1033, 1427, 1430, *yü-ch'ieh* '*yoga*' stands for *yoga-tantra*-s.

5.15 Vajrabodhi was assisted, and later followed, by his disciple Amoghavajra (in China from 719 to 741 and again from 746 to 774) in the translation of ***yoga-tantra*-s** from

Sanskrit into Chinese. Amoghavajra employed the term *yü-ch'ieh ta-chiao-wang*[1]=*yoga mahā-tantra-rāja*, where *tantra* was translated as *chiao*. Elsewhere *yü-ch'ieh*, the transcription of *yoga*, serves as a technical equivalent of *yoga-tantra* : Nj. 1036, 1044, 1052, 1319, 1383, 1389, 1390, 1400, 1411, 1428, 1433, 1443, 1447, 1448, 1453. This serves to confirm that Hsüan-tsang was referring to the *yoga-tantra*-s, and thus Hwui-li's biography of his master preserves an important evidence of the presence of teachers of *yoga-tantra*-s at Kanci in the seventh century.

5.16. Hsüan-tsang in his Si-yu-ki[2] points out that Kanci had 'some hundred of' monasteries, ten thousand monks, and there was a *stūpa* about 100 feet high which was built by king Aśoka.

5.17 The South Indian *śramaṇa*, Bodhiruci[3] worked in China during A. D. 693-713 and translated 53 works into Chinese. Among them are trantric texts like the *Adhyardhaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā*[4] and the *Ekākṣara-Uṣṇiṣacakravarti-sūtra* (I-tzu fo-ting-lun-wang ching)[5] which was translated in A. D. 709. Prof. Seigai Omura has explained the *maṇḍala*-s expounded in these *sūtra*-s translated by Bodhiruci in the second volume of his *History of the Development of Esoteric Buddhism*[6]. Another nexus between *Tantra*-s and South India.

5.18 The Eight Patriarchs of Shingon or Japanese *Vajrayāna* who transmitted the doctrine and rites are Nāgārjuna, Nāgabodhi, Vajrabodhi (A. D. 670-741)[7], Śubhakarasiṁha (A.D. 637-735), Amoghavajra (A. D. 705-774), I-hsing (A. D. 683-727), Hui-kuo A. D. 746-805), Kōbō Daishi (A. D. 774-835).

Tantric Buddhism was carried to East Asia by Vajrabodhi of Kanci who "according to his biography, travelled to southern India at the age of 31 and began a seven-year period of study under Nāgabodhi, a disciple of Nāgārjuna. At this time, it is recorded, he studied the *Vajraśekhara-yoga-sūtra*... According to a Chinese source Vajrabodhi's birthdate is conjectured as 671 A. D., and so his thirty-first year would correspond to the year 701 A.D."[8] Nāgārjuna is an eminent authority on the *Tantra*-s in the Tibetan tradition as

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1. *Nj.* 1022.
2. Beal 1884 : 2.229.
3. *Nj.* p. 442 no. 150.
4. *Ibid.* 18, T. 240.
5. *Ibid.* 532, T. 951.
6. Lokesh Chandra 1972 : 34.
7. Saunders 1964 : 149.
8. Matsunaga 1977 : 178.

well. In the *Blue Annals*[1] it is clear that the *yoga* and *anuttara yoga tantra*-s spread from the south : "the *ācārya* Nāgārjuna and his disciples obtained the *yoga-tantra*-s, including the *Guhyasamāja* and others (the *anuttara-yoga-tantra*-s, were also called *mahāyoga-tantra*-s...), and preached them. They spread from the South. After that Kambala and others discovered the *yogini-tantra*-s, in the country of O-ḍi-yan. They also spread towards Madhyadeśa". Nāgārjuna is associated with the construction of an Iron *Stūpa* in South India, which is illustrated in the Kakuzen-shō 'collection of Kakuzen' written and drawn by him about A. D. 1183-1213, reproduced in the Iconographic Section of the Taishō edition of the Chinese *Tripiṭaka*.[2] The term 'iron' is a translation of *loha* which in Tamil means 'metal'. As a holy monument the *stūpa* could not have been overlaid with iron only but with seven or nine metals including precious metals as is usual in sacred architecture. Thus the phrase '*iron stūpa*' in its mistranslation conceals a Tamil nuance.

5.19 The third Patriarch Vajrabodhi was the son of the royal preceptor of the Pallava kings of Kanci. Thus the Chinese and Japanese sources provide positive evidence of the vogue of *tantra*-s in South India and even at Kanci itself which to them was the original home for the dissemination of tantric learning.

5.20 For seven years Vajrabodhi studied the *Vajraśekhara-tantra* and other tantric texts under Nāgabodhi in South India.[3] Amoghavajra "first received the transmission from Vajrabodhi, the *Tripiṭaka* Master, and moreover visited the Acharya Nāgabodhi in Southern India and acquired completely the *Vajraśekhara Sūtra* comprising eighteen divisions"[4]

5.21 In the 8th-9th century A. D. when the Vaiṣṇava Ālvār Tirumaṅgai of Tiruvali-Tirunagari came upon the scene, the *vihāra* at Nāgapaṭṭinam was so flourishing that it had a Buddha image of solid gold, as narrated in the *Guru-paramparai* (*Āṛāyirappaḍi*) of the twelfth century, which is one of the hagiologies of Tamil Vaiṣṇavism[5].

5.22 The biographies[6] of Prājña of Kapiśā (worked in China A. D. 785-810) point out that at the age of 23 years he entered Nālandā and studied the *sūtra*-s and *śāstra*-s which included the *Vajraśekhara* (Bagchi : Kin kang king). He went to the country of Chen-li where he stayed for 18 years. He learnt the speech of

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1. 2.753.
2. Vol. 5 no. 103.392.
3. Takakusu 1956 : 151.
4. Hakeda 1972 : 143.
5. Ramachandran 1954 : 15.
6. Bagchi 1938 : 2.583.

South India where they persue the *guhya-piṭaka* or *vidyādhara-piṭaka* and practise strange rites. Thereafter he proceeded to the South where he studied the *yoga tantra, maṇḍala* and *mudrā* of the 'five families' in more than 3000 *gāthā*-s. Here South India should refer to Kanci, for in the life of Hsüan-tsang[1] Drāviḍa has the gloss *nan-yin* 'South India' in miniscule letters, and the capital of Drāviḍa was Kancipura.

5.23 Thereafter, Prājña studied the language of Cīna or China. He embarked on a boat destined for Kuang-chou, but the outbreak of a tempest took it to the island of Srilanka. Thence by the route of the Southern Sea arrived at Kuang-fu in A. D. 781. He took residence at Ch'ang-an, worked there till A. D. 810, and translated eight Sanskrit works into Chinese.

5.24 The biography of Prājña is a clear indication that South India was a renowned centre of Tantric philosophy, art and ritual. Prājña studied the Chinese language and embarked for China from a South Indian port. This goes to show that South India in this context refers to Kanci, which is described by Hwui-li as : " The town of *Kin-chi* is the opening (mouth) of the southern sea of India, and in the direction of Sinhala the water journey is three days'. It seems to imply that Conjiveram was the central town from which the traffic to Ceylon was conducted."[2] As a major port and capital of the Drāviḍa kingdom, Kanci must have been frequented by rich Chinese merchants and it is from them that Prājña could acquire a knowledge of Chinese.

5.25 In China, Prājña taught Sanskrit to Kōbō Daishi, the founder of Shingon or Vajrayāna in Japan[3]. He gave Sanskrit manuscripts to Kōbō Daishi : "With the pledge to transmit the torch of the Dharma, I came to China. I wish to sail for Japan, but circumstances do not allow me to fulfil my intention. Take with you the new *Avataṁsaka Sūtra* and the *Ṣaṭ-Pāramitā Sūtra*, both of which I have translated, and these Sanskrit manuscripts. I sincerely hope that these will help create conditions (in which to propogate Buddhism) so that people will be saved".[4] In the years A. D. 796-798 Prājña translated anew the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra* in 40 fasciculi. It is important to note that at the end there is a letter addressed to the Chinese Emperor from the King of Wu-ch'a (Uḍa) in South India, who presented his own copy of the Sanskrit text to the Chinese Emperor in A. D. 795 (Nj. 89). Here Wu-ch'a (Uḍa) is explicitly stated to be situated in South India, and it can be none other than Uḍḍiyāna/Kanci. The search for authentic Sanskrit manuscripts preceded the Chinese translations of Buddhist texts. A century earlier, the

1. Nanking woodprint, chapter 4 folio 6b line 9.
2. Beal 1884 : 2.228.
3. Hakeda 1972 : 33.
4. *Idid.* : 149.

Chinese translation of the *Avataṁsaka* in 80 fasciculi was completed by Śikṣānanda in A.D. 695-699 after the Empress Wu Tsö-t'ien had sent a special envoy to Khotan for the Sanskrit text of this *sūtra*[1]. It was perfectly natural that when Prājña wanted to procure an authentic manuscript of the *Avataṁsaka*, he must have requested the Chinese Emperor to get it from Oḍḍiyāna. The year A. D. 795 when the *Avataṁsaka* manuscript reached China is significant. It was prior to the years A. D. 796-798 during which Prājña was engaged in its translation.

6. TRANSMISSION FROM SOUTH INDIA TO THE EAST AND NORTH-WEST

The oldest of the text of its genre the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (ed. BST. 112) clearly states that the *Pāramitānaya*[2] originated in the South (*Dakṣiṇāpatha*) and spread to the east and later flourished in *Uttarāpatha* i. e. the North-west of India : ***ime** khalu **punaḥ** śāriputra ṣaṭpāramitā-pratisaṁyuktāḥ sūtrāntāstathāgatasyātyayena dakṣiṇāpathe pracariṣyanti, dakṣiṇāpathāt punareva vartanyāṁ pracariṣyanti, vartanyāḥ punar uttarapathe pracariṣyanti. Vartanyām iti pūrvadeśe*[3]. The *Pāramitāyāna* developed into *Mantrayāna*[4], and this confirms that the route of transmission of *Mantrayāna* was from the South to the Northwest. The South Indian monks were great wanderers who roamed far and wide disseminating Buddhism. An inscription in one of the apsidal temples at Nagarjunikonda[5] actually records a donation for nuns and monks who in their journeys to far away lands had visited Kāśmīra, Gandhāra, Vaṅga, Vanavāsī, Aparānta, Yavana (?), and Tāmraparṇī (Sri Lanka)[6].

7. CONCLUSION

The evidence of different Buddhist traditions points to the origin of *Pāramitāyāna* and *Mantrayāna* in the South and its spread thence to other regions of India. The linguistic evidence of the word Oḍḍiyāna itself, the presence of South Indian vocables in *dhāraṇī*-s, the unanimous traditions about the origination of *tantra*-s in various places of Southern India, and the fact that Kanci was a cradle of Buddhism as well as a centre for the dissemination of *Vajrayāna* to East Asia : all converge to the conclusion that Oḍḍiyāna is Kanci.

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1. *Nj*. 88.
2. Joshi 1967 : 345.
3. Haribhadra in his *Āloka* (ed. BST : 427).
4. Lessing/Wayman 1968 : 21.
5. *EI*. 20.22-23.
6. Weiner 1977 : 34.

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NOTES SUR LE PĀÑCARĀTRA

A. M. Esnoul

Comme pour toutes les autres manifestations de la pensée indienne, il est impossible de remonter aux sources du mouvement *pāñcarātra*, dont l'épanouissement philosophique se produit vers le XIe siècle avec l'apparition du maître vedāntin, Rāmānuja, figure éminente de cette forme du viṣṇouisme.

En fait, il s'agit d'un courant très ancien attesté çà et là dans les textes ainsi que par quelques témoignages épigraphiques.

La Ieignée viṣṇouite du *Pāñcarātra* se confond en partie avec celle des bhāgavata; Dans cette perspective on peut y rattacher certaines inscriptions du IIe siècle avant l'ère, trouvées dans le Nord-Ouest de l'Inde. L'une ā Ghaṣundi, au Rājasthan nous apprend qu'un nommé Héliodore–donc d'origine grecque—aurait élevé une colonne portant l'image de Garuḍa et un mur au sanctuaire de Vāsudeva et Saṃkarṣaṇa–autres noms de Kṛṣṇa et de son frére Balarāma–en témoignáge de son appartenance au bhagavatisme; mais ce double culte est trés particulierement *pāñcarātra* comme l'atteste également une pièce de monnaie decouverte récemment en Afghanistan et datant de la même période.

En ce qui concerne les textes, la *Bhagavadgītā* apparaît comme la revelation majeure, coeur même du *Mahābhārata*. Bein entendu, tout cela represente un fonds commun à l'ensemble du viṣṇouismé et, pour trouver le terme *pāñcarātra* comme désignant une forme religieuse particulière, il faudra attendre des ouvrages plus tardifs. Néanmoins,le premier en date de ceux-ci est lui aussi un fragment de l' Epopée: le *Nārāyaṇīya Parvan*, qui appartient selon toutes apparences à la dernière strate de composition du *Mahābhārata*. On ne peut guère le croire de beaucoup antirieurs au *Harivaṃśa*, cet autre grand poème a la louange de Viṣṇu qui ne doit pas remonter plus haut que le IIIe ou IVe siècle de notre ère.

Toutefois la doctrine qui sert de base au ***Pāñcaratra***, l' ***ekānta*** ou ***ekāntitva***, la consécration a l' Unique, est certainement bien plus ancienne. Le ***Nārāyaṇīya Parvan*** y

revient sans cesse. Ce texte est une longue parenthèses' inscrivant à l'intérieur du Livre XII de l' Epopée, le *Śānti Parvan*, du chapitre 321 au Chapitre 338 de l'édition critique. Il apparaît en quelqve sorte comme une réplique de la *Bhagavadgītā*, cet aspect "d'écho" rendu plus sensible par un découpage volontaire en dix-huit chapitres dont l'unité ne s'impose pas de façon évidente. L'essentiel a d'ailleurs été exposé dans les sept premiers et l'on serait tenté, d'imputer la présentation actuelle de l'ensemble à un souci de parallélisme avec le célèbre tevte Kṛṣṇaïte.

Le Bhagavant s'était manifesté à Arjuna pour lui impartir l'enseignement auquel se conformaient les *bhāgavata*. De nouveau le Bhagavant va se révéler à un personnage connu de la tradition védique, le *ṛṣi* Nārada et l'enseignement qu' il va lui dispenser, bien que dans la ligne de la précédente révélation, comportera un certain nombre de particularités inhérentes à cet aspect du Viṣṇouisme que l'on connaîtra soes lé nom de *Pāñcarātra*.

Le conseil de *bhakti* donné à Arjuna s'assortissait d'une doctrine socio-morale, concernant le *svadharma*, centre des prescriptions de la *Gītā* puisque tout le raisonnement du Seigneur s'articulait sur cette assertion : l'essentiel de la conduite consiste à agir selon les obligations de son *varṇa*, de sa catégorie sociale. Dans cet éclairage agir n'est pas vraiment agir, car l'acte ne déclenchera pas le mécanisme karmique qui réinsère l'homme dans le cycle maudit du *saṃsāra*.

La révelation est faite a Nārada "*agre*", au commencement du *kalpa* ; elle est donc posée par le *Nārāyaṇiya Parvan* comme très anterieure à celle dont a bénéficié Arjuna. Ici la distinction entre *pravṛtti* et *nivṛtti* (agir et non-agir) ne prend pas appui sur la notion de *svadharma* mais sur un degré plus profond de la *bhakti*, sur cet *ekāntitva* où le fidèle se voue pleinment a l' Etre Vnique, au Suprême, au *Puruṣottama*.

D'autre part, le Bhagavant de la *Gītā* était Kṛṣṇa, assimilé nommemént à Viṣṇu en un seul endroit, probablement parce què une telle assimilation allait de soi. Dans le *Nārāyania Parvan* l'aspect prédominant est celui de Nārāyaṇa, le forme cosmique du dieu en qui, à la fin de chaque *kalpa* se résorbent tous les êtres. En outre, c'est Nārāyaṇa qui se rattace le plus directement, le plus ètroitement a la tradition védique du Puruṣa, sacrifice incarné. Cette position semble impliquer que le courant ait coexisté à la forme *bhāgavata*, lui ressemblant sur de nombreux points, utilisant les mêmes noms pour designer l' Absolu personifié, plus particulièrement celui de Vāsudeva, mais possédant des particularités qui en font une tradition originale.

Pourquoi ce nom de *Pāñcarātra* ? Les discussions n'ont pas manqué a ce sujat. Il semble que l'explication la plus claire, celle qui rend le micux compte de l' appartenance à un courant très ancien, est celle où le mot se comprend comme qualifiant un sacrifice qui s'étaleit sur cinq jours, *rātra* désignant la période de ving-quatre heures que nous

appellons "jour". Cela relierait directement le saysteme au *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* XIII.6-1, où le terme *pāñcarātra* s'applique effectivement à un sacrifice de cinq jours.

Das la même perspective se situe un texte beacoup plus tardif, la *Sanatkumāra-saṃhitā* : celle-ci se divise en cinq livres, chacun présentant la révelation faite à l'un des fils de Brahmā, Sanatkumāra, par differents personna ges ou groupe de personnages. De ces cinq livres on'en a retrouvé que quatre, eux-mêmes présentant des lacunes. L'enseignement *pāñcarātra* est donné successivement par Brahmā, Śiva, Indra et les *ṛṣi* ; le dernier livre, celui de Bṛhaspati est actuellement perdu. Il manque sur tous les manuscrits ; ainsi que les trois premiers chapitres du *Brahmarātra*.

De toutes façons, l'enseignement essentiel, directement issu du Seigneur, se trouve déjà dans le N. P. du *Mahābhārata*. On peut penser que celui-ci est varaiment le texte de base du système, résumant sans doute des idées trés répandues dès cette époque ; ce qui explique le caractère parfois allusif, ou tout au moins très concentré, dès exposés doctrinaux. On s'attache plutôt, semble-t-il, à les remettre en mémoire qu'a les exposer en détail.

Outre la proclamation de l'ekānta, la caractéristique majeure du *Pāñcarātra* est la théorie des *vyūha*, des expansions divines, développées parallèlement à celle des *avatāra* mais dans un autre but. Alors que les *avatāra* sont inséparables de la notion de *dharma* et ne sont que des manifestations accidentelles destinées a réduire le déséquilibre engendré par l'*adharma*, les *vyūha* ont un caractère périodocité ; ils sont inséparables de la création.

On peut imaginer qu'un *avatāra* ait pu ne pas se produire ; et, par ailleurs, leur nombre est susceptible de se multiplier indéfiniment ; la liste de dix, aussi courante soit-elle, n'a rien d'exhaustif. Elle n'est pas immuable et le *Bhāgavata*, pour as part, affirme qu'on en compte vingt-trois mais qu'en fait ils sont innombrables. Les *vyūha*, par contre, sont en nombre limité même si dans les textes tardifs on admet l'existence de "sous-*vyūha*". Leur nombre quatre est déterminé par leur aspect fonctionnel ; ils relèvent en quelque sorte de la nature même du dieu.

Vyūha et *avatāra*—que le *Pāñcarātra* appelle plus volontiers *vibhāva*—ont été conçus finalement dans la même intention : preserver le caractère d'invariabilité, d'impassabilité de l' Absolu. Même s'il est personnifié pour les besoins du culte et de l'adoration, jamais la pensée indienne n'est parvenue à le distinguer totalement de notion du Brahman, de la Totalité impersonnelle sur laquelle s'exerce la spéculation upaniṣadique.

Créer—*émettre*, ce qui est le sens véritable de SṚJ—entraîne l'idée d'une altération subie par celui émet. Toutefois, si l'on admet l'Absolu puisse, pour les besoins de l'action à accomplir ou de l'adoration des fidèles, se présenter sous une forme limitée, le principe de l'Unité inaltérable reste sauf.

Dans la perspective de la création, l'Absolu va se manifester sous quatre formes différentes liées au mécanisme cosmique. Evidemment, le fait n'est pas sans analogie avec ce que l'on rencentre dans d'autres courants de la pensée indienne. Dans le śivaīsme, en particulier dans celui du Kaśmir, la *trimūtri*, triple émanation de Sadāśiva, offre les trois aspects correspondant à l'émission, le maintien et la résorption de l'univers, tels que nous les retrouvons dans le viṣṇouisme. La triade, couronnée par un quatrième personnage qui les englobe tous, existe parallèlement dans le śivaīsme et dans le viṣṇouisme. Mais la façon dont les faits se présentent dans le *Pāñcarātra* est tout de même assex particulière. Sans doute nous répête-t-on que le premier *vyūha*, celui qui répond au nom de Vāsudeva, possède dans leur excellence la totalite des six *guṇa* (qualités) qui constituent le corps divin alors que les trois suivants ne possèdent en plénitude que deux *guṇa* chacun, cependant, on ne peut assimiler les trois derniers *vyūha* aux trois fonctions cosmiques. Certaines *saṃhitā* s'y sont essayé mais les résultats ne sont pas probants et les textes ne sont d'ailleurs pas tous d'accord.

Les personnages de la tétrade des *vyūha* empruntent levrs noms à la tradition kṛṣṇaīte. Les six qulités divines—qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec les trois *guṇa* de la Nature, sont la connaissance (*jñāna*), la force (*bala*), la majesté (*aiśvarya*), l'énergie (*śakti*) l'endurance (*vīrya*), le rayonnement (*tejas*) ; elles constituent donc l'essence de Vāsudeva, son corps disent même les textes. A cette essence participent les trois *vyūha* suivants, mais de manière partielle ; *jñāna* et *bala* atteignent seuls leur plus haut degre chez Saṃkarṣaṇa, *aiśvarya* et *Vīrya* chez Pradyumna, *śakti* et tejas chez Aniruddha.

Toutefois, la deuxième expansion divine, Saṃkarṣaṇa, se trouve vis à vis de Vāsudeva dans une situation privilégiée ; c'est lui que, au deuxième sièete avant notre ère, inscriptions et monnaies associent au culte de Vāsudeva.

S'il est dit émaner de lui c'est d'une manière spéciale, sur un plan en quelque sorte horizontal, alors que Pradyumna (nom d'un fils de Kṛṣṇa) est une émanation d'espèce filiale de Saṃkarṣaṇa et que Aniruddh (petit-fils de Kṛṣṇa dans les mythes kṛṣṇaītes) est dans le même rapport à Pradyumne que Pradyumna à Saṃkarṣaṇa. Telle semble du moins être la position prise par la plupart des *saṃhitā* et par la tradition la plus ancienne. La *Sanatkumāra-saṃhitā*, qui exprime peut-être par ailleurs certains aspects plus récents des doctrines, fait un effort d'uniformisation et donne Saṃkarṣaṇa comme le fils de Vāsudeva et de *Śānti*, forme féminine émanée de lui et à laquelle il s'unit (III.6.5-6). Mais ce texte trahil une influence śaktique très forte que le N. P. laissait dans l'ombre ou sur laquelle, en tous cas, il n'insistait pas. La seule mention d'un élément féminin, *vidyā*, la connaissance, contient cependant en germe toutes les spéculations futures. Ênlre autres, au chapitre VI.66-61, Nārāyaṇa proclame qu'il retourne *aveu elle* au Suprême Non-Agir, c'est á dire à son sommeil essentiel.

L'aspect surplombant de Vāsudeva par rapport aux trois *vyūha* suivants est extrêmement sensible dans le *Lakṣmī Tantra*, texte du Nord, qui asubi l'influence du śivaîsme kaśmirien et où Vāsudeva ressemble fort au Sadāśiva superposé aux trois personnages de la *trimūrti* dont le Śiva d'Eléphanta est sans doute la plus belle représentation iconographique.

Un autre point particulier au *Pāñcarātra* est le rôle tenu par le sage Nārada. On sait que Nārada est un *devarṣi*, fils de Parameṣṭhin ; le *Mahābhārata* le mentionne assez souvent avec les Gandharva ; il semble parfois être l'un d'eux ; avec eux il partage la faculté de se mouvoir à travers l'atmosphère. Par ailleurs, on recontre un chef des Gandharva de ce nom ; il devait à l'origine lui être identique. Cela explique peut-être le caractère parfois ambigu du personnage.

Il est celui qui annonce les évènements passés ou à venir. Dans ce supplément au *Mahābhārata* qu'est le *Harivaṃśa* il est toujours celui qui, parlant des choses qu'il devrait taire, précipite le destin. Son aspect double est dans sa nature de gandharva, êtres mi-bénéfiques, mi—maléfiques. En tant que musicien céleste, il chante au milieu des dieux, s'accompagnant de sa *vinā* (cf. par ex. *Mbh.* IX.54). On retrouvera cet aspect du sage dans la littérature purāṇique alors que les textes de *saṃhitā* verront en lui le prophète que le Bhagavant s'est choisi. Car le *Pāñcarātra* adopte délibéremment son côte bénéfique. Il sera le grand initié, le grand inspiré, soit que le Seigneur lui fasse révéler sa doctrine par un tiers (*Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā*) ou que, comme dans le N. P., le Bhagavant se manifeste à lui comme il se manifeste à Arjuna dans la *Gītā*.

Un autre point curieux concerne le couple Nara-Nārāyaṇa. Si Nārada s'étonne au sujet des deux sages qu'il a rencontrés sur les bords de la Badarī, nombreux sont les autres passages du *Mahābhārata* proclamant que l'Arjuna et le Kṛṣṇa de la *Gītā* seront les réincarnations de ces deux formes divines. Mais dans le N. P. Nara et Nārāyṇa sont aussi donnés comme faisant partie d'una tétrade, différente de celle des *vyūha*. Le deuxième chapitre du N. P. déclare en effet : "Le Seigneur, pour que prospère le *Dharma*, est né sous quatre formes dans la maison de *Dharma* (ici la Loi personifiée). Ces quatre formes sont Nara, Nārāyaṇa, Hari et Kṛṣṇa". E aussitôt après le texte laisse entendre qu'il s'interessera exclusivement aux deux premières manifestations, les autres "étant occupées ailleurs, oū elles avaint à faire".

Sur la plan des *avatāra* aussi apparaissent certains traits propres au *Pāñcarātra*. Dans le N. P., on ne fait d'abord allusion qu'aux trois premiers de la liste classique de dix ; en insistant tout particulièrement sur l'incarnation du sanglier. Si une liste habituelle apparaît un peu plus loin, il faut ajouter que le développement ne s'y conforme pas toujours. Un certain *avatāra* semble bien appartenir à la tradition pāñcarātrienne : celui de Hayaśiras—ou Hayaśīrṣa—l'Être à la, tête de cheval. Le but de cette descente

divine était la reconquête du Veda volé par deux Asura, Madhu et Kaiṭabha. Sa mission remplie, la tête de cheval est déposée par Nārāyaṇa dans l'océan du Nord-Est. Divers passages du *Mahābhārata* en font mention mais c'est le N. P. qui expose le mythe en détail: On le retrunve, au moins sous une forme allusive, dans mainte autres textes d'inspiration *pāñcarātra*.

Dans la *Sanatkumāra Saṃhitā*, par exemple, existe une liste de *vibhava* qui omet certains noms des listes classiques, mais dans le troisième chapitre du Livre III (*Indrarātra*) les stances 58 à 61 offrent une version legèrement différente, et surtout très abrégée, de celle présentée au chapitre XIV du N. P.

Dans le chapitre VI du même *Indrarātra* qui décrit le monde des aspects divins correspondant aux multiples noms de Viṣṇu, on indique que la région du Nord, traditionnellement régie par Kubera, le dieu des richesses, est le domaine de Hayaśiras; il s'y trouve, comme dans toutes les autres régions citées, cent demeures gouvernées par des personnages *parvenus à la viṣṇouité*.

L'expeession elle-même est curieuse; bien sûr, tout ce qui existe participe par essence à la nature de Viṣṇu puisqu'il est la Totalité; mais la formulation est particulière: il ne s'agit pas de l'absorption finale, bien plutôt d'une sorte de participation qui rend ces personnages aptes à recevoir un culte. Parvenus à ce résultat par des formes diffèrentes de dévotion et en accord avec leur categorie sociale, on les trouve là, disposés en rond sur chacune des régions et sous-régions de l'espace selon l'ordre habituel de la *pradakṣiṇā*, en commençant par l'Est. Cent chefs donc d'un nombre beaucoup plus grand d'élus se trouvent à chacun des points et la majeure partie du chapitre est consacrée à l'énoncé de leurs noms.

Il faut noter par ailleurs l'importance de la roue dans la cosmogonie du *Pāñcarātra*. Cela est particulièrement sensible dans l'*Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* où, aux chapitres VIII et IX, l'etagement des roues multiples dont le nombre de rayons va croissant est caractéristique. Parmi elles la roue primordiale—ou roue du mouvement (*calanacakra*) revêt trois aspects correspondantsx aux trois fonctions divines engagées dans le processus cosmique : l'aspect créatif, l'aspect destructif et celui de la maintenance.

La roue principale est suivie d'un nombre considérable de roues secondaires qui répondent à un autre stade du processus cosmique. Pour comprendre la superposition de ces diverses roues de l' *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā*, il faut se rappeler l'exposè que celle-ci fait de la création. C'est alle qui l'expliqe le plus complètement. Ailleurs il ne s'agit souvent que d'allusions ou de vues fragmentaires. Il est probable que le śivaïsme kaśmirien a joué un rôle dans la conception qu'a l'*Ahirbudhnya* des théories *pāñcarātra*; néanmoins sa position explique aussi un certain nombre de points effleurés dans les *saṃhitā* du Sud.

On doit d'abord envisager deux grandes étapes : une création primaire ou création subtile (*sūkṣma*) et une création secondaire, dite grossiere (*sthūla*). C'est la premiére qui va présenter des caractères originaux, la seconde se conforme au schéma beaucoup plus général que l'on retrouve dans les *purāṇa*. La création subtile est donc la plus intéressante ; elle se déploie sur trois plans superposés.

Ce qui surgit tout d'abord, la création pure, commence á l'instant où Lakśmī, ar grande *śakti* de Viṣṇu ouvre les yeux, c'est à dire apparaît comme distincte du Seigneur avec lequel elle demeurait confondue durant le temps du *pralaya*, car elle lui est co-éternelle. Elle se manifeste sous un double aspect, l'un de pure activité (*kriyāśakti*), l'autre formel (*bhūtiśakti*). La *kriyāśakti* apparaît en tant que Sudarśana, le disque de Viṣṇu, support permanent (*ādhāra*) de l'aspect formel.

C'est Lakṣmī qui suscite les six *guṇa* divins dont l'ensemble constitute la première émanation, Vāsudeva. Vont suivre les trois autres *vyūha* flanqés do leurs expansions secondaires, puis les *vibhava*, le ciel surême avec ses habitauts que domine la forme suprême (*parā*) du Seigneur, enfin les âmes individuelles (*jīva*) : celles que l'on dit éternelles (*nitya*) et celles qui sont délivrées(*mukta*).

Le deuxième stande de la création n'utilise qu'une part de l'énergie divine ; on la qualifie de création "mixte", à la fois pure et impure dans la mesure où elle transporte de *yuga* en *yuga*, de *kalpa* en *kalpa*, les impressions laissées par le *karman* des creations antérieures.

A ce point apparaît le-*kūṭastha*, présenté comme l'agrégat des âmes liées par les traces (*vāsanā*) des vies précédentes. D'autres descriptions de ce *kūṭastha* nous le donnent comme composé de quatre paires de "Manu", ancêtres des quatre *varṇa*, ce qui est, quant à l'origine des castes une versione *pāñcarātra* du *Puruṣasūāta*.

Aux côtes du *kūṭastha* se trouve la *māyāśakti*; ce couple représente sur un plan subtil ce que sera la *mūlaprakṛti* par rapport au *puruṣa* selon la description du *Sāṃkhya* classique, correspondant du reste à ce que l'on trouve au stade suivant de l'évolution. Les trois aspects de la *māyāśakti* sont trois pouvoirs restrictifs : *niyati*, limitation régulatrice subtile des deux autres, *kāla*, le temps, subtil lui aussi, plus près de la notion de durée que de celle de temps, l'aspect *guṇa*, enfin où *sattva*, *rajas* et *tamas* ne sont pas en équilibre mais émanent l'un de l'autre, *sattva* procédant directement de *kāla*, *rajas* de *sattva* et *tamas* de *rajas*.

Le troisième et desrnier stade de la création primitive commence au moment où ces trois *guṇa* s'assemblent pour former la *mūlaprakṛti*, telle que la décrivent les *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, mais à la différence de celles-ci la *Pāñcarātra* associe non pas deux mais trois principes pour expliquer la suite de l'évolution on trouve ici outre *prakṛti* et *puruṣa*, *kāla*,

qui n'est plus le temps subtil du stade précédent, car il s'agit maintenant d'un temps mesurable. A ce détail près, à part quelques particularités qui ne sont pas fondamentales, cette évolution va suivre le schéma habituel du *Sāmkhya.*

L'un des faits originaux est la descente, amorcée précédemment, des quatre paires de Manu à travers les différents principes du Réel, descente qui leur permettra de se pourvoir progressivement de tout ce qui les mettra an masure de se multiplier en tant qu'êtres incarnés.

La fin de lour périple se situe au moment où, ayant traversé les quatre premiers éléments, ils parviennent à la terre, le cinquième et dernier. La nuit cosmique s'achève vaiment ; du nombril d' Aniruddha surgit l'oeuf d'or, l'embryon d'or ; et tandis qu'il croît, Brahmā, le dieu créateur naît d'un lotus blanc.

Brahmā, en contexte viṣṇouite, joue un rôle très particulier et qui explique d'une cestaine manière pourquoi le śaktisme a genéralment moins gagné le viṣṇouisme que le śivaïsme qu le bouddhisme tardif. Dans la tradition non-pāñcarātrienne, en effet, Brahmā, en assumant la création préserve l'immutabilté et l'inactivite divines. Dans le *Pāñcarātra* où la creation se développe sur plusieurs plans, la grande Lākṃī, la *śakti*, inseparable du dieu puisqu' elle represente son energie, est le premier moteur de la creation. Brahmā n' intervient plus que tardivement pour régler la création materiel le de l'univers. II est plutôt l'ordonnateur, le régulateur des mondes que leur créateur.

Il est aussi l'intercesseur habituel entre la création et la divinite lorsque le *dharma* est menace. Chèque fois que l'ordre est en peril, les dieux se rendent en délégation trouver Brahmā. Et, le plus souvent, celui-ci prend leur tête pour aller porter leurs dolĕances au Seigneur Tout-Puissant. Generalement il faut reveiller le dieu qu'ils trouvent sommeillant sur le serpent *Śeṣa*, à la surface des eaux cosmiques. C'est d'ailleurs un fait curieux et particulier au système que ce sommeil persistant de Nārāyaṇa. Parce que la continuité de l'univers n'est concevable que dans la mesure où le portent la mémoire et la volonté divines, le sommeil de Nārāyaṇa ne oeut être un sommeil ordinaire mais un sommeil yogique à la puissance infinie.

Cependant, lorsque le monde se manifeste, on s'attendrait à ce que le Seigneur soit éveillé ; mais, justement, il a suffi que la *Śakti* soit éveillee pour que se produise le defousement du processus créateur.

Le sommeil est la représentation de cette immuabilité divine que rien ne peut entamer, que rien ne peut émouvoir si ce n'est la *bhakti*, la ferveur de ceux qui réclament son secours.

FROM PRĀṆĀGNIHOTRA TO EUCHARIST

Giulio Cogni

If one considers the biological life of the organisms, and, beyond them, the life of the earth, planets, stars, nebulae and cosmos, one sees that every form, cell and element does not destroy itself or allow itself to be destroyed by or destroy the others, what would result as a cancer or a total disturbance for all, but it is spending at every moment all own energies, for all is giving its own life for the well-being of others, is multiplying itself into the other cells and transforming itself into the others if necessary, by an universal sacrifice. There is no egoism or altruism, but Oneness, that overcomes both : the organic joy of being one energy in a living compound of forms that mix themselves into one organic form.

Otherwise it is sickness, as soon as the feeling of the Oneness is fading : and Oneness signifies that this feeling or inner sense of being one is manifesting and realising itself by a general, perhaps magnetic coherence that transforms into an Oneness of floating energy, whereby all nourishes all, by an inner feeling that all is all. As long as health is lasting, this is the splendour of the living being, of the world, of cosmos : all energies, as powerful as they could be, are transforming the one into other for the well-being of One, that they themselves are. All cells, all elements are eating and eaten ; in fact they are only the organism, where all distinction can only result into an analysis of abstractions.

With reference to Vedānta, as it is here our purpose, we can say that the last meaning of this is that, in fact, nothing is existing *per se*, that is, all is illusion of *māyā* if considered partially as true for itself; only the Oneness; as pure Presence-consciousness which is there also in the Void (the Buddhist *śūnya* or the *turīya*—beyond the deep sleep, *suṣupti*, as for the *Vedānta*) is the core of all aspects of Being, manifesting itself primarily as Energy in the play, or movie of the multiplicity of forms. Forms are indeed, only the One itself as perceived in endless various perspectives : but they are, as the *one* itself,

if abstracted (as *ātman* for some Buddhist critics) against all dogmatic or paranoic illusion, indifferent and transmutable one another *ad libitum*. But they are also important and to be loved for themselves, as in the art, because they are the One (*ātman*) as displaying apparently itself in the manifestations (*karma*, *saṁsāra*) and as such must be considered the One itself.

Now, to the universal Energy (*prāṇa*) as plentiful realisation of the Oneness in the play of Life.

The Kirlian phenomenon, that has been becoming in the last years a capital argument in the parapsychology, is only a demonstrative experience of a reality, that is throughout commonplace : everybody is giving out energy, much more if it is a living being. Heat and smell are perceptions of energies, that are naturally of most different types; all being is in fact living, for instance, through a rhythmical transpiration. The Kirlian-effect reveals these in and out spreading energies in the form of flaming halos, because the energies, it is evident, are diffusing in space just as fire.

Apart from the fact, that we know today that we are transpierced by endless electromagnetic waves, revealed now by Radio and Television, which we are not aware of : energies that float ceaselessly everywhere. The omnipresence of Brahman seems to be a primordial intuition of it, revealed by all Upaniṣads.

The Upaniṣads had already spoken of it : they had, in their lyrical language, celebrated the universal existence as *prāṇa*, or breathing in and out living energies (*apāna*= outbreathing, or emission of generating energies) : and the mystery of cosmic being as the unmoving Identity of all by everlasting becoming of all into all; this was the mystery of the beatitude of Being (*ānanda*) : that is, *to be all*; and all was only, beyond every illusion of time and space—*ākāśa* and *kāla*—the Non-dual one (*advaita*) as Self of all Existence : the *brahman* divine.

All is *prāṇa*, indeed, that signifies that all is Energy. But, because of the power of lyrical intuition as immediate and comprehensive experience truth, *prāṇa* was spoken of as breath and ethereal substance of breathing. And here is the point.

In the common opinion, one thinks, following some materialistic simplification, that all that we breath is only oxygen with some other atmospheric gas; and we do not become aware, that we are in fact breathing—through nose and mouth as well—living flavours, smells, life-heat, only to remain in the sphere of immediate experience. We are nourishing ourselves of "other", when we are absorbing, besides the breathing of the beloved, his, her flavour, warm energy and, through the skin, in the intimacy, his, her living vibration, so that you are totally dear to me as total creature, because of the splendid energy that breathes in and out of your young body.

Gino Raya, the theorist of *famismo* (a new coined word that could be translated as *hungrism*[1] has in fact understood a fundamental truth, that was already proclaimed by the Upaniṣad. Hunger is, truly, a need for food, but not only of salads or milk or other similar things : it is also hunger (or thirst) of light, flavour, smell, and, at first, of interior harmony, joy of life, Love Divine. And by this pulsation of hunger we absorb with all our senses and elaborate inside what we are eating and drinking of the master, of the beloved, of sun, air, and all organic and inorganic elements of the world. The company of a beloved being is life for us, because, particularly when he or she is near us, we feed ourselves better out of his living vibration, that is altogether made of breath, heat, flavour, electromagnetic energies of his or her body.

Now the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* had said, similar to other Upaniṣads but more lyrically, that *brahman* is food (*anna*) ; *brahman* is, an other look, *prāṇa* (breath) : in other aspect, *brahman* is thought (*manas*) ; and in other perspective it is *vijñāna*, knowledge; finally, out of an all comprehensive look, *brahman* is joy, beatitude, *ānanda*. And what is *ānanda* ? The Identity (*samatā*) of all existent; that is, the all embracing identifying Love, Glory of the *advaita vedānta*.

As Swami Prabhavananda precisely remarks in his paper *The Sermon on the Mount according to Vedānta*[2], according to the Upaniṣads all is food, whatsoever the form in which it is presented, donated or assumed. This signified already, by these sacred books, where it was always spoken of *prāṇa* as energy in every form, that was endlessly sacrificed as food (*yajña, prāṇāgnihotra*) by the universal sacrifice of *puruṣa*, the primordial Divine Being which had, by its sacrifice, broken and dispersed himself into endless bodies and forms, that are feeding one another, that the supreme joy or beatitude is to return One into many and many into One. And that is *yoga*, that tries, from *haṭha* up to the *jñāna yoga*, through all its steps to reintegrate the One, the Identity of the universal multiplicity. It had discovered, by concentrating its physical exercises in the *prāṇāyāma*, proposed by all texts, from the sublime *Bhagavadgītā*[3] to the great *Yoga-Vāsiṣtha*, as a mystery of vital beatitude, that it is not the material health that is to be researched and obtained, but the realisation of the universal exchange of Energy.

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1. Gino Raya—*La Fame*, Ciranna, Roma, 3° ed. 1974.—*L'Amore come Antropofagia*, ib. 2 ed. 1966. D. Cicciò, P. Licciardello—*Prestoria del Famismo*, ib. 1975. A. Aniante—*Il Famismo*, Pan, Milano 1977.
2. Mentor Book, New American Library, London 1972.
3. *apāne juhvati prāṇam prāṇe' pānam tathā 'pare/*
   prāṇāpānagatī ruddhvā prāṇāyamaparāyaṇah //
   apare niyatāhārāḥ prāṇān prāṇeṣu juhvati /
   sarve 'py ete yajñavido yajñakṣapitakalmaśāḥ // *Bhāgavadgitā*, IV. 29, 30.

By deep breathing into the cycle of *A-U-M*, or by suspending the breath a while in the long pause of ***kumbhaka***, and finally by deep exhaling, one can absorb, as much as possible, in form of gas, the universal energy around; one can hold it inside and better assimilate it in oneself; and then, by giving it out, spend one's energies and let them diffuse in the universe.[1]

In a gymnasium, in a great assembly, particularly if all bodies are as naked in the air and sun in total transpiration, by the general inspiration and transpiration of all these bodies one realises the true joy of being together in Love. And if I tell them some things that they are expecting from my words I become indeed their food, as the lover becomlng food for the beloved, and vice versa. A true speaker of master is aware of the fact, that his speech is really a product not only of himself, but, before all, of the multitude that is sitting around him, and forms with him one body with his interest and enthusiasm. This is the beatitude of the living experience of communion. Why ? The joy of such experience is paradoxically founded on 'food'. Only because I am not alone or insulated in the anonymity in the middle of the multitude, only because I am becoming one vital stream in the multitude, I am breathing the great joy of existence. And naturally I feed and all feed through their eyes on lights and forms, as by the ears on words that I am speaking, and I myself on words that tell me and are to me as vital food.

This is the great truth of the Liane of the Beatitude of Brahman (*Brahmānandavalli* and *Bhṛguvallī*) of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.*

"The Spirit who is here in man and the Spirit who is there in the Sun, lo, it is One Spirit and there is no other. He who has this knowledge, when he goes from this world having passed to the Self which is of food; having passed to the Self which is of *Prāṇa*, having passed to the Self which is of Mind; having passed to the Self which is of Knowledge; having passed to the Self which is of Bliss, lo, he ranges about the worlds, he eats what he will, and takes what shape he will and ever he sings the mighty *Sāma*. 'Ho ! ho ! ho ! I am food ! I am food ! I am food ! I am the eater of food ! I am the eater ! I am the eater ! I am who makes Scripture ! I am who makes ! I am who makes ! I am first born of the Law; before the gods were, I am, yea, at the very heart of immortality.[2]

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1. See, for instance, *Yoga Darśana Up.*, 6-25, 32. (air as nectar and ambrosia) transl. by. J. Varenne, in *Yoga*, University of Chicago Press, 1976. *Haṭha-Pradīpikā*, II, 3 follow. *Sāvitrī*, Torino, 1978. W. Hauer, *Der Yoga* etc. 2 Ausg. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1958, p. 26, 78, with quotations of *Aitareya Ār.* VI. 2. 3 and of the *Vrātya* books, with reference to the Iranian *Vratr.* It is remarkable that ritual cannibalism flourished also in Iran. For Gauḍapāda (*Mand. Kar.*) all is similarly either (*ākāśa*).
2. Transl. by Shri Aurobindo.

"Hāvɔ ! hāvo ! hāvo ! ahamannamahamannamahamannam ahamannādo ahamannādo ahamannādo ahamannādaḥ aham ślokakṛtaham ślokakṛtaḥślokakṛtahamasmi pratamajā ṛtāsya-pūrva devesyɗ amṛtasya nābhiḥ-yo mā dadāti sa ideva māhāvāḥ-ahamannamannamadantimāhadmi-aham viśvam bhuvanambhyabhuvahvm-suvarṇa jyotir-ya evam veda-ityupaniṣat."

It echoes also in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣd, Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, Prāṇāgnihotra Upaniṣad*[1] and others, unto lesser lyrical, but similar significances. The beatitude is realised through spending ourselves for others, becoming food of others, and finds its higher expression in the sacrifice of the Eucharist of the Last Supper.

From the Gospel of John (VI. 54-65) : "I am the living bread, who came from Heaven. Who will eat from this bread will live eternally. And the bread is my flesh, for the life of the world...Amen amen, I tell you, if you will neither eat the flesh of the son of man, nor drink his blood, you will not have in yourselves the Life. Who eats my flesh and drinks my blood will have the eternal Life. Because my flesh is true food, and my blood is true drink. Who eats my flesh and drinks my blood, remains in me and I in him. As my Father has sent me so I live for my Father, and who eats me will live for me." This speech raised a scandal. Jesus remarked that "Life is Spirit; flesh is not helpful. My words, that I told you, were indeed spirit and life." The equivalence of his flesh with his words—both are life, outside and inside—is almost the same as by the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* the five equivalences (*anna, prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, ānanda*) who experiences this interior sameness conquests the beatitude of the Identity and solves the mystery of existence. From the Gospel of Matthew (XXVI.26-28)—"At supper Jesus took bread and blessed and broke it, and gave it to his disciples; and said : 'Take and eat; this is my body. And taking the glass, he gave thanks to God and presented it to them, by saying : 'drink from it all of you ! This is my blood of the new testament, that will be poured out for many, for solving all evils'."

If material food can appear vulgar and its event all other than agreeable, this is not true : because all is indeed *brahman*, all is Self. The sacrifice of the food is supreme joy, as all uniting sacrifice. The material food can become as subtle as gas; and as such it is continually absorbed from other bodies through breathing. It can become energy of thought (*manas*) and as such we absorb it through senses and transform into us by assimilating it. It can be the general vibration of our bodies that transforms through light, breath, sound, contacts into others, be it in love or by contact of the healer with his patient. These values are accentuated in the Commentary of Śaṅkara. "Beginning with text 'The vital force is, indeed, the food, and the body is eater' and ending with

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1. I refer to the Italian Edition of the *Upanishad* by Carlo Della Casa. Utet, Torino, 1976.

space, the entire creation has been shown as food and eater. ....At this point someone may say : 'If this be so, I am afraid of liberation, consisting in becoming the Self of all. Let my wordly existence itself continue; for even though liberated, I shall still be food to be eaten by somebody. The answer is : Do not entertain such a fear, for the enjoyment of all the desiderable things falls within the range of relative existence. But this man of knowledge has become Brahman by transcending, through illumination, all that is described and the eater and the eaten which fall within the domain of empirical experience and which are the creation of ignorance. For him there exists nothing separateley of which he can be afraid. Hence there in nothing to be afraid of in liberation.'' We can remark that here lies the very ground of the joy of the sacrifice of Christ, in the moment itself that would be painful to the non-liberated one in the Divine Identity.

The Gospel spoke, indeed, not differently from the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, if one compares it with the Indian Text, not according only to the word but to the significance. The similarities between the Christian Gospel and the Oriental wisdom are in so many points evident, if one frees them from all western falsifications of theologies, of historical churches, that time will come, think, when all mystery of the Gospels will be dissipated by a new interpretation in the line of the Oriental tradition, to whom very probably the word of Christ was itself related. But this is a question that we can not explore here. The fact is that through the word of the quoted Upaniṣads the last word pronounced by Jesus at his Last Supper becomes totally clear and full of significance. It is the Identification by Love with the bodies of his beloved friends and, through an act of feeding them with his flesh, and, by the words "do it in the future by commemorating me with all future mankind in space and time. The joy of his Identity with all, experienced through his death—by becoming food of all. In the case, as he was a separate person as long as he lived, by identifying himself with the food of mankind, through an act of parapsychological psychometry, as it were.

The author of this paper has studied deeply the long misunderstood tradition of ritual cannibalism in the world, that revealed his higher expression in the rituals of Mexico, but also in Brazil and Indonesia, and so on along the tropical belt. Also by these peoples the offering of their own bodies as food—mostly after some identification of themselves with a Godhead—was the source of joy and beatitude. The virtues were the same : and meaning as well. I will become you by giving my life for you as the extreme sacrifice of making of my life, flesh and blood, food for you. The same can be found in some Buddhist *Nāṭaka*-s, and, first of all, in the utmost significant hisrory of the *Maṇicūḍāvadāna*, that the author of this paper has illustrated in a paper presented to the Second World Conference of Sanskrit and published in the *Indologica Taurinensia* by the

University of Turin (1977).[1]

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I think, I have best expressed all that in a short Vedantic poem on the deep impressive symbol (*maṇḍala*) of 'The Holy Shroud' :

From the nocturnal silence
of His sleep He sees,
sustains and crosses all worlds.
All the Universe lies hidden in the sleep
of the God-Man,
from the bottom of all creatures
Redeemer and Liberator
by endless Identification
through Donation and Sacrifice.

Take up my body, eat,
drink of my blood, live,
I am you and all.
We are all One, we are,
in the—Forest of Being.

1. Text transl. by the author in original rhythms with introduction and commentary, *Vidyā*, Roma 1979 (The prose is mixed with poetry). It is perhaps suitable to add that the question of the diffusion of ritual cannibalism in the tropical belt and non-European countries has to be revised after recent discoveries. The classic work of Ewald Volhard: *Kannibalismus* (Frankfurt a.M. 1939, edited by the Forschungsinstitut für Morphologie der J. W. Goethe Universität) knew no case of cannibalism in Europa. But just in the Museum für Ur/und Frühgeschichte Türingiens of Weimar I had the opportunity to ascertain that objects and documents exposed there (quoted also in tourist guides) testify that endocannibalism, as ritual burial into bodies of men and women, was practised in a locality by Ehringsdorf some 100 000 years ago: moreover, that, as late as 800 B. C. Festivals of Fecondity were celebrated in Bad Frankensausen (Turingia) where human flesh of immolated men and children was consumed in suppers of ritual communion. It will, I think, as time goes on, become ever clearer, that it is not the question of Europe or not that matters, because the fundamental sense (first of all by ritual patrophagy) was simply the universal joyous idea of reviving in the bodies of men and women into whom the bodies of the victims were assimilated and transformed, joined with a general sense of identity beyond all otherness. As Maria Callas, the famous soprano, wrote in her last will: "put me down gently in the seas of Greece where I was born" so ancient mankind wanted following some realistic and monistic sense of life to be put gently down in the bodies of young men and women, where they felt as continued into new forms, in the eternal cycle of living energy. The custom lasted as long as the cultural field permitted it. Feuerbach said: "Der Mensch ist was er isst". The meaning was: "Man is what he eats, fashioned as Man". All that we perceive in the world are forms or perspectives of the universal Energy, that realises itself inside as Life,

THE SOUTH INDIAN VERSION OF THE VARĀHA PURĀṆA

Anand Swarup Gupta

I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Among the eighteen Mahāpurāṇas the *Varāha-Purāṇa* has its own importance, mainly due to its very liberal attitude towards the lower strata or castes of the Hindu society, due to its religious tolerance for the various religious sects—Śaivism, Śāktism, Vedism, Tantricism etc.—though itself being a Vaiṣṇava Purāṇa, and due to its inclination towards the utmost simplicity and modes of worship for the benefit of the general masses of the Hindu society. It is a popular Purāṇa in the Ramanujam sect of South India[1]. But in its MSS. its text is availabe in several versions of different extent. The extent of the texts of the eighteen Mahāpurāṇas is given in the *Nāradiya*[2], *Bhāgavata*[3], *Devi-Bhāgavata*[4], *Brahma-Vaivarta*[5], *Matsya*[6], *Skanda*[7], *Agni-P*[8]. and *Vāyu-P*[9]. All these Purāṇas except the *Agni-P.*, give more or less the same extent of the Mahāpurāṇas.

All these Purāṇas including the *Agni-P.* record the extent of the *Varāha P.* as 24,000 *śloka*-s. But the available extent of the *Varāha Purāṇa* text in all its printed vulgate editions of Northern India (viz. Veṅkaṭeśvara, Bibliothica Indica and Bangavāsī Press editions) as well as in its 12 North Indian Devanāgarī manuscripts collected by us is about 10,000

1. *Cf.* Article 'श्रीवराहपुराणं श्रीरामानुजसम्प्रदायश्च' by Pt. K. V. Nilameghacharya, published in *Purāṇa*, IV.2., pp. 360-383.
2. I.92-109.
3. XII.13.4-8.
4. I.3.3-12.
5. IV.133.11-21.
6. *Adh.* 53.
7. VII.2.2.28ff.
8. 272.1-23.
9. I.42.3-10 Venkt. edn.

śloka-s of 217 *Adhyāya*-s and in the Bengali MSS. it is even less, for they contain the text up to the 202 *Adhyāya* of the Venkt. edn. But in all the main three South Indian manuscripts, *viz.* Grantha, Malayalam and one Devanāgari manuscript procured from Sarasvati Mahal Libray, Tanjore (South India) is much less (i.e. only about 100 *Adhyāya*-s of About 3500 *śloka*-s). The Telugu MS. D. 2260, of the Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras, being an exception, for it generally agrees with the Devanāgarī MSS. of Northern India in extent but in some places of the text it splits the longer *Adhyāya*-s into several smaller ones. The *Nandīnāgarī* MS. (in palm-leaves) procured from the Śriṅgeri Maṭha, Mysore, is incomplete; i.e. upto *Adhyāya* 129.50 only of the Venkt. edn. and so it also differs from the MSS. of the main South Indian Version, which contains the text of about 100 *Adhyāya*-s, only as already mentioned.

II. SOUTH INDIAN VERSION

The main South Indian version of the *Varāha-P.* is represented by the following three South Indian MSS. (briefly noted above) which were procured by us for the critical edition of the *Varāha-P.* The necessary details of these three MSS. are given below:—

1. Malayalam MS. (written in Malayalam script of Kerala) No. 19449, Palace Library No. 440, preserved in the Kerala University, Trivandrum.
2. Grantha MS. in palm-leaves (written in Granth characters of South India) procured from India Office Library, London, Keith 6807 (Microfilm Copy).
3. Devanāgari MS. from the Sarasvati Mahal Library, Tanjore (South India), B. 1579, D. 10130. This Tanjore Devanāgari MS. generally agrees with the Granth MS. mentioned above.

All these three South Indian MSS. complete the text of the *Varāha-P.* in about 3500 *śloka*-s only, i.e. up to the 99th *Adhyāya* of the Venkt. edn. plus the last 26 *śloka*-s (56-82) of *Adhyāya* 112 of the same edn. Thus they represent the shortest available version of the *Varāha.P.*

The 99th *Adhyāya* of Venkt. edn. and the North Indian Devanāgari MSS. contain the story of King Śveta of Ilāvṛta country (Venkt. *Śloka*-s 56ff.) in support of the importance of giving charity in the form of corn or food (*anna-dāna*) during one's life-time, so that he may not remain hungry in his future heavenly life. This story of King Śveta (*Śvetopākhyāna*) needs here to be stated in brief :—

King Śveta performed a number of sacrifices (*yajña*-s) and distributed charities in the form of precious jewels, gold, cows, villages etc. but did not give any corn or food disregarding the advice of sage Vasiṣṭha, for he (Śveta) considered *anna* a very trifling thing. After his death when he attained the heaven he got there all the enjoyments of

life except the food which he had never given in charity. When he could not endure hunger he came to the earth in a *vimāna* and saw the bones of his burnt corpse. Feeling very hungry he licked his own bones. Vasiṣṭha saw him licking his own bones and asked him the reason. He said that he did not get food in heaven and so he was feeling very hungry. Vasiṣṭha said that as he (Śveta) had not given *anna* in charity, so he could not get it in heaven too, for no one gets there what he did not give here अदत्तं नोपतिष्ठेत कस्यचित् किञ्चिदुत्तमम् । *Śl.* 76 ab). Thereupon King Śveta asked the sage if there was any means by which one can get what he did not give. The Sage advised him to give in charity the cow in the form of sesame-seeds (*tila-dhenu*), the cow in the form of water (*Jala-dhenu*), the cow in the form of clarified butter (*ghṛta-dhenu*), the real cow (*pratyakṣa-dhenu*) and the cow in the form of juice (*rasa-dhenu*), so that he could be saved from hunger :—

तिलधेनुं भवान् राजन् जलधेनुं च सत्तम ।
घृतधेनुं च धेनुं च रसधेनुं च पार्थिव ।
देहि शीघ्रं येन भवान् क्षुधया वर्जितो भवेत् ॥

Adh. 99.87[1]

Then on the request of the king the mode of giving *tila-dhenu* in charity is described in the following eleven *Śloka*-s (89-99ab) at the end of the 99th *Adhyāya* in the Venkt. edn. as well as in all the MSS. including those of Bengal and South India[2]. But after the *tila-dhenu* the mention of the charity of the other four kinds of *dhenu*-s, is very brief in all three Bengali and the three main South Indian MSS. (Grantha, Malayalam and the Tanjore Devanāgarī MSS.), giving only one *śloka* to each of the remaining four *dhenu*-s (viz. *jala-dhenu*, *pratyakṣha-dhenu*, *ghṛta-dhenu* and *rasa-dhenu*) as follows[3] :—

जलधेनुश्च तद्वच्च जलकुम्भे तु कल्पिता ।
दत्ता च विविधान् कामान् सद्यः संपादयिष्यति ॥
धेनुश्च तत्त्वतो दत्ता द्वादश्यां नियमेन ह ।
सापि संतारयेद् दुर्गान्नरकात् कामदा भवेत् ॥
घृतधेनुस्तथा दत्ता विधानेन विचक्षणैः ।
सर्वकामसमावाप्ति कुरुते शान्तिदा भवेत् ॥

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1. All the Bengali and the South Indian MSS., and even the North Indian Devanāgarī MSS. read these same *śloka*-s; only five North Indian Devanāgarī MSS. read घृतधेनुं दधिधेनुं च for घृतधेनुं च धेनुं च in the second line of this *śloka*. Not only that, the *Padma-P.*, *Sṛṣṭi-khaṇḍa*, *Adh.* 36, *Śl.* 133 (Calcutta, Mor Edn.) also contains these *śloka*-s with a minor variant.
2. The text of *tila-dhenu-vidhi* and *māhātmya* given in the *Varāha-P.* here corresponds with that given in the *Padma-P.* also (*Sṛṣṭi-Kh.*, 36.136-144).
3. *Cf.* also *Padma-P.*, *Sṛ..kh.* 36.144ff, which gives the same text with some variants, thus disposing of the remaining four *dhenu-dāna*-s in the *śloka* each like the Bengali and the South Indian MSS.

रसधेनुस्तथा दत्ता कार्त्तिके मासि पार्थिव ।
सर्वान् कामान् प्रयच्छेत तिर्यग्जानामपि ध्रुवम् ॥

Then, immediately after these above four *ślaka*-s all the Bengali and the main South Indian MSS. begin the text from Venkt. *Adhyāya* 112.56 cd, containing the importance and the mode of giving in charity the whole of the *brahmāṇḍa* or the world in the form of the prescribed symbol (viz. a golden jar), which is described in the Venkt. edition upto *śloka*-s 66 of this (112th) *Adhyāya*. Then Śveta performed the rite of the ***brahmāṇḍa-dāna*** and attained the supreme bliss (*siddhi*) by attaining which one becomes free from all grief :—

एवमुक्तो वसिष्ठेन सोऽप्येवमकरोन्नृपः ।
जगाम च परमां सिद्धिं यत्र गत्वा न शोचति ॥

Śl. 66

The *brahmāṇḍa-dāna* and its *māhātmya* is described in the Veṅkt. edn. in its *Adhyāya* 112.57-67 ab. as well as in all the MSS. Then follow the following topics in the Venkt. edn. and in all the MSS. with a few variant readings in the MSS. here and there :—

1. Text tradition of the *Varāha-P.* (112.67 cd-73).

2. The name of the eighteen *Purāṇa*-s—(112.74-77).

3. The *Māhātmya* of the recitation and worship of the *Varāha-P.* text as well as of honouring the reciter or *vācaka* (112.78-82).

The above is the order and extent of the text of all the Bengali and the three main South Indian MSS. And then the three South Indian MSS. end their *Varāha-P.* text here, while the Bengali MSS. and the two South Indian MSS.—Nandināgarī and Telugu—as well as all the North Indian Devanāgarī MSS. have extended the text further to agree with the enumeration of the topics of the *Varāha-P.* given in the *Nāradiya Purāṇa*[1].

Between the *tila-dhenu-dāna* (*Adh.* 99) and the *brahmāṇḍa-dāna* (*Adh.* 112.57ff.) the North Indian Devanāgarī MSS., the Nandināgarī MS. and the Telugu MS. (the Venkt. edn. following them) insert the long descriptions of charities of the following *dhenu*-s,[2] in separate *Adhyāya*-s :—

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1. *Cf. Nāradīya-P.* (Veṅkṭ. edn.) I.103.1-12.
2. The *Nāradīya-P.* II.42.21ff. (Veṅkṭ. edn.) gives the names of these *dhenu*-s as follows :—

यास्तु पापविनाशिन्यः कीर्तिता दश धेनवः ।
तासां स्वरूपं वक्ष्यामि शास्त्रोक्तं शृणु मोहिभिः ॥

Jala-dhenu (Venkt. *Adh.* 100), *rasa-dhenu* (*Adh.* 101), *guḍa-dhenu* (*Adh.* 102), *Śarkarā-dhenu* (*Adh.* 103), *Madhu-dhenu* (*Adh.* 104), *Kṣira-dhenu* (*Adh.* 105), *dadhi-dhenu*(*Adh.* 106), *Navanita-dhenu* (*Adh.* 107), *lavaṇa-dhenu* (*Adh.* 108), *Kārpāsa-dhenu* (*Adh.* 109), *dhānya-dhenu* (*Adh.* 110), *Kapilā-dhenu* (*Adh.* 111),—*ubhayato-mukhī-dhenu* (*Adh.* 112.1-51), and then the *dhenu-dāna-māhātmya* (*Adh.* 112.52-56).

Thus they give one full *Adhyāya* to each of the *jala-dhenu*, *rasa-dhenu*, *navanita-dhenu* (for *ghṛta-dhenu*?) and *kapilā* and *ubhayato-mukhi-dhenu* (for *pratyakṣa-dhenu*) instead of only one *śloka* each to them as given both in the Bengali and the South Indian MSS.[1] and add the *dāna*-s of about eight *dhenu*-s more, each in a separate *Adhyāya*, which are not given in the Bengali and the three South Indian MSS.[2]

Thus the main South Indian version of the *Varāha-P.* is the shortest available version of the said Purāṇa, shorter even than the Bengali version. It ends with its *Śveta-upākhyāna* plus the concluding text agreeing with the Venkt. edn. 112.56ff. as already detailed above. Below are given the *puṣpikā*-s of the concluding text of the three South Indian MSS. :—

1. Malayalam MS. :—

इति श्रीवाराहपुराणे श्वेतोपाख्यानं समाप्तम् ।
संहिता चेयं समाप्ता ॥

2. Granth MS. :—

इत्यादिश्रीवाराहपुराणे श्वेतोपाख्यानं समाप्तम् ।
संहिता चेयं समाप्ता ।

3. Tanjore MS. :—

इत्यादिमहापुराणे वाराहे श्वेतोपाख्यानं नाम एकशततमोऽध्यायः । इति वाराहसंहिता समाप्ता ॥

प्रथमा गुडधेनुः स्याद् घृतधेनुस्तथाऽपरा ।
तिलधेनुस्तृतीया च चतुर्थी जलसंज्ञिता ॥
पञ्चमी क्षीरधेनुश्च षष्ठी मधुमयी स्मृता ।
सप्तमी शर्कराधेनुर्दधिधेनुस्तथाऽष्टमी ।
रत्नधेनुश्च नवमी दशमी तु स्वरूपतः ॥
कुम्भाः स्युर्द्रवधेनूनां चेतरासां तु राशयः ।
स्वर्णधेनुमप्यत्र केचिदिच्छन्ति सूरयः ।
नवनीतेन तैलेन तथा केऽपि महर्षयः ॥

The charities of these various *dhenu*-s are described in detail in the *Matsya* and the *Bhaviṣya* also.

1. The *Padma-P.* (*Sṛ-kh.*, *Adh.* 36) also describes these four *dhenu*-s each in one *śloka* only like the Bengali and the South Indian MSS. of the *Varāha-P.*
2. The *Padma-P.* text also agrees here with the Bengali and the South Indian MSS. of the *Varāha-P.*, omitting all these eight extra *dhenu*-s.

PRAŚASTAPĀDA'S CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE (DRAVYA)[1]

Wilhelm Halbfass

Since the early days of Western Indology in the 18th century, the Sanskrit term *dravya* has usually been rendered as "substance", and as a rule the meaning of this European term has simply been taken for granted : "Substance", often with Aristotelian connotations, is used as an apparently self-evident tool of translation and interpretation. Yet, it does not require much historical or systematic reflection to see that the concept of substance in itself, and in its Western context, is one of the most confusing and most controversial of all philosophical concepts, confusing and controversial like the concept of b e i n g itself, with which it is so closely associated. Already in Aristotle himself, the Greek prototypes of our notion of substance, namely *ousía* on the one hand, *hypokeímenon* on the other hand, have a wide variety of connotations and implications, to which later developments have added ; and the concept of substance subsequently covers a field of meanings which reaches from fully qualified particular, the concrete individual, to the mere indeterminate stuff, the substratum which supposedly underlines all qualifications, from empirical "things" with a certain functional unity and relative stability to the postulate of an absolutely independent and self-sufficient centre and basis of reality.[2]

In general, we may say that the word "substance" does not refer to o n e clear and definite conception, but rather to a whole field and framework of questions and implications, confusions and historical developments, and that, in applying it to a non-Western term like *dravya*, it is advisable to be aware of these questions and ambiguities and not to

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1. This is a revised version of a paper read at the 185th Meeting of the American Oriental Society, Columbus, Ohio, 1975.
2. Cf., eg., the article "Substance and Attribute" in P. Edwards (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York/London 1967.

consider as clear and self-evident what may just be a more familiar kind of confusion.

To be sure, the style of thought, the context of orientation, the whole historical and conceptual framework in which the word *dravya* has its role, is a very different one. Yet, some of the basic ambiguities and problems, which we find in the case of "substance", are also found in the case of *dravya*, and among these, the tension and interplay between the two meanings "concrete individual" (*vyakti* etc.) and "mere matter" or "substratum" (*āśraya*, *pradhāna* etc.) is of particular interest and importance. It is already clearly reflected in one of the oldest fully explicit discussions of this theme, which is found in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali[1] : On the one hand, the term *dravya* may refer to the common and permanent substratum of individual things, which are distinguished from one another by varying and impermanent forms (*ākṛti*) ; on the other hand, may refer to these things themselves, which accordingly come to be considered as impermanent and accidental exemplifications of permanent forms.

In such and similar discussions, which extend over many centuries, it is basically the relationship between qualificand and qualification, between substance and quality or attribute, and at the same time between subject and predicate, which is at stake. The problem is the "categorial" distinction between the substance and its qualities and other attributes, its ontological status with reference to its various attributes and qualities, its degree and independence and self-sufficiency, and the nature of the union or combination into which both can enter. This problem, this set of problems has many facets and many manifestations in the Indian philosophical tradition ; it is one of the main testing-grounds of the representative school of Indian thought, of their various and conflicting approaches, and its treatment is a leading indicator of their central viewpoints and attitudes. Moreover, we may say that grammar and cosmology, epistemology and philosophy of nature, functional analysis and metaphysical construction meet in the disputes over this problem, and that they enter into various forms of combination and mutual stimulation, but also of conceptual entanglement and confusion.

In the following, we shall focus on some questions and ambiguities concerning the concept of substance, as they are exemplified in classical Vaiśeṣika, in its doctrine of "categories" or rather constituents of reality (*padārtha*), in its way of combining an originally cosmological approach with a more functional analysis and with models of grammatical thought. In the case of the Aristotelian "doctrine of categories", evaluating the rôle

1. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. F. Kielhorn; 3rd ed. K. V. Abhyankar, Poona 1962-1972, II, 366; also II, 200; I, 7.

of linguistic analysis on the one hand and of physical, cosmological, metaphysical thought on the other hand has been a constant challenge to interpreters; and we may say that an analogous challenge and ambiguity exists also for the Vaiśesika classification of *padārtha*. It has, in fact, been suggested that the origin of this classification is a grammatical one, that, in a sense, it is an extrapolation of grammatical categories, according to which the notions of substantive,[1] adjective and verb would have been the prototypes of the cosmological categories *dravya*, *guṇa* (quality) and *karman* (motion); this would also imply that the notion of a real, ontological and cosmological relationship of qualification between substance and quality, of substances h a v i n g qualities, is implicitly derived from grammatical observations concerning attribution and predication. On the other hand, it has been suggested that already Pāṇini presupposes and implicitly refers to the Vaiśeṣika list of cosmological or metaphysical categories, that, e.g., his concept of *guṇavacana*, "adjective", is based upon the Vaiśeṣika theory of real, ontologically separable *guṇa*.[2]

Both suggestions are simplifications; as a matter of fact, there has been much more complication, tension, partial interdependence and confusion. Although the historical evidence for the actual steps and stages of development which early Vaiśeṣika may have taken is rather scanty, the sequence and conflict of different stages of development and of different viewpoints is somehow reflected in the systematic structure of classical Vaiśeṣika, as presented in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and, more specifically, in Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*: There are, as we shall try to show, at least two different levels in Praśastapāda' s way of dealing with the question of substance.[3]

As is well known, classical Vaiśeṣika has list of six "categories" (*padārtha*), the first of which is the category of *dravya*, which in turn has a ninefold subdivision : Under the title of "substance", a series of nine entities—partly particular and singular entities, partly classes of entities—is presented which reaches from earth and water to the self and to *manas*. While all nine of these are basically and essentially e t e r n a l (*nitya*) and irreducible constituents of the world, the first four of them, the elemental substances—earth water, fire and air—occur not only in their eternal, irreducible form, i. e. as atoms, but also as destructible compounds, aggregates and that means above all : as empirical things of our daily acquaintance. Thus, the word *dravya* has a basically cosmological meaning

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1. E.g. H. von Glassenapp, *Die Philosophie der Inder*, Stuttgart 1949, 62.
2. K. A. Subramania Iyer, The Conception of *guṇa* among the Vaiyākaraṇas. *New Indian Antiquary* 5 (1942/43), 121-130.
3. For a more detailed discussion of some of the related problems, see my article: Zum Begriff der Substanz (*dravya*) im Vaiśeṣika. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 20 (1976), 141-166.

on the one hand, referring to the ultimate transempirical constituents of the world, on the other hand it refers to concrete empirical things of our daily life and practice. It is obvious that these two meanings relate to basically different viewpoint and problems.

What all substances, the "eternal" as well as the "non-eternal" ones, have in common, is, in fact, of a somewhat functional and abstract nature, and it is presented in a list of common abstract attributes (*sādharmya*), in which Praśastapāda, summarizing and systematizing remarks which are already found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, gives a kind of definition of *dravya*[1]. The most important and most ambiguous (though apparently most self-evident) of these is the abstract attribute *guṇavattva*, the fact that substances "have" qualities (*guṇa*), that they are their substrates (*āśraya*) and are qualified by them. Substances are supposed to "have", to "possess" qualities; and in trying to explicate this relationship as a relationship between ontologically different entities, allied Naiyāyika authors of that period like Uddyotakara refer to other possessive relationships (e. g., between a man and his vessel) and corresponding gentitive constructions.[2] Praśastapāda himself is not so outspoken and uncautious; nevertheless, or perhaps just because of this, his conception of *guṇavattva* is a hiding-place of ambiguities and paradoxes, and a stimulus of controversy and discussion.

How can a substance, a *dravya*, if it is supposed to be qualified by something "apart" from itself—not only *guṇa*, but also *karman* (motion), *sāmānya* (universal), etc.— nevertheless, be something definite and distinct in itself ? Is there anything left, if we take away all the *guṇa* and other "qualifiers"? Is there anything like a "naked" substance, stripped of and apart from its attributes, a *viśeṣya* without *viśeṣaṇa* ? How can the substances, which are supposed to be the basic entities, the irreducible elements of the world, be just one class of entities, side by side with other classes of entities ? And how can the qualities (*guṇa*) etc. be juxtaposed and added to the substances of which they are qualities ? Questions like this are asked by various critics of the Vaiśeṣika system, by Vedāntins as well as by Buddhists.

Praśastapāda and classical Vaiśeṣika have a rather peculiar way of dealing with, or in a sense avoiding, such and similar questions. *Guṇavattva*, "having qualities", is a *dharma* of the substances; it is not itself a *guṇa*, "quality". A *dharma* is an inseparable

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1. Cf. *Bhāṣhya of Praśastapāda*, together with the *Nyāyakandalī*, ed. V. P. Dvivedin, Benares 1895 (Vizianagram Sanskrit Ser. 6), 20. In addition to *guṇavattva*, we find the characteristics *dravyatvayoga*, *svātmany ārambhakatva*, *kāryakāraṇāvirodhitva* and, with a more limited applicability, *antyaviśeṣavattva*.
2. Cf., e.g., The *Nyāyavārttikam* by Udyotakara Miśra, ed. V. P. Dube, Calcutta 1887-1914 (Bibl. Indica), 79ff.

abstract attribute of what it qualifies; it is not an ontologically separable entity like a *guṇa* or any other *padārtha*. Seen as a *dharmin*, a *dravya* is seen as a logical, grammatical subject of predicates, not as a cosmological or at least ontological substrate (*āśraya*) of other entities (*guṇa* etc.). It shares its status of being a *dharmin* with all other "categories"— a *guṇa* obviously can be a subject of predicates, i. e. a *dharmin* in a functional and logical sense— while on the other hand *dravya* alone is the *āśraya* of all the "categories" apart from itself. There is a definite, a finite number of *dravya* or classes of *dravya*, substances, in so far as they are substrates and elements in a cosmological sense, and as a matter of fact, the system attempts a complete listing or enumeration. An enumeration like this is, of course, quite impossible in the case of such a functional concept as *dharmin* : A *dharmin* is whatever can be meant, thematized as subject of predicates, whatever can be referred to by pronouns, specifically demonstrative pronouns like "this or "that"[1].

Accordingly, there is a twofold relationship of "having"—one implying ontological separability and with a clearly cosmological background, the other logical, grammatical, without any implication of "real" separability. There is a twofold manner of seeing the substance as h a v i n g attributes and b e i n g qualified : As a *dharmin*, i. e. taken in the sense of a logical and grammatical subject, a *dravya* is characterized and distinguished from other "categories" by abstract and inseparable attributes like *guṇavattva*; as an *āśraya*, substratum with cosmological connotations, it is characterized by the *guṇa* etc., in so far as it "has" and supports them as something over and above, as something added to itself. While Praśastapāda posits an external relationship between *dravya, guṇa* etc., he describes the *dravya* as such and in so far as it can be contrasted with *guṇa* etc. without any recourse to such external relationships. The question of a possible indeterminateness of the substance, of an attributeless substratum, of featureless matter, never arises in Praśastapāda's philosophy: Even as a "mere" *āśraya*, substratum, "apart" from the qualities etc., the substance remains definite and identifiable, in so far as it may be seen as a *dharmin*.[2]

It is odvious that Praśastapāda divides the problem of substance between two different levels of discourse and orientation, and that this has to do with his historical situation. On the one hand, *dravya* is conceived of in a basically cosmological manner, as a theme of a reductive philosophy of nature, on the other hand, it is conceived of in a logical-functional manner, corresponding to the style of grammatical analysis which does

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1. On the functional usage of the word *dravya* and on related questions in Bhartṛhari cf. K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari*, Poona 1969, 78ff ; 262ff.

2. There is neither a "bare particular" (in the sense of some modern philosophers) nor "bare matter" (*hyle, hypokeimenon* in the Aristotelian sense) in Vaiśeṣika.

not hypostatize attributes or predicates. Praśastapāda never thematizes this twofold aspect of his problem, nor does he develop any theory of semantic levels. He simply tries to explain and justify the old cosmological heritage of his school in a context and on a level of thought and argumentation which is no longer cosmological in its orientation.

That Vaiśeṣika has its historical roots in cosmology and philosophy of nature, may be taken for granted and this is especially true for its concept of substance. The cosmological problem of substance, as the question of what is permanent in change, is undoubtedly one of the oldest themes of philosophy and may even be called one of its starting points[1]; the concept of *nityadravya* shows that it is also one of the basic motives of the Vaiśeṣika system. Moreover, the Vaiśeṣika understanding of "qualities", of the "additive" relationship between *dravya* and *guṇa*, has clearly been pre-modelled by ancient cosmological ways of thinking, schemes of classification and enumeration and models of evolution which are genuinely different from what we may call doctrine of categories. Our main textual evidence for this is the *Mokṣadharma* section of the *Mahābhārata*[2]. In this and in similar texts, we find not only the word *guṇa* (we are, of course, n o t referring to the Sāṃkhya or pre-Sāṃkhya usage of this term), but also *guṇa* lists, which are quite comparable and even partially identical with those given in classical Vaiśeṣika, and we may say this specifically, but not exclusively with reference to the "elemental" qualities *rūpa, rase, gandha, sparśa, śabda* and their subdivisions. There is nothing like a "categorical" distinction between substance and quality in these texts; there is no explicit reference to the general problems of determination, attribution and predication, i.e. to the set of problems referred to by the word *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* which has its roots in grammatical analysis. The *guṇa* in these cosmological texts are simply seen as products, secretions, so to speak, of the elements (*mahābhūta*)—earth, water, etc.; they are a further stage of development and differentiation in the scheme of cosmic evolution. In this scheme, and to this cosmologically oriented frame of mind, it is quite natural to regard the "qualities" as something over and above, as something added to, and in so far also as something separate from, the substances, i. e. from the elements.

Obviously, classical Vaiśeṣika, as a "doctrine of categories", is no longer a cosmology and philosophy of nature of this sort. It is not only an enumeration and classification of basic entities, elements; it also deals with meanings of being and with categorical distinctions between entities. It develops questions and viewpoints which relate to the

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1. In the Greek as well as in the Indian and other traditions.
2. Cf., e.g., *Mahābhārata* (crit. ed.) XII, 224, 35 ff.; 225, 1 ff.; 177, 26 ff.

conceptual analysis of empirical things rather than to the speculative reconstruction of the universe. In doing this, it is subject to the impact of developments in grammar and in the philosophy of language, which represent more functional, less hypostatizing types of thought, and it gets involved in problems and in ways of analysis which are foreign to the cosmological orientation, to the cosmological level of thinking. Yet, these different levels, these different contexts of problems, are never clearly and explicitly distinguished in the Vaiśeṣika system, as presented by Praśastapāda. There is nothing in it that would correspond to the clear and explicit demarcation line which Aristotle draws between his own categorical analysis of meanings of being and the cosmological and physicalistic ways of thinking of the Pre-Socratics[1]. The Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories remains completely interwoven with cosmology and philosophy of nature. The list of the "categories" *dravya, guṇa* etc. is modelled after the cosmological enumerations of ultimate constituents of the universe. The way in which they are distinguished from each other and somehow reified against each other clearly reflects an originally and primarily physicalistic and cosmological orientation. In a sense, the enumeration of the "categories" remains an enumeration and classification of "elements", of juxtaposable entities, of quasi-physical constituents of the universe. So far the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories remains, so to speak, a hybrid philosophy of nature. And this, we may say, accounts for a good deal of the twilight which surrounds Praśastapāda's concept of substance. It also accounts for the fact that he does not have a clear and explicit concept of the concrete thing, as that totality which includes all its qualifications. His emphasis is always on separable factors, the unity or combination of which is somehow secondary.

The twilight, the unclarified interaction between grammatical, "logical" models of attribution and predication and cosmological patterns of juxtaposition is also present in another characteristic area of problems, i. e. in the juxtaposition of two concepts of being (*sattā*) and (*astitva*) in classical Vaiśeṣika thought : While *sattā* is a real universal (*sāmānya*), juxtaposed and added to the particular in the same sense in which we found the *guṇa* added to its *dravya*, *astitva*, with its subdivision *sattāsambandha* and *svātmasattva*, is an unseparable and unhypostatized *dharma*. The real universal *sattā*, "beingness", accounts for the fact that *sat*, "being", is found in all things which actually are (*dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*). However, being a universal inherent in other entities, it cannot account for the way in which itself and other universal a r e, nor can it account for the fact that other entities can b e the substrates of the universal "beingness". It is here where the *dharma*, the abstract attribute *astitva* comes in. *Sattā*, "beingness" is itself as a *sāmānya*, a *padārtha*,

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1. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 992 b 18 ff.

and in so far, it is one of the juxtaposable factors or constituents of the world, standing in an additive relationship to other such factors. *Astitva*, on the other hand, is not an ontologically separable attribute and qualifier of what there is. It is in no way added or juxtaposed to the entities, the being of which it is. It represents a much more functionalistic, non-hypostatizing style of thinking and level of discourse[1].

The sharp criticism and questioning from other schools, especially from the Buddhist side, forces the later commentators to disclose some of the implicit presuppositions and unanswered questions which are hidden by the twilight surrounding Praśastapāda's concepts of being and substance. However, further discussion of these developments would lend us beyond the limited scope of this paper.

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1. For a more detailed discussion of these and related problems, cf. my article : Conceptualizations of 'Being' in Classical Vaiśeṣika. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 19 (1975), 183-198, Cf. Praśastapāda (ed. referred to in no. 1 on p. 540), 16; 311.

THE FIRST YOGA LAYER IN THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

Mislav Jezic

A. At the IVth World Sanskrit Conference in Weimar in May 1979, I had the opportunity to summarize my investigations concerning the structure and textual history of the *Bhagavadgītā*. In the Conference paper I presented both a short review of the history of philological research on the *Bhagavadgītā* and a select bibliography containing 53 items; these are not repeated here, because I hope to enlarge on them in a more comprehensive work on the subject.

B. It is first necessary to say something about my methodology in order to make the arguments in this paper intelligible. The *Bhagavadgītā* displays numerous repetitions of meaning and expression, as every epic text in principle does. Some of them are typical of a more general epic technique and offer a ready expression of thought in a defined metrical setting, or even, simply, fulfil the given metrical pattern irrespective, for the most part, of the context, e. g. the name of Kṛṣṇa or Arjuna. Such phrases, which are usully called "epic formulae", determine the epic syntax beyond the purely linguistic facts. This phrase syntax, however, remains still subordinate to a higher discourse syntax, which is also concerned with certain types of repetitions. Those which repeat something said elsewhere by complementing what was said, by opposing it, by answering what was asked, etc., at any rate by developing the given subject in a logical and, as far as the composition is concerned, in a clear and definite way, can be termed "continuity repetitions" : they obviously continue an exposition, description or narration. On the other hand, those which repeat something, so far as the composition is concerned, in an indefinite way, or even in a contradictory way, and do not develop the subject, rather giving the expressions new connotations, can be termed "duplication repetitions" : these, very probably, imply that the repetition and the repeated do not belong to the same historical layer, but present us with a case of a later reworking of the text. Especially valuable instances of continuity repetitions are beginning and ending markers of particular sequences. The former briefly expounds the themes of a sequence, and the latter con-

cludes the exegeses of the sequence, often beginning with "*tasmāt*". Such markers can be particulary helpful in detecting different layers.

It goes without saying that such types of repetitions should be formally demonstrated in every case, and the philological conclusions corroborated by a sufficiently close network of clearly characterised repe titions. The exclusive use of single words in single sequences, of metrical criteria or external criteria of content, when borne out by the described methodology, can be useful secondary arguments, but taken alone as the basis of a method they can not be adapted to the specific structure of any text because of their absoluteness, that is to say their non-relativity, therefore, they fail to bring out the evidence which the text offers. They tend to force the material into ready-made categories and yield only foregone conclusions.

No wonder if we fail to analyse a given text right up to the last stanza, or even last word. The actual task of philological research is to draw conclusions about a text only so far and so definitely as the evidence permits. In a text transmitted originally, or in part, orally, it would be encouraging to be able to analyse it historically in any measure at all, althought it could have been so often altered during the course of successive performances, at least at one stage of its history; how much more encouraging it would be if a far-reaching analysis proved to be applicable.

C. In the Conference paper I tried to sketch the general structure of layers in the *Bhagavdgitā*. On grounds of the already mentioned typology of repetitions, there can be distinguished an epic episode which ends with stanza II.37, continued by the *Bhīṣmaparvan* XLI. 1; a hymn in *triṣṭubh*-s, to which the bulk of the XIth chapter belongs, but also stanzas II. 5-8; a didactic layer inserted in the epic episode : st. II. 11-30 (with possible interpolations), and skilfully enclosing it by a common ending marker in st. II.38; a layer I called the Ist yoga layer, beginning with the following stanza and ending with IV. 42; and a series of following didactic glosses, recapitulations and layers, the last of which is a *bhakti* layer, the largest one, which succeeded in completely reinterpreting the preceding epic, didactic and hymnic text sequences and giving them their present context.

II

We shall now consider only the first yoga layer, as I propose to call it, in order to be able to proceed in greater detail.

A. The epic episode of the *Bhagavadgitā* ended with st. II. 37cd "*tasmād uttiṣṭha kaunteya yuddhāya kṛtaniścayaḥ*". This conclusion was enlarged by st. II. 38 which belongs

to a later Sāṃkhya layer.[1] This stanza repeats some main motives of this Sāṃkhya layer, but it also duplicates the epic conclusion, from which it formally repeats "*yuddhāya*", while giving it a clearly different context. The hymn, again, sings anew of the epic theme and repeats the said conclusion in st. XI. 33a "*tasmāt tvam uttiṣṭha...*", but proceeds further because its chief aim was not to depict the epic dilemma, rather it was to confront us with the revelation of the god.

In the stanza which follows the "Sāṃkhya" sequence, we can recognize the beginning marker of a sequence. The conclusion of the themes which are mentioned here is not found until st. IV. 41 (we should take into account that the "*jñāna*" was, in st. III. 3, identified with the "Sāṃkhya"). The identification of stanza as the conclusion is corroborated by the following st. IV. 42 which is clearly the common ending marker "*tasmād*" of the "Sāṃkhya", the yoga and the epic sequence, but historically it must belong to the youngest of them, that is to the yoga layer.

ILLUSTRATION 1[2]

II. 39. *eṣā te' bhihitā sāṃkhye*
buddhir y o g e tv imāṃ śṛṇu/
buddhyā yukto yayā pārtha
k a r m a b a n d h a m prahāsyasi//

IV. 41. *y o g asaṃnyastakarmāṇaṃ*
jñānasaṃchinnasaṃśayam/
ātmavantaṃ na k a r m ā ṇ i
n i b a d h n a n t i dhanañjaya//

42. *t a s m ā d ajñānasaṃbhūtaṃ*
hṛtsthaṃ j ñ ā n āsinātmanaḥ/
chittvainaṃ saṃśayaṃ y o g a m
ātiṣṭho t t i ṣ ṭ h a bhārata//

V. 1. *s a ṃ n y ā s a ṃ k a r m a ṇ ā ṃ kṛṣṇa*
punar y o g a ṃ ca śaṃsasi/
yacch r e y a etayor ekaṃ[3]
tan me brūhi suniścitam//

In the illustration, the word for word continuity repetitions are marked differently from the synonym continuity repetition (*jñānā*=Sāṃkhya) and both differently from the duplication repetitions.

It is significant that the most important duplication repetition "(*tasmād...*) *uttiṣṭha*" does not appear anywhere in the *Bhagavadgītā* apart from the three positions

1. Cf. II.14-15.
2. All the citations follow the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*, *Bhīṣma-parvan*, ed. by S. K. Belvalkar, Poona, BORI, 1947.
3. Cf. Illustration 2.

cited, with the one exception of st. II. 3 which anticipates and prepares for epic conclusion. Its function here is obviously to re-establish the connection of the enlarged text with the *Bhīṣmaparvan* XLI. 1 and thereby with the whole epic.

BhP. XLI. 1. *tato dhanañjayaṃ dṛṣṭvā*
bāṇagaṇḍīvadhāriṇam|
punar eva mahānādaṃ
vyasṛjanta mahārathāḥ||

"*Punar*" points to the *BhG*. I. 12-19 (*BhP*. XXIII 12-19), together with which this stanza frames our epic episode.[1]

The conclusion of the yoga layer "*yogam ātiṣṭha*" deliberately conforms to the conclusion.

In order to prove conclusively that the layer ends here, we should, on the one hand, analyse the whole of the subsequent text and check whether it could be in its entirety of a different and later origin. But it is not feasible in this paper. We must take it for granted that this analysis has already been done, and be content with just one example. Stanza V. 1, immediately following the conclusion of the first yoga layer, includes word repetitions marked in illustration 1. With Arjuna's question it evidently introduces a new text sequence. Its theme is a doctrinal one : the difference between the yoga and the *saṃnyāsa*. Until this point there was no mention of *saṃnyāsa*. The *karma-yoga* was expounded as an activity free from passions and selfish motives. The new layer seems to have arisen, partially, out of a misunderstanding of the preceding sequence, and, in particular, of the expression "*yogasaṃnyastakarman*" in st. IV. 41, which possibly puzzled the author of the following sequence, and consequently it had to puzzle Arjuna. Partially, the reason to add on this sequence could have been the wish to elaborate the text in the light of a new conception of the *saṃnyāsa*. This sequence can be termed the second yoga layer.

On the other hand, we should check the coherency of the text sequence between the markers. That is the task of this paper.

B. The composition of the sequence can first be grasped if we turn our attention to Arjuna's questions which articulate its portions. A series of Arjuna's questions as well as the epic and the Sāṃkhya answer to them, precedes our whole sequence. Except in the hymn interpolation, II. 5-8, Arjuna does not seek an answer, he decides for himself "*na yotsye*" in II. 9.[2] However, his questions provoke Kṛṣṇa's reaction in st. II. 2-3

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1. Cf. Georg von Simson, Die Einschaltung der *Bhagavadgītā* im *Bhīṣmaparvan* des *Mahābhārata*, *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Vol. XI, No. 3, 1969, pp. 159-174; see the last footnote on p. 174.
2. Cf. I.46.

and 31-37, reinterpreted in later layers. The last question preceding Kṛṣṇa's long answer in our layer is found in st. II. 4. Further questions, already in our sequence of text, follow in II. 54, III. 1-2 and III. 36.

ILLUSTRATION 2

1. II. 4. *katham bhiṣmam aham saṃkhye*
droṇam ca madhusūdana/
iṣubhiḥ pratiyotsyāmi
pūjārhāv arisūdana //

II. 53. *śrutivipratipannā te*
yadā s t h ā s y t i niścalā/
s a m ā d h ā vacalā buddhis-
tadā yogam avāpsyasi //

2. 54 *sthitaprajñasya kā bhāṣā*
s a m ā d h i s t h a s y a keśava/
sthitadhīḥ kiṃ prabhāṣeta
kim āsīta vrajeta kim//

3. III. 1. *jyāyasi cet karmaṇas te*
matā buddhir janārdana/
tat kiṃ karmaṇi ghore mām
n i y o j a y a s i keśava //

2. *vyāmiśreṇaiva vākyena*
buddhim mohayasīva me /
tad ekaṃ vada niścitya
yena ś r e y o' ham āpnuyām //[1]

4. 36. *atha kena prayukto' yam*
pāpaṃ carati pūruṣaḥ /
anicchann api vārṣṇeya
balād iva n i y o j i t a ḥ //

It is remarkable how clearly II. 54 differs from the rest. The other questions are existential; although less personal than the epic stanza II. 4, they still express Arjuna's abhorrence of the "*karma ghoram*" or the "*pāpam*", and so they remain attuned to the epic, with which st. IV. 42 reintegrates our layer, as already mentioned. II. 54, on the contrary, is an astonishingly scholastic question. It appears without any convincing relation to the preceding text, compositionally without function, and it introduces quite a new terminology, e. g. "*prajñā*" instead of "*buddhi*" etc. So there are ample reasons to suspect that it could be an interpolation. It could have been motivated by the expression "*sthāsyati...samādhau (...buddhiḥ)*" in the preceding stanza. Stanzas 55, 57, 58, (61), 67, 68 belong together with it because they treat of the *prajñā*; 57-61 and 68 have even the same 4th *pāda* "*tasya prajñā pratiṣṭhitā*" : such a formalization is nowhere to be found

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1. **Cf. Illustration 1.**

in our layer. St. 56, treating *sthitadhi* or *sthiradhi*, also belongs here, because it continues the answer to the question. Stanzas 59 and 69 seem rather to continue st. 58, resp. 68, than to belong to the original first yoga layer. The latter could probably, by its proverbial character, attract the only *triṣṭubh* stanza in our sequence, II. 70, perhaps a floating verse, which appears with some variation in the *MBh.* 12. CCXLIII. 9. Stanza 61, containing the expression "*matparaḥ*" [except in Śāradā manuscripts 1, 4 (sup. lin. *matparaḥ*), 5, 6 and commentaries by Ānandavardhana and Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭha, which have instead "*tatparaḥ*"], could belong to the later *bhakti* layer, unless the reading "*tatparaḥ*", although not well confirmed, is the original one.

The homogeneity of this interpolation as a whole is remarkable and therefore, easily recognizable. If we omit it, nothing is lost from the remaining text; in fact, it even becomes much more coherent.

C. The Śāradā manuscripts, the Kaśmīrī manuscript 6, the Devanāgarī 3 (marg. sec. m.) and the commentaries by Ānandavardhana, Bhāskara and Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭha insert another question, 89* after III. 37, referring, as it seems, to "*kāma*" or "*krodha*" (the answer concentrates on the *ahaṃkāra* as their basis) :

89*. *bhavaty eṣa kathaṃ kṛṣṇa*
kathaṃ caiva vivardhate/
kim ātmakaḥ kim ācāras
tan mamācakṣva pṛcchataḥ //

But most *Bhagavadgitā* manuscripts and commentaries neither contain this question nor the four *śloka*-s following it. However, there are no definite formal grounds, except a certain syntactical clumsiness, to prove their unauthenticity.

D. St. II. 72, treating of the *brahmanirvāṇa*, stands, as it seems, out of context in our layer. But it clearly anticipates the next yoga layer in chapter V[1]. Its function is to connect a later addition with the preceding text.

E. There are two segments of our sequence which treat of the *yajña* : III. 9-16 and IV. 23-(31). The former begins with a stanza, the second half of which seems to duplicate III. 19 while introducing the rest of the segment :

ILLUSTRATION 3

III. 19. *t a s m ā d a s a k t a ḥ satataṃ*
kāryaṃ k a r m a s a m ā c a r a/
a s a k t o hy ā c a r a n k a r m a
param āpnoti pūruṣaḥ //

9. *yajñārthāt karmaṇo' nyatra*
loko' yaṃ karmabandhanaḥ/
t a d a r t h a ṃ k a r m a kaunteya
m u k t a s a ṅ g a ḥ s a m ā c a r a //

1. Cf. V.24-26.

The case is not quite certain, but if there are some reasons, as we shall see, to consider III. 17-18 as an interpolation too, then stanza 19 would follow, if 9-16 is an interpolation, at an earlier stage of the text history immediately after 8, and the suspicion that the correspondences between 9 and 19, each in its turn following after 8, could possibly present us with a case of duplication, would be formally corroborated. The reinterpretation of the original meaning would rest on the phrase "*yajñarthāt karmaṇo-'nyatra*". Stanzas 10-16 follow one another with such a syntactical and semantical cohesion that it is obvious that they represent, together with st. 9, a complete entity within the rest of the text.

The second segment begins for its part with a stanza which unmistakably alludes to st. III 9 :

IV. 23. *g a t a s a ṅ g a s y a m u k t a s y a*
jñānāvasthitacetasaḥ /
yajñāy ā c a r a t a ḥ k a r m a
samagram praviliyate //

While the first segment explains succinctly the theory of the sacrifice in the original sense of the word, the second enumerates the types of the sacrifice, subsuming under this conception a number of ascetic practices and distinguishing the material sacrifice from the sacrifice by knowledge alone. It is possible that the latter reinterprets the former by the expression "*jñānāvasthitacetas*" and by what follows on from it in accordance with its yoga context in ch. IV. [But there are other possibilities too, e. g. stanzas 10-15 could be a mere quotation within the framing stanzas 9 and 16 and these could belong together with stanzas IV. 23-(34)]. The second segment, at any rate, does not display such a logical unity as the first, but until st. 33 it shows a noticeable homogeneity. As for stanza 34, I am not able to decide whether it belongs to this segment, to the primordial yoga layer or to the *bhakti* interpolation in st. 35, recognizable by the affirmation "*bhūtāny aśeṣeṇa drakṣyasi. . .mayi*". The second seems, however, to be the least probable.

If these two segments are considered as later reintepretations of our yoga layer, along with still later *bhakti* insertions, there would be no more mention of the *yajña* in this layer. The text that remains, displays clear continuity in both cases[1]. The reason for interpolation could be, in the case of the first segment, a reinterpretation of the "*lokasaṅgraha*" [st. 20, 25] as "*yajñacakra*", in case of the second segment, the connecting of the new doctrine with the upaniṣadic and brāhmaṇic lore in order to bestow their authority on it. In both cases the interpolation is convincing because it unwittingly

1. Cf, III.8 and 19, IV.19-22 and 36.

reveals the historical origin of the law of *karman* in the conception of the sacrifice, as the act par excellence, and its fruits.

F. St. III. 35, treating the *svadharma* and the *paradharma*, stands even more out of context than II. 72, and has a similar role, namely, to anchor a late addition in XVIII. 41-48 in the preceding text. The word "*śreyas*", perhaps, unsuccessfully alludes to Arjuna's question in III. 2, before he puts the next question in III. 36.

G. At the end of chapter III, in stanzas 41-43, there is a strange repetition :

ILLUSTRATION 4

BhG. II. 55. *prajahāti yadā kāmān* *sarvān pārtha manogatān* *ātmany evātmanā tuṣṭaḥ* *sthitaprajñas tadocyate //*	*BhG.* III. 17. *yas tv ātmaratir eva syād* *ātmatṛptaś ca mānavaḥ /* *ātmany eva ca saṃtuṣṭas* *tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate //* 18. *naiva tasya kṛtenārtho* *nākṛteneha kaścana /* *na cāsya sarvabhuteṣu* *kaścidarthavyapāśrayaḥ //*
Kaṭhopaniṣad 1. 3.[1] 10. *indriyebhyaḥ parā hyarthā* *arthebhyaḥ ca param manaḥ /* *manasas tu parā buddhir* *buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ //*	III. 42. *indriyāṇi parāṇy āhur* *indriyebhyaḥ param manaḥ/* *manasas tu parā buddhir* *yo buddheḥ paras tu saḥ //*
11. *mahataḥ param avyaktam* *avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ /* *puruṣān na paraṃ kiñcit* *sa kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ //*	
BhG. III. 41. *tasmāt tvam indriyāṇy ādau* *niyamya bharatarṣabha /* *pāpmānam prajahi hy enaṃ* *jñānavijñānanāśanam/*	43. *evaṃ buddheḥ paraṃ buddhvā* *saṃstabhy ātmānam ātmanā/* *jahi śatruṃ mahābāho* *kāmarūpaṃ durāsadam //*

St. 41 neatly continues the preceding text, but 43 seems to duplicate 41. The enlargement could have been precipitated by the word "*ādau*" in 41, which could have recalled the terms "*manas*", "*buddhi*" and "*ātman*" after the senses have been mentioned. Our yoga layer is in its entirety consecrated to the exposition of the role of the *buddhi* in

1. Cited after : *Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads*, Vol. I, ed. by V. P. Limaye and R. D. Vadekar, Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala, Poona 1958.

the spiritual discipline of a warrior. "*Ātman*" appears probably as a philosophical term in our sequence only in stanzas II. 55, III. 17-18 and here. Elsewhere it is most probably only a pronoun. St. II. 55 does not belong to our layer, as already explained in II. B. St. III. 17 could probably have been precipitated by II. 55, as III. 43 could have been too, as the partial repetitions [*ātmany eva... tuṣṭaḥ, ātmani/-am...ātmanā*] betray. None of these hints is by itself a sufficient reason to consider these stanzas as younger, but all of them in conjunction with the repetition "[pra-] *jahi pāpmānam/śatrum...*" can hardly be accidental. It is all again mutually corroborated by the considerations in part II. E of this paper, concerning stanzas III. 17-18 which could have the function, after the *yajña* interpolation in III. 9-16, to reaffirm the *nivṛtti* ideal, first introduced into our sequence by the *prajñā* interpolation. The presence of this ideal along with the *karmayoga* in the *Bhagavadgitā* culminated at a later stage in the yoga layer of the 6th chapter.

On the other hand, st. III. 42 has interesting correspondences with the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1. 3. 10–11., but it can hardly be derived from it, because the *Kaṭha* portion shows a developed psychology or even theology which is missing in our *Gitā* layer. Only much later layers in the *Gītā* show familiarity with such a conception of the *puruṣa* or of the *avyakta*[1]. Either both texts used a common, probably oral, source, or their mutual influences need a special study[2].

Here is, may be, the proper place to sum up the main terminological implications of these analyses. In the first yoga layer the word "*ātman*" seems to be used only as a pronoun. The terms "*brahman*" and "*yajña*" are not used at all. Both appear only in the *yajña* insertions. The word "*puruṣa*" means simply "man". The whole psychical sphere is mostly designated by the term "*buddhi*".

H. Finally, we can rather easily distinguish between parts where Kṛṣṇa appears as a teacher and those where he presents himself as a divinity, as Sh. G. Khair[3] has already correctly done in principle. He introduced as a criterion the use of the pronoun for the Ist person singular in the role, let us say, of the *summum bonum*. The portions of the text using it in that sense can not be older than those which do not do so. That is how we can easily extrapolate stanzas III. 22-24, 30-32 and IV. 1-15, 35, perhaps also II. 61 (see II. B). They either use "*aham*" in that sense or presuppose other stanzas which do so. In the Weimar-conference paper I tried to show the repetitions which connect III. 22-24 with its context and to point to obvious differences in the meaning which prove that it is a case of duplication. For stanzas IV. 1-15 there are relatively few dupli-

1. Cf. e.g. VIII.9-11 or 20-22.
2. Cf. also "*kāṣṭhā*" as a metaphor, like *aśvattha* in *BhG.* XV.2-5, which is a continuation of the mentioned segment VIII.9-11.
3. *Quest for the Original Gītā*, Bombay, Somaiya Publications, Pvt. Ltd., 1969.

cation repetitions to be perceived[1] and they have no great value as evidence, but there are very many continuity repetitions which connect this segment with other *bhakti* sequences in the *Gītā*, which for their part show a number of duplication repetitions of other layers in the poem. This evidence can not be exhaustively treated in this paper, so I will deal with only one example : IV. 11cd is a continuity repetition of stanza III. 23 cd already referred to : "*mama vartmānuvartante manuṣyāḥ pārtha sarvaśaḥ*"[2]. There can be no doubt about IV. 35 or about III. 30, but III. 31-32 raises the interesting problem as to how to define the layer relations existing among these stanzas, stanzas IV. 39-40 and VI. 37 et seq., all dealing with the *śraddhā*.[3] Here, it can be proposed provisionally that III. 31-32 be considered as a duplication repetition of IV. 39-40.

I. What remains after we have extrapolated younger segments of our sequence, is more or less the original first yoga layer, as preserved in the actual text of the *Bhagavadgītā*. We can not trace all the changes it might have undergone, we do not know even how it has actually been handed down before the moment when our *Gītā* was definitely fixed. Neither are we able in every case to decide whether an enlargement or a part of it was just created in order to redact our poem, or whether it was a citation from an already existing source, subsequently included in the *Gītā* at some stage of its history. We can only accept the information which is provided by the structure of the text, try to establish a relative chronology of its portions and an approximate text of each layer in it, without pretending to come to a final decision as to the source of each stanza or even each *pāda*.

The first yoga layer, as it revealed itself, teaches the *buddhiyoga*. It is a *karmayoga* which presupposes the knowledge of some elementary *Sāṃkhya* conceptions. On the basis of the understanding that the three constituents of nature (*prakṛter guṇāni*) constantly generate activity in the world, one should not try to shrink from one's work because even the body could not subsist in that case. But he who fulfils his work without clinging to it and without any thought for the fruits of his labours, does not commit any sin. He who knows that it is not he himself who acts, but the body or nature, should not desist, however, from applying himself to the work, in order not to confuse the common people. He should act for their sake. It is only greed, lust, hate or anger which causes sin. Such passions should be overcome. The senses should be controlled. But when this is

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1. Cf. e.g. IV. 10 and II. 56; : *vītarāgabhayakrodha*.
2. The use of the indicative in III. 23cd is, however, strange.
3. For the discussion of the term "*śraddhā*" see in P. Hacker's article "*śraddhā*"; *WZKSO* 7. 1963, pp. 151-189, or *Kleine Schriften*, ed. by L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden, F. Steiner Verlag, 1978, pp. 437-475.

done, then the knowledge burns up every trace of sin. With such self-control and such knowledge Arjuna should rise up to fight.


This message is not quite systematically articulated in our layer. However, along with the literary articulation of the text by means of Arjuna's questions, which integrate the message into the epic description (see part II. B), there is a partial logical articulation of the doctrinal exposition. We can, in some measure, follow it by considering the use of the conclusive particle "*tasmād*". Its distribution shows that two occurences of it conclude the interpolations : II. 68 concludes the *prajñā* insertion and III. 15 the first *yajña* segment. The remaining four (II. 50, III. 19, III. 41, IV. 42) articulate our layer, although not very systematically. But in spite of it, the degree of homogeneity of this layer as revealed by the foregoing analyses fairly convincingly confirms the proposed procedures.

III

Finally, we can try to sketch the chronological relations among the detected segments of the sequence treated. We tried to detect the oldest layer and we named it the first yoga layer. The segment noted in the critical edition as 89* could possibly be a specimen of otherwise formally hardly noticable enlargements which we can not trace when the traditions do not diverge. At the other end we find *bhakti* insertions which belong to the youngest layer because they present us with Kṛṣṇa as god and reinterpret, in the whole, the elements from all the other layers. The *svadharma* interpolation is presupposed by it.[1] But it could also be quite late because its complement in chapter XVIII. 41-48 seems to be one of the latest additions to the poem. The both *yajña* interpolations are presupposed by the *bhakti* layer. The *bhakti* stanza IV. 35 seems to presuppose compositionally, by its position, the second, probably younger, *yajña* insertion. Elsewhere we can find in the *bhakti* layer numerous allusions to the *yajña*.[2] It is usually hard to decide when they allude to the *yajña* in general, as a religious practice in competition with the *bhakti*, and when they allude specifically to the cited insertions; but on the whole, after the *bhakti* reinterpretation of the *yajña*, it would be hopeless to interpolate the cited segments, so they must have been interpolated earlier. The *ātman* interpolations most probably presuppose the *prajñā* insertion (see part II. G and ill. 4), as does probably the *triṣṭubh* II. 70 (see II. B). Stanza II. 72, as appertaining to the second yoga layer

1. Cf. IV.13.
2. E.g. V. 29, VII. 29—VIII. 4, IX.16 etc.

THE HISTORICAL SCHEME the sequence II.39—IV.42



(see II. D.), presupposes the introduction of the conceptions of the *ātman*[1] and brahman[2] in the poem, i. e. it presumably presupposes the *yajña* and the *ātman* insertions. But I am not able to find any indication of the chronological relation between the *yajña* segments and the *prajñā* insertion.

These results can be summarized in the following tentative scheme :[3]

1. Cf. V.19, 25, 26.
2. Cf. V.10, 19, 20, 21, 24-26.
3. Explanation : the arrows point to what a layer presupposes; the double arrow shows the presupposing relation between separate texts (see I.C.)

श्रीभास्कररायदीक्षितानां दार्शनिकी दृष्टिः

बटुकनाथ शास्त्री खिस्ते

भारतीये परम्परानुगामिनि शास्त्रपरिशीलनपरायणे पण्डितसमाजे तन्त्रशास्त्रीयगूढार्थान्वेषणप्रवणे च जिज्ञासुव्रजे सुपरिचितं नामधेयं प्रातःस्मरणीयानां श्रीभास्कररायभारतीदीक्षितचरणानाम् ।

प्रायः प्राचुर्येण धारणा साधारणानां विदुषामप्येवमेवाऽऽसीत् यत् तन्त्रं नाम मारण–मोहन–वशीकरणाद्युपायबोधकः कश्चिदवहेलनीयः सम्प्रदायोऽस्तीति । परमितः कतिपयवर्षेभ्यो विशेषतश्च पाश्चात्येषु विद्वत्सु तन्त्रशास्त्रीयगाम्भीर्यं समाकृष्टेषु तद्विवेचनपरेषु पौरस्त्येयेष्वपि विचारयत्सु शास्त्रीयस्वरूपाध्ययनं शनैः शनैरभिवृद्धिप्रथमारोहति । तत्र सर जान वुडरफ-महामहोपाध्याय डा० गोपीनाथकविराज-डा० के० सी० पाण्डेय-प्रभृतीनां विदुषां विशिष्टमवदानं जागर्तीति स्वीकरणीयमेव । तत्र काश्मीराचार्या महामाहेश्वरा अभिनवगुप्तपादप्रभृतयः स्वतः प्रामाण्यं शिवागमानां मन्वानास्तथैव व्याचक्षते । एवमेव श्रीकण्ठशिवाचार्यादयोऽपि ।

श्रीभास्कररायदीक्षितास्तु भगवत्पादशङ्कराचार्याऽविच्छिन्नशिष्यपरम्परान्तर्भूता वेदमूलकत्वेनैव तन्त्रप्रामाण्यं व्यवस्थापयन्ति । तदेतन्निरूपितं नित्याषोडशिकार्णवव्याख्याने सेतुबन्धे । यथा–"श्रीमहात्रिपुरसुन्दर्याश्च गौणीं भक्तिं सेतिकर्तव्यतां कां निरूपयितुमैदंपर्येण सुन्दरीतापनीपञ्चकं भावनोपनिषत्–कौलोपनिषत्–गुह्योपनिषन्महोपनिषच्चेत्यादयो वेदशिरोभागाः प्रवृत्ताः । वेदे च पूर्वकाण्डस्य शेषभूततयाऽऽश्वालयनादिकल्पसूत्राणां मन्वादिस्मृतीनाञ्च प्रवृत्तिवदुपनिषत्काण्डशेषत्वेन परशुरामादिकल्पसूत्रणां यामलादितन्त्राणाञ्च प्रवृत्तिः । पुराणानां तु काण्डद्वयं प्रत्यपि शेषत्वेन प्रवृत्तिः । ततश्च स्मृतितन्त्रपुराणानां वेदमूलकत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यम् ।" इति ।

यानि वेदांशविरुद्धानि तन्त्राणि तद्विषये श्रीभास्कररायैरुच्यते–'ये च प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिविरुद्धास्तत्तदेकदेशास्तेषां विरोधाधिकरणन्यायेन यावन्मूलश्रुतिदर्शनमननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् । यानि तु सर्वांशेनाऽपि वेदविरुद्धान्येव कानिचित्तन्त्राणि पाशुपतविशेषपाञ्चरात्रविशेषादीनि तानि नेदृशीं भूमिकामारूढस्य । अपितु श्रौतस्मार्तकर्माधिकारिण एव केनचित् पापेन ततश्च्युतौ तेष्वधिकारः । अत एव—

पाञ्चरात्रं भागवतं तथा वैखानसाऽभिधम् ।
वेदभ्रष्ठान् समुद्दिश्य कमलापतिरुक्तवान् ॥

इत्यादिना कतिपयानामेव परिगणनमुपपद्यते । तेन - -

श्रुतिभ्रष्टः श्रुतिप्रोक्तप्रायश्चित्ते भयं गतः ।
क्रमेण श्रुतिसिद्ध्यर्थं मनुष्यस्तन्त्रमाश्रयेत् ॥

इत्यत्र तन्त्रसामान्यपरं तादृशविशेषपरम् । पत्युरसामञ्जस्यादित्यधिकरणमपि तादृशतन्त्रपरमेव । यानि तु रामकृष्णनृसिंहरुद्रपरशिवसुन्दर्याद्युपासनाबोधकान्यगस्त्यादितन्त्राणि तन्मूलभूतानां रामतापन्याद्युपनिषदां प्रत्यक्षत्वादेव नाऽप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्काऽवकाशः इति । एतावता न सर्वेषां पाशुपतानां पाञ्चरात्राणां वेदबाह्यत्वं किन्तु तद्विशेषाणामेवेति निर्णयः स्फुट एव । उपासनायामधिकारिणः कीदृशाः के वा भवन्तीत्याशयं विशदयितुं त्रिपुरामहोपनिषद्व्याख्याने तैरेव निरूपितं यथा–"'अधिकारिणस्तु देहातिरिक्त आत्मा परलोकयातायातक्षमोऽस्तीति विश्वासशीला एवाऽऽमुष्मिकफलक्रियासु यथाऽधिक्रियन्ते, तथा तेष्वपि देवतानामस्मदादिभिरदृश्यमानानामपि अभिमतफलदानक्षमा शक्तिः काचिदस्तीति विश्वासशीला एव रामकृष्णाद्युपास्तौ अधिक्रियन्ते । ईदृशजनाभिप्रायेणैव देवतानां विग्रहादिकं समर्थितं बादरायणादिभिः ।" इति ।

इत्थं देवतोपासकानां भूमिकां निर्दिश्य ये तु संस्कारवशादास्तिका अपि कर्मकाण्डैकरुचयस्तद्विषयेऽपि तत्रैव निर्दिष्टो निर्णयः । यथा—

"येषां तु देवतासद्भावे जन्मान्तरकर्मसंस्कारवशादनाश्वास आस्तिकता च ते पूर्वकाण्डोक्तकर्मस्वेवाऽधिकारिणो न देवतोपासनायाम् । सादृशजनाभिप्रायेणैव देवतानां विग्रहपञ्चकनिरासेन कर्मप्राधान्यवादः समर्थितो जैमिन्यादिभिः ।"

इत्थमधिकारिभेदाद् भूमिकाभेदः सम्भवतीति स्फुटीभवत्येव । अग्रे च तैरेवं निरूप्यते–"उपासनाशास्त्रे तु देयताप्राधान्यवाद एव न कर्म्मणः प्राधान्यम् । क्रियाप्राधान्याभावादेव देवतारूपसिद्धवस्तुबोधका वेदान्ता इति वाचोयुक्तिः ।" इति किञ्च देवतातत्त्वनिर्णये उपनिषदादिवत् पुराणानामपि सविशेषं प्रामाण्यं तैरङ्गीक्रियते । श्रुतिषु तावदर्थवादः प्रवर्तते न पुराणेष्वपीति सप्रमाणं व्यवस्थापितं गणेशसहस्रनाम'खद्योत'-व्याख्यायाम् । यथा–"पुराणेष्वर्थवादत्वं ये वदन्ति नराधमाः" इत्यादिबृहन्नारादीयादिवचनेनार्थवादशून्यपुराणानामर्थवादजटिलं कर्मकाण्डमपेक्ष्य तत्त्वनिर्णये प्राबल्यात् ।

"श्रुतिस्मृती हि नेत्रे द्वे पुराणं हृदयं मतम् ।
श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां हीनोऽन्धः काणः स्यादेकया विना ।
पुराणहीनाद्धृच्छून्यात्काणान्धावपि तौ वरौ ॥"

इत्यादिवचनैर्देवतातत्त्वनिर्णये कर्मकाण्डमपेक्ष्य पुराणानामेवाऽऽधिक्यस्य भक्तिमीमांसातन्त्रे समर्थितत्वात् ।" इति ।

देवतायाः स्वरूपञ्च कीदृशमिति निरूपितं सेतुबन्धे—

"उपास्यायाः परमेश्वर्यास्त्रीणि रूपाणि, उपास्तियोग्यानि । स्थूलं, सूक्ष्मं परञ्चेति । तत्राऽऽद्यं

करचरणाद्यं करचरणाद्यवयवशीलं मन्त्रसिद्धिमतां चक्षुरिन्द्रिय–पाणीन्द्रिययोर्योग्यम्—

'ततः पद्मनिभां देवीं बालार्ककिरणारुणाम्'।

इत्यादि। द्वितीयं मन्त्रात्मकं पुण्यवतां श्रवणेन्द्रिय–वागिन्द्रिययोर्योग्यम्। 'श्रीमद्वाग्भवकूटैकस्वरूपमुखपङ्कजा' इत्यादिना रहस्यनामसूक्तम्। सर्वमन्त्रमूलभूतमातृका सरस्वत्याद्यात्मकञ्च।

तृतीयं वासनात्मकं पुण्यवतां मनसो योग्यं, चैतन्यमात्मनो रूपमित्यादिना वक्ष्यमाणम्। एतत् त्रितयाऽतीतं तु वाङ्मनसातीतं मुक्तैरहन्तयाऽनुभूयमानमखण्डं रूपम्।" इति।

त्रिपुरोपनिषद्भाष्ये 'तिस्रःपुरस्त्रिपथा विश्वचर्षणी' इत्यादिमन्त्रव्याख्यानावसरे 'त्रिपुरा'-पदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं मार्गत्रयप्रापकत्वादिति व्याख्यातं तैरेव। तथाहि–"मुक्तिस्तावत् पञ्चविधा—सालोक्यमेकं, सामीप्य—सारूप्य–सायुज्यत्रितयं, कैवल्यञ्चेति। तासु आद्यान्ते प्रत्येकं द्वौ मार्गौ मध्यमत्रयमे को मार्गः। तथा च तैत्तिरीयश्रुतौ "य एवं विद्वानुदगयने प्रमीयते देवानामेव महिमानं गत्वा" इत्याद्यारभ्य "ब्रह्मणो महिमानमाप्नोति तस्माद् ब्रह्मणो महिमानम्" इत्यन्तो मन्त्रभागः। अस्य चायं भावः—ऊर्ध्वरेतसां स्वाश्रयोक्तकर्मानुष्ठानवतां—चन्द्रलोकप्राप्तिः सालोक्यरूपा, प्रतीकोपासनया स्व-स्वामिभावेनोपासनयाऽहंग्रहोपासनया सामीप्यादित्रयरूपाऽऽदित्यप्राप्तिः, निर्गुणोपास्तिरूपब्रह्मज्ञानवतां तु कैवल्यरूपब्रह्मपदप्राप्तिरिति। एतन्मार्गत्रितयमेव उपबृंहितं विष्णुपुराणे तृतीयेंऽशे—

उत्तरं यदगस्त्यस्य अजवीथ्याश्च दक्षिणम्।
पितृयाणः स वै पन्था वैश्वानरपथाद् बहिः॥

इत्यादिना

विवेकज्ञानदृष्टञ्च तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् इत्यन्तेन। मार्गत्रैविध्याद् गन्तव्याः पुर्योऽपि तिस्रः। ईदृशपुरत्रयप्रापकत्वात् परदेवता 'त्रिपुरा' इत्युच्यते।

आत्माबुद्ध्या प्रतीकेन मातृबुद्ध्याऽप्यहंधिया।
कर्मणाऽपि भजन् मर्त्यः कैवल्यं पदमश्नुते॥

इत्यनेन पञ्चविधात्म–त्रिविधभजनेनाऽपि त्रैपुरप्राप्तेरुक्तत्वात्। तस्मात्सैव तिस्रःपुरः त्रिपुरा। त्रयः पन्थानो यस्याः सा। इति।

नित्याषोडशिकार्णवस्य चतुर्थविश्रामे सेतुबन्धे श्रीदेव्याः शिवं प्रति एकैकाक्षरसाधनमहाज्ञानप्रभावादिप्रश्ने शिवस्योत्तरमिदम्—

शृणु देवि महाज्ञानं सर्वज्ञानोत्तमं परम्।
येनाऽनुष्ठितमात्रेण भवाब्धौ न निमज्जति॥

एतद् व्याख्यानमित्थं क्रियते–"सर्वेषां परिणामानां परिणामिविषयकं महाज्ञानम्। परं तत्त्वविषयकं शृणु। येन ज्ञानेन अनुष्ठितमात्रेण उदितमात्रेण। तादृशज्ञानस्य सहकार्यन्तराऽनपेक्षणात्।

अग्रिमः श्लोकश्च—

त्रिपुरा परमा शक्तिराद्या ज्ञानादितः प्रिये ।
स्थूलसूक्ष्मविभेदेन त्रैलोक्योत्पत्तिमातृका ॥

अस्य व्याख्या—"सर्वस्य जगतः प्रलयकालस्यावधिपर्यन्तं हि विनष्टप्राणिनां कर्माणि सूक्ष्मरूपेणाऽ निगीर्य एकमेवाऽद्वितीयं ब्रह्म तिष्ठति । तत्परिपाकवैचित्र्यवशादेव हि सिसृक्षादिरूपा ब्रह्मशक्तिः पूर्वमव्यक्तत स्थिताऽपि तदा व्यक्तीभवति । सेयमेव त्रिपुराख्या परमा शक्तिः सृष्टेराद्या प्रथमा कारणभूतेति यावत् । तद ऽप्याद्यं यद्यपि परं ब्रह्माऽस्ति तथाऽपि तत्प्रलयप्रथमक्षणमारभ्य तच्चरमक्षणपर्यन्तं विद्यमानमपि न सृष्टिक्ष मासीत् । इयं तु सिसृक्षादिरूपा शक्तिः स्वयं व्यक्ता सत्युत्तरोत्तरं सृष्टिं व्यधादित्याशयेनाऽस्या एवाऽऽद्यत्वं व्यपदेशः कृतः । इयं शक्तिरिच्छारूपाऽपि निर्विषयकचिन्मात्रभवत्वात्तद्रूपाऽपि भवति । इयमेव हि ज्ञेय-ज्ञाता त्रिपुटीकल्पनक्षमेत्यत उक्तं ज्ञानादित इति । ज्ञान–ज्ञातृ –ज्ञेयरूपत्रिपुटीत इत्यर्थः । अत एव त्रिभ्यः पुरे व्युत्पत्तिध्वननाय त्रिपुरापदेन विशेष्यनिर्देशः । 'ज्ञाना' इति पदं भिन्नं त्रिपुराया विशेषणम् । ज्ञानरूपे तदर्थः । सेयं शक्तिः वक्ष्यमाणसूक्ष्मत्रैलोक्यस्थूलत्रैलोक्ययोरुत्पत्तौ मातृका माता तज्जनिकेति यावत् केचित्तु त्रैलोक्यं विद्याकूटत्रयं, तदुत्पादिका मातृका स्थूलसूक्ष्मभेदेन वैखरीमध्यमादिभेदेन द्विविधा ज्ञानादि हकाररूपशिवञ्जातेत्यर्थमाहुः ।" इति ।

एवं शक्तिस्वरूपं प्रतिपाद्य प्रलयकालेऽनुपलभ्यमानयोस्तादृशत्रैलोक्ययोरपि मयूराण्डरसन्यायेन श सत्तामङ्गीकुर्वन्तो जगतः शक्तिपरिणामरूपतां सिद्धान्तयन्ति भास्कररायदीक्षिताः । तत्राऽयं पूर्वपक्षः समुदेति निखिलं विश्वं कवलयन्ती शक्तिरपि सूक्ष्माकारेण परशिव एव निलीयते एवं परशिवस्यैव सशक्तिकजगत्कारण स्वीकर्तव्या । तथा च तेनैवोपपत्तौ किमन्तर्गतगडुभूतशक्तिकल्पनयेति 'तद्धेतोरेव तदस्तु किन्तेने' न्यायावतारात् ।
तत्रोत्तरं मूलकारेणैव दीयते तथा हि—

'तस्यां परिणतायां तु न कश्चित्पर इष्यते' इति अत्र व्याचक्षते "तु शब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावर्तक आवश्य कत्वव्यञ्जकश्च । शक्तिपरिणामकल्पनस्याऽऽवश्यकत्वेन तत एवोपपत्तेः प्रत्युत परशिवकल्पनमेव व्यर्थत्वान्नेष इत्यर्थः । अयं भावः—औपनिषदानां पक्षस्तु परस्य चिद्रूपस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तिर्मायाख्या सा च जडैव । सैव जगतः परिणाम्युपादानम् । परं ब्रह्म तु विवर्तोपादानम् । अत एव जगतोऽपि मायिकत्वाज्जडत्वं मिथ्यात्वञ्च अद्वैतश्रुतयस्तु पारमार्थिकव्यक्तिरेकैवेत्येवंपराः । सर्वं ब्रह्मेति सामानाधिकरण्यं तु बाधायामित्यादि तान्त्रिकाणां पक्षस्तु—

परचिन्निष्ठा या चिच्छक्तिरौपनिषदानामपि सम्मता सैव अनन्तरूपत्वान्मायेत्युच्यते । 'पराऽस्य शक्ति र्विविधैव श्रूयते', 'माया च अविद्या च स्वयमेव भवति' इत्यादिश्रुतेः । तत्परिणाम एव प्रपञ्चः । अत एव चिद्रूपः । 'चिद्विलासः प्रपञ्चोऽयम्' इति ज्ञानवासिष्टात् । अत एव च सत्योऽपि । सर्वं ब्रह्मेति सामानाधि रण्यस्य अत्यन्ताऽभेद एव स्वारस्यात् । न च अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः । विरोधापादकस्य एकस्य भेदस्यैव मिथ्यात्व ऽङ्गीकारात् ।" इति ।

अयमेव सिद्धान्तो वरिवस्यारहस्यव्याख्याने भङ्ग्यन्तरेण निरूपितो यथा—अत्रेयं तान्त्रिकप्रक्रिया—'इच्छामि', 'जानामि' इत्यादौ उत्तमपुरुषान्तर्भासमानं स्फुरणान्वयि ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशाभिधं ब्रह्म। तच्च सर्वज्ञत्व–सर्वेश्वरत्व–सर्वकर्तृत्व–पूर्णत्व–व्यापकत्वादिशक्तिसंवलितम्। तस्य च आनन्दरूपांश एव स्फुरणं, पराहन्ता, विमर्शः, परा, ललिता, भट्टारिका, त्रिपुरसुन्दरी इत्यादिपदैर्व्यवह्रियते। उक्तञ्च विरूपाक्षपञ्चाशिकायां विश्वशरीरस्कन्धे—

ईश्वरता कर्तृत्वं स्वतन्त्रता चित्स्वरूपता चेति।
एतेऽहन्तायाः किल पर्यायाः सद्भिरुच्यन्ते॥ इति

पराहन्तामन्तरेणेदन्ताया असंस्फुरणादहमिदमोः स-सम्बन्धिकत्वादिदंपदगम्यस्य दृश्यस्याऽहन्तारूप-शक्त्या तद्विशिष्टब्रह्मणा वा जन्यत्वम्। तच्च दृश्यं तत्परिणाम एव। 'तस्यां परिणतायान्तु न कश्चित्पर इष्यते' इति वामकेश्वरतन्त्रात्। 'वाचारम्भणं विकारः' इत्यादिश्रुतीनां तत्रैव स्वारस्यात्। 'मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतम्' इत्यत्राऽपि द्वैतशब्देन भेदस्यैव मिथ्यात्वमुच्यते न पुनर्भेदवतः। तथात्वे तु प्रतियोगितासम्बन्धेन जगत इव अनुयोगितासम्बन्धेन ब्रह्मणोऽपि भेदवत्त्वस्य सत्त्वात् सदसद्भ्यामभावो निरूप्यते इति न्यायसिद्धत्वाऽविशेषान्मिथ्यात्वापत्तेः। ततश्च श्रुतेरपि परिणामवाद एव सम्मतः सिद्ध्यति। भगवता व्यासेनाऽपि 'प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तांऽनुपरोधात्' इत्यस्मिन्नधिकरणे एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञां मृद्घटनखनिकृन्तनादिदृष्टान्तं 'बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' इत्यभिध्योपदेशादिकं च अनुसन्दधानेन परिणामवाद एवाऽभिप्रेतः। कण्ठरवेणोक्तञ्च—'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्'[1] भाष्यकारैरपि तत्र विवर्तवादानुसारेण व्याचक्षाणैरपि सौन्दर्यलहर्यां 'मनस्त्वं व्योमत्वम्' इति श्लोके 'त्वयि परिणतायां नहि परम्' इति स्वाभिमतः परिणामवाद एव स्फुटीकृतः। इति। एवमयं परिणामवादसिद्धान्तः श्रीभास्कररायैस्तत्र तत्र व्याख्यानावसरे प्रतिष्ठापितो निर्दोषतया स्वप्रक्रियामनुबध्नाति। शक्तिकारणतावादेऽपि शिवस्य स्वीकारो वर्तते परं शक्तिविशिष्टस्यैव तस्योपलब्धिरिति लाघवात् शक्तेरेव प्राधान्यम्। नित्याषोडशिकार्णवस्य पञ्चमविश्रामे श्रीभास्कररायोपदर्शिता तान्त्रिकी सृष्ठिप्रक्रियाऽपि सूक्ष्मतमा विवेचनार्हा यथा—

"धौतोऽतिश्वेतः सुसूक्ष्मतमो महार्हो महापर इव निर्गुणः परशिवः। तस्यैव अतिश्वेतेनाऽन्नरसेन सर्वांशे लेपेन घनताऽऽपादने स एव घटित इत्युच्यते। तत्तुल्यः शक्तियुक्त उच्यते तत्रैव करिष्यमाणचित्रानुगुण्येन सूक्ष्माकारेण लाञ्छनालाञ्छितो भवति। तत्तुल्यः सूक्ष्मसृष्टिविशिष्टः परशिवः सूत्रात्मेत्युच्यते। ततो विविधरञ्जनेन योगाद्रञ्जितः परो विराट्पुरुषो भवति। अत्र परशिवाख्यं ब्रह्म स्वभावादनन्तशक्तिकम्। तदुक्तं ज्ञानवासिष्ठे—

'सर्वशक्तिपरं ब्रह्म नित्यमापूर्णमव्ययम्' इत्यादि तद्गतशक्तिकदम्बसमष्टिरेव त्रिपुरसुन्दरी। 'देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्विगूढा'मित्यादिश्रुतिभिः शक्ति-शक्तिमतोरभेदाच्च न ब्रह्मणो निर्धर्मकत्वभङ्गः। तदुक्तं श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यैः—

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१. ब्र० सू० १.४.२६

आनन्दो विषयाऽनुभवो नित्यत्वञ्चेति सन्ति धर्माः । अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात्पृथगिवावभासन्त इति । अत एव तादृशशक्तिविशिष्टयेव परं ब्रह्मेति तात्त्विकसिद्धान्तः । तेन शक्तेरपि ब्रह्मकोटावेव निवेशः । संक्षेपशारीरकेऽपि—

चिच्छक्तिः परमेश्वरस्य विमला चैतन्यमेवोच्यते । इति ।

ततश्च शुद्धपरस्यैव लाञ्छनाद्यसम्भवात्सान्द्रत्वापादिकाया अन्नरसस्थानीयायाः शक्तेरेव सृष्टि-जनकत्वम् । परशिवस्य सान्निध्यमात्रेणैव कारणत्वं तत्तु कारणतावच्छेदकतायाः पर्याय एव । ततश्च शिव-निष्ठा शक्तिरेव सृष्ट्यात्मना परिणमते । इति ।

शङ्करभगवत्पादाचार्यैः सौन्दर्यलहर्यादौ सूत्रितः—

'शिवः शक्त्या युक्तो यदि भवति शक्तः प्रभवितुम्
न चेदेवं देवो न खलु कुशलः स्पन्दितुमपि ।'

इत्यादिरूपः सिद्धान्तः श्रीभास्कररायदीक्षितैर्न्यायमीमांसादिसिद्धान्तपद्धत्या विविच्य प्रतिष्ठापित इत्यत्र न सन्देहः । न च ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यादौ विवर्तवाददृष्ट्या विचारादिदमनुपपन्नमिति वाच्यम्, भूमिकाभेदादधिकारि-भेदाच्च व्याख्याभेदस्य सुवचत्वात् । दक्षिणामूर्तिस्तवेऽपि तथा दर्शनाच्च । श्रीशङ्कराचार्याणामशेषवैदिकसिद्धा-न्तप्रवर्तकत्वेन षडाम्नायसमुद्धारकत्वेन च महती कार्यपरम्परा समवर्तत । परं तैरपि स्वपीठेषु सर्वत्र श्रीचक्र-श्रीविद्ययोरुपास्तिरेव प्राधान्येन प्रवर्तिता या सम्प्रत्यपि जागर्ति । आचार्यपादानां स्वल्पवर्षात्मके जीवने यदवशिष्टं कार्यजातं तत् परवर्तिभिस्तदंशभूतैर्महापुरुषैरनुष्ठितमिति साम्प्रदायिका मन्यन्ते । तत्र शिवोपासना-विषये श्रीमदप्पयदीक्षितेन्द्रैः शक्त्युपासनायाश्च विषये श्रीभास्कररायदीक्षितेन्द्रैः सविस्तरं सिद्धान्तभूताः प्रबन्धा व्यरच्यन्त । श्रीभास्कररायचरणानां सम्प्रदायो विशेषतो दक्षिणापथे प्रवर्धमान आसीत् । तच्छिष्येण जगन्नाथशुक्लेन निबद्धो 'नित्योत्सवः' सर्वैराद्रियते । लेखेऽस्मिन् केचन मूलभूतास्तेषां सिद्धान्ताः सूत्रायमाणा उल्लिखिताः । येन विदुषां विशेषतो दृष्टिरावर्जिता स्यात् । परमेकं प्रमोदस्थानं यत् सम्प्रति 'तञ्जौर' समीप-वर्तिनि 'भास्करपुर'ग्रामे श्रीमत्परमपूज्यपादकाञ्चीशङ्कराचार्यश्रीचन्द्रशेखरेन्द्रसरस्वतीप्रेरणया भक्तैः 'श्रीभास्करेश्वर'शिवलिङ्गस्य कुम्भाभिषेकमन्दिरनिर्माणादिकं विहितया तत्रैव च श्रीभास्कररायग्रन्थानां सङ्ग्रहसम्पादनव्यवस्थाविद्वद्विचाराद्यवसरोत्साहश्च प्रवर्तयितुमिष्यते । इति ।

SOME NOTES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚVETĀŚVATARA UPANIṢAD[1]

Arnold Kunst

The problems posed by the interpretation of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*[2] are almost as interesting as is the Upaniṣad itself. There are both in the West and in India two clearly discernible trends in the method of such interpretation. One follows quite strictly the line of the monistic, advaita doctine, involving frequent disregard of the text itself. The other shows a realistic appreciation of a largely deistic philosophy of the Upaniṣad, which leans towards soteriological concepts of the *Sāṃkhya* or rather the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* syncretism[3]. The Upaniṣad presents, in fact, triadic combination of (1) Īśvara=*puruṣa,* (2) Brahman, whose role as that of a creator is identified with the role of the *prakṛti,*

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1. The author is indebted to the Editorial Board of the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, for its permission to reprint this article originally published in the BSOAS XXXI, 2, 1968, London.
2. Henceforth referred to as *ŚU.*
3. Among editors, translators, and exegetes of the Upaniṣad, those following the advaita line are, in the first place, Deussen (*SechzigUpanishad's des Veda. 3. Auflage*, Leipzig, 1921) and Radhakrishnan (*The Principal Upaniṣads,* New York, 1953); among the 'realists' are E. H. Johnston ['Some Sāṁkhya and Yoga conceptions of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad', *JRAS*, 1930, 855-78, and also *Early Sāṁkhya* (RAS Prize Publication Fund, XV), London, 1937], A. Silburn [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (Les Upanishad : texte et traduction sous la direction de Louis Renou, VII), Paris, 1948], and R. Hauschild [*Die Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XVII.2), Leipzig, 1927]. It is hardly necessary to mention that the interpretation of *ŚU* by Śaṅkara and his followers, ancient and Modern, has precious little to do with the thought originally expounded in the Upaniṣad. While Śaṅkara's views on *ŚU* are known from his references in the commentary on the *Brahmasūtra,* Hauschild has shown conclusively that the *Śvetāśvatarabhāṣya* often attributed to Śaṅkara is an advaita commentary written probably by Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa as late as the sixteenth century. For the present note, however, the question of the authorship of the *bhāṣya* is of no paramount importance.

pradhāna, or *buddhi*, and who is the intermediary between the Īśvara, and (3) *ātman*=*jīva*.

Even if the concept of the triad in the Upaniṣad is not pursued with due consistency, it certainly defies the monistic Brahma=*ātman* interpretation of the advaitins not only because *ŚU* introduces the personal Brahman between the Īśvara and the *ātman* =*jīva* but also because it places a supreme deity at the top of the triad. This supreme deity, introduced as the *primo motore* (*preritṛ* : *ŚU* i. 6) of the universe and appearing under such names as Īśvara, Īśa, Maheśvara, Hari, Rudra, and Śiva, seems to represent none other but Śiva, whose popular cult as the world's creator and destroyer penetrated into the Upaniṣad's poetry and suited the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* concepts of soteriology as expounded in *ŚU*. The introduction in *ŚU* of the concept of personal Brahman fits equally well into the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* evolutionary doctrine. A degree of confusion as to whether Brahman is identifiable with the *prakṛti* (=*pradhāna*) or *buddhi* (=*mahat*) is of no major consequence in the text as, in *ŚU*, he is the essence of things empirical and, at the same time, the reflection of Īśvara's (=*puruṣa*'s) creative power[1]. This is what actually makes him the intermediary between the absolute and the empirical world (cf. *ŚU* iii. 4).

Thanks to Hauschild, whose edition and translation of *ŚU* is the best and most convincing we have had until now, it has become much easier to separate the original intention of *ŚU* from the myths imposed upon it by the pure advaita interpretation[2]. There still remain, however, a few points arising from the interpretation of *ŚU* which are open to doubt. One of them concerns, for instance, verse 16 of the sixth *adhyāya*, the sense of which has so far not been brought to light. As that verse is ostensibly the epitome of the Upaniṣad's thought and, as such, has strong affinities with the tenets of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* philosophy, it seems to require an additional comment.

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1. This type of confusion is not peculiar to *ŚU* alone. A mix-up in the 'hierarchy' of evolutes occurs also in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (e.g. iii.1). It all obviously stems from the gradually developing systematization of the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy. One has, however, to keep in mind that *ŚU* not only applied the already existing tenets of the Sāṃkhya doctrine but helped to formulate it.
2. As an example of an unrealistic interpretation of the intention and thought of *ŚU*, there is almost the astonishing footnote by Deussen (op. cit., 308) of *ŚU* vi. 13, which reads in part : *tat kāraṇaṃ sāṃkhyayogādhigamyaṃ jñātvā devam* ... To this Deussen says that by *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* are not to be understood the *later* (my italics) systems of that name, as they are in many ways at variance with the doctrines of the Upaniṣads. The expressions *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* are to be understood, he says, in the way Śaṅkara interprets them in the commentary to *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.3, i.e. *vaidikaṃ jñānaṃ dhyānañca*. Even if we allow for the chronological error ('later systems') prevailing in Deussen's time, the insistence that *ŚU* is at variance with *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* is striking in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. On p. 290 of *Sechzig Upanishd's* Deussen himself says that a whole series of terms and basic concepts of *Sāṃkhya* philosophy occurs in *ŚU*; among many others he cites the example of the manifold types of relation of *puruṣa* to *prakṛti*.

The verse reads:

sa viśvakṛd viśvavid [;] ātmayonir
jñaḥ kālakāro guṇī sarvavidyaḥ |
pradhānakṣetrajñapatir guṇeśaḥ
saṃsāramokṣasthitibandhahetuḥ ||

Hauschild translates it as follows :

'Er wirkt alles und weiss alles, er ist aus sich selbst entstanden, er ist kundig, Zeitenschöpfer, mit den Konstituenten ausgestattet und besitzt alles Wissen. Er ist Gebieter über die Urmaterie und die individuelle Seele und Herr über die Konstituenten. Er its die Veranlassung zur Befreiung vom Kreislauf der Geburten und der Urheber des Gebundenseins durch das Verharren in ihm [d.h. dem *saṃsāra*]'.

As the translation stands, it contains some contradictions which render the verse inconsistent with the Upaniṣad's previous description of the Īśvara. As has been mentioned before, the text reflects quite faithfully the ***Sāṃkhya-Yoga*** conception of the Īśvara=*puruṣa*; consequently the Īśvara attributes, listed in verse 16, would be expected to correspond both with the *puruṣa* attributes ascribed to him by the syncretist system, and with the attributes chosen in some other passages of the Upaniṣad.

Among the attributes of Īśvara listed in verse 16 are *guṇī, viśvavid, viśvakṛt,* and *sarvavidyaḥ*[1]. *Guṇī* has been rendered by Hauschild as 'mit den Konstituenten bestattet', by Deussen as 'guṇahaft', by Radhakrishnan and Hume[2] as 'the possessor of qualities', and by Silburn as 'doué des modes'. For this passage and for *ŚU* v. 2, Böhtlingk[3] suggests 'gute Eigenschaften besitzend' und 'Vorzüge besitzend'[4]. All of these suggest the understanding of *guṇin* as equal to *guṇavant*. In some texts these two adjectives appear as synonymous. For the text in hand, however, it would be very difficult to reconcile such a meaning with the predication of Īśvara as *nirguṇaḥ* just five verses before. No such glaring contradiction can be intended between the texts of two verses uttered almost in one breath.

The *nirguṇatva* of the *puruṣa* is stated several times in Vijñānabhikṣu's *Sāṃkhya-*

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1. The *vivaraṇa* reads *sarvavid yaḥ*; *sarvavidyaḥ* is preferable. In *ŚU* vi. 2 where the combination of some of those adjectives occur, the structure of the sentence might justify the reading *sarvavid-yaḥ*, though Hauschild doubts it.
2. Robert Ernest Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Second edition revised,* OUP, 1934.
3. See St. Petersburg dictionary, s. v.
4. The *bhāṣya* (ĀSS) says : *guṇī=apahatapāpmādimān.* Śrī Upaniṣad Brahmayogin (cf. *The Śaiva Upaniṣads,* edited by Pandit A. A. Mahadeva Sastri, Madras, Adyar Library, 1950, 230) comments as follows : *guṇī=māyātatkāryaguṇī apahatapāpmādiguṇavān vā.*

pravacanasūtra (e.g. 38.3 and 65.29); in Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvakaumudī* (*kār.* 19) there is a reference to ***puruṣasyātriguṇatvam***.

It thus follows clearly that in our passage *guṇī* cannot mean one who is the possessor of, or endowed with qualities, whether good or bad. An explanation of the meaning of ***guṇin*** is actually provided in *ŚU* v. 5, where the *anyaḥ* who ***vidyāvidye īśate*** (the 'other' who controls knowledge and ignorance) is described as ***guṇāṃś ca sarvān viniyojayed yaḥ***, i.e. he dispenses and distributes all the constituents without having any share in them himself.[1] He dispenses the ***guṇa***-s in no other way than he dispenses any other properties that relate him to all the phenomena of his creation. In our context the relation of ***guṇin*** to ***guṇa*** is not merely in the grammatical sense, the same as that of ***māyin=maheśvara*** to ***māyā=prakṛti*** (cf. *ŚU* iv. 10). According to the ***Yoga***, the act of creation, the main factor of which is the distribution of the *guṇa*-s, is not the result of a direct relation between the creator and the object of creation. The act of creation is effected by the Īśvara through the medium of ***prakṛti*** or ***pradhāna*** (or even ***buddhi***), which, according to his will, breaks the barriers of its equilibrium and becomes engaged in evolutionary activities. ***Guṇin*** must, therefore, be understood in our text as one who dispenses the ***guṇa***-s, which are resulting from the creative force, but not as one who is endowed with them in any way.

That ***puruṣa*** cannot be *nirguṇa* and ***guṇavant*** at the same time does not dispose of the perennial logical difficulty whereby Īśvara or ***puruṣa***, while being described as pure intelligence, absolutely inactive, detached and free of causality[2], is assumed to be involved, as if by proxy, in the transformation of ***prakṛti***. The relationship of ***nirguṇatva*** to ***guṇavattva***

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1. The relationship between Īśvara and his creation is quite clearly explained by the full text of *ŚU* v. 5, which reads in *extenso* :

   yac ca svabhāvam pacati viśvayoniḥ
   pācyāṃś ca sarvān pariṇāmayed yaḥ |
   sarvam etad viśvam adhitiṣṭhaty eko
   guṇāṃś ca sarvān viniyojayed yaḥ ||

   'He who, by bringing into completion his creative force, is the source of all beings and (as such) moulds all these beings that are to be brought into completion; he alone controls all this universe and distributes all the constituents'. [The syntax of this verse is confusing, to say the least. For *yac ca svabhāvam* the commentary suggests *yac ca yaś ceti liṅgavyatayaḥ;* with Hauschild, I prefer to consider *viśvayoniḥ* (=*deva* in v. 4) as the subject governing the whole of v. 5]. In the verse cited above we thus have the function of creation placed completely in the power of Īśvara, who, by the process of developing his own nature (*svabhāva*), realizes the act of creation. The externalization of Īśvara's *svabhāva* lays the ground for the necessity of *guṇa*-s, which the *svabhāva* in its undeveloped (*avyakta*) stage neither requires nor possesses. (For these and other problems connected with the *svabhāva*, and its relation to *guṇa*, cf. E. H. Johnston, *Early Sāṁkhya*, 67-72).
2. Cf. *Yogasūtra*, i. 24 : *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ*.

with reference to Īśvara involves both the ontological dogma (*guṇavattva* begins beneath Īśvara) and the principle of excluded middle[$\sim$(pq)]. The attributes *nirguṇa* on the one hand and *viśvavid* and *viśvakṛt* on the other do not seem to militate against each other, as the two latter attributes arise from the intuitive and supralogical acknowledgment of Īśvara's ommiscience and omnipotence and from the inner conviction, supported by authority, of his influence on the evolutionary processes.

As for the seeming tautology between *viśvavid* and *sarvavidyaḥ* suggested by the translations[1], this has to be dismissed altogether, as the use of such synonyms is not in conformity with the style of the rest of the Upaniṣad, where each expression seems to have its peculiar shade of meaning.

For the proper allocation of the purport and meaning of each of the adjectives listed in verse 16 an understanding of the whole of the verse is required. The verse appears to be clearly divided into two separate parts. The first part consists of three words *sa viśvakṛd viśvavid*; all the rest comprises the second part. As *viśvakṛt* and *viśvavid*[2], i.e. creator of all and knower of all, Īśvara is endowed with these two attributes, which are intrinsically and exclusively his own and belong to his *svabhāva*. These two adjectives would, therefore, seem to exhaust the characterization of Īśvara (=*puruṣa*) as the absolute consciousness and the *cause efficiens* (*nimittakāraṇa* or *nimittahetu*—cf. *ŚU* vi. 5) of the evolutionary processes.

All the other adjectives following these two belong, as it were, to the category of ancillary characteristics and define Īśvara's (=*puruṣa*'s) participation in the *prakṛti* (or *buddhi*, according to the prevailing interpretation) as that of a surveillant and controller of the evolutionary and phenomenological processes themselves in so far as these processes, according to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system, serve the best interests of the *puruṣa* (*puruṣārtha*).[3]

If the dualistic division suggested above is observed, we shall have to follow an interpretation of the remaining adjectives on a plane based on *puruṣa*'s hypostatical participation in evolution from the point of the *pradhāna* or *buddhi*. Consequently it is not likely that *ātmayoni* implies that 'er ist aus sich selbst entsanden' but rather that Īśvara is the matrix of individual beings[4]; in this sense he is also *jñaḥ*, as described in the phrase

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1. Hauschild's 'er weiss alles' und 'er besitzt alles Wissen' are just two phrases meaning the same thing.
2. Cf. *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (ed. R. Garbe, HOS, II), iii. 56: *sa hi sarvavit sarvakartā*, and...*sarvavit sarvakarteśvara ādipuruṣo bhavati*.
3. Cf. also Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I.259.
4. Cf. *ŚU* iv. 11, *yo yoniṃ adhitiṣṭhati* and *ŚU* v. 2, *yo yoniṃ yonim adhitiṣṭhaty eko viśvāni rūpāṇi yonīś ca sarvāḥ*. One of the alternatives given in the *bhāṣya* is *sarvasyātmā sarvasya ca yoniḥ*. Cf. also E. H. Johnston, *Early Sāṅkhya*, 56 and 84.

pradhānakṣetrajñapatiḥ. *Jñaḥ*, in contradistinction to °*vid* (or °*vidyaḥ*), means one who possesses discriminative knowledge. In the *Mokṣadharma* (*Mbh.*, XII.6291) the *ātman* is described as *kṣetrajña* in so far as it is connected with the *prakṛti* and the *guṇa*-s ; once freed of them it becomes *paramātman* (=*puruṣa*)[1]. As E. H. Johnston points out, the *kṣetrajña* denotes that portion of cosmic soul which is attached to the individual. Consequently *jña*, which relates to individual, not cosmic knowledge, qualifies *puruṣa* as the one who, having set his omniscience in motion, is himself quasi-empirically conscious of the processes of cognition of the individual, and the *pradhānakṣetrajñapatir guṇeśaḥ*, the custodian of the constituents who watches over the individual beings in the realm of their emancipatory activities[2]. The expression *sarvavidyaḥ*, in contrast to *viśvavid*, would also convey the Īśvara's act of endowing the beings with knowledge conducive to soteriological attainments.

The attributes *jñaḥ*, *kālakāraḥ*[3], *guṇi*, and *sarvavid* in *ŚU* vi. 2 are listed in the context of Īśvara, by whom the evolving elements are enveloped (*āvṛta*) and controlled (*īśita*). As for the expression *kālakāraḥ*[4] and *saṃsāramokṣasthitibandhahetuḥ* in verse 16, their meaning is self-evident ; they qualify the *puruṣa* as the maker of time within which the processes of creation occur, and as the cause of the birth cycles, deliverance, continuance, and bondage[5].

The following translation of verse 16 is thus suggested.

'He (the Īśvara=*puruṣa*) is the creator of everything and the knower of everything. He is the womb from which beings have sprung ; he is conscious (of them) ; he is the custodian of constituents in that he watches over the individual beings (*kṣetrajña*=*ātman*) and over the *pradhāna*(=*prakṛti*) (to which they are bound) ; he is the reason (*hetu*=*nimittakāraṇa*) of the birth cycles, deliverance, continuance, and bondage'.

As for verse 17 of *ŚU* vi, one has to agree with Deussen (but see also Silburn) that

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1. Cf. Gauḍapāda's commentary to *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 2; for the phrase *vyaktāvyaktajña*° he suggests *jñaḥ puruṣaḥ*. In *Mbh.*, XII.12680 (cf. Johnston, op. cit.) *kṣetrajña* is described as that which is *antarātmā* and is *triguṇavyatiriktaḥ puruṣaḥ kalpitaḥ*. There is, however, no contradiction in the description of the *kṣetrajña* as *guṇaiḥ saṃyukta*. The *saṃyoga* is that connexion which permits the *puruṣa* to be reflected in the *buddhi*. The possibility of such a *saṃyoga* is, of course, denied by the advaitins.
2. In spite of the *bhāṣya*, *pradhāna* is to be understood here as *vyaktaṃ pradhānam* (cf. *ŚU* i. 10 : *kṣaraṃ pradhānam*...).
3. The alternative reading *kālakāla* for *kālakāra* (c. the Tyāgīśānanda ed.) referred to by some commentators is unlikely.
4. Cf. *ŚU* vi. 3 and 4.
5. Hauschild's translation of this last phrase is not convincing.

tanmayaḥ refers to Brahman or *buddhi*, and not to Īśvara. It is not likely that Īśvara could be described as °*maya*, no matter what meaning is attributed to *tat*. Nor could Īśvara be described as *īśasaṃstha*, being *īśa* himself. Verse 17 seems to be introductory to verse 18 which refers to Brahman explicitly as Īśvara's creation (*yo vai brahmāṇam vidadhāti pūrvam*), and as the receiver of the Vedas etc. Hillebrandt's suggestion that *tanmayaḥ* means 'er enthält die feinsten Stoffe' seems to indicate a confusion of *tat* with *tattva* or *tan*° (*tanu*°?) °*mātra*. Hauschild's translation 'er besteht aus dem *tat*' does not clarify much[1]. Why not interpret that *tat* part of the compound as *saḥ* (=Īśvara) and simply translate: 'He [Brahman] is the creation of him (Īśvara)'? As Īśvara's reflection, Brahman also reflects a number of the former's attributes (*amṛta*, *jña*), by the endowment with which he can freely and directly exercise his authority.

In the translation of *ŚU* vi. 17d there also seems to have arisen a misunderstanding in the interpretation of the expression *hetuḥ*[2]. In *nānyo hetur vidyate īśanāya* the *hetuḥ* is the same as the *hetuḥ*=Īśvara in 16d; as Īśvara's creation Brahman functions *puruṣārthatvena*, since in the teleological sense the career of the world and its beings is to be worked out towards the unification with the *puruṣa*. The phrase in question means therefore: (Īśvara had) no other reason for the establishment of his (Brahman's) domination (than to create a soteriological platform).

An interesting point arises in connexion with the many quotations in *ŚU* from the *Ṛgveda*, the *Atharvaveda*, and the *Śatarudrīya*. Some of these quotations have been described by Hauschild as 'ungeschickt' or 'unpassend'. This may be so occasionally, but, and this applies equally to some other Upaniṣads, the inclusion of verses from Vedic texts serves a very definite purpose, of which the raising of the Upaniṣads' prestige and authority is not a major one.

An out-of-context quotation from the Vedas undergoes an important process of 'upaniṣadization' with the result that the meaning of the original text is largely lost and is replaced by a new 'sublimated' meaning. For instance, the verse from *ṚV* i. 164 quoted in *ŚU* iv. 8, which Hauschild finds 'so unpassend wie möglich' originally referred to him, who, 'ignorant of the transcendent sound of the *ṛc* (probably *oṃ*)...cannot benefit from (reciting) the *ṛc*' and to those who 'knowing it, sit here together (*ta ime samāsate*)'. The verse, as it stood in the *Ṛgveda*, applied to the gatherings of priests uttering the syllable

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1. Cf. Hauschild, op. cit., p. 37 and n. 2.
2. Hauschild's translation: 'Man kennt keine andere Ursache für die Herrschaft (!!)'.

with a proper knowledge of both its ritual and its esoteric meaning. For the context of *ŚU* quotation the *bhāṣya* quite aptly suggests for *samāsate* the meaning *kṛtārthās tiṣṭhanti*, i.e. those who having mastered the Vedas may rest as those who have fulfilled all the action necessary for the attainment of their unification with the absolute[1].

1. Cf. for instance *ŚU* vi. 18.

ASPECTS OF ORIGINAL BUDDHISM

Hajime Nakamura

It is generally admitted that early Buddhist philosophy is set forth in the Pāli Nikāyas and their corresponding Chinese texts. But the Pāli Nikāyas themselves consist of various earlier and later layers which derive from different periods.

The Pāli language was a language of West India, apparently that of Avantī when the school (*Theravāda*) had its main centre in that country.

The *Theravāda Tripiṭaka*, now preserved in the Pāli language is certainly one of the most authentic, in the sense of trying to preserve the discourses of the Buddha in their wording as recognized probably before schisms[1].

But in the Buddhist texts there is no word that can be traced with unquestionable authority to Gotama Śākyamuni as a historical personage, although there must be some sayings or phrases derived from himself. So, selecting older parts among the voluminous scriptures of Early Buddhism, scholars of critical approach have tried to elucidate the true purport of the teachings of the Buddha, or what is closest to his virtual teachings.

In this sense we shall distinguish between (I) Original Buddhism and (II) Early Buddhism. The former can be known only from older portions of the Pāli scriptures, whereas the latter can be known chiefly from the most portions of the Pāli scriptures that are in common with Sanskrit and Chinese Āgamas.

According to text-critical studies it has been made clear that some (*Gāthā*) portions and some phrases represent earlier layers. They are *Gāthā*-s of the *Suttanipāta* (especially the *Aṭṭhaka-vagga* and the *Pārāyaṇa-vagga*), of the *Sagātha-vagga* of the *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, of the *Itivuttaka*-s, of some Jātakas, the *Udāna*-s in the scripture named the *Udāna*, and some

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1. Text-critical studies on the scriptures of early Buddhism were fully discussed by Hajime Nakamura in his *Genshi Bukkyō no Shisō* (=The thought of early Buddhism), vol. 2 (Tokyo, Shunjūsha Press, 1971).

Gāthā-s and sentences rewritten from *Gāthā*-s into prose. There must be some more. Based upon these portions of the scriptures we can construe aspects of original Buddhism. The picture which we can get therefrom is fairly different from that as we can get from the Pāli scriptures in general. That is to say, Buddhism, as appears in earlier portions of the scriptures, is fairly different from what is explained by many scholars as earlier Buddhism or primitive Buddhism. Main points are as follows:

(1) Those words or phrases which are regarded by scholars as peculiarly Buddhistic or what are said to be technical terms of Buddhism are seldom noticed in earlier *Gāthā* portions.

(2) What might be called 'dogmas' of Buddhism are seldom taught. Dogmas (*diṭṭhi*) of any religious or philosophical school are refuted. Rather sceptical attitude about dogmas is expressed. In this respect it was closer to the attitude of Sañjaya, the sceptic, and to the theory of *naya* (viewpoints) of early Jainism.

(3) A special kind of nuance which reminds us of later Buddhism is less; on the contrary those phrases and words which remind us of the Ājivaka religion and Jainism are often used. They are quite similar to those as are used in the edicts of King Aśoka. It means that many sentences in the prose sections of the Pāli scriptures were fixed after the reign of King Aśoka.

(4) Buddhist recluses lived lonely in solitude, chiefly in woods, forests and caves. Some monks lived together with their fellow ascetics (*sabrahmacārin*[1], *sādhivihārin*[2]). But the common livelihood of monks in monasteries (*vihāra*-s), as was conspicuous in later days, is scarcely mentioned.

(5) The life of Buddhist ascetics in its incipient stage was fairly different from the monastic life of monks in later days. It was quite close to the life of hermits as is mentioned in great epics, such as the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. In these epics ascetics are mentioned as hermits (*ṛṣi*-s), and in *Gāthā*-s of earlier texts of early Buddhism. Buddhist recluses or hermits are also referred to as *isi*-s (The Pāli form of the Sanskrit *ṛṣi*-s), whereas in the prose sections explaining *Gāthā*-s, the word *isi*-s disappears and the word *bhikkhu* is used in its place.

Many Buddhist recluses lived in huts thatched with straw (*kuṭi*, *kuṭikā*). A monk said, "I should lie down with a roof of thatch, like others in comfort'[3]. Another Buddhist recluse said :

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1. *Sabrahmacārin*, *DN.* vol. II, p. 27; vol. III, p. 241 ff.; 245; *MN.* vol. I, p. 101; *AN.* vol. II, p. 97; *Suttanipāta* 973; *Theragāthā* 387-392.
2. *Sādhiviharin*, *Sanchī Inscriptions*, ed. by Bühler, I, No. 209. This corresponds to the Pāli *saddhivihārin*.
3. *Theragāthā* 208.

> "My hut was made of three palm leaves on the bank of the Ganges. My bowl was only a funeral pot, my robe a rag from a dust-heap"[1].
>
> "I made a small hut in the forest, and I am vigilant, zealous, attentive, mindful"[2].

A monk named Sarabhaṅga said :

> "Having broken off reeds with my hands, having made a hut, I dwelt there; therefore, by common consent my name was Reed-breaker (=Sarabhaṅga)"[3].

The Jātaka conveys a story that in the past hermits (*isi*-s) lived in thatched huts (*paṇṇakuṭi, assama*) thatched with leaves[4]. The dwelling where Buddhist recluses lived were called *assama*. A very early poem which encourages donation of huts to recluses depicts the Buddhist life in a hut in its earliest stage :

> "An intelligent person, even if of low birth, should embody forbearance and meekness, act rightfully, and worship holy persons. He should make a comfortable and pleasant huts (*karaye assame ramme*).
>
> He should establish wells and springs in waste land, and roads in steep places, and give foods, beverages, foods to chew, clothes, beddings to rightful persons with faithful mind"[5].

The fact that early Buddhist recluses lived in huts can be evidenced from Jain sources also. Sāriputta, who was regarded as the representative ascetic of Buddhism by Jains, is said to have lived in a cosy abode (*assama*)[6].

In so far as early poems (*gāthā*-s) go, the above-mentioned way of life was predominent, but in due course of time the assertion that recluses need not spend such an incoveniant life appeared among Buddhist recluses. One of the persons who made such a set-out seems to have been Sāriputta. His saying is conveyed in a Jain work :

> "What use of forests and huts (*assama*) for the hero who has conquered his senses ?
>
> Wherever one feels happy, there one finds a forest.
>
> That place is also his hermitage.
>
> × × ×
>
> Medicines are useless for those whese diseases have been healed.
>
> × × ×

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1. *Ibid*. 127.
2. *Ibid*. 59.
3. *Ibid*. 487.
4. *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, vol. I, pp. 226-227, prose.
5. *Ibid*. I, p. 100 *Gātha*.
6. *Isibhāsiyāiṃ* 38.13.

For the one who has disciplined oneself well, forests or treasures (in villages) are vain.
The whole (world) is for his meditation"[1].

Sāriputta asserted that ascetics need not necessarily live in forests or hermitages. Based upon such an assertion ascetics came to live in villages, and finally in monasteries. Recluses became monks.

The term *vihāra* is mentioned in the *Suttanipāta* only once[2], but in this passage *vihāra* means just 'abode', not 'monastery'. In the *Theragāthā*[3] and the *Therīgāthā*[4] *vihāra* in the sense of 'monastery' is mentioned.

Early Buddhist recluses lived in forests, caves and practised meditation there, even in grave-yards. (They claimed themselves to be ***vanavāsin***-s, those who live in forests. This picture exactly corresponds to that given by Megasthenes, the Greek traveller to India around 300 B. C.)

(6) In the earliest stage of Buddhism nuns did not exist. Legend has it that it was with Mahāpajāpatī, Buddha's mother-in-law, that women took order to become nuns. However, it is likely that, when Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador sent to India by Seleucus, the king of Syria in about 300 B.C. came to the court of Candragupta, Buddhist nuns did exist, for Megasthenes relates with surprise that in India 'lady philosophers' existed. (It is almost certain that Jain nuns came into existence later than in Buddhism).

(7) When earlier *gāthā*-s were composed, the fully developed form of disciplines (*paṭimokkha*) as can be seen in the Pāli and Chinese versions of The Book of Discipline ***Vinaya-piṭaka***) did not exist, for it is not mentioned in entirety in *gāthā*-s, and ***patimokkha*** as is mentioned in the ***Suttanipāta*** is very simple.

To the question: "Which are the precepts and vows (*sīlabbātani*) for a resolute *bhikkhu*"?, the *Suttanipāta*[5] sets forth the regulations for the way of life, especially the diet and clothing, of *bhikkhu*-s.

In Buddhist literature in general ***sīlabbatāni*** were refuted as being set forth by other religions, but here they were set forth for Buddhist ascetics, which sounds very strange for those who have knowledge of Buddhist literature. This can be explained away only in

1. *Ibid.* 38, vv.13-15.
2. V.391.
3. 477.
4. 68; 115; 169 etc.
5. V.961.

this way. Early Buddhism in the process of formation did not have special technical terms peculiar to Buddhism; therefore, Buddhists used the term which was current throughout all religions, and was in common with other schools.

After describing regulations about dwelling, the *Suttanipāta* lays injunctions :

"Let him not commit theft,
let him not speak falsely,
let him touch friendly what is feeble or strong,
what he acknowledges to be the agitation of the mind, let him drive that off as a partisan of Kaṇha (i.e. Māra)[1].

This is substantially close to the teaching of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*[2].

Here we can find three among the five precepts of Buddhism, mentioned in the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* and the *Suttanipāta*. It means Buddhism inherited these precepts from early religions, and later systematized them in a fixed form.

"Let him not fall into the power of anger and arrogance; having dug up the root of these,

Let him live, and let him overcome both what is pleasant and what is unpleasant".

Jainism also teaches the same thing[3]. "(A monk) should forsake arrogance and anger" (*thaṃbham ca koham ca cae*)[4].

(8) Gotama, the Buddha, was looked upon as an excellent personage, and was not deified, but deification of Gotama, the Bhddha, was going to take shape gradually.

Buddhism is the teaching to have one become a Buddha, and also the teaching which was set forth by Buddha. But 'the teaching which was set forth by Buddha' does not necessarily mean 'the teaching which was set forth by Śākymuni'. Besides Śākyamuni there were many other Buddhas.

In Jain scriptures those who have perfected their religious practice are all called '*buddha*'.

A person who has attained enlightenment is called '*buddha*' in Jain scriptures also. Buddhism just inherited it.

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1. V.967.
2. III.17.4.
3. *Āyāraṅga*, I. 6. 1. 2 (ed. by Schubring, p. 27, 1.24); *Dasavesāliya* I.5.
4. *Dasavesāliya* IX.3.12.

According to the "Words of Sages" (*Isibhāsiyāiṃ*), a Jain scripture, non-Jain sages were also called '*buddha*', such as Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya, the Upaniṣadic philosophers, and some sages who appear in great epics. Before deification of Śākyamuni began, all excellent ascetics of Buddhism were called '*buddha*-s'.

For example, the term '*buddha*' in the *Suttanipāta*[1] means simply 'an excellent ascetic', not the glorified Buddha.

The term '*buddha*' did not mean a single person. Theoretically we are led to the conclusion that the teachings which enable us to become *buddha*-s could exist besides the teaching by Śākyamuni. It was only that they were not conveyed to posterity under the name of Buddhism (*Buddhasāsana, Bauddha*).

Devadatta is hated nearly in all Buddhist scriptures, although the teachings ascribed to him are contradictory to each other. This much was common to all versions of his legend : He was a dissenter, although he wanted to become a Buddha and to have others become Buddhas. He was also a Buddhist and established a Buddhist order, which continued to exist till later periods, and which differed with the Buddhist order of Śākyamuni. Fa-hien (4th century A. D.), the Buddhist pilgrim, when he travelled to Śrāvastī, found the Buddhist order residing there and worshipping the three Buddhas in the past, but not worshipping Śākyamuni[2]. Hausan-tsang relates that the monks of the Bundhist order of Devadatta, living in three monasteries, did not take milk and butter[3].

It is said that "they follow the posthumous teachings of Devadatta".

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1. 513; 517; 523; 622; 643; 646 etc.
2. "The Biography of Fa-hien the High Priest" (*Taisho Tripiṭaka*, vol. LI, p. 861 a).
3. "The Travel Records of Hsüan-tsang", vol. X (*Taisho Tripiṭaka*, vol. LI, p. 861 a).

ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ AS DIALECTIC

Harsh Narain

Much useful information about *Ānvīkṣikī* was collected by Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana, the first in our day to highlight the concept as a stage in the development of Indian logic. In the present paper, it is proposed to carry the research a little further and bring out certain other dimensions of concept and study it in the context of the Western concept of dialectic.

There have been various lines of development of the concept of dialectic among the Greeks. It appears to have had its roots in dialogue and rhetoric and soon emerged as procedure of discussion. Protagoras and Socrates turned it into what is called the Socratic Method, giving it the appearance of the destructive method of elenchus. Zeno, Plato, and Aristotle gave it the form of conversational thinking. In Plato and Aristotle, it appears more or less in three forms: logic, categoriology, and first philosophy. Zeno is also responsible for using it as *reduction ad absurdum* through conflict of thesis and antithesis. In Heraclitus, we find it in two rather well-defined forms: (1) atonceness of emergence and extinction and (2) identity, interpenetration, and strife of opposites. It is interesting to find that a line of development strikingly akin tq that in Greek thought of almost an identical concept of dialectic is traceable in Indian philosophy: Indian philosophy has evolved the concept of *Ānvīkṣikī* (literally, the science of enquiry), which admirably answers to the Zenonian–Platonic dialectic in almost all its important aspects.

The philosophical dialogues of the Upaniṣads and the *Mahābhārata* are important, though they may not be as relevant here as the Platonic dialogues. The Indian counterpart of the dialogues of Plato are the dialogues of the Buddha preserved in the Pāli canon. In the age of the Upaniṣads and the Dharma–Sūtras, dialogue, rhetoric or eristic was a recognized

discipline designated as *vākovākya*, one of the several sciences by Narada,[1] who is said to have been capable of reply and counter-reply (*uttarottara-Vaktā*) with even such an orator as Bṛhaspati, the precepter of the gods.[2] The science of eristic is also designated as *kathā*,[3] *vāda*,[4] and *sambhāṣā*.[5] *Kathā* is of three kinds : *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*.[6] Akṣapāda defines *vāda* as a truth hunting exercise,[7] in which sense it can be equated with the dialectic of Plato and Aristotle as distinguished from their 'eristic'; *jalpa* as a match-winning exercise,[8] in which sense it can be equated with the eristic of Plato and Aristotle ; and *vitaṇḍā* as a worse form of eristic, the parties to which try to get the better of each other without commitment to any position what ever,[9] in which sense it can be equated with sophistic or sophism in the Greek tradition. *Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are ostensibly prescribed for jealously guarding the truth like the hedge of thorns round sprouting seeds.[10] An early Buddhist logician also subscribes to this view.[11] Dharmakīrti, the leading Buddhist logician, sardonically remarks, however, that, if such a device is allowed, there is no reason to disallow physical duel and use of sword.[12] Jaina logicians dismiss *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as

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1. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (Gorakhpur : Gita Press), 7.1.2; वाकोवाक्येतिहासपुराणकुशल: *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra*, Narahari Shastri Talekara, ed., Anandashrama Sanskrit Series, No. 61 (4th impression, Pune : Anandashrama, 1966), 1.8.6.
2. *Mahābhārata* (Gorakhpur : Gita Press), *Sabhā-Parvan* 5.5.
3. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, published with *Nyāya-Sūtra*, Ganga Nath Jha, ed., Poona Oriental Series, No. 58 (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1939), 1.2.1.
4. *Upāyahṛdaya*, Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XLIX (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), pp. 3ff.
5. *Caraka-Saṁhitā*, Haradatta Shastri, ed. (Lahore: Motilal Banarsidass, 1940), *Vimāna-Sthāna*, 8.6.9-20.
6. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.2.1.
7. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.2.1.
8. *Ibid.* 1.2.2.
9. *Ibid.* 1.2.3.
10. *Ibid.* 4.2.50: तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे, बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत् ।
11. *Upāyahṛdaya*, p. 4: यथाऽऽम्रफलपरिपुष्टिकामेन तत्फलपरिरक्षणार्थं बहिर् बहुतीक्ष्णकण्टकनिकरविन्यास: क्रियते, वादारम्भोऽपि तथैवाधुना सद्धमरक्षणेच्छया, न तु ख्यातिलाभाय ।
12. तत्त्वसंरक्षणार्थं सद्भिरुपहर्तव्यमेव छलादिविजिगीषुभिरिति चेन्, नख-चपेट-शस्त्रप्रहारादीपनादिभिरपीति वक्तव्यम् । तस्मान् न ज्यायानयं तत्त्वरक्षणोपाय: ।
Dharmakīrti, *Vādanyāya*, Rahula Sankrityayana, ed. (Sarnath: Mahabodhi Sabha, 1936), p. 71.

pseudo-dialectic (*kathābhāsa*).[1] It appears that sacrificial ceremonies provided a suitable occasion for eristical feats. In the horse-sacrifice performed by Yudhiṣṭhira, eristicians vied with each other in trying to emerge victorious in the eristical matches.[2]

Caraka deals with *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā* in a similar vein.[3] He uses the terms '*sandhāya-sambhāṣā*' (peaceful discussion) and '*vigṛhya-sambhāṣā*' (hostile discussion) in the sense of dialectic and eristic, *vāda* and *jalpa-vitaṇḍā*, respectively.[4] 'The physician should enter into disputation with the physician', he enjoins.[5]

The disputation consists of three processes : thesis (*sthāpanā*), antithesis (*ākṣepa* or *prati-sthāpanā*), and synthesis (*siddhānta*).[6]

In several ancient texts, the king is required to master four sciences : *Ānvīkṣikī*, *Trayī* (Vedic studies), *Vārtā* (political economy), and *Daṇḍa-Nīti* (polity)[7]. It is traditioned that these four sciences were duly dealt with in a 1600-chapters long treatise composed by Brahman (masculine) or Prajāpati in order to inaugurate a new age (*yuga*).[8] Any way, *Ānvīkṣikī* is often described as *Nyāya-Vidyā*, *Hetu-Vidyā* or *Tarka-Vidyā* (science of logic, reasoning, or eristic),[9] in which sense it comes under fire in extra-logical literature. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Rāma suggests that the secularist-Brāhmaṇas given to *Ānvīkṣikī* are prattlers, who disregard even the chief religious codes.[10] In the *Mahā-*

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1. See, for example, Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya*, published with auto-commentary and Anantavīrya's *Siddhiviniścaya-Ṭīkā*, Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya, ed., Jañanapitha Murtidevi Jaina Granthamala, Sanskrit Works, No. 22 (Varanasi: Bharatiya Jñanapitha, 1959), 5.2.
2. तस्मिन् यज्ञे प्रवृत्ते तु वाग्मिनो हेतुवादिनः ।
   हेतुवादान् बहूनाहुः परस्परजिगीषवः ॥ *Mahābhārata, Āśvamedhika-Parvan* 85.27.
3. *Caraka-Saṁhitā, Vimāna-Sthāna* 8.28.
4. *Ibid.* 8.15 ff.
5. *Ibid.* 8.14.
6. *Ibid.* 8.31, 32, 37; *Mahābhārata, Ādi-Parvan* 70.44.
7. *Manu-Smṛti*, Gopal Shastri Nene, ed., Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 114 (Varanasi Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1935), 7.43; *Artha-Śāstra*, R. Shama Sastri, ed. (Mysore: Government Branch Press, 1924), 1.2.1; *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 59.33; 318.34-35, 47. Cf. *Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra* 2.2.3.
8. *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 59.29, 33.
9. आन्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1; आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्याम्—। *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 180.47; *Anuśāsana-Parvan* 37.12. Cf. न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस् तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः *Śānti-Parvan* 210.22.
10. कच्चिन् न लोकायतिकान् ब्राह्मणांस् तात ! सेवसे ?
    अनर्थकुशला ह्येते बालाः पण्डितमानिनः ॥

bhārata, Indra confesses to Kāśyapa that he came to be a jackal by being given up to the useless science of reasoning called *Ānvikṣikī*, insinuating against the Vedas, and doubting everything.[1] Manu condemns the subjection of religion to insult through the science of reasoning (*hetu-śāstra*).[2] He also rules that eristicians must not be honoured even by lip-service.[3] He will permit only such '*tarka*' (logic) as is in consonance with the Vedas and other scriptures.[4] Vyāsa forbids teaching of Sāṅkhya to those burnt down by the science of logic.[5] He reports, however, that Yudhiṣṭhira sated with pleasures even the wretched logicians (*tarkakān api*),[6] the adverb 'even' suggesting that it was an act of grace or condescension on his part to include the logicians among his beneficiaries.

Incidentally, here the term '*tarka*' does not appear to stand for the special form of reasoning, sometimes translated as dialectical reasoning, such as in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* :

धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः ।
बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते ।।
Rāmāyaṇa, Shivarama Sharma Vasishtha, ed., Vidyabhavana Sanskrit Series, No. 28 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, 1957), 2.100.38-39.

1. अहमासं पण्डितको, हैतुको, वेदनिन्दकः ।
आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थिकाम् ।।
हेतुवादान् प्रवदिता, वक्ता संसत्सु हेतुमत् ।
आक्रोष्टा, चाभिवक्ता च, ब्रह्मवाक्येषु च द्विजान् ।।
नास्तिकः, सर्वशङ्की च, मूर्खः, पण्डितमानिकः ।
तस्येयं फलनिर्वृत्तिः शृगालत्वं मम द्विज ।।
Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan 180.47-49.

2. योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद् द्विजः ।
स साधुभिर् बहिष्कार्यः नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ।।
Manu-Smṛti 2.11.

3. पाषण्डिनो, विकर्मस्थान्, वैडालव्रतिकाञ्छठान् ।
हैतुकान्, बकवृत्तींश् च वाङ्मात्रेणापि नार्चयेत् ।।
Ibid. 4.30.

4. *Ibid.* 12.106. Cf. *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 269.52, condemning '*vāda*'.

5. न तर्कशास्त्रदग्धाय··· । *Mahābhārata, Śānti-Parvan* 248.18.

6. *Ibid.* 45.6.

'*Tarka* is the reasoning suggestive of proof calculated to yield knowledge of the true character of a thing, when the true character of the thing is not (already) known.'[1] On the contrary, it stands for the whole process of reasoning of which the '*tarka*' of the *Nyāya-Sūtra* is but one variety. It is more or less in this wider sense that the term is used in the *Brahma-Sūtra* : '*Tarka* is instable'[2] In demonstration of the instability of *tarka*, Śaṅkara examines the three means of knowledge—perception, inference, scripture, thereby suggesting that the term '*tarka*' covers the entire range of logic and epistemology.[3] It is interesting to note, incidentally, that Veṅkaṭanātha[4] and Jayatīrtha[5] regard '*tarka*' or '*yukti*' as a species of inference (*anumāna*) and Caraka[6] and the Jainas[7] accord to it the status of an independent means of knowledge. Yāska narrates an interesting tradition that, when the tribe of the seers was on the verge of extinction, they installed '*tarka*' as their substitute, to guide mankind.[8] Here '*tarka*' acquires its widest sense of philosophy.

We have demonstrated elsewhere how Plato's dialectic becomes co-extensive with philosophy. *Ānvīkṣikī*, too, has had a similiar history. Manu seems to equate or identify it with '*ātma-vidyā*', the science of the self, while enumerating it among the four sciences the king is required to study.[9] Kauṭilya and Kāmandaka report the followers of Manu

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1. *Nyāya.Sūtra* 1.1.40.
2. तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्··· । *Brahma-Sūtra*, with *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya, Bhāmatī*, etc., Mahadeva Shastri Bakre and Wasudev Laxman Shastri Panshikar, eds. (3rd ed , Bombay: Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1934), 2.1.11.
3. *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 2.1.11.
4. See Sitansusekhar Bagchi, *Inductive Reasoning*: A Study of Tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic (Calcutta: Sri Munshichandra Sinha, 1953), p. 106.
5. *Ibid.* p. 79.
6. *Caraka-Saṁhiā, Sūtra-Sthāna* 11.7, 18.
7. See, for example, Māṇikyanandin, *Parīkṣāmukha-Sūtra* (with Prabhāchandra's *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*), Mahendra Kumar Shastri, eds. (2nd ed., Bombay: Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1941), 2.1-2; 3.1-2.
8. *Nirukta*. V. K. Rajavade, ed , Anandashrama Sanskrit Series, No. 88, Vol. I (Poona: Anandashrama, 1926), 13.12.
9. Manu's words are, to give the reading that commends itself to us most, viz. the reading of Uddyotakara in *Nyāya-Vārtika*, Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi, ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1916), 1.1.1, p. 12 :

   त्रैविद्येभ्यस् त्रयीं विद्याद्, दण्डनीतिं च तद्विदः ।
   आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्मविद्भ्यो, वार्तारम्भांश् च लोकतः ॥

   Manu-Smṛti 7.43.

(*Mānavāḥ*) to hold that *Ānvikṣiki* is a branch of the Vedic studies.[1] Here '*Ānvīkṣiki*' seems to refer to what is called Vedānta or Upaniṣad, which deals with the science of the self. Kāmandaka does define '*Ānvikṣikī*' as '*Ātma-vijñanā*'.[2] The *Śukra-Nīti* follows suit, substituting '*Ātma-vidyā*' for '*Ātma-vijñānā*'.[3] Indeed, it subsumes the Vedānta, too, under '*Ānvīkṣiki*'.[4]

The signification of the term '*Ānvīkṣikī*' is further widened when it is made co-extensive with philosophy (including methodology and metaphysics) almost in so many words. It is in this sense that Kauṭilya appears to use the term when he remarks that *Ānvīkṣiki* is Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata.[5] But why, if '*Ānvıkṣiki*' means philosophy, does Kauṭilya, instead of giving an exhaustive list of the schools of philosophy, mention only three schools, not caring to mention even Vedānta and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools ?

It appears that, till the age of Kauṭilya, Vedānta had not developed as a school independent of Sāṅkhya, of which it formed part originally. Even the *Bhagavad-Gitā*, regarded technically as a source-book of Vedānta, mentions only two supreme paths of

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1. त्रयी, वार्ता, दण्डनीतिश्चेति मानवा: । त्रयीविशेषो ह्यान्वीक्षिकीति ।

Artha-Śāstra 1.2.2-3;

त्रयी, वार्ता दण्डनीतिरिति विद्या हि मानवा: ।
त्रय्या एव विभागोऽयं सेयमान्वीक्षिकी मता ॥

Kāmandakīya-Nītisāra, Jwala Prasad Mishra, ed. (Bombay: Shri Venkateshvara Steam Press, 1874 Śākā), 2.3.

2. आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविज्ञानं धर्माधर्मौ त्रयीस्थितौ ।
अर्थानर्थौ तु वार्तायां, दण्डनीतौ नयानयौ ॥
आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविद्या स्यादीक्षणात् सुखदु:खयो: ।
ईक्षमाणस् तया तत्त्वं हर्षशोकौ व्युदस्यति ।

Kāmandakīya-Nitisāra 2.7, 11.

3. आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविज्ञानाद्धर्षशोकौ व्युदस्यति ।

Śukra-Nīti, Mihirchandra, ed. (Bombay: Shri Venkateshvara Steam Press, 2312 V). It appears to be a modern text, however. See Lallanji Gopal, *The Śukranīti : A Nineteenth Century Text* (Varanasi: Bharati Prakashan, 1978), 1.57.

4. आन्वीक्षिक्यां तर्कशास्त्रं वेदान्ताद्यं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।

Ibid. 1.152.

5. साङ्ख्यं, योगो, लोकायतं चेत्यान्वीक्षिकी ।

Artha-Śāstra 1.2.10,

salvation, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, omitting Vedānta altogether.[1] Indeed, it itself cites a *Brahma-Sūtra*, apparently different from the *Brahma-Sūtra* ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa, as setting out the theory of the self akin to the Sāṅkhya theory.[2] Yes, the *Gītā*'s ***Brahma-Sūtra*** cannot be the *Brahma-Sūtra* we have, for the patent reason that the latter does not set out such a theory. Besides, the extant *Brahma-Sūtra* is ascribable to Bādarāyaṇa rather than to Vyāsa, the putative author of the *Mahābhārata* including the *Gītā*, which it refers to as authorities. Two examples should suffice. The *Sūtra* describing the self as part of the Absolute[3] appears clearly to refer to the *Gītā* text to that effect.[4] Likewise, in the *Sūtra* 'And they do remember' (*Smaranti ca*),[5] it is authorities like Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*, that are referred to, as held by Śaṅkara, for example.[6] Indeed, it is the way of Śaṅkara to quote the *Mahābhārata* and the *Gītā* as '*smṛti*-s', in particular, on behalf of the author of the *Sūtra*-s. So Vyāsa is an authority for Bādarāyaṇa and, accordingly, different from him. Naturally, therefore, the *Gītā's*

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1. लोकेऽस्मिन् द्विविधा निष्ठा पुरा प्रोक्ता मयाऽनघ ।
ज्ञानयोगेन साङ्ख्यानां कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम् ॥
Bhagavad-Gītā (Gita Press), 3.3.

2. तत् क्षेत्रं, यच्च यादृक् च, यद् विकारि, यतश्च यद् ।
स च यो यत्प्रभावश्च तत् समासेन मे शृणु ॥
ऋषिभिर् बहुधा गीतं छन्दोभिर् विविधैः पृथक् ।
ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव हेतुमद्भिर् विनिश्चयैः ॥
महाभूतान्यहङ्कारो बुद्धिरव्यक्तमेव च ।
इन्द्रियाणि दशैकं च पञ्च चेन्द्रियगोचराः ॥ Etc. *Ibid.* 13.3-5.

3. अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्··· ।
Brahma-Sūtra 2.3.43.

4. ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः ।
मनःषष्ठानीन्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति ॥
Gītā 15.7.

5. स्मरन्ति च ।
Brahma-Sūtra 2.3.47.

6. With the remark, स्मरन्ति च व्यासादयो यथा जैवेन दुःखेन न परमात्मा दुःखायत इति, Śaṅkara quotes the following text from the *Mahābhārata*, *Śānti-Parvan* 351.14-16:
तत्र यः परमात्मा हि स नित्यो निर्गुणः स्मृतः ।
न लिप्यते फलैश्चापि पद्मपत्रमिवाम्भसा ॥
कर्मात्मा त्वपरो योऽसौ मोक्षबन्धैः स युज्यते ।
स सप्तदशकेनापि राशिना युज्यते पुनः ॥
Śārīraka-Bhāṣya 2.3.47.

Brahma-Sūtra is different from the extant *Brahma-Sūtra*. Pāṇini refers to a *Bhikṣu-Sūtra* by a Pārāśarya.[1] This Pārāśarya is identifiable with the Pārāśarya Bhikṣu Pañcaśikha referred to as such and as the preceptor of Janaka in the *Mahābhārata*.[2] May be, he was the author of the *Brahma-Sūtra* referred to in the *Gītā*.

Now, the 'Yoga' referred to by Kauṭilya is usually considered the Yoga system allied to the Sāṅkhya and represented by the *Yoga-Sūtra* ascribed to Patañjali. Kuppuswami Sastri maintains that it stands for the Vaiśeṣika logic and that the word 'Lokāyata' used by Kauṭilya stands for the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika logic in its secularized form and as distinguished from its Vedic associations.[3] He does not indicate the basis, however, for such an interpretation of 'Lokāyata'. Distinguishing this 'Lokāyata' from the materialist system of Cārvāka, he contends that 'the view of the Cārvāka materialist is separately mentioned in a previous part of the same chapter and Kauṭilya rejects it and is not prepared to bring the Cārvāka doctrine under any recognized *vidyā* or branch of learning,[4] This statement does seem to have force. Kauṭilya mentions '*Bārhaspatyāḥ*' (Cārvāka materialists) and their rejection of the Vedas.[5] Their doctrine cannot come under '*Ānvīkṣikī*', for the simple reason that they reject the Vedas, whereas *Ānvīkṣikī* is, according to him, part of the Vedic studies. Rightly, therefore, Kauṭilya nowhere suggests that his 'Lokāyata' refers to the Cārvāka materialists called '*Bārhaspatyāḥ*'.

As a matter of fact, there is reason to believe that there was also a Vedic Lokāyata (ascribed to the same Bṛhaspati, however), as suggested in the *Maṇimekhalai*.[6] It is noteworthy that 'Lokāyata' finds place in the list of the accomplishments of learned

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1. पराशर्यशिलालिभ्यां भिक्षु–नट–सूत्रयोः । *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Brahmadatta Jijñāsu, ed., Shri Ramlal Kapur Trust Granthamala, No. 24 (7th ed., Bahalgarh: Ramlal Kapur Trust, 1971), 4.3.110.

2. पराशरसगोत्रस्य वृद्धस्य सुमहात्मनः ।
भिक्षोः पञ्चशिखस्याहं शिष्यः परमसम्मतः ॥
Mahābhārata, *Śānti-Parvan* 320.24.

3. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṅgraha* (2nd ed., Mylapore: Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, 1951), pp. xviii, xvi.

4. *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

5. वार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति बार्हस्पत्याः । संवरणमात्रं हि त्रयी लोकयात्राविद इति ।
Artha-Śāstra 1.2.4-5 :

6. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, *Maṇimekhalai in Its Historical Setting* (London : Luzac & Co., 1928), pp. 67, 92.

Brāhmaṇa-s in the *Mahābhārata*[1] as well as in the Pāli canon.[2] The term as used in the latter literature is interpreted to mean critical reasoning (*vitaṇḍā-vāda-sattham*) in the *Aṭṭha-Kathā*, though, as pointed out by Rhys Davids, it is complimentary rather than derogatory. He interprets it to mean 'Nature-lore-wise sayings, riddles, rhymes'.[3] According to G. Tucci, however, it is not '*loka*' but '*bhājana-loka*' in the Pāli canon which signifies 'nature'.[4] The *Saṁyutta-Nikāya* lists the Lokāyata doctrines as follows : (1) All is (*sabbam atthi ti*) ; (2) All is not (*sabbam natthi ti*) ; (3) All is one (*sabbam ekattaṁ ti*) ; and (4) All is separate/different (*sabbam puthuttaṁ ti*).[5] According to the *Aṭṭha-Kathā*, the first and third represent eternalism (*sassata-diṭṭhiyo*), while the second and the third nihilationism (*uccheda-diṭṭhiyo*).[6] The second adumbrates Dīghanakha's view,[7] seemingly revived by Jayarāśi.[8] The *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra* lists thirty-one kinds of Lokāyata doctrines, including the foregoing.[9]

Well, the *Maṇimekhalai* again. There is no reason why, as held by others, the teacher of the gods, the putative founder of Lokāyata, should found an anti-Vedic school of philosophy. The same treatise refers to Buddhism, too, as Vedic, which is not wholly unfounded. Aside from the patent fact that the Buddha is accepted by the Hindus as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, there is not a wholly incredible tradition that there was a veritable *Śākhā* of the Vedas, called *Nimitta-Śākhā*, which was once interpreted to refer to the Buddha as omniscient.[10]

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1. *Mahābhārata, Ādi-Parvan* 70.46.
2. *Dīgha-Nikāya*, Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, ed., Nalanda-Devanagari-Pali-Series (Nalanda: Pali Publication Board, 1958), *Sīlakkhandha-Vagga, Brahmajāla Sutta*, p. 11; *Sāmaññaphala-Sutta*, p. 61; *Majjhima-Nikāya*, ed. cit., *Brahmāyu-Sutta*, pp. 382, 390; *Sela-Sutta*, p. 397; *Assalāyatana-Sutta*, p. 403; *Caṅkī-Sutta*, pp. 429, 432; *Saṅgārava-Sutta*, p. 483; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya*, ed cit., *Nidāna-Vagga, Nidāna-Saṁyutta, Lokāyatika-Sutta*, pp. 65-66; *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, ed. cit., *Navaka-Nipāta, Mahāvagga, Lokāyatika-Sutta*, p. 66; *Sutta-Nipāta*, ed. cit., *Mahāvagga, Sela-Sutta*, p. 354.
3. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. 49.
4. *Loc. cit.*
5. *Saṁyutta-Nikāya, Nidāna-Vagga, Nidāna-Saṁyutta, Lokāyatika-Sutta*, pp. 65-66.
6. Jayatilleke, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
7. *Majjhima-Nikāya, Majjhima-Paṇṇāsaka, Dīghanakha-Sutta*, pp. 193-195.
8. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, Sukhlal Sanghavi and Rasiklal C. Parikh, eds., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LXXXVII (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1940).
9. *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, P. L. Vaidya, ed., Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 3 (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1963), pp. 71-72.
10. *Tattvasaṅgraha*, with *Pañjikā*, Dvarikadas Shastri, ed., Bauddha-Bharati Granthamala, No. 2 (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968), 3510 ff.

There also appears to be some force in Kuppuswami's interpretation of the term 'Yoga' used in Kauṭilya's passage quoted above. It is evident that the *Gītā*'s 'Yoga' cannot be the Yoga system represented by Patañjali, which has nothing to do with the path of action (*karma-yoga*) as opposed to the path of knowledge (*jñāna-yoga*) ascribed to Sāṅkhya. The *Gītā* makes it clear that Sāṅkhya enjoins the path of knowledge and Yoga, the path of action.[1] In the *Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā*, the term 'Yoga', as juxtaposed to 'Sāṅkhya', appears to signify *karma-yoga*, broadly speaking.[2] Another source from which light can be had on this issue is the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. It says that, according to Sāṅkhya, nothing can come out of nothing, that what exists cannot be reduced to nothingness, that intelligences are unmodifiable, that modification belongs to the objects—the body, the senses, and the monad (*manas*)—as also to their causes. He adds that, according to Yoga, the elemental creation is due to the acts of man etc., that imperfections and conations are the cause of action, that intelligences are endowed with their own respective attributes, that the non-existent comes into existence and that the existent is reduced to non-existence.[3] Here Vātsyāyana unmistakably identifies Yoga with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Indeed, Raghūttama, a modern Naiyāyika, identifies Vātsyāyana's 'Yoga' with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with the remark, 'Yoga is *yukti* (reasoning), or *tarka* (logic)'.[4] It is also interesting to note that Rājaśekhara uses the term 'Yoga' as a synonym for Śaiva philosophy,[5] which, however, covers the entire Nyāya school excluding the Vaiśeṣika school, which he chooses to call the Pāśupata school and describes as akin to the Yoga

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1. *Gītā* 3.3.
2. निष्कर्माणः स्मृताः साङ्ख्याः प्रसङ्ख्यानैकतत्पराः ।
   नित्यनैमित्तिकैर् युक्तो योगो योगाङ्गवाञ्छया ॥
   कुर्यादलब्धलाभाय लब्धवृद्धाय एव च ।
   ब्रह्मिष्ठो वैदिकं कर्म नित्यं नैमित्तिकं तथा ॥
   Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā, M. D. Ramanujacharya, ed. (Madras : Adyar Library, 1916), 15.24-25.
3. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.1.29.
4. योगो युक्तिस्तर्कः, प्रधानतया येषां ते योगाः । Raghūttama, *Bhāṣyacandra*, Ganga Nath Jha and Dhundhiraja Shastri, eds. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1925), 1.1.29, p. 133.
5. अथ योगमतं ब्रूमः शैवमित्यपराभिधम् । Rājaśekhara, *Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya* Vijaya Bhupendra Suri, ed., Bhupendra Suri Jaina Sahitya No. 10 (Ahor: Bhupendra Suri Jaina Sahitya Samiti, 1943), 84.

school.[1] It appears that the tradition of a *Yoga-Śāstra* having been written by Śiva or Maheśvara[2] is well based and that the treatise set out a philosophy covering Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. This *Yoga-Śāstra* might have been different from the *Yoga-Śāstra* produced by Hiraṇyagarbha[3], the putative prototype of the *Yogā-Sūtra* ascribed to Patañjali. In fact the ***Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā*** speaks of two Yoga-Saṁhitā-s, one dealing with the science of control (of the mind)—***nirodha-yoga***—and the other with the science of works (***karma-yoga***), though it ascribes both to Hiraṇyagarbha.[4] From Haribhadra Sūri and Praśastapāda it is gathered that Śiva is the supreme deity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.[5] Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra says that there was an older ***Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*** written by Śiva.[6] Even the extant ***Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*** is reported to have been proclaimed to Kapila by Śiva in the form of an owl.[7] Indeed in the *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha*, Maheśvara is the supreme deity.[8]

So, in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, Yoga appears to stand for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or some kindred school of philosophy. The 'Yoga' of the *Gitā*, too, is different from the Yoga system

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1. अथ वैशेषिकं ब्रूमः शैवमित्यपराभिधम् । *Ibid.* 113.
   अक्षपादेन ऋषिणा रचितत्वात् तु यौगिकम् ॥ *Ibid.* 131.
2. ···माहेश्वरं योगशास्त्रम्··· । Bhāsa, *Pratimā-Nāṭaka*, S. Rangachar, ed. (2nd ed., Mysore : Sanskrit Sahitya Sadan, 1968), Act V, p. 51.
3. हिरण्यगर्भो योगस्य वक्ता नान्यः पुरातनः ।
   Mahābhārata, Śanti-Parvan 349.65.
4. आदौ हिरण्यगर्भेण द्वे प्रोक्ते योगसंहिते ।
   एका निरोधयोगाख्या कर्मयोगाह्वयाऽपरा ॥
   Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā 12.32.33.
5. आक्षपादमते देवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिवः ।
   विभुर् नित्यैकसर्वज्ञो नित्यबुद्धिसमाश्रयः ॥ Haribhadra Sūri, *Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya*, Goswami Damodara Shastri, ed , Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 95 (Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1929), 13;
   देवताविषये भेदो नास्ति नैयायिकैः समम् । *Ibid.* 59; सकलभुवनपतेर् महेश्वरस्य··· । *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha*, Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraja Shastri, eds., Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 3 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. 1924-31), p. 20.
6. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, *Kaṇāda-Sūtra-Nibandha*, cited in Anantalal Thakur, 'Bhaṭṭa-Vādīndra—the Vaiśeṣika', *JOI*, Baroda, X, No. 1.
7. Thakur, *Loc. cit.*
8. *Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha*, pp. 20-22.

represented by Patañjali. It appears to be one of the two chief dimensions of an identity, of which the other dimension is Sāṅkhya in the *Gītā* sense of the term.

Thus, Kauṭilya's statement, that *Ānvikṣiki* consists of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata, is capable of being construed to cover almost all the chief schools of orthodox Indian philosophy—'Sāṅkhya' standing for Vedānta, later Sāṅkhya, and later Yoga; Yoga, for some now undecipherable system of which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika might be an offshoot; and Lokāyata, for the Vedic prototype of the later Lokāyata schools. The Pāñcarātra and allied schools are covered by the expression 'Sāṅkhya', without which they are unthinkable. The Śaiva and Pāśupata schools appear to have been subsumed under 'Yoga'. Pūrva Mīmāṁsā does not then seem to have developed into an independent system of philosophy, which is why it is left out of account. Therefore, the '*Ānvīkṣikī*' of Kauṭilya is philosophy in the usual sense of the term.

It is in this vein, to be sure, that Kauṭilya waxes lyrical about *Ānvīkṣikī* : '*Ānvīkṣiki* is ever the lamp of all the sciences, the clue to all works, the ground of all merit.'[1] This verse is quoted by Vātsyāyana, with a slight variation just to indicate that it is a quotation.[2] It is bound to remind one of Plato's dialectic which he describes as 'the coping-stone of the sciences' and as 'set over them'.[3] In the same vein, he asserts that dialectic and 'dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principles and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of soul, which is really buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and in this work she uses as hand-maids and helpers the sciences which we have been discussing.'[4] Indeed, like '*Ānvikṣiki*', Plato's dialectic is 'the study of all wisdom whatever'.[5]

The verse referred to above, incidentally, also serves to throw into relief the practical character of the Indian concept of philosophy. In fact, the Cārvāka materialists and pan-

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1. प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
   आश्रयः सर्वधर्मणां शश्वदान्वीक्षिकी मता ॥
   Artha-Śāstra 1.2.12.
2. प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
   आश्रयः सर्वधर्मणां विद्योद्देशे प्रकीर्तिता ॥
   Nyāya-Bhāṣya 1.1.1.
3. Plato, *Philebus*, *The Dialogues of Plato*, B. Jowett, tr. (4th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 534e.
4. Plato, *Republic*, ed. cit, above, 533 c-d.
5. *Ibid.*475, 486a.

negativists are dubbed mere wranglers just because their schools are far from conducive to higher life.[1]

Rājaśekhara divides *Ānvīkṣikī* into the question-side (*pūrva-pakṣa*) and the answer side (*uttara-pakṣa*), placing Jainism, Buddhism, and Lokāyata in the first and Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika in the second category, and giving them all the common name of 'six logics or dialectics (*ṣaṭ-tarkāḥ*)'.[2] This description of *Ānvīkṣikī* leaves no doubt whatever that *Ānvīkṣikī* means what dialectic means to Plato and Aristotle—eristic, logic, and philosophy, all together.

The subject matter of *Ānvīkṣikī* is twofold : *Ātman* (the Self) and *Tarka* (logic and epistemology). Hence it is more than either *ātma-vidyā* or *tarka-śāstra*. As *ātma-vidyā*, it is identifiable with the Upaniṣad or the above-noted schools into which the Upaniṣadic thought came to be crystallized; as *tarka-śāstra*, it is condemned by the scriptures. Vātsyāyana remarks that, without setting out reasoning, dealt with in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* under fourteen heads, in the table of sixteen categories minus the first two, *Ānvīkṣikī* would run the risk of being reduced to the status of the science of the Self like the Upaniṣad.[3] Uddyotakara adds that the science of the Self, like the Upaniṣad, is included in the first science, the Vedas.[4] This, too, serves to confirm our view that *Ānvīkṣikī* is co-extensive with philosophy. In a way, it may also be said to be akin to Hegel's Logic which comprises formal logic as well as ontology.

Thus, like the dialectic of Plato and Aristotle, our dialectic designated as *Ānvīkṣikī* starts its career as eristic and ends as philosophy.

Ānvīkṣikī came later to be styled '*Nyāya*' which, originally, was not a monopoly of the Naiyāyikas but was used by logicians of all the schools of philosophy. Gradually, however, it came to be more and more pinned down to the school of the Naiyāyikas. Indeed, as is evident from its use in the *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra*, it clearly refers to Pūrva Mīmāṁsā rather than to the system of the Naiyāyikas.[5] Āpastamba, who is almost as

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1. न हि लोकायते किञ्चित् कर्तव्यमुपदिश्यते ।
वैतण्डिककथैवासौ न पुनः कश्चिदागमः ।।
Nyāya-Mañjarī, Suryanarayana Shukla, ed., Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 106 (Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1936), *Pramāṇa-Prakaraṇa*, p. 247.

2. द्विधा चान्वीक्षिकी, पूर्वोत्तरपक्षाभ्याम् । अर्हद्—भदन्त—दर्शने लोकायतं च पूर्वपक्षः, साङ्ख्यं न्यायवैशेषिकौ चोत्तरः । त इमे षट् तर्काः ।
Rājaśekhara, *Kāvya-Mīmāṁsā*, Kedar Nath Saraswat, ed. (2nd ed., Patna: Bihar Rashtra-Bhasha Parishad, 1965), chapter 2, pp. 10-11. The omission of Pūrva and Uttara-Mimāṁsā (Vedānta) is significant.

3. *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1, p. 3.

4. *Nyāya-Vārtika* 1.1.1, p. 12.

5. *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra*, George Bühler, ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. XLIV and L (1932), 2.4.8.13; 2.6.14.13.

old as Plato, appears to be aware of both the Pūrva-and the Uttara-Mīmāṁasā systems.[1]

Satish Chandra Vidybhusana and Rahula Sāṅkṛtyayana talk of the Greek origin of Indian dialectic and logic. But there is no warrant for such an assertion. The term '*Nyāya*', in the sense of logic, appears to be known to Pāṇini, who was anterior to Aristotle, the father of Western logic. In one of his *Sūtra*-s, '*nyāya*' means 'propriety;'[2] in another, it is derived and given the meaning 'propriety' (*abhreṣa*),[3] and, in a third, it is sought to be derived again.[4] In the last *Sūtra*, the term must signify something else, as otherwise it would be superfluous, which is unthinkable of the *Sūtra*-thrifty Pāṇini. This circumstance lends support to the view, originally put forward by Theodor Goldstücker,[5] that here '*nyāya*' means 'logic' or 'syllogistic reasoning'.

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1. See Bühler, *Sacred Laws*, *SBE*, *Āpastamba*, Introduction, p. xxvii,
2. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.4.92, read with the *Gaṇa* to *Sūtra* 4.3.54.
3. *Ibid* 3.3.37.
4. *Ibid*. 3.3.122.
5. Theodor Goldstücker, *Pāṇini* (1st Indian ed., Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1965), pp. 166-167.

ABOUT JAPA

Andre Padoux

Intellectuals are always looking for ideas, for reasons, or systems. They do not simply accept a fact as it is; they try to discover some new idea from it and fit it into a system. Indologists are generally intellectuals. Hence so many theories and often arbitrary intellectual constructions. Wise is he who prefers to discover new facts, accumulate knowledge and leave to others these brilliant theories that are so amusing to concoct, and fascinating to read, but which, quite often, are arbitrary, and will remain so as long as factual knowledge in the history of Indian philosophy, religion and culture is not greater and surer than now. Prof. Sternbach is, I believe, counted among the wise, and to be congratulated for it. Whereas the present writer...(entertains at least no illusions on the value of theories !).

But about *japa* : what theory can one build up on the subject ? and, first, what is *japa* ?

Vidhānena mantroccāraṇam, answers *Śabdakalpadruma* and goes on to quote several texts describing how to do it : we need not expatiate on these practical details, but let us remark that to define *japa* thus is to say the essential in a nutshell—and also to leave the English-speaking western indologist confronted with the whole problem, which lies not with the rules or prescriptions (*vidhāna*) for doing *japa*, but in the simple compound *mantroccāraṇa*. For : what is a *mantra*, and what is *uccāraṇa* ? Or, rather, what aspects can both *mantra* and *uccāra* take when combined in the practice of *japa* ? As long as one uses these Sanskrit terms, one remains on comparatively easy ground. But if we try to translate them, we are confronted with the whole problem : (1) what is a *mantra* and/or what can be considered as *mantra* when *japa* is practised ? and (2) what is *uccāra* ?

Japa is often translated by muttering, whispering or repeating (in a murmuring tone) but those are inadequate and vague translations, which leave aside all that is specific in *japa*. It is also sometimes translated by prayer but this, I believe, is misleading : though a spiritual activity, *japa* is not exactly a prayer. It is in effect a recitation of

Vedic texts, or a repetition of some ***mantra*** or (in the case of tantric ***japa***) a kind of Yogic practice involving mastery of the ***prāṇa***[1] : the purely mnemonic, the textual or sometimes the purely repetitive, as well as the Yogic purāṇic and mantric aspects of ***japa***, put it is an altogether different category from prayer. Of course, one must also acknowledge the fact that ***japa*** of the name of a deity, or of its ***mantra***, for example, as so often prectised nowadays, is a prayer. But if one keeps—as we shall do in this indological paper—to relatively ancient texts (pauranic, tantric and the like)[2], most of the ***japa*** therein prescribed[3] cannot reasonably be described as prayer. Admittedly, prayer is not only an outpouring of the heart : in all traditions, one finds ritual prayer : "a fixed formula which people recite without feeling or mood of devotion, untouched both in heart and mind" (to use F. Heiler's questionable definition)[4]. But ***japa*** is not only that sort of ritual activity. It comprises also of all the forms of mantric utterances which fall within the scope of ***mantra-yoga***, ***ajapā-japa***, etc., and which are spiritual exercises, not prayers properly so called.

So, if prayer is an often misleading translation, and muttering, etc., an inadequate one, the best course is probably to keep the Sanskrit word ***japa*** untranslated, and to look for the constellation of meanings, the varieties of religious and spiritual practices, that form the semantic field of that word. I will not do this here in detail, but only briefly review some important aspects of ***japa***, and underline their common points so as to bring out, if possible, the overall dynamic value of the term[5].

Going back, then, to the *Śabdakalpadruma's* definition of ***japa*** as *mantroccāraṇa*, let us first cast a glance at the various aspects of ***mantra*** in ***japa***.

In its older forms (the word ***japa*** is late Vedic, the practice itself being probably earlier), ***japa*** is chanting of ***bhūr bhuvaḥ svar Om***, or muttering of various ***mantra***-s, the ***gāyatrī***, etc., or of verses, hymns, etc., in certain circumstances and according to precise ritual prescriptions. One may note here that comparatively earlier a distinction was

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1. Such as described in *Yoginīhṛdaya*, III. 171-190, on which see my paper in *Tantric and Taoist Studies*, in honour of Prof. R. A. Stein (Berkeley, 1979).
2. Not to mention older practices, Vedic or post-Vedic, for which see references in Kane : *Hist. of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. II, p. 685-6.
3. See, for example, the practices described by Abhinavagupta in *Tantrāloka*, VII. 39, ff.
4. The fixed formulas of liturgical prayer in christianity or of many other religions are perfectly compatible with religious fervour. Ritual activity does not necessarily exclude devotion, as any tantric text would show : the most elaborate rituals are often prescribed as having to be performed *bhaktyā*.
5. A longer study of *japa* (in French) should be published shortly in the *B. E. F. E. O.* as the third part of a series of "Contributions à l'étude du *mantraśāstra*". See *ibid.*, vol. LXV (1978) and LXVII (1980).

made between three sorts of *japa* : *vācika*, *upāṃśu* and *mānasa*, each succeeding one being held superior to the preceding. This threefold classification of *japa*, which later authors would connect with the divisions of *vāk* : *parā*, *paśyanti*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*, shows the early appearance of the superiority recognized to mental over silent, and to silent over vocal enunciation. This privilege of the unspoken over the spoken word—which has remained unshaken—is all the more noteworthy in a tradition where the Word—*vāk*—has always had such an exalted place and fundamental role : *brahma vai vāk*[1], but the Veda itself suggests that the hidden part of *vāk* is the highest one[2]. One must also remember that *brahman* is Conscience, and the highest conscience is silent. Worth noting here, also, is the fact that Vedic recitation includes *vikṛti*, where the order of words is altered : interpolation of words or syllables of *mantra*-s is precisely a tantric practice[3]. It thus appears that very ancient traits foreshadow or prefigure later tantric notions and practices.[4]

From these beginnings, *japa* went on evolving as new types of *mantra*-s, appeared alongside the ancient ones : all the *mantra*-s, that is, of various deities one finds in the Purāṇas, Tantras, Āgamas, Saṃhitās, etc., in which the eulogies or invocations of gods and goddesses are more and more interpersed or associated with an ever increasing number and variety of syllables devoid of all apparent meanings[5], but gethering in themselves all the concentrated energy of the word (*vāk-śakti*), all the power of the deity they are supposed to "express" (whose *vācaka* they are).

Such changes in the forms of *mantra*-s naturally brought about changes in *japa*. It tended to become less of a ritually efficient recitation, where the obvious meaning of the words played an important part (though this never entirely disappears : it is present in a number of cases—the simplest ones, if I may say so), and to be more a handling, a putting to effective use, spiritual or otherwise, of the *śakti* inherent in the *mantra* or *bīja*.

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1. *Ait. Br.* IV.21.1.
2. *ṚV.* VIII.100.10.
3. Diversely called, as *sampuṭa*, *vidarbha*, *pallava*, etc.
4. There is obviously no continuity from Vedism to Tantrism, but a genetic link is, in many cases, likely, when not certain. There is very often no need at all to try and ascribe the origin of tantric ideas and practices to some unknown "autochtonous" element. That some such substratum may have played a part is not altogether ruled out. But, generally speaking, tantrism, far from being an anomalous and foreign excrescence on Hinduism, in fact (in my opinion) only carries into effect (sometimes, admittedly, to an extreme level) tendencies innate in Brahmanic and Hindu tradition, and the germ of which is quite often Vedic.
5. Which is not to say meaningless, as all *mantra*-s and *bīja*-s have a "meaning", but of a special sort : an interesting subject, this, in fact, deserving a proper study.

One passes over, so to speak, from a "play" of words to a display of energy or, rather, to the mastery and handling of the spiritual power of *vāk* as embodied in a *mantra*.

The ancient notion of the superiority of unspoken over spoken word, as well as that regarding *prāṇa*, the vital and cosmic force in man, were not alien to these developments. They, as it were, coalesced in the conception of *ajapājapa*, where the enunciation of the *haṃsamantra* was associated with the movement of respiratory *prāṇa* and eventually identified with it. *Japa*, in such a case, is nothing else than a spiritual concentration on breathing as expressive of—so to speak—the identity of the soul with God : a condition where words disappear, and only breath in its subtle form, vital cosmic force, spiritual impetus and divine consciousness, remain. In such types of *japa*, the consciousness aspect of the practice is fundamental, as the main element is concentration on the sound as well as the "meaning" of the *mantra* resulting in identification, fusion (*samāveśa*) with its spiritual energy.

Japa being *mantroccāraṇa*, the aspects and values of the enunciation of *mantra*-s or *bīja*-s follow the same logical evolution from (more or less) an ordinary recitation to the handling of a spiritually conceived form of energy, culminating in concentration on the movement (or immobilization) of *prāṇa* and, still further, in pure spiritual awareness.

Some such values are indeed inherent in the very word used to denote all mantric utterances : *uccāra*, *uccāraṇa*. Being derived from *uc-car*, to go upwards, ascend, rise, issue forth, it has come to mean emit, utter or pronounce, because any enunciation is due to the upward movement of breath resulting in the issuing forth of a sound. In a general sense, *uccāra* is thus simply vocal enunciation, and can, therefore, apply to any sort of mantric utterance; this is how it is used in the *Śabdakalpadruma*. But, in a number of tantric texts, *uccāra* has a special meaning, applying not only to *haṃsoccāra* but to a number of cases where it consists not so much in actually enunciating a *mantra* or *bīja*, still less voicing them[1] than in joining the phonic energy of the *mantra* with the cosmic and divine energy as present in the body and mind of the yogin, a process which implies both spiritual concentration on those energies and their ascending from the *mūlādhāra* to the heart, and/or from the heart to the *brahmarandhra* or *dvādaśānta*. When, for example, Kṣemarāja, in his commentary on *Svacchanda Tantra*[2], says : *nādātmano haṃsasya nitya-pravṛtta uccāraḥ*, he understands *uccāra* as something quite different from any empirical enunciation. Jayaratha[3] also stresses the spiritual aspect of *uccāra* when he defines it as *prāṇacidātmā*, the *cit* aspect being itself divided into *cit* proper and *vimarśa*. *Uccāra* would

1. If only because some *bīja*-s are unpronounceable; but mostly because *mānasajapa* is the highest.
2. IV.258.
3. Comm. on *Tantrāloka*, V.128.

then combine in itself the three aspects of *mantra*, namely vital and cosmic energy (*prāṇa*), pure consciousness (*cit*) and supreme Word : *parā vāk* (which is *vimarśa*). This sort of *uccāra* or *japa* would lead the *sādhaka* to the highest level of consciousness.

Abhinavagupta, in the same work[1], gives as an example a *japa* described in the *Vijñāna-Bhairava* (130) in which one becomes Śiva by repeating the name of Bhairava : *bhairavaśabdasya santatoccāraṇācchivaḥ*. Jayaratha explains this by saying : '*uccāraṇāt*' : *madhyadhāmni hṛdayāt dvādaśāntam yāvat parāmarśanācchivo bhavet*, which is to say that the *uccāra* consists in an intense consciousness of the *mantra*, associated with the ascending movement of *mantra* and *prāṇa* (*kuṇḍalinī*, that is) in the *madhyadhāman* (=the *suṣumnā*) from the heart to the *dvādaśānta cakra*. But, more than *suṣumnā*, *madyadhāman* is the central point, the junction, between *prāṇa* and *apāna*, the state where these two are in perfect equilibrium and come to rest awhile in the central cavity of the "heart" : when they dissolve in this central void, the perfection of *japa* or *ajapājapa* is attained, and the yogin enjoys the highest bliss[2].

Another description of the spiritual aspects of *japa* is to be found in the *Vijñāna-Bhairava* (145) : "This mystical realization that one realizes again and again in the supreme Reality, this indeed is *japa*. In the same way (one must consider) what is being enunciated in *japa* as spontaneous *nāda* consisting in "*mantra*"[3]. Abhinavagupta refers to this passage in the first chapter of his *Tantrāloka*[4], saying that "*japa* is the very nature of this (Śiva), free from both existence and non-existence"[5]

In all such instances little remains of the ordinary sort of *japa*—a sort which no tradition excludes, but which appears very lowly and unsophisticated in comparison. *Japa* is one thing to the lay devotee, another for the adept in his *sādhanā*, still another for the *jīvanmukta*. The higher one rises, the fewer concrete enunciative traits remain. One needs not add other examples of these peculiar but very important aspect of *uccāra* in *japa*. One can, however, still point out the fact that in the *uccāra* of some *bīja*-s, such

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1. *TĀ.*, V.135-6.
2. This central state of equilibrium is sometimes called *viṣuvat*. *Yoginīhṛdaya*, III.171 ff., describes a *japa* of *śrīvidyā* which comprises a mystical experience (*bhāvanā*) of six voids and seven *viṣuvat* : see note 1 on p. 594. A discussion of the problem of *viṣuvat* is to be found in Mme H. BRUNNER's edition cum French translation of the *Somaśambhupaddhati*, vol 3, pp. 356-396 (Pondicherry, 1977).
3. *Bhūyo bhūyaḥ pare bhāve bhāvanā bhāvyate hi yā /*
   Japaḥ so 'tra svayaṃnādo mantrātmā japya īdṛśaḥ //
4. I.90.
5. *Tatsvarūpam japaḥ prokto bhāvābhāvapadacyutaḥ/*

as *OṂ*, *HAUṂ*, *HRĪṂ*, there is a reckoning of the *uccāraṇakalā* from the first *varṇa* of the *bīja* to *unmanā*, and that the increasing subtlety of this *kalā* goes down to a 64th, and even to a 256th part of one *mātrā*[1] : this shows that *uccāra*, in such cases, has nothing to do with concrete pronunciation ; it is a purely yogic and spiritual practice.

Indeed, when *mantra* and *japa* are considered from the highest point of view, in their essence, a very special conception prevails : not only is *mantra* considered as pure consciousness, which in any case it always is in essence (*svarūpa*), but also whatever the liberated man utters is *mantra* and his talk, it seems, is *japa*. (This conception is developed in particular in Kashmir Śaivism—incidentally by far the most philosophical and brilliant of all tantric schools).

The divine nature of *mantra* is admitted everywhere and is usually expressed as a consequence of their being made of letters, whose nature is that of the deity : *mantra varṇātmakāḥ sarve, varṇāḥ sarve śivātmakāḥ*. The well-known *sūtra*[2] of the *Śiva-sūtra* gives it a more philosophical expression : *cittaṃ mantraḥ*—"*mantra* is conscience". "Conscience, explains Kṣemarāja in his *Vimarśinī*, is that which has conscience of the highest Reality. It is the knowledge whose form is that of the perfect awareness of (such *mantra*-s as) *prāsāda*, *praṇava* etc., which are the essence of the full throbbing flash (of the absolute I)...It is that by which one has an inward consciousness, devoid of all duality, of the supreme Lord"[3].

The most interesting point, however (stressed in particular by Kashmir Śaiva texts and shadowed in the passage just quoted), is that the *mantra*, divine as it is in essence, is but potentially so, and actually attains to this state only when used in the proper manner by a qualified adept who, by spiritual effort and/or the grace of God, attains to the highest level of consciousness. In the words of the *Spanda-kārikā*[4] : "Unsoiled and peaceful, they (=the *mantra*-s), together with the mind of the *sādhaka*, get absorbed there (=in *spanda*). Their nature, therefore, is Śiva"[5]. Kṣemarāja, in his comment on *Śiva-sūtra*[6], quoted above, says in the same spirit : "The *mantra* is the very mind of the devotee, who, becoming consciously aware (*vimarśa*) of the *devatā* of the *mantra*. becomes identified with

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1. See for example pl. XII and XIII : *u cāra* of *mūlamantra OṂ* according to two different tantras, in Mme BRUNNER's edition of the *Somaśaṃbhupaddhati*, vol. 3.
2. II.1.
3. *Cetyate vimṛśyate anena paraṃ tattvam iti cittam, pūrṇasphurattāsatattvaprāsādapraṇavādivimarśarūpaṃ saṃvedanam....antar abhedena vimṛśyate parameśvararūpam anena* (*ŚSV*, p. 47).
4. II.11.
5. *Tatraiva sampralīyante śāntarūpā nirañjanāḥ* / *Sahārādhakacittena tenaite śivadharmiṇaḥ* // (*Sp. K.*, II.11, p. 80).
6. II.1.

it. Such is *mantra* : not a mere collection of phonemes"[1]. But only the most advanced *sādhaka* can accomplish this, perhaps only the *jīvanmukta*.

But for such liberated souls *japa* takes on a new and more surprising aspect : for them, whatever word they say has the nature of a *mantra*. Their very conversation, according to *Śiva-sūtra*[2] is a *japa* : "*kathā japaḥ*". Which is to say, adds Kṣemarāja in his *Vimarśinī*, that "whatever conversation, one who has attained to the uncreated consciousness of the absolute I (*ahaṃvimarśa*) which has the nature of the great *Mantra*, may make, for him, all this is *japa* which itself is an ever repeated awareness of the deity that is his own Self"[3]. Kṣemarāja goes on to quote *śloka* 145 of the *Vijñāna-Bhairava* which we have already seen[4], then another text concerning the continual *japa* of *haṃsa*. This might seem to limit the "conversation" to two specific types of *japa* and to exclude other, more ordinary, sorts of utterances. A wider interpretation of this *sūtra* is, however, possible and is notably to be found in Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*. Here is the passage :

> "For one who has attained to this uncreated Heart, whatever he does, whether he breathes, or thinks, all this for him is considered as *japa*".

To which Jayaratha's commentary adds : "The yogin who rests in the perfect awareness of the uncreated absolute I, thus, whatever external action he accomplishes, all this is for him a *japa*. This to say that all these things shine for him in the nature of *mantra* because it takes the shape of an ever repeated awareness of the deity which is his own Self (Jayaratha uses here the very words of the *Śiva-Sūtra-Vimarśinī*). As it is said :

> "Whatever *śloka*, *gāthā*, etc., one perceives as conjoined with (the *mantra*) which goes from *A* to *M*, all this is seen as a *mantra*."

In the same way it is said : "(His) conversation is a *japa*"[5], etc. Even others have said : "This conversation is a *japa* ..", etc.[6]

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1. *Atha ca mantradevatāvimarśaparatvena prāpatatatsāmarasyam ārādhakacittam eva mantraḥ, na tu vicitravarṇasaṃghaṭṭanāmātrakam* (*ŚSV*, p. 47-8).
2. III.7.
3. *Mahāmantrātmakākṛtakāhaṃvimarśārūḍhasya yadyadālāpādi tattadasya svātmadevatāvimarśānavaratāvartanātmā japo jāyate.*
4. Note 3 on p. 597.
5. *ŚS.*, III.27.
6. *TĀ.*, IV.194 :

   Akṛtrimaitadhṛdayārūḍho yatkiñcid ācaret /
   Prāṇyād vā mṛśate vāpi sa sarvo'sya japo mataḥ //

   Akṛtakāhaṃparāmarśaviśrānto hi yogī tadanuvedhena yatkiñcidbāhyavyavahārayogyaṃ vyāharet so'sya sarvo japaḥ—sarvam evāsya svātmadevatāvimarśānavaratāvartanātmatvena mantrarūpatayā parisphured ityarthaḥ yaduktam—

It would seem, according to this text, that any activity (and not only speaking) of somebody who is identified with God (in the present case through the *mantra* of the Heart: *SAUḤ*) could thus be considered as a mantric utterance at its highest level of continuous awareness of the deity. One must probably take it that Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha (as well as the *Śiva-Sūtra*) did not consider absolutely any act or word of a *jīvan mukta* as equal to the highest *japa*, but thought mainly of ritual on religious activities and utterances. But the distinction of religious from profane is always difficult in a traditional way of life, and all the more so for a liberated soul whose words and acts do differ from those of ordinary beings to the extent that they have a perfection, an adequateness to their end, and an effectiveness which is lacking in others. It would seem that they might in that respect be equated with the total perfection of the highest *japa* : in both cases the same total awareness of God would be there.

But, howsoever one should interpret Abhinavagupta's or Kṣemarāja's sayings on that point, the fact remains that the word *japa* covers a very large field of meanings : from Vedic recitation to muttering a prayer with a rosary, from ritual repetition to devotional chanting, from all types of vocal mantric utterances to *ajapājapa* and purely internal yogic *japa* coupled with the ascent of *kuṇḍalinī*, from wakeful activity to intense visualization and meditation (*dhyāna* and *bhāvanā*).

What common element, then, permits to subsume under only one word so many differing practices ? The *mantra*, of course. For, whatever form the practice of *japa* takes, it always is, in some form or other, *uccāra* of *mantra* : there is no *japa* that is not somehow *mantroccāraṇa*. The various forms of *mantra* and *uccāra* explain the varieties of *japa* ; and the diversity of *mantra* and *uccāra* reflects itself the variety of levels and forms, not so much of spiritual practice than of *vāk*. From the empirical level of *vaikharī*, to *madhyamā*, then *paśyantī*, and finally to the supreme unspoken Word, *parā vāk*, the aspects and forms of *vāk* are many. According to one's spiritual level and needs, one would resort to one or another form or level of *vāk* through different kinds of *japa*—mantric practice being in all cases putting into action and handling of the energy of *vāk*.

There is undoubtedly a remarkably consistent Indian tradition regarding the importance and power of *vāk*, as well as the possibilities of harnessing that power for

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ślokagāthādi yatkiñcidādimāntyayutaṃ yataḥ |
tasmādvidamstathā sarvaṃ mantrātvenaiva paśyati ||
iti, ata eva 'kathā japaḥ' ityādyanyatroktam, yadabhiprāyenaiva ito bāhyair api
yo jalpaḥ sa japaḥ
ityādyuktam. (*ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 227).

mundane or supramundane ends. The same holds true for *prāṇa* : cosmic and vital energy, and breath. *Japa*, in its various forms, can be taken as providing a wealth of examples of the theory as well as of the practice and uses of both *vāk* and *prāṇa*—and it also illustrates a variety of possible attitudes of the devotee towards God, and of ritual action. So, whatever theories one may, or may not, wish to elaborate on the subject, the simple fact remains that *japa* is a significant and important element in Hinduism.

SOME NOTES ABOUT THE READING OF BRAHMASŪTRAS' TEACHING

Tomasz Rucinski

Although *Brahmasūtra*-s of Bādarāyaṇa are one of the most important treatises in Indian philosophy, basic work of the Vedānta system and containing, according to Indian tradition, the philosophical synthesis of the teachings of Upaniṣads, Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy is not known to historians of Indian philosophy.

In the West at the beginning of contacts with Vedānta philosophy, the first known commentator of *BS* was Śaṅkara,[1] so he was treated as the trustworthy interpretator of *BS*. In the course of time was "disoovered" the commentary of the other great Vedantist, i. e., Rāmānuja, who interpreted *BS* in a different way. The historians faced the problem, which of the commentaries expresses the exact thought of Bādarāyaṇa. George Thibaut made an English translation of both and came to a conclusion that each commentary contained misinterpretations, but Rāmānuja's philosophy is closer to that of Bādarāyaṇa. Later, other commentaries became known and an attempt to discover the teaching of *BS* was made by comparing them. V. S. Ghate followed this way in "Le Vedānta, ètude sur les *Brahma-sūtra*-s et leurs cinq commentaires" (Paris 1918), where he compared commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha and concluded that Nimbārka's thought was the closest to that of Bādarāyaṇa's[2]. The other way to get to

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1. The first western translation of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* was into German by Deussen (1887)but in India, as far as I know, there appeared already in 1851, the first English translation of *BS* along with extracts from Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*: *The Aphorisms of the Vedānta Philosophy; with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary.*
2. Using the method of comparison of the commentaries some special questions were also discussed e.g. Hajime Nakamura in his article "The Concept of Brahman in the *Brahma-Sūtras*" (*The Indo-Asian Culture*, Vol. IX.2, October 1960, s 176) writes: " we are often perplexed as to which explanation to adopt. However, if we investigate carefully and critically, comparing the

know this philosophy was also proposed, namely by investigation and reaching the unity of teachings of Upaniṣads[1], but up to this day I have not heard about undertaking such a research work. Some scholars and also followers of different schools of Vedānta defend the interpretation of one favourite commentator. Swami Vireswarananda in the Introduction to *Brahma-sūtra*-s[2] using his own arguments defends the interpretation of Śaṅkara, and on his lines translates *BS* into English. B. N. K. Sharma in *The Brahma-sūtra-s and their Principal Commentaries*[3] defends the interpretation of Madhva, but criticises the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Telivala[4] with detailed analysis describes inconsistency of Śaṅkara's commentary using the work of Vallabha. These and other works of this kind though justify the rejection of some parts of *Brahmasūtrā*-s' interpretations, cannot lead to the discovery of Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy. Although *BS* have many commentaries[5] there is lack of generally accepted *bhāṣya*[6]. This is surely an obstacle in discovery of Bādarāyaṇa's teachings; on the other hand it gives the base while investigating the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa to be not influenced by the opinions of commentators. From polemics in the Vedantic commentaries one can learn that the *BS* were also interpreted from the position of Sāṅkhya, and Vijñānabhikṣu tries to harmonize it with the Vedānta.

The differences between commentators are not only in their philosophical teachings but also in the way of treating the *sūtra*-text. It happens that some *sūtra*-s are omitted by the commentator and others are added. Sometimes he joins two *sūtra*-s into one or divides one into two. Śaṅkara comments on 555 *sūtra*-s, Rāmānuja—545, Madhva—564 and Śrīkāra—544. The commentators join the succeeding *sūtra*-s in *adhikaraṇa*-s. Each *adhikaraṇa* should consist of five elements; 1. *viṣaya*, 2. *saṁśaya*, 3. *pūrvapakṣa*, 4. *siddhānta* or *uttarapakṣa* and 5. *saṅgati*, or *nirṇaya*. But it is not easy to create such *adhikaraṇa* from successive *sūtra*-s. Here the commentators differ considerably : Śaṅkara divides

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explanations with each other, it is not impossible to get to the point which author of the *sūtra*-s had in mind. By this method we hope that we shall be able to make clear the concept of Brahman in the *Brahmasūtra*-s".

1. George Thibaut, *The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya*, Sacred Books of the East, XXXIV, Introduction, p. p. CI.
2. Almora 1936 (Advaita Ashrama).
3. Bombay, 1971-78 (in three volumes).
4. *Discuss how far Śaṅkarāchārya truly represents the view of the author of the Brahmasūtras*, Bombay 1918 (sec. ed. 1928).
5. Theodor Aufrecht in *Catalogus Catalogorum* (Vol. 1. p. 383-386 and 792, Vol. 2, p. 86-87 and 213, Vol. 3. p. 82-83) enumerates over a hundred commentaries and works on *BS*.
6. On *BS* we have several *bhāṣya*-s, whereas on the other philosophical *sūtra*-s there is only one *bhāṣya* for each.

all the *sūtra*-s into 192 *adhikaraṇa*-s, Rāmānuja—into 156, Madhva—into 223 and Śrīkāra—into 113 only. Some *sūtra*-s express, according to some commentators, Bādarāyaṇa's opinion, and according to others, the opposite one. Many *adhikaraṇa*-s consist of one *sūtra* only and the "added" elements, according to the scheme of *adhikaraṇa*, are often characterised by slight artificiality. Nearly each *adhikaraṇa*, except of those which contain criticism of other systems, the commentators join with a certain part of authoritative text, mostly with Upaniṣads. B. Faddegon criticizes such method of reading *sūtra*-s using the example of Śaṅkara's commentary to the third *pāda* of the third *adhyāya* in this way : "...whereas the chapter contains 66 aphorisms, the number of sections dealing with separate subject-matters, is no less than 36; and, if we are to give credit to Śaṅkara, Bādarāyaṇa would in no less than twenty-three instances have discussed a subject standing completely apart from the context in one single aphorism. We are, I think, naturally led to suppose that Śaṅkara has cut up the *sūtra*-text into an incoherent mass of detail. Not the slightest trace of order, neither in the topics discussed, nor in the Vedāntas quoted, is to be found. From one Upaniṣad or Brāhmaṇa we pass on to another; from a passage at the end of an Upaniṣad to a passage in the middle or at the beginning. Now we hear that certain texts must be—as it is called—combined; then that certain texts must be separated; again we return to cases of combination; then suddenly leaving combinations and separations, we find a certain dogma discussed, or one particular Upaniṣad-passage interpreted. In one word, we receive the impression that Bādarāyaṇa's brain suffered from a hopeless confusion."[1]

It can be assumed that the philosophers of different schools of Vedānta try to present their philosophy interpreting the *sūtra*-text rather freely, to show the agreement with the teachings of Bādarāyaṇa and to support their own philosophy by his authority. This assumption does not eliminate the possibility that one of the commentators interprets the *BS* exactly. For stating this it is necessary to establish Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy. The scholars suggest to investigate separately the philosophical contents of the basic texts and separately the philosophical contents of the commentaries on them in order not to attribute the commentators' standpoint to the author of the commented text.[2] Thus without the deep immanent analysis of *BS*, Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy cannot be known.

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1. B. Faddegon, *The chapter (III.3), method of exegesis, in the Vedānta-Sūtra*, Acta Orientalia, Vol. I, Para I, (1922), pp. 107-108.
2. Such was the opinion of my Teacher, Leon Cyboran, regarding *Yogasūtra*-s and *Yogabhāṣya* expressed in his *Philosophy of Yoga*, (in Polish) Warszawa 1973, pp. 34-35, where he also mentioned a similar opinion of J. W. Hauer (*Das IV. Buch des Yoga-sūtra, ein Beitrag zu seiner Erklärung und Zeitbestimmung*. Studia Indo-Iranica. Leipzig 1931, p, 131).

Before reading correctly the *BS* it is necessary to :

1. establish the meaning of all technical terms not defined by Bādarāyaṇa. It is presumed that during composing of *BS* the meanings of these terms were well known to the philosophers but this philosophical tradition probably disappeared. The commentators, while establishing the meanings of such terms, usually refer to the Upaniṣads but sometimes also to other texts as Āraṇyakas, Brāhmaṇas or Vedic Sūktas. A certain amount of terms does not appear in those texts and to others Bādarāyaṇa has given special meanings.

2. establish the language of *sūtra*-s, that is, rules of composing one single *sūtra*. The philosophical *sūtra*-text is of this kind that its language differs from the language of other types of philosophical treatises. All the possibilities of language for expression as briefly as possible are fully applied. Yet it is said :" *ardhamātrālāghavena putrotsavaṁ manyante vaiyākaraṇāḥ*"[1]. And the definition of *sūtra*, which surely Bādarāyaṇa does not violate, is given by *Padmapurāṇa :*

   alpākṣaram asandigdhaṁ sāravad viśvatomukham/
   astobham anavadyaṁ ca sūtraṁ sūtrovido viduḥ//[2]

3. determine formal and contextual relations between successive *sūtra*-s and groups of *sūtra*-s, i. e., the structure of the text.

At first these three preparatory dealings, closely connected with one another, should be accomplished. Then, I believe that, assuming the unity of the text, it will be possible through philosophical speculations to approach the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa.

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1. S. K. Belvalkar "The *Brahma-sūtra*-s of Bādarāyaṇa with the Comment of Śaṅkarāchārya, Chapter II. Quarter I", p. 1.
2. See e.g. S. Vireswarananda, *Brahma-Sūtra*-s. p. IV.

THOUGHTS ON THE GĪTĀ

Satyavrat Shastri

Amidst a mass of seemingly desparate matter and the apparent multiplicity of views a discerning critic would naturally ask : what is, if at all, the central teaching of the *Bhagavadgitā*. Before an answer to this is attempted it would be in the fitness of things if notice is taken of the circumstances in which it came into being. In the vast dreary lands of Kurukshetra the two mighty armies of the Kaurvas and the Pāṇḍavas stood facing each other. The conches had been blown, the drums beaten and the bugles sounded. The strike order was imminent. Exactly at the crucial moment Arjuna, the bravest of the Pāṇḍavas, asked Kṛṣṇa, his charioteer, to take the chariot to the vacant space between the two armies so that he could have a full view of those to whom he was going to give the fight. The charioteer did as asked and Arjuna cast a glance at his adversaries. He found among them, his brothers, his brothers-in-law, his uncles and other relations. Remorse overstruck him. He became diffident for fight. He could not summon up courage to strike at his kith and kin, the grand father like Bhīṣma and the teacher like Droṇa among them. He decided not to fight. Occupying now the back seat in the chariot he told Kṛṣṇa that he was experiencing a strange kind of sensation in him, his limbs were aching, his mouth drying up and his body trembling. He would not like, said he, to enjoy the worldly pleasures soaked in the blood of his near and dear ones. Noticing him in this state Kṛṣṇa decided to shake him out of his melancholy. He disapproved of his decision of not offering fight and told him to get ready for it.

He was sorry that impurity should have crept into Arjuna's mind at the oddest of the hours :

कुतस्त्वा कश्मलमिदं विषमे समुपस्थितम् । [1]

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1. *Bhagavadgītā*, II.2,

He asked him not to be unmanly, to give up the weakness of the heart and get up :

क्लैब्यं मां स्म गमः पार्थ नैतत्त्वय्युपपद्यते ।
क्षुद्रं हृदयदौर्बल्यं त्यक्त्वोत्तिष्ठ परन्तप ॥[1]

and further

तस्मादुत्तिष्ठ कौन्तेय युद्धाय कृतनिश्चयः ।[2]

Get up O Arjuna ! resolve to fight.

This is the beginning of the *Gitā*. After listening to the Lord Arjuna said :

नष्टो मोहः स्मृतिर्लब्धा त्वत्प्रसादान्मयाऽच्युत ।
स्थितोऽस्मि गतसन्देहः करिष्ये वचनं तव ॥[3]

O Kṛṣṇa, my delusion is over. Through your grace I have got knowledge. My doubts are cleared. I (now) stand up. I will obey your world.

And that is the end of the *Gitā*.

Its beginning is 'उत्तिष्ठ' , get up. Its end is 'स्थितोऽस्मि' here I stand. Between these two lies the *Gitā*.

Its motive, its objective should be all too clear with it. What was it that the Lord gave to Arjuna that made him stand up स्थितोऽस्मि.

It was a kind of philosophy that imparted him clear perspective, infused him with new vigour to take up arms once again, the philosophy of action, with no desire for its fruit, an action with detachment, the philosophy of *Karmayoga*, for which the *Gitā* is well known the world over. It is this philosophy which forms the core of the teaching of the great work. Here a side question may well arise : Why should the Lord have waited upto the particular moment of the two armies facing each other and Arjuna's indifference to fight at the sight of his friends, relatives and elders to impart this knowledge. By imparting it earlier he could well have avoided this situation to arise. Why, at that particular moment ? After all Kṛṣṇa had been very intimate with Arjuna all along who could well take the liberty of addressing him as Kṛṣṇa, Yādava and Sakhā—friend, 'हे कृष्ण हे यादव हे सखेति', so intimate was he with the Lord that he could well instruct him in superior knowledge and not keep it back from him. He was also related to him. Why did he not then impart the knowledge to him earlier. The answer to this could be that the superior knowledge has to be imparted judiciously and at the right moment. It is not to be given away to any one and everyone but only to those who have developed the

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1. *Ibid.* II.3.
2. *Ibid.* II.37.
3. *Ibid.* XVIII.73.

spirit of a disciple, 'शिष्यभाव:' . In that spirit they would be ripe to receive it and can conserve it. Though intimate, Arjuna had not upto the particular moment of the sermon assumed the 'शिष्यभाव'. He had been a friend, a companion and a relative but not शिष्य. It is when sorrow overtook him and confusion stalled him that he acquired the spirit of a शिष्य.

यच्छ्रेयः स्यान्निश्चितं ब्रूहि तन्मे शिष्यस्तेऽहं शाधि मां त्वां प्रपन्नम् ।[1]

Please tell me whatever is best in your judgment. I surrender unto you. I am your disciple.

When the friend in Ajuna had turned a disciple with the feeling of total प्रपत्ति, शरणागति:, only then was he considered fit enough to receive the superiormost knowledge, the most secret one, गुह्याद्गुह्यतरं ज्ञानम् which in the words of the *Gitā* itself could not be imparted to any one who has not the proper religious austerity, renunciation and devotion to God nor to the one who does not want to listen or who finds fault with God :

इदं ते नातपस्काय नाभक्ताय कदाचन ।
न चाशुश्रूषवे वाच्यं न च मां योऽभ्यसूयति ।।[2]

In his marathon address to Arjuna the Lord has given this highest knowledge. He has instructed him in *Sāṃkhya Yoga*, *Jñāna Yoga*, *Rāja Yoga*, *Karma Yoga* and *Bhakti Yoga.* The knowledge of all the Vedas and the systems of philosophy is contained in his words. Arjuna is afforded the cosmic vision by Him. In answer to a specific question of Arjuna the Lord said that *Karma Yoga*, in complete surrender to Him was best suited for him. He cleared all the doubts in Arjuna's mind with reasons and examples till he was fully satisfied. The Lord would, however, not ask Arjuna to follow His instruction blindly. Even the Lord of the Universe, he has a liberal attitude. He has no idea to impose his will on his disciple. He asks him to think over what he has said and then do whatever would please him :

विमृश्यैतदशेषेण यथेच्छसि तथा कुरु ।[3]

There is no dogmatic or doctrinaire approach in the *Gitā*. If instruction is well received it would cause reaction from within. If it fails to do so, well, it is the recipient's lot. If, however, the recipient is ripe for it as the parched earth is for rain water, it may not fail to produce reaction as in the case of Arjuna, who received it with equanimity after initial dithering even in the thick of the battlefield. Arjuna was the ***prapanna śiṣya***—'शाधि

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1. *Ibid.* II.7.
2. *Ibid.* XVIII.67.
3. *Ibid.* XVIII.63.

मां त्वां प्रपन्नम्'[1] who begged for instruction, शाधि. It was, therefore, not unexpected that the wealth of knowledge emanating from the Lord would not fail to enlighten him.

As has been said earlier the core of the *Gitā's* teaching is action. The *Gitā* declares in the most solemn words : 'कर्म ज्यायो ह्यकर्मण:'[2], action is superior to inaction. The *Gitā* preaches active life. It does not require one to take to the life of a recluse to gain true knowledge. One can gain that even in the thick of life's activities just as did the Rājarṣis like Janaka,—कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादय:[3], who, while fully preoccupied with the royal duties, remained completely untouched by them. The ego was just missing in them. That is why they could say :

मिथिलायां प्रदीप्तायां न मे दह्यति किञ्चन ।

Even while Mithila is on fire there is nothing *m i n e* in it which is being burnt.

Since they were one with the supreme Reality, Brahman, they, even though possessed of body, were bereft of its consciousness. That is why they could come out with the words :

कश्चिन्मे दक्षिणं बाहुं चन्दनेन समुक्षपेत् ।
सव्यं छिन्द्यात्कुठारेण समावेतौ मतौ मम ।।

One anointing my right arm with sandal paste and the other chopping off my left one with a spade, both are the same for me.

The philosophy of action of the *Gitā* is qualified with the inalienable consideration of no desire for the fruit. The key verse enunciating it says :

कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भू:……… ………।।[4]

Your duty is limited upto the performance of the action only and not its fruit. Do not be the cause of the fruit of the action.

The Lord is only too conscious of the pitfalls in this. There is a well known saying in Sanskrit : प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न हि मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते. Even a fool would not take to something without a motive. The result of the action is the motive. If the motive is taken away

1. *Ibid.* II.7.
2. *Ibid.* III.8.
3. *Ibid.* III.20.
4. *Ibid.* II.47.

the natural tendency in a man would be not to perform any action. Why should he perform it at all if he is not to get anything out of it. Realizing this tendency in man the Lord is quick to utter the solemn warning immediately after instructing him not to care for the result of action not to give himself over to inaction —मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि'. The Lord knows that inaction by its very nature would not be foreign to man. To keep his body and soul together he will have to perform some action or the other all through :

शरीरयात्राऽपि च ते न प्रसिध्येदकर्मणः[1]

Engage one has to oneself in some action or the other, not even for a moment can be one without an action :

नहि कश्चित् क्षणमपि जातु तिष्ठत्यकर्मकृत्[2]

It is the deliberate inaction that he is asking to avoid. The stillness of the body is not inaction. With the bodily movements controlled, the mind may be free to wander about. To all appearances a man may give the impression of not engaged in action, yet he would be as given to performing action as anybody else. In this he will be deceiving nobody but himself. The Lord in the most forthright words proclaims him a hypocrite—मिथ्याचार :

कर्मेन्द्रियाणि संयम्य य आस्ते मनसा स्मरन् ।
इन्द्रियार्थान् विमूढात्मा मिथ्याचारः स उच्यते ॥[3]

So action one has to perform but the Lord advises one to perform it in such a way as one may not have any consideration of its fruit. The Lord illustrates this by his own example, may be it can go home : There is nothing to be gained or achieved by him that He does not have already, as far as He is concerned, still says He, He continues to work :

न मे पार्थास्ति कर्त्तव्यं त्रिषु लोकेषु किञ्चन ।
नानावाप्तमवाप्तव्यं वर्त एव च कर्मणि ॥[4]

The Lord says that a being should keep His example before him. He should continue doing things without caring for their fruit. But a being may here well say : Well the Lord can do it. He is Lord after all. But how can he a poor being do it ? The Lord is asking him to do something impossible. The Lord realizes this predicament

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1. *Ibid.* III.8.
2. *Ibid.* III.5.
3. *Ibid.* III.6.
4. *Ibid.* III.22.

of his and says that in case it is not possible for him to do so in absolute terms, let him be the medium and it is here that the philosophy of action of the *Gītā*, the *Karmayoga* imperceptibly glides into the philosophy of Devotion—the *Bhaktiyoga*. The Lord asks man to offer everything to him, whatever he is doing, whatever he is eating, whatever he is offering in sacrifice, whatever he is giving away (in charity) and whatever penance he is practising :

यत्करोषि यदश्नासि यज्जुहोषि ददासि यत् ।
यत्तपस्यसि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणम् ।।[1]

Even if the consideration of motive cannont be set aside by an ordinary mortal, let him offer all his actions to the Lord. Then the actions will cease *suo moto* to be those of his and the fruit, if any, emanating from them will also cease to be that of his. The Lord unequivocally declares :

ये तु सर्वाणि कर्माणि मयि सन्यस्य मत्पराः ।
अनन्येनैव योगेन मां ध्यायन्त उपासते ।।
तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् ।
भवामि न चिरात्पार्थ मय्यावेशितचेतसाम् ।।[2]

These who surrender unto me, who offer me all actions and who meditate on me, who concentrate on me in their minds, I pull them out before long from the ocean of life and death.

Whether actions are performed without desire for their fruit in absolute terms or whether they are performed in the name of the Lord being offered to him together with their fruit, they are to be performed with full understanding. He asks Arjuna to take refuge in knowledge—बुद्धौ शरणमन्विच्छ[3]. An action done without understanding, according to him, is inferior to that done with it--दूरेण ह्यवरं कर्म बुद्धयोगात्.[4] An understanding person casts off good and evil in this very life : बुद्धियुक्तो जहातीह उभे सुकृतदुष्कृते.[5] The *Karmayoga* here imperceptibly glides into the *Jñānayoga*.

The term yoga has been defined by the Lord in two ways. समत्वं योग उच्यते[6], equanimity is yoga and 'योगः कर्मसु कौशलम्'—Yoga is proficiency in actions. The two

1. *Ibid.* IX. 27.
2. *Ibid.* XII. 6, 7.
3. *Ibid.* II.49.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.* II.50.
6. *Ibid.*

definitions give the feeling that two different, unrelated things are being said here. That actually is not so. An intelligent person, *buddhiyuktaḥ* has the wisdom to analyse the world. He sees it full of miseries, even the pleasures which appear agreeable in the beginning turn out to be unpleasant in the end. There is nothing permanent in the world, everything is temporary and fleeting. The good and pleasant must be followed, as a rule, by the bad and the unpleasant, as much as a day is followed by night. The inevitable pairs of opposites; the *Dvandva*-s are the root cause of suffering. The best way to overcome it is to develop equanimity of mind—*Samatva*. The mind then will not be influenced by them. But this is not hardening the heart or developing callousness which are individualized self defences and lack of understanding of the reality. In the Yoga of action there is complete and total dedication to work; there is no shunning the work and its results, pleasant and unpleasant. One takes to the Yoga of action of purity, the senses and the mind with the firm *understanding*, *jñāna*, that the Ātman is free and unaffected by the external world and that the confusing factors are the sense organs and their objects. The purification of the mind cannot be brought about by only sitting aloof. It can be done by skilful performance of one's duty forsaking the ego, doership; enjoyment of fruits of action is *yoga* of action—*Karmayoga* in its conjuction with *Jñānayoga*.

While referring to the *Jñāna* above it has been said that it means the understanding that the Ātman is completely unaffected by what goes on around. It is here that the *Jñānayoga* imperceptibly glides into the *Sāṃkhya Yoga*. The Ātman is eternal, omnipresent, permanent, immovable and everlasting :

नित्यः सर्वगतः स्थाणुरचलोऽयं सनातनः ।[1]

It is the body which perishes and not the soul which is unmanifest, unimaginable and immutable. What really it is, is difficult to say. There is nothing tangible with which it can be compared. The Upaniṣads rightly, therefore, describe it, नेति, नेति not this, not this; people look at it as wonder so they speak and hear of it as wonder. They know not what it is. While performing an action one should have the understanding that it is one's body and the senses that would be engaged in it and not the soul whose effulgent light is discerned after piercing through the hard shell of ego that envelopes wisdom by dispassion, *asaṅga*, *karma-phala-tyāga*, *buddhi* and discrimination. But before this can be attempted a strict control over the mind and the senses is an absolute necessity. And here comes the *Aṣṭāṅga Yoga* that helps one exercize self-control. The Lord knows that the mind is fickle, strong, impetuous wayward :

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1. *Ibid.* II.24.

चञ्चलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद्दृढम् ।[1]

If that is the state of mind, the state of the senses can well be imagined. The mind is compared to a charioteer and the senses to the horses. If the charioteer is out of control the horses are bound to go astray, particularly when the horses are wayward—इद्रियाणि प्रमाथीनि. The mind has first to be put under control which can be done by means of practice and non-attachment.

अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च गृह्यते ।[2]

The senses then are to be put under restraint—तानि सर्वाणि संयम्य.[3] One has to elevate oneself to the state of स्थितप्रज्ञ, unperturbed in sorrow with no craving for pleasures, with all attachment, fear and anger gone, remaining blissful in Ātman—आत्मन्येवात्मना तुष्टः[4] and still doing his duties skilfully, the skill being in doing them without any desire for their fruit and with the full understanding that the soul will remain unaffected by them.

Freedom from attachment and absence of egotism is the hallmark of realized souls. It is not the freedom obtained by shunning the world and remaining in seclusion or the freedom to do things at will in which one is bound to feel the individuality and build the ego. It is living in the world, unaffected by it and destroying the ego. When the ego is completely erased the individual emrges with the universal. There remains no distinction between the self and the non-self, myriads of names and forms merge into the non-dual Brahman. This is the supreme state, free from duality and the delusion born of it. Fixed in that state even at the end, the time of death, one attains the bliss of Brahman :

एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः पार्थ नैनां प्राप्य विमुह्यति ।
स्थित्वास्यामन्तकालेऽपि ब्रह्मनिर्वाणमृच्छति ॥[5]

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1. *Ibid.* VI.34.
2. *Ibid.* VI.35.
3. *Ibid.* II.61.
4. *Ibid.* II.55.
5. *Ibsd.* II.72.

MEMBERS OF AN INDIAN SYLLOGISM

Anant Lal Thakur

EARLIER PHASE

Syllogistic reasoning has been utilised by almost all the philosophical schools in India. But it is the central topic in the system of Akṣapāda Gautama. The arrangement of categories in the *Nyāya Śāstra* attests this. Of the eleven *prakarṇa*-s in the first chapter of the *Nyāyadarśana*, that on *Nyāya* is the sixth. The five preceding it form its background and those succeeding, are the subsidiary topics. Etymologically, '*Nyāya*' means an argument that leads one to the establishment of intended meaning (नीयते प्राप्यते विवक्षितार्थसिद्धिरनेनेति न्याय:). It is a composite sentence meant to prove some truth and compound of five components each of which is called an *avayava* (member)—साधनीयस्यार्थस्य यावति शब्दसमूहे सिद्धि: परिसमाप्यते तस्य पञ्चावयवा: प्रतिज्ञादय: समूहमपेक्ष्यावयवा उच्यन्ते[1]. These components have been counted in प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवा: ।[2] Among these the *pratijñā*—statement of the thesis, specially presents the probandum. The *hetu*—probans states the cause of the establishment of the probandum through similarity or dissimilarity of the subject with the instance[3]. The *udāharaṇa*—exemplification presents the instance similar or dissimilar to the subject either possessing its characteristics or being opposite to it in nature[4]. An *upanaya*—application charactrises the subject as similar to or dissimilar to the 'instance' according to the nature of the same in either case.[5] The *nigamana* or conclusion is the re-statement of the thesis prefixed by the statement of

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1. *Nyāyabhāṣya* I.i.1.
2. *Nyāyasūtra* I.i.32.
3. *Ibid.* I.i.34-35.
4. *Ibid.* I.i.36-7.
5. *Ibid.* I.i.38.

the probans[1]. Each of these components is also called a *vākya* proposition. Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* has given examples of each of these *avayava*-s.

1. Sound is non- eternal (*Pratijñā*).
2. Because it has the character of being produced (*Hetu*).
3. Objects like the cooking-pot having the characteristic of being produced are non-eternal (*Udāharaṇa*).
4. Similarly sound also possesses the same characteristic (*upanaya*).
5. Therefore, sound is non-eternal because it has the characteristic of being produced (*Nigamana*).

In the case of dissimilar probans Nos. 3 and 4 only differ as follows :

3. Obejects like the self, not having the characteristic of being produced are found to be eternal (*Udāharaṇa*).
4. But sound does not possess the characteristic of being not-produced (*Upanaya*)

Vātsyāyana has shown that Gautama first counts the categories, then defines them along with their sub-divisions, if any and lastly examines these definitions in order to prove the suitability of the definitions thus presented. But in the case of the *avayava*-s, which together form the *nyāyavākya*, examination is wanting. Vātsyāyana, however, has supplied the lacuna. But it is difficult to distinguish his own contribution here from what he inherited from his predecessors in the school other than the Sūtrakāra himself.

In his exposition on *Nyāyaśāstrā*[2], Vatsyāyana shows that a *Nyāya* is the examination of an entity with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge— प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं न्यायः । He further remarks that the *Nyāyavākya* is the sum total of its five components each of which is called an *avayava* keeping its relation with the compound in view and making distinct contributions towards the ascertainment of truth regarding the entity in question. Besides this, each of the first four components arises from a distinct means of valid knowledge. Thus the *pratijñā* is the contribution of verbal testimony (*śabdapramāṇa*). The *hetu* proceeds from inference (*anumāna*°). The *udāharaṇa* comes from perception (*pratyakṣa*°). And lastly *upanaya* is the outcome of analogy (*upamāna*°). The fifth *avayava* i. e. *nigamana,* is a cementing force to help the four to unite into a single whole in order to present a complete judgement. Vātsyāyana further shows that these members are interdependent. In case the *pratijñā* is left out, the other members lose

1. *Ibid.* I.i.39.
2. *Ibid.* I.i.1.

their basis and become useless. If the *hetu* is left, the *pratijñā* loses its suppport, and the *udāharaṇa* and the *nigamana* suffer in conforming to their definitions as given in the *Nyāyasūtra*-s. If the *udāharaṇa* is wanting, the relation between the probandum and the probans vanishes and the *upanaya* also loses its ground. Without the *upanaya* the *hetu* cannot establish the *sādhyadharma* (the intended characteristic of the subject) as it remains uncertain in the subject. The *nigamana* is also of great importance as without it, the mutually unrelated members cannot unite to establish a single truth.

Vātsyāyana then proceeds to show the purpose served by the respective members of the *Nyāyavākya*. The ascertainment of a relation with the characteristic intended to be established with regard to the subject in the purpose served by the *pratijñā*°. The *hetuvākya* shows the capacity of the *hetu*, similar or dissimilar to the 'instance' to establish the relation between the *pakṣa* and the *sādhya*. The *udāharaṇa* establishes the power of one characteristic to prove another residing in the same substratum. In the *upanaya*, the characteristic intended to prove is shown to co-exist in the same substratum with that to be proved. And lastly, the *nigamana* shows that when the two characteristics present in the *udāharaṇa* are accepted as the 'proof' and 'that to be proved' no contrary or contradictory case can ever present itself.

The *Nyāya* with the five components has been referred to in the *Mahābhārata*, where Nārada is praised as possessing the correct knowledge about the *nyāya* syllogism consisting of five propositions[1]. The *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa* also mentions the five members. Again the *Carakasaṃhitā*, *Vimānasthāna*[2] also counts, defines and illustrates the five members.

Vātsyāyana earlier refers to the views of some more ancient logicians who accepted five additional members of a *nyāyavākya*. These members are *jijñāsā* (enquiry), *saṃśaya* (doubt), *śakyaprāpti* (apprehension of the potency of the *pramāṇa*-s to reveal the nature of *prameya*-s), *prayojana* (incentive) and *saṃśaya-vyudāsa* (dispelling the doubt). Vātsyāyana does not deny their remote and casual contribution to a debate. But according to him they are not indispensible factors of a *nyāyavākya* proving a thesis. These are psychological in character and are not concerned with proof which is the province of logic. It may be mentioned here that the *yuktidipikā* (an anonymous commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa) also mentions these ten *avayava*-s and divides them into two classes—the *Vyākhyāṅga*-s and the *parapratipattyaṅga*-s. The first five are to be used when the position of the debator is to be explained to the opponent or to the assembly. The last

1. *Mbh.* II.5.5.
2. III.5.5.

five are used to prove a thesis to others.[1] It may be mentioned in passing here that Kauṭilya accepts Sāṃkhy as a branch of *Ānvīkṣikī vidyā* and that the *Yuktidīpikā*, just in the spirit of a debator, declares that the views of the rival philosophers are as highly brittle to a *Sāṃkhya* tusker, which has *vīta* and *avīta hetu*-s for its tusks and which dwell in the forest known as *pakṣatā*.

It seems that the *Yuktidipikā* here refers to a very old *Nyāya* tradition, even older than Vātsyāyana. It may be added here that *saṃśaya* and *prayojana* are known *Nyāya* categories. *Saṃśayavyudāsa* has been identified with *tarka* by Vācaspati. *Jijñāsā* is a thirst for comprehensive knowledge about something genrally known.[2] It generates craving, aversion or detachment for the thing concerned. Lastly, *Śakyaprāpti* is the capacity of instruments of knowledge to make the knower comprehend the objects of knowledge.[3] Here the last two are general topics of all philosophical enquiries. As such each of these *Vyākhyāṅga*-s are known to every logician. But no attempt to include them or any similar item in the *Nyāya-vākya* was made in the school of Akṣapāda. The inclusion of *nyūna* and *adhika* as *nigrahasthāna*-s clearly attests the fact that Akṣapāda accepted five and only five members of a *Nyāya-vākya*. And those accepting the *Vyākhyāṅga*-s also as members of the same must have belonged to a separate *Nyāya* school. We learn from the *Mahābhārata* that there were several *Nyāya* treatises propounded by different schools of logicians.[4]

Bhadrabāhu in his *Daśavaikālikaniryuktigāthā* has presented two sets of *avayava*-s. In the first, he adds *pratijñāviśuddhi*, *hetuviśuddhi*, *udāharaṇaviśuddhi*, *upanayaviśuddhi* and *nigamanaviśuddhi* to the accepted five *avayava*-s. In his second set, we get *pratijñā*, *pratijñāvibhakti*, *hetu*, *hetuvibhakti*, *vipakṣa*, *Vipakṣapratiṣedha*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *āśaṅkā*, *āsaṅkāpratiṣedha* and *nigamana*. The enumeration of Bhadrabāhu has hardly any logical basis and seems to exert very little influence on later philosophical literature.

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1. Cf. यदा वीतो हेतुः स्वबुद्धाववहितविज्ञानस्वरूपं विज्ञानान्तरमादधानेन वक्त्रा प्रतिपाद्यादौ वाक्यभावमुपनीयते, वाक्यमन्तरेणार्थस्य बुद्ध्यन्तरे संक्रामयितुमशक्यत्वात्, तदा अवयविवाक्यं परिकल्प्यते । तस्य पुनरवयवाः जिज्ञासासंशयप्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्तिसंशयव्युदासलक्षणाश्च व्याख्याङ्गम् । प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तोपसंहारनिगमनानि परप्रतिपादनाङ्गमिति ॥ *Yuktidipikā*, Cal. p. 47.
2. अप्रतीयमानेऽर्थे प्रत्ययार्थस्थ प्रवर्त्तिका जिज्ञासा *N. Bh.*
3. प्रमातुः प्रमाणानि प्रमेयाधिगमार्थानि सा शक्यप्राप्तिः ।
4. Cf. न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस्तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः *Mbh.* XII.210.22.

After Vātsyāyana, the history of syllogistic reasoning took a new turn. A *Nyāyavākya* no longer was recognised as the cumulative effect of the four *pramāṇa*-s. Rather it came to be identified with a variety of *anumāna*. Again the fixed member of five *avayava*-s also was seriously questioned. These questions may be discussed here.

Among the critics of the *Nyāya* view, Dharmakīrti and Arcaṭa are most vocal. The former, in his *Hetubindu* says that the *pratijñā* need not be accepted, as the *parārthānumāna* is a verbal reproduction of a *svārthānumāna* and there is no *pratijñā* in the latter. On seeing smoke issuing out of a particular spot one remembers that it is pervaded by fire and on the strength of this rememberance, comes to know about the presence of fire on the spot. This is in effect the import of the *pratijñā*. But one does not oneself know this meaning prior to the appearance of the *pramāṇa*. In case such a knowledge is accepted, the use of *hetu* becomes useless. Thus after accepting on no ground the existence of fire, the subsequent search for a *hetu* is a queer way of cognition of things. Such an assertion on the part of the opponent falls to the ground as it is quite useless. An entity is accepted as such when it is not contradicted. The Naiyāyika in the case of *svārthānumāna* understands the subject-matter of the *pratijñā* without its presentation but demands a *pratijñā* in the *parārthānumāna*. This is just like the beggar's demand of high *dakṣiṇā* if and when reverentially invited on a festival day. Thus Dharmakīrti rejects the use of a *pratijñāvākya* along with *upanaya*° and *nigamanavākya*-s and advises the Naiyāyika to give up vanity, shut down his eyes and consider if the syllogism can be complete with a less number of propositions.[1]

Here one doubt lingers. The *Nyāyavākya* of Akṣapāda and Vatsyāyana is explicitly of the *parārtha* variety. We do not know the acceptance of the *svārthānumāna* variety in the early stage of development of the *Śāstra*. Now to refute an ancient author with reference to a newly introduced item requires justification. Or, the critic should have proved that Vātsyāyana's logic remains lame without *svarthānumāna*. Actually, *svarthānumāna* is a psychological process having nothing to do with reasoning or proof with which logic is concerned.

Arcaṭa in his *Hetubinduṭikāloka* assails the *pramāṇasamavāya* theory of Vātsyāyana. आगम: प्रतिज्ञा is not acceptable to him. The proposition either means that the *pratijñā*, which is but the opinion of the opponent, is identical with *āgama* or that the sense of the *pratijñā* is derived from the *āgama*. In the first case, the very *pratijñā* is strong enough to establish the *sādhya* and *hetu* etc. becomes redundant. While in the second case only some *pratijñā*-s might be derived from the Vedas, but a greater number propounding secular

1. *Hetubindu* pp. 55f.

truths will have to be rejected. Take for instance, the proposition पर्वतो वह्निमान् (There is fire on the hill). It can not be accepted as a *pratijñā* as it has no connection with the Vedic lore.

Arcaṭa here either misunderstood or misrepresented the *Nyāya* view. The term '*āgama*' here means '*Śabda*', the assertion of a reliable person (*āptavacana*) and not the arbitrary assertion of any body and every body. The *Sūtra* concerned reads as आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः[1] where the component *āpta* has been defined as आप्तः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य चिख्यापयिषया प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा। A discussion requires a basis. This basis is supplied by *āgama* or *āptavacana*. It remains an article of faith with the proponent so long as it is not duly proved. But when proved it becomes a scientific truth to both the proponent as well as the opponent. The *pratijñā* thus resembles a geometrical theorem requiring proof.

Against Vātsyāyana's second proposition हेतुरनुमानम्, Arcaṭa says that what you call a *hetu* is not a *hetu* at all. Because you show its existence in the *pakṣa* while a true *hetu* requires two more characteristics i.e. presence in a co-subject and absence in a counter-subject. In reply, a follower of Vātsyāyana would say that according to neo-logicians not only the three characteristics of the *hetu* but five including *abādhitatva* and *asatpratipakṣitatva* are present in every correct *Nyāya-vākya*.

Again Arcaṭa objects against Vātsyāyana's assertion दृष्टान्तः प्रत्यक्षम्। He says दृष्टान्तोऽपि न सर्वः प्रत्यक्षः which means that all the *dṛṣṭānta*-s are not perceptible. But he has forgotten to adduce an appropriate instance. We, on our part, take *dṛṣṭa* in the sense of *jñāta* on the basis of लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः। In this connection, we may refer to the general objection that the knowledge of only one instance on the part of the proponent and opponent is not a sure ground of inference. The inference actually depends on *Vyāptitjñāna* resulting from repeated observation and enquiry and the instance only reminds this universal relation. On the other hand, an instance once accepted as such by the unbeliever, will force him to swallow many a bitter pill. Again, if he rejects the instance altogether, he will have no other instrument to refute his opponent. Vātsyāyana, however, warns us against hasty selection and random use of the *dṛṣṭānta* and *hetu*.[2]

Against Vātsyāyana's assertion that the *Upanaya* is to be connected with *Upamāna* (उपमानमुपनयः), Arcaṭa's objection is that *Upamāna* is not a source of valid knowledge

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1. I.i.7.
2. Cf. तदिदं हेतूदाहरणयोः सामर्थ्यं परमसूक्ष्मं दुःखबोधं पण्डितरूपवेदनीयम् *N.bh.* I.i.37.

(उपमानं प्रमाणमेव न भवति). This is, however, a matter of opinion. And a Naiyāyika who accepts the validity of *upamāna* on proper grounds would not reject it just for an assertion of his rival.

Lastly, Arcaṭa rejects *nigamana* as a member of a *Nyāya-vākya*. He says यत्र च प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रथमत एव प्रयोगो नेष्यते, तत्र तस्याः पुनर्वचनं कुतो निगमनं भविष्यति ? When the *pratijñā* itself stands rejected, its repetition is beyond one's comprehension.

This again does not look like a refutation. It gives the view of the Buddhist and no justification for it is forthcoming.[1]

Arcaṭa's is the only criticism against the *pramaṇa-samplava* theory in the known Buddhist literature on logic. It is so weak that it cannot be held responsible for the rejection of the above-mentioned theory along with some members of a syllogism. In our view the progressive and unrestricted use of the Nyāya syllogism among the different philosophical schools is responsible for the changes. The differences in views with regard to the number of *pramāṇa*-s and the characteristics of a *hetu* and non-acceptance of *nigrahasthāna*-s like *nyūna*, *adhika* and *aprāptakāla* also played their parts in bringing about the various changes which we propose to discuss separately.

1. Vide *Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. 72.